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Abstract
The dissertation is divided into two parts of equal length. The first part
provides a chronological survey of the development of the NSDAP during the
Weimar era. The framework of the investigation covers the slow spread of
the movement in the 1920s, the breakthrough of the NSDAP between 1929
and 1930, its subsequent development as mass party and the Nazis' seizure of
power in March 1933. Central aspects of the discussion are the origins of the
Nazi activists, their unifying experiences, the development of the NSDAP's
organisation, strategy and propaganda, its special features and limitations,
the Nazis' relation with other groups in society, and finally, sociological,
political and economic features of Saxon society.
The second part of the dissertation consists of three equally long thematic
chapters which look at the rise of the Saxon NSDAP from different angles.
All chapters deal with the divisions, contradictions and problems which
Saxon society was facing because of the process of modernization and how
this produced opportunities and limits for the Nazis. The discussion about the
rise of the Nazis in the working-class milieu of Saxony shows how the
NSDAP's ability to attract working-class support depended on how
successfully the SPD and KPD warded off Nazi infiltration in their traditional
constituencies. The chapter about the rise of the Nazis in the nationalist
milieu investigates the nationalist and right-wing bourgeois culture - i.e. its
clubs, organisations, celebrations, press and parties - its relationship with
the Nazi movement, and its increasing shift towards the right in the final
years of the Republic. Lastly, the chapter about the economic crisis and the
effects of the Nazis' propaganda machine in the Saxon district of
Schwarzenberg - a Nazi stronghold - exemplifies the importance of
propaganda for the NSDAP's electoral success and looks at the importance of
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(i) Current research and the main concerns of this dissertation
The amount of literature on the Welmar Republic - especially Its
final years - Is mountainous. Generations of histori ins have tried to
explain how the collapse of the Republic and Hitler's rise to power
was possible.' This dissertation investigates the rise of the Nazi
Party in Saxony between 1921 and 1933. "Another local study
about the NSDAP?", one might wearily ask, after enormous
quantities of similar studies seem to have established how the
Nazis managed to become a mass movement in nearly every region,
town and even tiny village in Germany. 2
 However, there are
several important reasons for this project.
First, as a recent conference about the Nazi Party at the local level
showed: "Our knowledge about the NSDAP at the local level is still
very limited ... there is a need for a new approach in the field. Most
traditional studies concentrated too much on the NSDAP while they
neglected the society in which the Nazis were able to thrive, i.e.
they included too little social history." 3
 This study looks at both, the
1 See especially K. D. Bracher, Die Auflosung der Weimarer Repubiik (1984,
fünfte Auflage, zweiter Nachdruck, Düsseldorf); E. Koib, The Weimar
Republic (London, 1988); D. J. K. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik.
Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne (Frankfurt, 1987); H. Mommsen, Die
Verpielte Freiheit. Der Weg der Republik von Weimar in den Untergang 1918
bis 1933 (Frankfurt, Berlin, 1990); H. A. Winkler, Weima.r 1918-1933. Die
Geschichre der ersten deutschen Demokratie (München, 1993).
2 The best ones are J. Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony 1921-1933
(London, 1971); W. S. Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power (2nd ed., London,
1984); G. Pridham, Hitler's Rise to Power. The Nazi Movement in Bavaria
(London, 1973).
3 C.-C. W. Szejnmann, 'Conference Report. Nationalsozialismus und Region.
An International Symposium organized by the Institut für Bayerische
Geschichte and the Institut für Zeitgeschichte from 26 to 28 October 1993 in
the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich', German Histoiy, 12 (3) (1994), p.
398. Recent admirable exceptions are K. Tenfelde, Proletarische Provinz.
Radikalisierung und Widerstand in Penzberg/Oberbayern 1900-1945
(Munchen, 1982); R. Koshar, Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism. Marburg,
1880-1935 (Chapel Hill, London, 1986); C. Rauh-KUhne, Katholisches Milieu
und Kleinstadtgesellschaft. Ettlingen 1918-1939 (Sigmaringen, 1991).
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local Nazi movement and Saxon society, in order to explain the rise
of the Nazi Party In the state.
Furthermore, little research has been conducted on the Nazi Party
in Saxony. There exists only two publications about the NSDAP in
Saxony between 1919 and 1945. The former East German
historians Werner Bramke covers in less than twelve pages 'Saxony
under the fascist dictatorship between 1933 until 1939', and Josef
Reinhold investigates in eight pages the role the local Nazis played
in the elections to the agricultural chamber in Saxony in 1931g.
Two diploma works cover additional ground. 6 This is unsatisfactory
as Saxony was not only the Nazi Gau with by far the highest
population and most NSDAP members of all Gaue, but also one of
the earliest strongholds of the movement and crucial for the rise of
the party on the Reich level in 1930. Additionally, the south-
western part of the state remained one of the greatest NSDAP
bastions until the Nazi 'seizure of power'.
As Marxist historians largely omitted the phenomenon of National
Socialism, hardly any local studies exist about this aspect in the
region that was formerly East Germany. 7
 More generally, little
4 W. Bramke, 'Vom Freistaat zum Gau. Sachsen unter der faschistischen
Diktatur 1933 bis 1939', Ze.itschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 31 (1983), pp.
1067-1078.
5 J. Reinhold, 'Die NSDAP und die Wahi zur Landwirtschaftskammer 1931 im
Freistaat Sachsen', Geschichte und Gegenwart, 9 (3) (1990), pp. 188-196.
6 H. Stoschek, 'Die Entwicklung der militaristisch-faschistischen Bewegung
in Sachsen in den Jahren 1919 bis 1925 unter besonderer Berucksichtigung
der NSDAP' (Diplomarbeit Potsdam, 1967); T. Mal, 'Der faschistische
sachsische Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann, die Entwicklung des Gaues
Sachsen und der NSDAP' (Diplomarbeit Jena, 1984). Both works were written
from a dogmatic Marxist viewpoint.7 J. H. Grill, 'Local and Regional Studies on National Socialism: A Review',
Journal of Contemporaly History, 21 (2) (1986), p. 264. Recently, however,
see K. Urbschat 'Mecklenburg-Schwerin in den letzten Jahren der Weimarer
Republik', in F. Bajohr (Hrsg.), Norddeutschland im Nationalsozialismus
(Hamburg, 1993), pp. 83-98; U. Schroder 'Zur Entwicklung der Hitlerbewe-
gung in Pommern (1922-1929)', Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und
Ostdeursclilands, 41 (1993), pp. 197-216.
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research of the region exists so far by western historians 8, who
faced great problems of access to archival sources in the former
GDR9, until the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 made
unrestricted research possible.
Lastly, no decent general surveys or specific accounts of Saxony
exist during the Weimar Republic and especially during the time of
the world economic crisis. 10
 This is unsatisfying as Saxony was an
important state in the Reich and some unique features make It a
particularly interesting province to study. It was the most
industrialised and urbanised province In Germany and was hit
harder by the economic depression than any other region.
A political and economic survey of Saxony at the end of the
introductory chapter gives a background of Saxony's development
during the Weimar era. The dissertation itself is divided into two
parts of equal length. The first part provides a chronological survey
of the development of the NSDAP during the Welmar era. The
framework of the investigation covers the slow spread of the
movement in the 1 920s, the breakthrough of the NSDAP between
1929 and 1930, its subsequent development as mass party and the
Nazis' seizure of power in March 1933. Central aspects of the
discussion are the origins of the Nazi activists, their unifying
experiences, the development of the NSDAP's organisation, strategy
and propaganda, its special features and limitations, the Nazis'
8 Exceptions are D. R. Tracey, 'The Development of the National Sodalist
Party in Thurmgia, 1924-1930', Central European History , 8 (1) (1975), pp.
23-50; and R. Bessel, Political Violence and the rise of Nazism. The Storm
Troopers in Eastern Germany 1925-1934 (New Haven, London, 1984).
9 I. Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship (London, 1985), p. 149.
10 Unfortunately the useful contemporary study by Fabian does not cover
the fmal years of the Republic. See W. Fabian, Klassenkampf urn Sachsen.
Em Stuck Geschichte 1918-1 930 (LObau, 1930).
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relation with other groups in society, and finally, sociological,
political and economic features of Saxon society.
The second part of the dissertation consists of three equally long
thematic chapters which look at the rise of the Saxon NSDAP from
different angles. All chapters deal with the divisions, contradictions
and problems which Saxon society was facing because of the
process of modernization and how this produced opportunities and
constraints for the Nazis.
The first two chapters about the 'working-class t
 milieu and
'nationalist' milieu of Saxony embark on a new approach in trying
to understand the course of recent German history. Since the mid
1980s a group of historians have concentrated on looking at the
extreme division of German society Into different groups, classes,
surroundings, and traditions. 1 ' They put emphasis on the divisions
in German society in trying to explain the collapse of democracy
and the rise of the Nazis in Weimar Germany. Economic problems,
strains due to a process of modernization and tensions of
Identification, intensified these divisions during the 1 920s. When
the Great Depression was showing its disastrous effects, there
developed a great desire among large segments of the population to
finally overcome these divisions and to form a unified nation which
was able to overcome the massive problems, In finding a way out
and creating a new beginning. The Nazis offered this vision.12
11 See especially D. Lehnert and K. Mengerle (Hrsg.), Politische ldentitlt und
nationale Gedenktage. Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik
(Opladen, 1989); ibid., Politische Teilkulturen zwischen Integration und
Polarisierung. Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik (Opladen,
1990); KUhne, Ertlingen; see also W. L Guttsman, Workers' Culture in Weiznar
Germany. Between Tradition and Commitment (Oxford, 1990); L. E. Jones and
J. Retallack (eds.), Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern
Germany. New Perspectives (Washington, 1992).
12 Lebnert/Mengerle, Gedenktage, pp. 9-22.
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The two chapters investIgate the socialist/democratic and
nationalist/authoritarian milieus which were facing each other with
increasing bitterness and hatred. The discussion about the rise of
the Nazis in the working-class milieu of Saxony looks at the
NSDAP's ability to become a mass party in an area with an
exceptionally large Industrial working-class. The chapter about the
rise of the Nazis in the nationalist milieu investigates the
nationalist and right-wing bourgeois culture - I.e. its clubs,
organisatlons, celebrations, press and parties - its relationship with
the Nazi movement, and its increasing shift to the right in the final
years of the Republic.
Finally, the last chapter looks at the role of the economic crisis and
Nazi propaganda In the rise of the Saxon Nazi movement. There are
still enormous gaps in our knowledge about Nazi propaganda and
its significance for explaining Nazi success at the polling stations.
Although the Great Depression from the late 1920s onwards had
probably the greatest negative impact of all those problems facing
German citizens at the time, no local survey on the Nazi Party looks
at this aspect in any depth. Saxony provides the perfect
requirements for such an Investigation as it was hit harder by the
world economic depression than any other region in Germany.
Throughout this investigation we draw comparisons with the
simultaneous development of Nazi movements in other regions in
Germany; this is done to understand both the similarities and the
peculiarities of the Nazi movement in Saxony with other areas. Was
it more 'left' or 'socialist' in its appeal and practice than elsewhere?
How did the Nazis adapt to the background of a traditional
working-class milieu? What were the distinctive features of Saxon
16
Nazis? To what extent did their background, ideas and methods
compare against their party colleagues in other regions?
(u) Political survey of Saxony during the Weimar Republic
Located in the middle-eastern corner of Germany, Saxony was the
fifth largest German province. Its landscape is flat and plain in the
north, and hilly with some deep valleys in the south, where it
borders Czechoslovakia. Its capital Dresden, with 619,157
Inhabitants, was the seat of parliament and administration. The
other sizeable cities included Leipzig, the largest with 679,159
inhabitants, Chemnitz (333,851), Plauen (111,436), Zwickau
(80,358), and Bautzen (40,335). Saxony was divided into five
administrative regions, the Kreisha up tmannschaften (KH) 13 (see
the map in Appendix 1). Each KH itself was further divided into
smaller units: twenty-eight Amtshauptmannschaften (AH) and
twenty-one free towns. The creation of the federal Weimar
Republic and Saxony's constitution in November 1920 ensured the
status of Freistaat (free state) with powers over police, education,
religion and internal administration.'4
Saxony underwent a similarly uneasy political development as the
rest of the Republic. First, there was the dominance of the Social
Democrats, the introduction of reforms, and the hope of many for a
better future. However, disappointment with the realities of the
new Republic quickly set in, the resurgence of the right took place,
and reforms were replaced with more conservative legislation. And
13 KH Bautzen (461,115 inhabitants), KH Chemnitz (976,079), KB Dresden
(1,393,026), KB Leipzig (1,307,312), XII Zwickau (854,784). The KHs Dresden
and Bautzen merged to one KB at the end of the Weimar era.
14 The Republic kept the powers over foreign affairs, jurisprudence, post,
finances and the military.
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finally, the conjuncture of many crises from the late 1920 onwards
led to an ever increasing polarization of the political parties and to
a political stalemate, which crippled the work of the state
parliament. The rapid rise of the local Nazis, who seemed to
promise an alternative to the seemingly exhausted political system,
took place against this background. However, in the political as well
as economic sphere, Saxony's difficulties seemed more extreme and
critical in many respects than on the national level.
The most typical feature of Saxony politically during the Weimar
Republic was the strong tensions between the organised working-
class movement on the left and the bourgeois-conservative groups
on the right. The polarization was enhanced by the lack of a
moderating middle in the political spectrum. The Centre Party,
which played such a decisive role in the political middle in other
provincial parliaments, was only a negligible force in Saxon
politics.'5
It is possible to divide the political development in Saxony into
three distinct phases during the Weimar Republic. The first was
dominated by the SPD and lasted from the end of 1918 until
October 1923. After the SPD lost its absolute majority in the state
parliament in November 1920, Its minority government was
tolerated by the KPD until the end of 1923. This enabled the SPD to
introduce a major programme of progressive social and legislative
reform,16
 which caused enormous resentment amongst those on the
15 The Centre Party was only able to win one single seat in the state
parliament during the Weimar Republic (November 1920). The main reason
for this was, that only 3.6 per cent of the Saxon's were Catholic and 90 per
cent of the population were Protestants (StJbSa, (1924/1926), pp. 48-49).
16 There were the introduction of the eight-hour working day and
unemployment benefit, and the passing of a written constitution. Important
reforms took place in the municipal code, education, abortion, and an
18
middle and right. Additionally, the left wing of the SPD gained
more and more Influence In the cabinet during these years. 17 Erich
Zelgner, a left-wing Social Democrat, became Prime Minister in
April 1923, and between the 10 and 29 October the KPD joined a
coalition government with the SPD. This coalition abruptly came to
an end when the Reichswehr followed orders from Berlin and
removed the government from office on 29 October 1923.18
The second phase was dominated by coalition governments
stretching from right-wing Social Democrats to members of the
DVP, and at the end also the DNVP. From early 1924 until mid-
1930, the governments in Dresden Increasingly drifted to the right
and replaced most reforms which had been introduced by the SPD
piece by piece with conservative legislation. Although the parties
on the left - SPD and KPD - together never received less than 46.6
per cent of the vote in the three provincial elections after 1922,
they were not Involved in the decision-making process in Dresden
until the end of the Weimar era. Moreover, after the SPD-KPD
coalition government had been brought to collapse by force in
November 1923, an Increasingly hostile relationship developed
between both Marxist parties.
The third phase saw the breakdown of effective parliamentary
government in Saxony. The polarization of the parliament had
created a deadlock between left and right and parliamentary and
attempt was made to democratise the civil service and to encourage a more
progressive looking judiciary (Fabian, Klassenkampf, chaps. 4-6).
17 Saxony was the greatest stronghold of the USPD. After the USPD re-
merged with the SPD In September 1922, Saxony became the most important
centre of the left-wing within the party.
18 For the Reichsexekution against Saxony see D. B. Pryce, 'The Reich
Government versus Saxony, 1923: The Decision to Intervene', Central
European History, 10 (2) (1977), pp. 112-147; H. A. Winkler, Von der
Revolution zur Stabilisierung. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der
WeimarerRepublik 1918 bis 1924 (Berlin/Bonn, 1985), pp. 655-660, 665-669.
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anti-parliamentary parties, with none of the groups able to push
through their ideas. Out of this stalemate emerged a 'neutral
cabinet' of civil servants (Beam tenkabinett) and lasted from May
1930 until March 1933.
The NSDAP participated for the first time in provincial elections in
Saxony in October 1926. Heilmuth von Mücke and Fritz Tittmann
gained parliamentary seats for the Nazis. Both handed in white
ballot papers and made possible the re-election of Max Heldt as
Prime Minister by all the bourgeois parties on 11 January 1927.
Minutes after the election of Heldt, however, Tittmann already
made clear that their future support for Heldt was dependent "on
the attitude and actions of the new government." 19
 Furthermore,
MUcke attacked Heldt's government statement nine days later and
summarized it as a "compilation of empty phrases, from which one
can only conclude that decisive steps for the Volk are not going to
be taken." 20
 However, both Nazis were not prepared to join a SPD-
KPD motion of no-confidence. 2 ' This was the pattern of most of the
Nazi activities in and outside Saxony's parliament. Verbally, they
vehemently attacked the existing government In Dresden. In
practice, however, between late 1926 and early 1930 the Saxon
Nazis did little to obstruct the government with concrete
parliamentary action and directed most of their attacks against the
Marxist parties.
19 Verhandlungen des Sächsischen Landtages (VdSL), 3. Wahiperiode (Wp),
7. Sitzung, 11.1.1927, P. 143. It is not true, that the Nazis voted for Heldt (see
Autorenkollektiv (W. Bramke and K. Kinner and H. Arndt and H.-J.
Friederici), In der Revolution geboren. In den Klassenkampfen bewährt.
Geschich te der KPD-Bezirksorganisa don Leipzig-Westsachsen (Leipzig,
1986), p. 161).
2O¼5j., 3. Wp, 9. Sitzung, 20.1.1927, p. 169.
21 Ibid. On April 1928 and 19 February 1929 the two NSDAP members of
Parliament also voted against a vote of no-confidence (VdSL, 3. Wp, 76.
Sitzung, 19.4.1928, pp. 2736-2737; and ibid., 106. Sitzung, 19.2.1929, p. 3955).
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The limited influence the Nazis were able to exert after the 1926
elections was transformed to a decisive one after the May 1929
state elections, when the NSDAP won five mandates and held the
key position in Saxony's parliament by tolerating a DY!', DNVP, WP
and ASPD cabinet under Wilhelm BUnger. For the first time since
1920 the bourgeois parties held a majority again. The Nazis were
quick to exploit their position. They put increasing pressure on the
new government and constantly threatened to bring it down when
their demands were not met. In summer 1930, the Nazis thoughts,
the time was ripe. They had been able to expand their support
noticeably from mid-1929 onwards and were eager to translate the
progress of the movement into more parliamentary seats. On 20
May 1930, they supported one of the many motions of no-
confidence of the Marxist parties - this time it came from the SPD -
and helped bring down the government.
The calculation paid off. The Nazis achieved their greatest electoral
breakthrough in an important German province by scoring 14.4 per
cent of the vote in the state elections in Saxony In June 1930. The
Munich headquarters had concentrated its efforts for several
months on Saxony. The complete Nazi leadership had participated
in an enormous election campaign to achieve this success. However,
the Nazi strategy to create a central German block of National
Socialist domination together with neighbouring Thuringia, where
Wilhelm Frick had become Minister of the Interior in January
1930, did not pay off. The Nazis failed to obtain the post of the
Minister of the Interior. All their attempts at negotiating the post
for Gregor Strasser failed due to the resistance of the DDP and VNR.
As no successor to Wilhelm Schieck, a member of the DVP, was
found after the elections (he had become Prime Minister twelve
21
days before the government had been brought down in May), his
'cabinet of 'civil servants' continued to govern Saxony until Its
dissolution by the Nazis in March 1933.
Earlier and more openly than in most regions in Germany, genuine
parliamentary democracy came to an end in Saxony in mid 1930.
Due to fear of more NSDAP gains, the Saxon Social Democrats were
keen on avoiding new state elections. Like their party colleagues at
the Reich level, they tolerated a bourgeois government from mid-
1930 onwards to prevent the NSDAP from getting into government.
Henceforth, all parliamentary attempts by the Saxon NSDAP and
KPD to bring about the fall of the government and provoke new
elections were unsuccessful.
(iii) Economic survey of Saxony
Saxony was by far the most densely populated German province.22
Its five million people comprised eight per cent of the German
population, although its territory was only 3.2 per cent of the
Weimar Republic. While on average 134.2 people inhabited a
square kilometre in Germany, the figure in Saxony was 333•23 Due
to Its dense population, Saxony was also the most urbanised
province in Germany: 34.9 per cent of the population lived in cities
with more than 100,000 inhabitants and only 23.9 per cent in
communities with less than 2,000 people (the corresponding
figures for the Reich were 26.8 per cent and 35.6 per cent).24
Additionally, in Saxony the difference between urban and rural
22 The economic comparison with the other German provinces ignores the
cities of Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen and Lilbeck. To include them would be
misleading as they have no rural areas.
23 StJbDR (1931).
24 F. Burlthardt, 'Die Sonderstellung Sachsens im Deutschen Reich und die
wirtschafthche Depression der Gegenwart', ZSaStL4, (1931), p. 72.
22
areas was far less pronounced than in Bavaria or Prussia.
Industrial and agricultural regions were often Intermixed and the
typical village In Saxony was the 'ndustrlal village' (Industriedort).
A far larger proportion of the Saxon workforce was employed In
Industry and handicraft than In the Reich, and fewer Saxons were
earning their money In agriculture than on the national level (see
Figure 1 below). If we measure the level of Industrialisatlon by
comparing the percentage of the working population employed in
industry/handicraft and trade/communication to the percentage





























































Source: StJbSa, (1924/1926), Falter, Wahlen, pp. 36-37.
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working In agriculture, Saxony was the most industrialised
province in Weimar Germany.25
It is possible to divide Saxony into three e:onomic regions. 26 The
region in the south-west (Chemnitz/Erzgebirge/Vogtland) was
characterized by Its numerous 'industrial villages'. Chemnitz was
the centre of the textile Industry in Germany, and was home to
mainly small-scale and medium-scale factories. Most of the large-
scale factories in Saxony were In the north-west, centred In Leipzig,
which possessed a versatile industry and one of the biggest
commercial fairs in Europe. Near Leipzig were many 'industrial
villages', as well as large lignite fields in the region of Borna and
BOhlen. The third industrial region centred around Dresden and in
the valley of the Elbe. This consisted mainly of the machine, metal
and tobacco industries.
Workers, who comprised 54.0 per cent of the working population in
Saxony (Reich: 45.1 per cent), were clearly over-represented in
contrast to other German provinces. 27
 Additionally, Saxony had a
very high percentage of female industrial workers. 28
 Saxony's
industrial structure was also unique: small and medium scale
industry dominated, large scale industry was comparatively
unimportant. Thirty-six per cent of the employed worked in
25 Burkhardt even regards Saxony as the most industrialised province in the
world (Burkhard, 'Sonderstellung', p. 70).
26 B. Rudiger, 'Der Freistaat in der Weimarer Republik', Sächsische
Heimatblätter, 30 (3) (1984), p. 141.
27 Burkhardt, 'Sonderstellung', p. 74.
28 In Saxony 33.3 per cent of the people employed in industry were female.
In the Reich the figure was only 22 per cent (ibid.). The main reason for
this was the importance of cheap female labour particularly in textile
manufacturing. Nearly 60 per cent of all employed in this sector were
women who received between 64 and 84 per cent of the wage of their male
counterparts (M. Ahmad, 'Zur sozialen Lage der Arbeiter in Sachsen von
1933 bis 1936 und ihre Widerspiegelung in der Presse', (PhD Leipzig, 1988), p.
25).
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companies with less than ten employees (Reich: 31.8), 68.7 per
cent in companies between eleven and 200 employees (Reich:
36.5), and only 8.7 per cent worked In companies w1th more than
1,000 employees (Reich: 12.8).29
Looking at the most important industrial sectors in Saxony, one
notices many old and traditional industries.30 Saxony was not well
represented in the new Industries like the chemical or electrical
Industry. The only exception was the vehicle Industry. The textile
industry was the biggest industrial sector in the province. It
employed 13.9 per cent (419,520) of the whole working population
(3,024,969). 3 ' Saxony was the centre of Germany's textile industry
and employed 34.8 per cent of all Germans in this sector. The other
big local industries were the machine, apparatus, and vehicle
industry (employed 6.2 per cent of the Saxon workforce), clothing
industry (5.5 per cent), building Industry (5.1 per cent), food
industry (4.3 per cent), production of iron and metal goods (3.7 per
cent), and paper and publication Industry (3.7 per cent).
It becomes clear that the consumer goods industry dominated over
the producer goods industry. 32 The main reason for this was
29 K. Schafer, 'Die strukturelle Arbeitslosigkeit in Sachsen, ibr Unifang und
thre Ursachen', Die Gemeinde, (6) (1931), p. 460; D. Petzina and W.
Abeishauser and A. Faust (Hrsg.), Soziaigeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch IlL
Materialien zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 1914-1945 (Munchen, 1978),
p. 64.
30 It is noticeable that the cottage industry was still very widespread,
especially in regions with a strong textile industry. In 1928 there were
91877 people employed in the cottage industry in Saxony (St.JbSa, (1929), pp.
130-131).
31 For this discussion see StJbSa, (1924/26), pp. 11-12; StJbDR, (1929), pp. 19-
22.
32 63 per cent of Saxony's industry belonged to the consumer goods industry
and 39 per cent to the producer goods industry. In Germany both groups
accounted for 50 per cent (P. Branistedt, Die Krisis der schsischen
Industriewirtschaft. VerOffen tlich ung des Verbandes Sächsischer
Industrieller, (67) (1932), p. 12).
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Saxony's scarce endowment of natural resources 33 and the
comparatively small number of big companies with a strong
capital base. Saxony produced mainly manufactured g(ods
(Fertigwaren) and few raw or half-manufactured goods. The
manufactured goods Industries had to Import raw materials and
exported not only to other regions in Germany, but to the whole
world. More than any region in Germany, Saxony depended on
export and the world market. 34
 Typical for Saxony was the great
variety of her products, which was reflected in the dominance of
small-scale and medium-scale Industries.
Saxony never really experienced a long period of economic stability
during the fourteen years of the Republic and after 1929 entered a
crisis more severe than In any other region of Germany.
Particularly harmful for Saxony's economic development proved to
be the great influence of the consumer goods industries and their
dependence on the import of raw materials and the export of
manufactured goods. Other negative aspects included
comparatively high freight costs, the fact that wages in Saxony rose
above the German average between 1913 and 1929, Increased
competition In foreign markets as a result of the First World War36,
and growing economic protectionism In world trade37.
33 Saxony had few natural resources, with the exception of a large lignite
field in the north-west, a little coal field in the south-west, granite in the
south-east, and china-clay around Meilcen and Oschatz.
34 Saxony exported about 40 per cent of all her produced goods in 1931
(Bramstedt, 'Krisis', p. 13). RUdiger estimates that Saxony accounted for about28-30 per cent of all exports from Germany to the USA, and for 60 per cent of
all textile exports (B. Rudiger, 'Freistaat in der Weimarer Republik (1918-
1933)', in K. Czok (Hrsg.), Geschichte Sachsens (Weimar, 1989), p. 449).
35 The employers argued that this destroyed her competitiveness. However,
wages dropped below average again after 1929 (Branistedt, 'Krisis', pp. 30-
40).
36 Unfortunately for Saxony the 'industrialising countries' were catching
up especially in the consumer goods industries. Germany's export of
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The kind of problems industry In the region faced during the
Weimar era revealed a deep-seated structural crisis of the Saxon
economy and made it more susceptible to economic vicissitudes
than most other regions. It took her a long time to overcome the
economic crisis of the first half of the 1920s, its industries
'flourished' favourably only for a short time from 1927 onwards,
and finally, Saxony's economy reacted more dramatically than any
other region when the world economic crisis set in at the end of the
1920s. 38
 Contemporaries nicknamed Saxony "storm-centre of the
trade cycle" ('Wetterwinkel der Konjunktur'). Werner concluded
that Saxony was more sensitive to the trade cycle than any other
Industrial region of Germany 39, and Bramstedt assessed that
Saxony suffered most in the Great Depression40.
The condition of its industries was good In 1927. But Saxony
belonged to those regions in Germany where a slow downturn of
the trade cycle in some sectors of industry from spring 1928
already augured a new recession. The KH Leipzig analysed this
economic development in 1928: "The very good situation of the
economy in 1927 already showed the first signs of a slow decline
at the beginning of 1928, which continued In the industries until
the end of the year." 41 In winter 1928/29 the situation worsened.
consumer goods in comparison to the producer goods decreased continuously
during the Weimar Republic.
37 Saxony managed to make good most of the lost markets in the East by
exporting more to the West after the First World War. This new market,
however, was increasingly closed due to protectionism after 1929 (Bramstedt,
'Krisis', pp. 20-23).
38 Also see K. Werner, Die deutschen Wirrschaftsgebiere in der Krise.
Statistische Studie zur regional vergleichenden Konjunkturbetrachtung
(Jena, 1932), pp. 28-29.
39 Werner, Wirtschaftsgebiete, p. 27.
40 Bramstedt, 'Krisis', p. 4.
41 STA L, AH DObein, Nr. 2409, Jahresbericht der KB Leipzig 1928, p. 3.
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Then, in the middle of 1929 the number of unemployed, shut-
downs and bankruptcies In Saxony rose at an unprecedented speed,
high above the average In Germany. The KH Leipzig recorded: "The
slow decline for industry, trade and business, which had already
started in 1928, contInued without interruption ... and worsened to
a crisis at the end of the year (1929) ... Shut-downs, unemployment
and short-time work exemplify the catastrophic situation of the
economy at the end of the year."42
At that time, production and employment suddenly collapsed in
Saxony unlike anywhere else in Germany. This was closely
connected with the loss of overseas markets and the breakdown
of world trade, from which Saxony suffered with particular
severity. Saxony's textile exports dropped by 56.1 per cent and
that of textile machines by 83 per cent to the USA between 1929
and 1932. The region was additionally hit by the curtailment of
foreign Investment and the withdrawal of short-term loans. This
was a hard blow for Saxony due to the general capital shortage.44
Schafer drew a picture of an old industry which had problems of
adapting to new, modern forms of production, finance, and
management.45 The number of bankruptcies per capita in Saxony
was also higher than in any other region in Germany during the
Great Depression.46
 Between 7.6 per cent of all independent people
42 Ibid., Jahresberlcht der KH Leipzig 1929, p. 4.
43 H. Schwarzbach, 'Die Differenzen zwischen dem Verband Sachsischer
Industrieller mid dem Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie 1931',
Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 12 (3) (1971), p. 81.
44 There were no big banks and only few large companies in Saxony. Many
experts regarded the capital shortage of its industry as one of the main
reasons for the severity of the crisis in Saxony.
45 Schafer, 'Arbeitslosigkeit', p. 462.
46 See H. Adler, 'Die Wirtschaftskrise im Spiegel der sachsischen Konkurs-
statistik', ZSaStL4,(1932/33), p. 310.
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working in agriculture, Industry and trade went bankrupt in 1930,
whereas the figure for the Reich was only 3 per cent.47
The figure best expressing the dramatic economic crisis which
unfolded in Saxony was the rapid rise in the rate of
unemployment 48
 (see Figure 2 below). Whereas Saxony still had
the lowest unemployment rates of any region in Germany in 1927,
it exceeded all other regions by the middle of 1929 and remained
the highest until 1937. There were about 690,000 regIstered
unemployed in Saxony In the middle of 1932, which was 13 per
cent of the total unemployed in Germany. Saxony's four large cities
had some of the highest unemployment rates amongst cities with a
population greater than 100,000 in the Republic.50
The distinct features of the economic crisis in Saxon)' were the
enormous speed with which It unfolded and the scale of its impact.
The worst hit industries had shown unemployment rates which
were far below average in Germany up to the middle of 1929.51
The first major sector hit was the metal industry. Up to this time it
had one of the lowest unemployment rates in Germany, but this
rose far above all others in the following months. The situation in
the textile industry was similarly unstable, with unemployment
47 Of all regions in Germany only the city of Lubeck had a higher figure
with 9.6 per cent (Burkhardt, 'Sonderstellung', p. 78).
48 All figures used below are 'official' unemployment figures of the
registered unemployed. The 'real' figures, including the unemployed who
were not registered, was between 4 and 6 per cent higher (J. Falter and T.
Lindenberger and S. Schumann (Hrsg.), Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der
Weimarer Republik (Munchen, 1986), p. 38).
49 Bramstedt, 'Krisis', p. 7; W. Bramke, 'Sachsen unter der faschistischen
Diktatur (1933-1945)', Sächsische Heimatblatter, 30 (4) (1984), p. 161.
5O December 1931 Chemnitz and Plauen ranked first and second with
unemployment rates of 15.9 and 15.7 per cent. Dresden and Leipzig ranked
fifth and twelfth with respective rates of 14.1 and 13.6 per cent (StJbDR,(1932), p. 303).





















rising rapidly at the end of 1929. The building Industry in Saxony
was still booming and had the lowest unemployment rate in












M J J A S 0 N D
	6.2 6.0 5.7 5.7
	 5.7 6.4
	 8.7	 125
5.4	 5.1	 5.0	 5.1	 5.1	 5.9	 7.7	 12.3
1929 J
	
F	 M A M J
	 J	 A S 0 N D
Reich 15.0 162 133 9.5 7.7 7.2 7.0 7.1 73
	 8.4 10.9 15.0
Saxony 14.2 155 13.2 10.2 8.7 83 8.7 9.3 9.6 10.9 133 18.3
1930 J
	
F	 M A M J
	 J	 A S 0 N D
Reich 16.9 17.7 16.0 14.7 14.0 14.0 14.6 15.2 15.9 17.2 19.5 23.0
Saxony 202 21.4 20.6 20.2 19.8 20.1 21.0 22.2 223 233 253 293
1931 J
	
F	 M A M J
	 J	 A S 0 N D
Reich 25.7 26.2 25.1 232 21.6 212 213 22.4 23.1 245 26.7 29.8
Saxony 313 31.4 30.2 29.3 27.8 272 27.0 28.4 29.4 30.8 32.4 35.9
1932 J
	
F	 M A M J
	 J	 A
Reich 31.7 32.2 31.8 303 29.5 29.1 28.7 27.9
Saxony 38.1 385 38.5 38.0 37.6 36.9 36.6 36.4
Source: P. Branisted, 'Die Krisis der sachsischen Industriewirtschaft',
VerOffentlichung des Verbandes Sächsischer Industrieller, (67) (1932), p. 47.
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Germany In 1928. In 1929 construction started to contract and
nearly collapsed in 1930. No sector suffered a greater increase in
unemployment.
The strong dependence of Saxony on the world market became
evident again In 1931. In the first half of 1931 there was some
recovery mainly due to the demand for consumer goods (the textile
Industry in particular profited from this). However, Saxony was hit
severely when Britain left the Gold Standard in September 1931
(the 'foundation' on which world trade had rested), when short
term loans were withdrawn, and most countries closed their
domestic markets to foreign goods. Its metal industry and
subsequently its textile industry collapsed, showing the highest
rates of unemployment in Germany.52
The severity of the crisis and its repercussions for the people of
Saxony become evident by looking at vital statistics: In Saxony
fewer live births occurred than in any other province in 1929.
Saxony had the second highest male suicide rate in Germany54
 and
was the only one of the large provinces where comparatively fewer
people married in 1931 than in 1913.
52 Ibid., pp. 21-27.
53 For 1,000 citizens 15.9 living babies were born. In the Reich 17,9 per cent
(StJbDR, (1931)).
54 In 1929, 5.8 men committed suicide out of 10,000. In the Reich the figure
was 3.8 (ibid.).
55 Burkhardt, 'Die bevOlkerungspolitische Lage in Sachsen Ende 1932',
ZSaStL4, (1932/33), p. 301.
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Part I: Chronology:
The Nazi Party in Saxony between 1920 and 1933
32
2. From the founding of the NSDAP to the first party ban
in Saxony (January 1919-December 1922)
(I) Munich/Bavaria
After the German Workers' Party (DAP) was founded by Anton
Drexier and Karl Harrer In Munich In January 1919, Adolf Hitler
joined the party in September 1919 and quickly became both chief
of propaganda and a member of the executive ,
 committee. The
party was renamed the 'National Socialist Workers' Party' (NSDAP)
in February 1920. The NSDAP, whose party membership had risen
from 1,100 in June 1920 to 3,300 in August 1921, was competing
for support among the far right together with similar groups.
Stachura argued that the "oratorical and propagandistic skills of
Hitler eventually allowed the NSDAP to make something of a minor
breakthrough in terms of public recognition, If mainly on account of
his anti-Semitism which was vehement even by Munich
standards."56
 After a leadership dispute Hitler took over the control
of the party in July 1921. Until the end of 1921 the activities of the
NSDAP were limited mainly to Bavaria. In mid-September 1921
Hitler's first circular letter, whose aim it was to establish control
over local branches outside Munich, was met with considerable
passive resistance. In a national party conference in January 1922
Hitler gathered the leaders of the provincial local branches and
postulated the need for a "ruthless, tight organisation." 57 This was
Hitler's first attempt to bind all party leaders to himself. A massive
vote of confidence at the conference then started the slow
development of Hitler's complete, personalized control over the
56 P. D. Stachura, 'The Political Strategy of the Nazi Party, 19 19-1933', German
Studies Review, 3 (2) (1980), pp.263-264.
57 Noakes, Lower Saxony, p. 26.
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party and the establishment of an efficient and centralized party
machine.
(ii) The origins of the NSDAP in Saxony: anti-Semitism and
vOlkisch movements
How did the Nazi movement spread to Saxony? Who were its early
activists and supporters? And what were their goals? The
beginning of the Nazi movement in Saxony was similar to other
parts of Germany. 58
 The first activists and sympathisers of the
NSDAP were radical anti-Semites and nationalists, strong opponents
of the newly created Republic, and members of vOlkisch groups or
paramilitary formations ( Wehrverbände). Most founding members
of the earliest Saxon NSDAP branches came from paramilitary
formations (see Table 1 below). War veterans too, played a crucial
role In the formation, and development of the Nazi Party in
Saxony.59
The activities of members of paramilitary formations and war
veterans were often synonymous with the völkisch movement.
VOlkisch groups were offsprings of extreme anti-Semitic and
nationalist organisations which had already existed before 1914
and were organised shortly after the First World War. In Saxony, as
in other parts in Germany, they were the most important
58 See especially Noakes, Lower Saxony D. Orlow, The History of the Nazi
Party, Vol. 1: 1919-1933 (Pittsburgh, Pa, 1969); Tracey, 'Thuringia'; W.
BOhnke, Die NSDAP im Ruhrgebiet (Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1974); G. Paul, Die
NSDAP des Saargebieres 1920-1935. Der Versptete Aufstieg der NSDAP in der
katholisch-proletarischen Provinz (Saarbrücken, 1987).
59 Table: The percentage of war veterans in the Saxon NSDAP:
before	 15.9.1930-	 after
14.9.1930	 30.1.1933	 30.1.1933	 1935
members	 11,383	 75,896	 147,602	 234,681
war veterans 3,997 (35.1%) 24,851 (32.7%) 65,390 (44.3%) 94,238 (40.1%)












































01.03.1925 Bruder von Stein
Marxist terror (searched & beaten
up), comradeship, DI In Hof 1923
Feder speech in Schwarzenberg
1924
DTf in Munich 1923, brawl at DT
1925, Hitler speech 1926, party
meeting in Weimar 1926
DTf In Munich 1923, Marxist ter-












45 SA in Ober-
lausitz
Table 1: Selected branches of the NSDAP in Saxony: background and
membership size
place/	 background	 unifying experience	 number
foundf d
Zwickau 1 DVSTB, Bund	 Esser and Hitler in Zwickau 1922, 2/1922: 57 (34
11.10.1921 nationalgesinnter 	 Marxist terror and imprisonment SA), 4/1923:
Soldaten	 1922-23, DT in Coburg 1922, party 200, 12/1930:
meeting in M/1. Sturmfahne 1923 400
DTfln M 1923, DT In Hof 1923
Chemnitz 1 DVSTB, Reichsham-
21.02.1922 merbund, Turn verein
Jahn, anti-Semites
DT in Weimar 1920, DT in
Detmold, room-brawl 1923, party
meeting in M 1923, DT in Hof 1923,
Brawl at Goebbel meeting 1925,
Hitler visits in Chemnitz
Terror by Hälz, DT in Coburg 1922,
party meeting in Mu. Sturmfahne,
DT in Hof 1923, room-brawl in
Oelsnitz 1924
Party meeting in Munich 1923,
DT in Hof 1923
Party meeting in M 1923, Ver-
botszeit, party meeting in Weimar
1926, Hitler in Freiberg 1930
Police surveillance, Marxist
terror, DI in Hof 1923, Hitler
speech 1926, party meeting in
Weimar 1926
DI In Halle, Hitler speech 1926,
Nazi sport meeting 1926
Aue 1
	anti-Marxists	 DTf in Munich 1923, DT in Hof 1923
1923	 hand-shake with Hitler, brawls 1930
Bautzen	 Wehrwo1f Wiking Brawls, Marxist terror,
02.06.1925 Bund, anti-Semites comradeship
Crimmit- Wehrwolf	 Marxist terror, Brawls 1929/30
schau1
12.8.1927
1: founded with the help from Tittmann (Zwickau); DT: Deutscher Tag, DTf: Deutsches
Turn fest; M: Munich
Source: Histories of local NSDAP branches, BA DH, newspaper articles.
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supporters for the early Nazi movement. Anti-Semitism was a
widespread and established phenomenon in Saxony. Retallack calls
Saxony the "c .adle" of "political anti-Semitism". 60 The first
International Anti-Jewish Congress was held in Dresden in 1882
and subsequently anti-Semitic associations sprang up quickly In
Saxony, counting 136 In 1890. 61 Anti-SemitIc candidates, who were
challenging the traditional 'politics of notables' (Honoratioren-
politik), received 15.9 per cent of the vote in Saxony in the June
1893 Reichstag elections.62
 This was remarkable as Jews only
accounted for 0.27 per cent of the total population of the Kingdom
of Saxony and mainly lived in a few large cities. Levy argued
"neither the number, character, nor economic power of Saxony's
Jewish inhabitants offered a convincing explanation of why the
parliamentary anti-Semites had scored such a decisive victory
there."63
 In addition to the political and populist anti-Semitism of
the German Reformers and Socials, there was also the presence of a
more deep-seated and ideological anti-Semitism in Saxony. The
Pan-German League, founded in 1891, propagated extreme anti-
60 See J. Retallack, 'Antisocialism and Electoral Politics in Regional Perspec-
tive: The Kingdom of Saxony', in Jones/Retallack, New Perspectives, p. 50.
61 Retallack, 'Antisociallsm', p. 66.
62 Ibid., pp. 66, 73. Unfortunately, Retallack does not discuss who these anti-
Semites were. He only mentions the view of contemporary Conservative, who
thought the radical anti-Semites were mainly supported by "the most
impoverished and least sedentary elements of the Mitteistand" (ibid., p. 79).
63 Levy suggested that the anti-Semitic parties in Saxon had something
positive to offer for the local middle classes: "Large numbers of them chose
the anti-Semites to carry their protest against serious economic troubles
They shared in the general illusion of the anti-Semitic parties' promise of
effectiveness and were misled by their uncompromising opposition to the
Capnvi government. Furthermore, the anti-Semites appeared young and
vital, willing to go further than the middle-class parties or the
Conservatives, which ... had been unresponsive to the needs of the
Mittelstand" (R. S. Levy, The DoifaJl of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties in
Imperial Germany (New Haven, London, 1975), pp. 95-97). The similarities
between the rise of the anti-Semitic parties in the 1890s as a means of protest
for the middle classes in Saxony, with the rise of the local Nazi movement in
the late 1920s, is striking.
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Semitism, nationalism and expansionism, and had a prominent
position in Saxony. The League was a central element of the
vOlkisch movement, bec.me an Important recruitment field for the
DeutschvOlkische Schutz- und Trutzbund (DVSTB) and the Nazi
Party, and "served as a chief provider of practically all the
elements that went into the ideological turbidity of the Nazis'
programme and Hitler's Weltanschauung (world view)."64
"Nowhere was the League stronger than in the Kingdom of Saxony"
and local branches in "Dresden and Leipzig were among the largest
and most active in the country." 65 The League was also strong in
small communities in the kingdom, particularly in the Vogtland,
with Plauen as its centre.66
The DVSTB was the most prominent, active and effective of these
radical anti-Semitic organisations. Many of the early local Nazi
activists, including Fritz Tittmann and Martin Mutschmann, who
were to become the most prominent Nazis in the region, were
members of the DVSTB in the early days of the Republic and soon
started to build up the Nazi Party in Saxony.67 It was appropriate
64 R. Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German. A Cultural Study of the
Pan-German League, 1886-1914 (Boston, London, Sydney, 1984), P. 300.
65 thid., p. 144.
66 Chickering explains the strength of the League in Saxony: "The influx of
Czechs into Saxony, particularly the immigration of cheap Czech labour into
the industrial centres of Dresden and Leipzig, was sufficient to feed anxiety;
so was the fact that Saxony served as a transition station for Polish, Jewish,
and other migration out of Galicia and areas to the east" (Chickering, Pan-
German League, p. 144). Similarly, Chickering explains the extraordinary
activity of the local branch in Plauen with social and ethnic tensions caused
by immigration of Czech labour: "In these circumstances, the rhetoric of
ethnic struggle adapted easily to the campaign against the Socialists, and the
Pan-German League became a leading force in the consolidation of the non-
socialist forces" (ibid., p. 145). Again, the similarities to the strength of the
Saxon Nazi movement, which had its stronghold in Plauen, and the small
communities of the Vogtland, are striking.
67 See 'Fin Leben für Deutschland', FK, 9.3.1939. When the DVSTB dissolved
itself in early 1923 the leaders advised their members to join the NSDAP
(BOhnke, Ruhrgebiet, p. 33).
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that Hermann Esser, one of the most notorious anti-Semites
amongst the Nazi leadership in Munich, was the first prominent
NSDAP speaker who attempted to rally support for the movement
in Saxony. The anti-Semitic speeches met great enthusiasm by
many middle-class visitors. However, at the same time they drove
more moderate visitors away from the Nazis. 68
 At the end of 1922
the police reported from the fiercely anti-Semitic NSDAP in
Chemnitz: "Originally the branch had about 200 members.
Apparently half of the members, mainly teachers, have recently
left the party due to the extreme emphasis on anti-Semitism."69
Nevertheless, anti-Semitism continued to feature in Saxony and
remained one of the most distinctive aspects of the local Nazi
movement.70
VOlkisch groups remained a permanent, and the most significant
recruitment pool for the Saxon Nazis until the late 1920s. Many of
their members joined the NSDAP due to its radical features or
because their own vOlkisch groups disintegrated over the years.
Furthermore, as the paramilitary organisations and most vOlkisch
organisations were neither political parties nor affiliated to political
parties, some members were dissatisfied with the lack of a concrete
68 After two speakers of the USPD had expressed their disgust with Esser's
extremely anti-semitic speech in Zwickau in late 1921 the majority followed
their advise and left the meeting (BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, LPV, Nr. 175,
19.12.1921).
69 BA DH, Z/A VI 2029, EK, PP Dresden an Mdl, 9.12.1922, p. 2.
70 E.g. the Saxon police reported that seventy-five Nazis from Plauen clashed
with Jewish travellers on the way to Chemnitz at the end of 1922. The latter
felt forced to pull the emergency brake (ibid., p. 5). The VOlkischer Bote fürdie Oberlausnz asked NSDAP supporters to sign lists for a referendum about
Jews: "All Jewish immigrants who arrived after 1 August 1914 have to be
expelled. Their property, as far it had been acquired unlawfully, is to be
confiscated ... The Jews who live with us have to be put under foreign
jurisdiction and have to be treated like foreign citizens. A special Jewish
code has to be drawn up and make into law" (STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 134, Bezirk
Zittau, 4.8.1924).
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political programme and the lack of radicalism behind their Ideas,
or even the bourgeois outlook of these organlsations. 71 What
Noakes analysed for Lower Saxony was also true for Saxony: Some
right-wing activists "who were disenchanted with the bourgeois
composition and style of the vOlkisch movement, welcomed the
NSDAP as a party with radical aims which projected an image of
dynamic activity and showed an understanding of how to appeal to
the masses."72
(ill) The NSDAP spreads into Saxony
The ideas of the Nazi movement and stories of the orator Hitler and
his Storm-troopers were brought to Saxony through a handful of
members of the Freikorps or army, students73 , salesmen and
others who had come in contact with the NSDAP in Munich at the
beginning of the 1920s. As in other regions In Germany 74, it was
the driving force of a few devoted activists which was responsible
for spreading Nazi ideology and founding local NSDAP branches in
Saxony at this early stage. Fritz Tittmann from Zwlckau was the
most important Nazi activist in Saxony until 1924. After he had
learned about the Nazi movement from Karl Kolbow from Frelberg
In April 1921, he attended a Nazi rally with Hitler in Munich In
71 Also see BOhnke, Ruhrgebiet, p. 33.
72 Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 16-17.
73 The students Kolbow founded the NSDAP branch in Freiberg and Pietsch
in Mittweida. In early 1923 a majority of the students in Leipzig adopted a
resolution that they supported the vOlkisch Idea (LVZ, Nr. 36, 12.2.1923).
This was similar to other parts of Germany: E.g. students founded the first
NSDAP branch in Oldenburg and Göttingen (Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 21-22).
74 E.g. Bruno Wenzel and Gustav Seifert in Hanover, or Rudolf Haase in
Gottingen (ibid., pp. 14-17, 22-23).
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summer that year and became a member of the NSDAP. 75 In the
course of the next several months Tittmann managed to find eleven
like-minded people and founded the first Nazi Par.y branch in
Saxony in Zwickau on 11 October 1921. It was only the fourth local
Nazi Party branch outside Bavaria. 76
 From Zwickau the Nazi
movement quickly spread to a few places in south-western Saxony.
Tittmann was relentless in propagating the radical ideas of the
party. 77
 Due to his initiative most of the earliest party branches,
who were mainly located in the south-west of Saxony, were
founded (see Table 1). His extensive activities were rewarded by
the Munich leadership, which appointed Tlttmann leader of the
NSDAP in west Saxony in mid-1922.78
(iv) The first NSDAP branches in Saxony: Zwickau, Chemnitz,
Markneukirchen, Plauen, Freiberg, Leipzig, Dresden
Zwickau was the centre of the Saxon Nazi movement until the Hitler
Putsch at the end of 1923, and remained one of the most important
Nazi branches in the region.79
 The significance of Zwickau for the
early Nazi movement in Saxony was due to Tittmann, who used
Zwickau as his headquarters. As in the rest of the economically
75 Stoschek, 'Entwicklung', pp. 224-225. His source, however, is not clear.
76 Compare with Böhnke Ruhrgebiet, pp. 40-41. The widespread claim of the
Saxon Nazis, that Zwickau was the first NSDAP party branch outside Bavaria
is not true (Funfzehn Jahre NSDAP in ZAckau (1 922-3 7), p. 10).
77 Stoschek claims that Munich supported Tittmann's efforts by sending him
twenty-six men who were active in Zwickau, Plauen and Chemnitz from
October 1921 onwards. In spring 1923 too, apparently sixty Nazis from
Bavaria supported the Nazis in Saxony. His sources are not clear (Stoschek,
'Entwicklung', p. 225).
78 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, Bericht uber die nationalsoziallstische Bewegung im
Freistaat Sachsen, p. 1.
79 Particularly active NSDAP branches played a crucial role in spreading the
Nazi movement throughout Germany. E.g. ZweibrUcken in the Saar-Pfalz
region (Paul, Saarland, p. 37), or Hanover and GOttingen in the Ruhrgebiet
(Noakes, Lower Saxony).
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depressed south-west of Saxony, some citizens, especially members
of the middle classes, were receptive to the Nazis' radical anti-
Semitism, anti-socialism, nationalism and hatred of the Versai"les
Treaty. This was quickly realized by the Nazi leadership in Munich.
Hermann Esser spoke In Zwickau in December 1921, and again in
May 1922. The far right placed great hopes on the development of
their organisations and parties in the area. A meeting of vOlkisch
groups of north- and middle Germany took place in Zwickau on 23
April 1922. The meeting was also attended by Hitler. 80
 Of all Saxon
NSDAP branches, Zwickau had the greatest party membership, the
most active party members before the end of 1923, and the best
attendance at early NSDAP meetings in Munich or other vOlkisch
meetings (see Table 1). Two Nazis from Zwickau attended the
leadership meeting in Munich in January 1922, some visited the
Deutscher Tag in Coburg in October 1922, and the SA from Zwickau
and Markneukirchen received the first consecrated flag in Saxony
from Hitler in 1923.81
The founders of the Nazi Party branch in Chemnitz came from
extremely anti-Semitic groups who used to meet in the restaurant
'Deutscher Krug' before the First World War. These local right-wing
radicals organised themselves in various völkisch groups like the
Reichshammerbund, the DVSTB and DeutschvOlkische Turn verein
Jahn after the war and formed the nucleus for the local Nazi Party
which was founded in early 1922.82
When the Social Democrats called the small town of
Markneukirchen a "centre of the Orgesch" in 1921 - a notorious
80 The local Nazis claimed that on this occasion Hitler spoke for the first time
outside Bavaria (NSDAP Zwickau, p. 11).
81 Ibid.
82 Funfzehn Jahre NSDAP in Chemnitz (1922-1937), p. 18.
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Freikorps group - they were describing both the activities of
young Bavarian former Freikorps members, and an extremely
conservative and right-wing population. 83 A handful of these
vOlkisch sympathizers founded the local NSDAP branch, the third In
Saxony, in March 1922. The few local Nazi supporters - probably
less than ten in 1922 - were extremely active. They visited the
Deutscher Tag in Coburg in October 1922, organised the first public
meeting in December 1922, and went to the first national NSDAP
meeting in Munich in January 1923. 84 The SA from
Markneukirchen took part at all Nazi activities in the
Erzgebirge/Vogtland, and by spring 1923 the police estimated the
local NSDAP membership as ninety. 85 The citizens of
Markneukirchen were extremely anxious about social upheavals.
The town in the AH Oelsnitz was one of the few places were the
SPD did not heavily benefit from the defeat of the old regime
shortly after the First World War and stayed far below the 50 per
cent in the 1919 Reichstag elections (44.8 per cent). 86 The
VOlkisch-Soziale Block (VSB) - a coalition of the vOlkisch
movement led by the NSDAP - already became the strongest party
with 40 per cent of the votes In the May 1924 Reichstag
elections. 87 The Nazi Party remained the strongest party In
Markneukirchen in every election until 1933, and Hitler was given
the freedom of the city in spring 1932. 88 The early support for the
Nazi movement in Markneukirchen can partly be explained by its
83 Fünfzehn Jahre NSDAP in Markneukirchen (1922-1 93 7), pp. 12-14.
84 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
85 BA DH Z/C 17411, EK, 'NS Sachsen'.
86 ZSäStL4, (1920/2 1).
87 NSDjIY Markneukirchen, p. 20.
88 The town council also decided to put Hitler's picture in its chamber, and to
flag the town hail at Hitler's birthday in 1932 ( Vorwärts, Nr. 190, 23.4.1932).
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industrial background. Markneuklrchen was a typical small town in
the Vogtland, dominated by small scale and cottage industry (in its
case the production of musical instruments). The local citizens were
prosperous until the impact of the First World War damaged its
industries and started a continuous decline. Many members of the
middle class were anxious to maintain their wealth, were
concerned with political instability, and foreign competition at the
end of 1918. The Nazis' anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic aims and
their preparedness to take on the radical working class, naturally
appealed to them.
The fourth Nazi Party branch in Saxony was founded in Plauen on
21 May 1922 and was one of the most active ones. From 1924
onwards, Plauen increasingly took over Zwickau's leading role in
the Nazi movement in the region. From the re-organisation of the
party in early 1925 onwards, It became the undisputed centre of
the NSDAP in Saxony until March 1933. The main reason for this
was the emergence of Martin Mutschmann, a textile industrialist
from Plauen, as the leading Nazi in Saxony during the Verbotszeit89
in 1924. Plauen and the surrounding Vogtland was the perfect
breeding place for the Nazi movement and became their stronghold
in Saxony and one of their major bastions in the Reich. The
dramatic decline of the textile industry led to economic hardships
and unemployment, and a strong polarization of local society. The
police remarked about the region: "It's a popular saying that there
are only Communists and Deutschnationale (German Nationalists)
In the Vogtland."9°
89 Period when the NSDAP was baned in Germany after the Hitler Putsch.
90 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11113, Blatt 30 (Stoschek, 'Entwicklung', p. 241).
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The Nazi branch In Freiberg, a mining town with a small university
at the edge of the Erzgebirge, was founded In November 1922 by
the student Karl Kolbow. 91
 The few local activists were war
veterans, members of the Relchswehr, and students. Except for a
small circle, the Nazi Party seemed to have disintegrated during the
Verbotszeit, and by 1927 there were still fewer than twenty Nazi
activists in the town.
The early development of the Nazi movement in Leipzig and
Dresden is difficult to assess due to the scarcity of sources, and the
complicated situation of an extremely divided vOlkisch movement.
Although the first NSDAP branch in Leipzig was already founded in
November 1922, and local party members were noted for their
activities in the first several months92 , the further development of
the Nazi Party in the town was extremely slow. This was due to the
strong competition from the DeutschvOlkische Freiheitspartei
(DVFP) in Leipzig, which was the strongest vOlkisch party in the
KH Leipzig. The DVFP was more successful In absorbing local anti-
Semites and radical right-wing supporters, and was also able to win
over local Nazis. 93
 Additionally, the Nazi movement in Leipzig was
hampered by internal disputes and extreme factionalism. 94 Only
the emergence of the ruthless Walter DOnicke who established
himself as the leader of the local branch from mid-1926 onwards,
made possible a slow expansion and the creation of an efficient and
unified party machine. Moreover, the Nazis themselves blamed
91 Funfzehn Jahre NSDAP Freiberg (1939).
92 E.g. see BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK.
93 More than a third of NSDAP members joined the GroSdeursche Arbeitsge-
meinschaft in January 1923, which later joined the DVFP (BA DH, Z/C 17411,
EK, PP Leipzig, 24.2.1923). The DVFP in Leipzig seemed to enjoy great influ-
ence. Reinhold Wulle, party leader and member of the Reichs tag, spoke at its
first meeting on 15.1.1923 (ibid.).
94 See 'Das Werden und Wachsen der NSDAP in Leipzig', LNN, 4./5.6.1933.
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unfavourable socio-economic conditions for why they found "the
struggle to infiltrate national socialist ideas particularly difficult" In
Leipzig.95
Even smaller than in Leipzig was the early Nazi movement in
Dresden, which came into being in early 1923. 96 The local Nazis
remained active even after their party was officially banned.97
When the former captain Helimuth von MUcke and Professor Kuhn,
two prominent figures from Dresden, joined the VsB in 1924, the
movement showed increased activities in the state capital and
generally in eastern Saxony. 98 The primary reasons for the overall
weakness of the local NSDAP were the extreme divisions of the
vOlkisch movement in the state capital, and the inability of the
NSDAP to establish dominance over other vOlkisch parties until
1928.
(v) The Nazis' first public meetings in Saxony
Apart from the early activities in Zwickau, the Saxon Nazis
appeared for the first time In a co-ordinated series of meetings
95 The Nazis argued their case by reflecting that Leipzig was a stronghold of
the SPD. They underlined this by showing that more than twice as many
pupils in Leipzig chose to attend lessons in Lebenskunde ( literally 'life
knowledge') rather than lessons in religion compared to Dresden and
Chemnitz (29.3 per cent compared to 14.3 and 12.7 per cent). Moreover,
because many of the citizens in Leipzig were in "professions which acquire
intelligence above the average" (e.g. the booktrade or graphic design), they
"lack the instinct" to believe in the Nazi movement ('Karnpf urn Leipzig', VB,
12.9.1932).
96 See Die Geschichte der Sächsischen SA von den ersten Anfa.ngen bis zur
heutigen Gruppe Sa (1934), p. 27.
97 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, Halbwochenbericht, 10.4.1923.
98 Also see Stoschek, 'Entwicklung', p. 255.99	 DtsP and the DVFP were much stronger than the NSDAP in Dresden
for a long time. The NSDAP only managed to become the by far strongest
party on the radical right in Dresden in the 1928 Reichstag elections (LNN,
Nr. 142, 21.5.1928).
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organised by all their local party branches at the end of 1922.
Tittmann was the speaker and tried to appeal to those dissatisfied
with the situation after the First World War. He blamed three
groups for the misery of the German people: The Social Democrats
were blamed for most of the misfortune as they were held
responsible for the lost war. Capitalists and profiteers made profit
from the German peoples, and finally Tittmann condemned the
Jews as driving force behind world capitalism and accused them of
uniting in a conspiracy to exploit the Germans. Striking In
Tittmann's speeches was the total rejection of the Republican
system, his intense hatred of the Social Democrats and Jews, and
finally the extreme radicalism with which he propagated his ideas.
Most of the visitors came from right-wing circles and were mainly
young. In the first public meeting in Chemnitz in November 1922,
Tittmann spoke about the betrayal of the SPD after November
1918, "which brought freedom only for racketeers and slave-
drivers of the Volk, for profiteers and stock exchange speculators
and bank jews." 10° The 350 young visitors were to a large extent
supporters of other vOlkisch groups which the Nazis had targeted
in their propaganda before the meeting. The audience of 400 in a
similar meeting In Plauen a day later, were "mainly supporters of
the DNVP, also industrialists and former officers" and "only a few
workers." 10 ' The police in Leipzig noted that the crowd of 250 in
the town's first public NSDAP meeting at the end of December were
"people who have been seen in rightist meetings in the past" and
included two high ranking policemen. 102
 The local SPD newspaper
100 BADH, Z/C 17411, EK, Chemnitz, 29.11.1922.
101 Thid., Halbwochenbericht, 5.12.1923.
102 Ibid., Leipzig, 23.12.1922.
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was more detailed and reported that "a very mixed audience was
present. Salaried employees, civil servants, also some workers,
master craftsmen, and women turned up. Most of the visitors were
young, probably mainly members of the DHV." 10 There was
generally loud applause when Tittmann mentioned the murder of
Rathenau, and when he advised anyone to slap German girls
publicly in the face when they were seen together with Jews.'04
The Nazis made notorious threats to anyone trying to hinder their
mission. Tittmann declared that "they would react with ruthless
violence" if legal propaganda work by the NSDAP was hindered. He
went on to say that opponents of the Nazis "will hang on a lamp
post higher than racketeers and profIteers." 105 All these statements
received great applause.
In the discussion during a Nazi meeting in Chemnitz a participant
said: "If the government and the political parties do not protect the
Volk, it has to help itself." 106
 Another Nazi told the police: "We
fight for justice and order to protect the citizens regardless the
government. It does not matter if it is a Monarchy or a
Republic." 07
 The Nazis portrayed themselves as looking after the
betrayed and exploited masses, and fighting for justice. In the
pursuit of these 'Ideals' they were extremely radical and ruthless in
their means. 108
 More than anything else it was this radicalism that
made the Nazis distinct from other vOlkisch groups and attracted
103 See Tine Faschisten-Versammlung in Leipzig', LVZ 27.12.1922.
104 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, Leipzig, 23.12.1922.
105 Ibid.
106 'Die Nationalsozialisten', Erzgebirgische Volksfreund, Nr. 281, 3.12.1922.
107 BA DH, ZA VI 2029, EK, Polizei-VerhOr, 23.12.1922.
108 Esser said in his speech in Zwickau in late 1921: 'Until there are no
gallows in the streets at which racketeers and profiteers were hanged, one
should not expect any improvements (ibid., Z/C 17411, EK, LPV, Nr. 175.
19.12.1921).
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those who were seeking extreme solutions to the problems they
faced.'°9 Their vision was a movement In which all groups in
society ' gould be unified by their desire for justice and pride for
the German nation.110
109	 Nazis in Dresden demanded in a leaflet: The "repeal of the
disgraceful dictation of Versailles (Schanddiktat), the deportation of all
foreigners who immigrated after 2 August 1914 (the district Wiesen and
Brühl would look different then, and no more German workers would be
living in the Osrjuden huts in the Hausenstra1e). Banning of unearned
income, breaking of the Zinsknechtschaft, ruthless fight against mean
criminals (Volksverbrecher), profiteers, racketeers, etc. (death penalty!)
without consideration of confession and race, fight with the law against the
political lie and its circulation in the press" (ibid., Halbwochenbericht,
10.4.1923).
110 Esser said in his speech in Zwickau: "The NSDAP does not want theory,
nor a party programme, nor a party dogma, but the unification of all
working classes ... to one big National Socialist Party (ibid., LP Nr. 175,
19.12.1921).
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3. The NSDAP during the first period of illegality
(December 1922-November 1923)
(1) Munich/Bavaria
Between July 1921 and the end of 1923 the NSDAP became
increasingly militant and pursued the strategy of overthrowing the
Republic with an armed rebellion. When Walter . Rathenau, the
Jewish German Foreign Minister, was assassinated by right-wing
fanatics in June 1922, the NSDAP was prohibited in almost every
state in Germany by the end of the year. This was not the case in
Bavaria where a reactionary government sympathised with the
radical right and made it possible for Hitler and the NSDAP to rise
in prominence. The putschist activities of right-wing forces in
Bavaria culminated in 1923 due to internal developments within
the Reich: There was the French occupation of the Ruhr, violent
agitation of the KPD in central and northern Germany, the Black
Reichswehr revolt, separatist activity in the Rhineland, the
increasing rift between Berlin and the rightist Bavarian
government, and hyper-inflation. 11 ' These developments and the
putsch plans against the government in Berlin largely preoccupied
the Nazi leadership in Munich throughout 1923. Munich did not
pay great attention to the development of the Nazi movement
outside Bavaria during that time.112
111 Stachura, 'Strategy', p. 266.
112 E.g. see Noakes, Lower Saxony, p. 33.
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(ii) The banned NSDAP in Saxony
The police in Dresden reported in December 1922 that "the main
reason for the uneasy political atmosphere in Saxony is the
National Socialist Workers' movement in Bavaria and its spread to
western Saxony." 3
 The increasing Nazi activities and the extreme
radicalism they propagated led the SPD government in Dresden to
ban all NSDAP meetings and parades in Saxony on 23.12.1922.114
Henceforth, the Saxon police closely watched all Nazi activities and
dissolved a number of illegal meetings. 115
 How did the Saxon Nazis
react to the ban? First of all, the ban was not enforced vigorously
by all the police, particularly in the south-west of Saxony. The head
of the police in Dresden complained that his colleagues in Zwickau
and Plauen had failed to dissolve various Nazi meetings. 116 The
Nazis later on claimed that they cleverly avoided the dissolving of
their meetings during this phase by calling them 'meetings for
invited guests only'. 117
 However, often only a lenient or even
sympathetic police' 18 , or the police officers' problems of
interpreting the meeting ban, made this possible. When the Nazis in
Zwickau met under the new name 'Lesergemeinschaft Deutscher
113 BA DH, Z/A VI 2029, EK, PP Dresden an Mdl, 9.12.1922.
114 It is noteworthy that the NSDAP had already been banned in Prussia
since 15.11.1922 (Bohnke, Ruhrgebiet, p. 24).
115 The police dissolved a secret Nazi meeting in Freiberg in January 1923
and various illegal NSDAP meetings in Leipzig (STA D, AH Glauchau, Nr. 24, p.
12; BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK).
116 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, PP Dresden an Bezirksstellen, 16.1.1923.
117 Das nationaisozialistische Sachsen (Dresden, 1934), P. 64.
118 The Nazis in Markneukirchen reflected: "The police showed a lot of
sympathy for the vOlkisch movement. They arranged house-searches in a
way, that it was possible to get documents and membership cards into a safe
place beforehand" (NSDAP Markneukirchen, p. 17). A Nazi from Zwickau
stated: "There were more house-searches than one would have liked. To the
honour of the officials it must be said though, that they found nothing. Even
at that time there were already police officers who loved their Germany
more than the Republic of Weimar" (Stoschek, 'Entwicklung', p. 235). Also
see BOhnke Ruhrgebiet, pp. 55-57.
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Zeitungen' In March 1923, the police realised very well that this
was in breach of the meeting ban, "but it was so skilfully organised,
that a concrete legal basis for police 1 .itervention did not exist."19
Additionally, even tough police surveillance, as In Leipzig, could
never completely monitor the flexible and secretive Nazi
activities. 120
 Even house searches and arrests were not able to
curtail much of the Nazi activities. In some cases they made Nazis
even more determined to carry on. Although Hans Förster, the
leader of the NSDAP In Leipzig, was questioned several times by
the police because he had organised illegal meetings, Förster simply
continued his activities. The fact that the police dissolved a meeting
of fifty Nazis in Leipzig in early March 1923 and registered all
names did not hinder the former from meeting again illegally only
eight days later.121
The Nazis' stubborn continuation of their pursuits shows their
complete lack of identification with and integration in the Republic.
Their defiance of its laws and regulations tied them together, and it
was regarded as treason and a sign of weakness to give in to police
pressure and obey the law. If police surveillance made further
official meetings impossible, the Nazis met for a beer at the
Stammtisch (regulars' table in a pub). Anyone who rejected the
party due to the government ban was regarded as coward.'22
119 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, 'NS Sachsen', p. 4. When the police in Zwickau also
tried to ban NSDAP membership meetings, Tittmann successfully protested to
the KH which ruled: "Because the organisation as such is not banned,
Informal membership meetings ... cannot be regarded as falling under the
ban" (Stoschek, 'Entwicklung', p. 232).
120 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, 'NS Sachsen', p. 16.
121 See 'Das Werden und Wachsen der NSDAP in Leipzig', LNN, Nr. 155/156,
4/5.6.1933.
122 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, 'NS Sachsen', p. 6.
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As a consequence of the continuous Nazi activities despite the
meeting ban, the newly elected left-wing SPD Prime Minister, Erich
Zeigner, banned the party itself in Saxony on 24.3.1923. 123 Even
this complete ban did not decisively curtail Nazi activities. Nazis in
Chemnitz continued openly to distribute leaflets in the town and
district throughout the summer124 ; Nazis in Leipzig continued to
hold meetings despite the risk of being imprisoned' 25 ; Nazis in
Dresden carried out a smear campaign against the Jews with
leaflets in various districts of the town 126 ; the police in Zwickau
concluded after several house searches: "The movement of the
NSDAP has not come to a halt despite its ban and dissolution"127,
and Nazis in Zittau distributed leaflets in early October that year.128
The distribution of leaflets and the putting up of posters was the
most important propaganda activity during the ban. 129 The Saxon
Nazis even continued to establish new party branches outside their
urban strongholds.' 3° When the police successfully raided the Nazi
propaganda centre in Chemnitz and confiscated "valuable material"
in October 1923, the Nazis seemed to recover quickly from such a
set-back.'3'
123 Ibid., EK. The complete ban of the NSDAP was a result of the
strengthening of the left-wing within the SPD government who favoured
tougher action against the radical right.
124 STA D, AH Glauchau, Nr. 24.
125 Eighteen Nazis had to appear in court in Leipzig in May 1924 for offence
against the NSDAP ban from March that year (STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 134, Bezirk
Leipzig, 23.5.1924).
126 Ibid., Nr. 128, Dresden, 7.10.1923.
127 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, Polizei-Report, 13.4.1923.
128 STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 128, Zittau 9.10.1923.
129 Similar to Lower Saxony, in Saxony too "the pamphlets were aimed at the
middle class, but above all at the workers. They were violently anti-Semitic"
(Noakes, Lower Sa.xony, p. 18).
130 The Zwickau Nazis' founded a party branch in Reinsdorf in April 1923,
and their colleagues form Plauen founded a branch in Elsterberg in August
1923 (Stoschek, 'Entwicklung', pp. 235, 244).
131 STA D, SStKa, Nr. 128, Chemnitz, 17.10.1923.
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Despite all the official 'harassment', the judiciary was often rather
lenient against Nazi offenders.' 32 Additionally, as In other parts of
Germany, the Saxon Nazis were extremely flexible in going
undercover in an endless number of clubs they founded, making It
hard for the police to intervene and keep them In check. 133 More
generally, despite the government's surveillance on activities of the
vOlkisch movement, its sympathizers continued to meet at right-
wing celebrations in 1923.
(iii) The unifying experiences of Saxon Nazis: (in)voluntary
'outcasts' of society and ghetto existence
During 1923 the Nazi movement in Saxony was extremely small,
divided, and did not possess a central and efficient structure of
party organisation. The members of the roughly twenty-seven
party branches and bases (Stutzpunkte) were linked together by
the common experience of radical völkisch feelings. This vOlkisch
milieu met at Deutsche Tage, or commemorations for the victims of
the First World War, past glorious battles, or the foundation of the
German Empire in early 1871. The Saxon Nazis kept close contact
with like-minded people in other parts of the country. Some visited
the Deutscher Tag in Coburg on 14. October 1922, and many went
to the Deutscher Tag In Hof in September 1923. It is noteworthy
how many local activists participated at the German Gymnastic
132 Eighteen Nazis had to appear in court in Leipzig in May 1924 for offences
against the NSDAP ban from March that year. One was acquitted, one
sentenced to three months imprisonment, and sixteen were sentenced to
three months imprisonment and a fme of fifteen Reichsmark. However, all
those sentenced were granted a suspended sentence for three years, as the
court attested them carelessness and juvenile inexperience (ibid., Nr. 134,
Bezirk Leipzig, 23.5.1924).
133 E.g. in Markneukirchen the Nazis continued to meet in the rambling
club 'Harmonia' (NSDAP Markneukirchen, p. 17).
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Festival in Munich in 1923 and came across the Nazi movement on
this occasion (see Table 1) These occasions, when these 'outsiders'
of the existing political system were able to share the
companionship of many people with the same feeling, unified them
in their radical right-wing beliefs and their opposition to the
Republic. The unifying force of Adolf Hitler, who became the prime
rallying point for most party members after 1925, is difficult to
assess. It is true that Hitler was not mentioned at all during the
first public meetings, and few members had seen him before 1925.
However, most hard-core activists had already seen him in Munich
or Hof before he was imprisoned at the end of 1923 and were left
with an everlasting impression.
Suppression of their beliefs and activities, and most of all
comradeship' 34, bound the Nazis together. The Saxon Nazis faced
continuous police surveillance and the permanent threat of house
searches or even imprisonment. Six Nazis were imprisoned after a
field exercise of the SA in the Erzgebirge in May 1923, and several
Saxon Nazis were imprisoned after the failed Hitler Putsch.
However, the Nazis also faced continuous pressure from the left-
wing working-class in Saxony. This pushed them even more into
the role of an 'outcast' in Weimar society, increased the strains on
the Nazis and made their life rather dangerous. When the murder
of the Reich foreign minister Rathenau by right-wing radicals in
June 1922 caused angry reaction from the working-class
movement, the Nazis in Zwickau were forced to hide for three days
in a nearby forest, and NSDAP members were thrown out of
134 E.g. see the account by Bennecke, a former SA leader in Saxony (BA,




 Social Democrats, but particularly Communists, disrupted
or even broke up Nazi meetings, often beating up the visitors, and
searched members of rightist movements for weapons. The first
room-brawl between Nazis and workers in Chemnitz took place
when a large group of Communist builders disrupted a Nazi
meeting In January 1923. 136
 Following a tip by locals after this
incident, police in Chemnitz searched the houses of several Nazis
and found weapons. 137
 Only mediation prevented several hundred
workers from storming the first public Nazi meeting in Plauen in
November 1922. Two months later, however, workers did exactly
this and brought to an end a similar gathering. 138
 When Nazis held
a meeting in Werdau, a neighbouring town of Zwickau, in April
1923, "Communists forced their way into the meeting and beat up
the National Socialists with clubs and sticks. The police had to
Intervene, and re-established order."139
The opposition from the Left and the threat of meeting-room-
brawls led the Saxon Nazis to create Storm-troopers (SA) who could
protect their meetings. However, as in other parts of Germany, the
Saxon SA was a small force which only existed in a few towns.140
The growth of the Saxon SA was a slow process, and they were not
135 NSDAPZwickau, pp. 11-12.
136 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, 'NS Sachsen', pp. 9-10.
137 The police found four revolver, fifty-two cartridges, two daggers, three
truncheons and one knuckleduster (ibid).
138 Ibid., p. 6.
139 STA D, All Glauchau, Nr. 24, Werdau, 6.4.1923.
140 It is likely that the SA only existed in Zwickau, Plauen, Markneukirchen,
Leipzig, and Dresden before 1925. Only sixty Saxon Storm-troopers rallied at
the Deutscher Tag in Hof in September 1923 (Sächsische SA, p. 27). The SA
was still years away from appearing in brown uniforms and marching in
columns. In Hof the Saxon SA appeared in "belt, windcheater, and black
stick" (NSDAP Zwickau, p. 12).
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able to take on the working-class parties for domination of the
streets before the early 1930s.'41
House searches and the intimidation of Nazis increased after an
agreement between the left-wing SPD government and the
Communist Party led to the great expansion of the Proletarischen
Hundertschaften from March 1923 onwards. The Nazis were not
only 'threatened' by militant workers when they held meetings or
parades, but by all kinds of activities which aroused the suspicion
of radical members of the Marxist parties. Tensions came to a head
when local Nazis and other activists of the radical right visited the
Deutscher Tag in Hof in mid-September 1923. It is not by chance
that this celebration of the radical right, which constituted the
largest meeting of Saxon Nazis at the time, did not take place in
Saxony but In neighbouring Bavaria where the right wing
movement was not pressurized by the government or Proletarische
Hundertschaften. In Plauen the police complained that the
Hundertschaften carried out identity checks and searches among
those who returned from the celebration in Hof. 142
 Other Nazis who
came back from the same nationalist celebration were beaten up
by workers upon their arrival in their home towns.143
As In other parts of Germany 144 , restrictions Imposed by the
government together with the active opposition from the organised
working class, made it difficult for the Saxon Nazis to spread their
ideas and win new members after 1922. However, the local Nazis
continued their activities even during these 'difficult'
141 See a similar account in BOhnke, Ruhrgebiet, p. 48.
142 STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 128, Plauen.
143 E.g. six Nazis were beaten up by workers in Kllngenthal when they
returned from Hof (ibid., Klingenthal).
144 BOhnke, Ruhrgebiet, p. 53; Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 28-29.
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circumstances. 145 More Important, the experience of 'repression'
tied this small nucleus of 'first-hour' Nazi activists together and
made them ready to propagate with relentless energy their hatred
of the existing political system and their own vision of society after
the party was re-founded in 1925.
(iv) Structure and organisation of the NSDAP in Saxony in 1923
As in other regions outside Bavaria, the Saxon NSDAP was still a
small and loose movement lacking a centrally organised party
structure in 1923. 146 There were only ten NSDAP party branches
and sixteen bases with several hundred members scattered in the
western part of the state in early 1923. 147 The Saxon Nazi
movement, as in most other regions in Germany, was mainly an
urban phenomenon in these early years' 48 , and most of its activists
came from the middle classes 149. The local Nazis met once a week
145 Bennecke argued that the party bans in Germany had little impact on
the development of the NSDAP outside Bavaria before November 1923: "The
groups were still small and were normally able to go undercover in other
völkisch groups or founded new ones. Only the public propaganda ... was
limited" (Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', p. 18).
146 In the Ruhrgebiet "there were only some few local branches, bases and
scattered single members, who only rarely knew something concrete about
each other and probably did not account for more than 500 persons" at the
beginning of 1923 (BOhnke, Ruhrgebiet, p. 54).
147 The NSDAP branches were: Zwickau, Chemnitz, Markneukirchen, Plauen,
Dresden, Leipzig, Meilen, Freiberg, Aue, Werdau, and Weida in Thuringia.
The NSDAP had bases in Mittweida, Radebeul, Adorf, Eibenstock, Klingenthal,
Falkenstein, Schneeberg, Schwarzenberg, Schandau, Gottleuba, Hohenstein-
Ernstthal, Niederschlema, Neumark, Wilkau, LOInitz, and ZwOnitz (BA DH, Z/C
17411, EK, Zwickau, 23.3.1923).
148 This remained so until the late 1920s. One indication for this was that the
NSDAP only won 4,455 out of its 19,549 votes (22.8 per cent) in places with
less than 10,000 citizens in the municipal elections in 1926 (StJbSa,
(1927/28)).
149 E.g. the forty-five people who attended an NSDAP meeting in Leipzig in
early 1923 came from the middle classes (except two workers) (BA DH, EK),
and twenty-seven early NSDAP supporters from Mei1en and Radeburg were
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in a pub (Versammlungslokal). 15° A common strategy of the
different branches did not exist yet. Only Tittmann made frequent
visits to Munich to inform himself about the latest strategies.'51
The most important factors explaining the presence or non-
presence of NSDAP branches before 1930 were to be found in
social, cultural, and economic conditions. It also depended on the
presence of devoted and active leaders.152
The Nazi districts coincided roughly with the largest administrative
units in the area, the Kreishauptmannschaften. The KH Chemnitz
and Zwickau were the heart of the movement and were loosely
controlled by Tittmann. Several reasons help to explain why the
Erzgebirge/Vogtland area became the earliest Nazi stronghold in
Saxony. First, socio-economic factors made sectors of the population
receptive to extreme right-wing ideas. 153 The closeness of south-
western Saxony to Munich and Bavaria was critical. 154 The
neighbourhood automatically fostered contacts between Nazis who
lived in the border area of both states, and Bavaria was a 'safe
haven' for the Saxon Nazis from persecution from the Saxon state
or the intimidation of the highly active working class. Furthermore,
the Nazis were able to move into a 'vacuum' regarding the
farmers, employers or workmen (Sächsische Staatszeirung, Nr. 237,
10.10.1923).
150 E.g. the Nazis in Plauen met every Wednesday at 6.30 p.m. in their local
pub (BA DH, Z/A VI 2029, PP Dresden an Mdl, 9.12.1922).
151 Ibid, Z/C 17411, EK, 'NS Sachsen'. The lose relationship of the NSDAP
branches with Munich was similar in other parts of Germany (Noakes,
Lower Saxony, p. 27).
152 Bennecke suggested the following analysis: "The development of
National Socialist branches did not take place according to a plan before
1930, but depended on local conditions. If there were no suitable people for
the development of the organisation, the areas were not sufficiently worked
on or even completely neglected" (Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', p. 14).
153 See the discussion about the earliest NSDAP branches above, and Part II.
154 Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', p. 17.
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existence of political parties on the far-right In the south-west of
Saxony in the early 1920s. It Is true that there were many
organ isations of the vOlkisch movement, but political parties,
particularly the DVFP, did not have a strong presence in the region.
The eastern part of Saxony, the region around the towns of Kamenz,
Bautzen, Lobau and Zittau - In sharp contrast to the south-western
part of the state - not only remained more or less untouched by
early Nazi efforts, but continued to be an area of comparative
wilderness for the movement until Hitler came to power. The lack
of Nazi infiltration in the first half of the 1920s can be partly
explained by its location. Not only was the region furthest away
from Bavaria, but also from the cradle of the Saxon Nazi movement,
the south-west. The party was still extremely small and badly
organised, and to some extent chance played a role in these early
years. 155
 More generally, however, particular soclo-economic
features made it difficult for the Nazis to gain a foothold in the
region. The percentage of Catholics was higher than anywhere else
in Saxony. 156
 This Catholic minority supported the Centre Party
throughout the years of the Republic. Moreover, there was the
existence of a liberal-bourgeois milieu especially in and around
Zittau. The combined Catholic, liberal-bourgeois and working-class
milieu in the area stood firm against serious Nazi Infiltration until
the end of the Republic.'57
155 BOhnke's assessment of the lack of Nazi infiltration into the rheinisch
region of the Ruhrgebiet in these years Is similar (Böhnke, Ruhrgebier, p.
53).
156 9.3 per cent of the population were Catholics in the KH Bautzen. This
compared to 3.0 per cent Catholics in the rest of Saxony (StJbSa, (1924/1926)).
157 See also F. Walter, 'Sachsen - En Stammiand der Sozialdemokratie',
Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 32 (2) (1991), pp. 207-231.
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In the KH Leipzig and the western part of the KH Dresden a few
Nazi activities started in late 1922. However, even there, the Nazi
irovement remained very small and insignificant in comparison to
the region of the Erzgeblrge/Vogtland until the early 193 Os. This
can be explained by competition from other vOlkisch organisations,
but particularly the great strength of the traditional working-class
parties in the area. On the whole, the land north of the line Plauen-
Zwickau-Mittweida-Meitcen-Dresden remained 'underdeveloped',
from the Nazi point of view, before 1930.
The first attempt to organise the few Nazi activists in the KHs
Leipzig and Dresden was made from activists in Mei1,en, who called
for a Nazi leadership meeting of north-west and east Saxony in
DObeln on 3 March 1923. It is noticeable that their colleagues from
the KHs Chemnitz and Zwickau were not present. Probably they
had not been invited as the Nazis in the north-west and east
Saxony tried to avoid domination by the older and larger branches
in the south-west. Even without them, most were not willing to
cede any kind of independence and rejected the creation of a
leadership for Saxony (Landesleitung). FOrster, the leader of
Leipzig, and others, also rejected the wish of some to work closely
with the DVFP which some suggested would be a powerful ally and
could prove useful in case of a party ban. FOrster was confident
that the NSDAP could look after itself and could work underground
if necessary. 158 Shortly after this meeting the Nazis in Zwickau
attempted to seize the initiative by overcoming the loose party
158 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, Polizei-Verhbr von FOrster, 11.5.1923. Throughout
Germany there were bitter disputes amongst Nazis about whether to join the
DVFP or to remain independent. In March 1923 Hitler accepted that Nazi
members could join the DVFP while the NSDAP was banned. The decision was
made easier as the NSDAP was still very weak in the north, the main area of
activity of the DVFP (BOhnke, Ruhrgebiet, p. 65).
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organisation and introducing central control in the whole of Saxony.
After consultation with Munich, they invited representatives from
all Saxon 1SDAP branches and bases to a leadership meeting in
Zwickau on 1 April 1923.' However, the ban for the NSDAP on 23
March shattered these plans. Instead of discussing the
centralization of the movement, Tittmann spoke about how to
behave in times of unrest. 160
 This was obviously already in
preparation for a planned coup attempt in Munich.
159 BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, Zwickau, 23.3.1923.
160 Ibid., Polizei-VerhOr von FOrster, 11.5.1923.
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4. The failed Hitler Putsch in November 1923
(i) Munich/Bavaria
Meanwhile, Hitler had become leader of the Kampfbund, which
coordinated the activities of the NSDAP and other right-wing
paramilitary groups in Bavaria. The Kampfbund and the Bavarian
government were increasingly determined to topple the national
government in Berlin. The idea was to march on Berlin along the
lines of Mussolini's 'March on Rome'. Noakes and Pridham argued
that they used "the excuse of the need to crush the left-wing
governments in Thuringia and Saxony which lay between Bavaria
and Berlin. They hoped to coordinate action with right-wing groups
in north Germany and in particular the Army." 161 However, when
the Reich government ordered the Army to remove the left wing
governments in Saxony and Thuringia from office in October 1923,
the Bavarian authorities and the Army commander von Seeckt
became hesitant regarding the coup plans. 162 Hitler, who was under
pressure from the enormous expectations he had built up among
his followers, decided to risk a coup in Munich. The attempted
Putsch in the Burgerbräukeller on 8 November 1923, collapsed the
following day. Hitler and other leaders of the putsch were arrested
and the Nazi Party was banned.
161 j. Noakes and G. Pridham (eds.), A Docwnentary Reader. Nazism 1919-
1945. 1: The Rise to Power 1919-1934 (Exeter, 1983), p. 27.
162 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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(ii) The Nazis in Saxony and the attempted Hitler Pu tsch
The Saxon Nazis, as party activists In other parts of Germany163,
were integrated in Hitler's preparations for a putsch against the
government In Berlin. The Saxon Nazis never gave up their
propaganda activities even after the party ban In March 1923.
However, Tittmann increasingly concentrated on the military
training of the local SA to be able to support his Bavarian
colleagues during a possible right-wing coup.164
The Saxon Nazis carried through several military exercises in the
Erzgebirge during this time. About a hundred party members from
Zwickau and Markneukirchen participated at a night exercise near
Aue at the end of April. 165 The Nazis exercised again in the
Erzgebirge in mid-May. This time they tried to get all members of
the Saxon SA together. About 120 Storm-troopers from Zwickau,
Chemnitz, Aue, Markneuklrchen, Schiema, Lugau-Olsnitz, Mittweida
and Annaberg participated. The SA from Freiberg, Mei1,en and
Leipzig did not turn up although they had confirmed their coming.
Nearly all of the participants were between sixteen and twenty
years old. What was noticeable was the "blind subordination"
towards Tittmann, "although Tittmann continuously gave wrong
commands and caused confusion due to his low voice." 166 Overall,
the exercises showed how seriously the Saxon Nazis tried to
163 E.g. the Nazis in Hanover and Gottingen (Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 38-
40).
164 In May 1925 the Saxon police reported on Nazi activities: According to
"reliable sources ... Bavaria ordered the Saxon leadership to set up two heavy
gun divisions. If needed, heavy guns will be brought in by lorries from
Bavaria ... It was put forward in a leadership meeting, that henceforth the
NSDAP is led strictly along military lines" (BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, PP Dresden,
11.5.1923).
165 Ibid., Bericht Uber NSDAP, Blatt 201.
166 Ibid., Blatt 203. A police officer had disguisedly participated in the
exercise. When it ended the police took six participants into custody (STA D,
AH Glauchau, Nr. 24, p. 15).
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prepare themselves for an eventual coup in Bavaria, and the extent
of the coordination between the local Nazis and the leadership in
Munich. 167
 At the same time, however, It became evident how
small the number of Nazi activists was, how limited their ability to
mobilize their support was, and how unprofessionally everything
was done.'68
After consultation with Munich, the Nazis moved the headquarters
of Saxony and Thuringia to nearby Hof in Bavaria at the end of
September 1923, and Tittmann became SA leader of Saxony,
Thuringia and Upper-Franconia. 169 Not only were they banned and
closely watched by the police and Proletarische Hundertschaften in
both states, but the closeness of Hof to the Bavarian capital also
made the coup preparations much easier. A coup seemed imminent
and the tensions were clearly building up. 170 After president Ebert
declared a state of emergency on 26 September 1923 and Hitler
started to rally his forces in Munich, Storm-troopers from Zwickau
and Werdau also went to Munich. 171 The plan for the remaining
Saxon Storm-troopers was to wait at home or local meeting places
167 Tittmann said in a speech during the exercise: "Bavaria might call upon
the local Storm-troopers soon." He advised all his Stonn-troopers to purchase
bread boxes, Leibriemen and small Schanzzeug and other things in
preparation for this. Tittmann also expressed the hoped that many of the
Saxon Storm-troopers would participate in a divisional exercise which would
take place in Munich several weeks later (BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, Bericht Uber
NSDAP, Blatt 199-200).
168 This became again evident when some Saxon Storm-troopers, who were
trained near Hof in early November, were forced to return home because of
food shortages (Stoschek, 'Entwicklung', p. 262).
169 NSDAPZwickau, p. 12.
170 Reports in the press frequently mentioned the dangers of a coup attempt
in Bavaria, and the police repeatedly found weapons and military plans
during house searches of Nazi activists (STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 128, Zwickau,
9.11.1923).
171 Of the sixteen Nazis who died during the attempted Hitler Putsch in
Munich, two came from Saxony (FI( 9.3.1939). For the following discussion
see Stoschek, 'Entwicklung', pp. 259 ff.
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for the orders to travel to Haidt, and then go forward together to
assist Hitler in Munich. The Saxon Nazis acted according to the plan,
but the sudden failure of the Hitler Putsch prevented their active
Involvement in Bavaria. Several of the Saxon Storm-troopers who
had stayed in Hof were taken in custody by the police when they
came back to their home towns after the putsch had collapsed.
Other Nazis were imprisoned due to their local activities. 172 Overall,
there were only a few, probably less than 150 activists, Involved in
all these developments. The first episode of the Nazi movement
ended in a fiasco throughout Germany. Moreover, only an
extremely tiny section of the local population identified with the
radical aims of the Nazi movement; the majority rejected Hitler's
Putsch attempt.173
172 E.g. Nazis from Freiberg were imprisoned when they came back from Hof
(NSDAP Freiberg, p. 6), and the local Nazi leader in Chemnitz was taken into
custody (NSDAP Chenmitz, p. 19).
173 STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 128, p.4.
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5. The NSDAP during the second period of Illegality
(November 1923 until January 1925)
(I) Bavaria/Germany
Hitler's assumption of responsibility for the Putsch during the
highly publicised trial for high treason in early 1924 made him a
hero of the vOlkisch movement In Germany. This ensured that
many supporters of the radical right looked to Hitler as the leader
they would wait for. However, the lack of his leadership during his
imprisonment led the banned NSDAP to disintegrate into rival
factions in 1924. Most of the former Nazi activists joined the
electoral alliance between the NSDAP and the DVFP during the
Reichstag elections in May and December 1924. 174
 During the first
election they formed the VSB, and then they merged to form the
NSFB in the second election. The DVFP clearly dominated the
election alliances in 1924: There were only nine Nazis among the
thirty-two candidates elected to the Reichstag in May 1924, and
only four Nazis out of fourteen elected in December that year.'75
While the NSDAP was mainly supported by members of the lower
middle classes, the DVFP also recruited many of its activists from
the former ruling classes and the higher middle classes. This
explains why the alliance with the DVFP was bitterly resisted by
some former Nazis, "particularly young people, who considered the
party too bourgeois in its social composition and political stye."176
The union between both parties came to an abrupt end when Hitler
174 The DVFP was an extreme anti-Semitic party. It was founded by former
leading members of the DNVP in December 1922 because of their
dissatisfaction with their party's lack of extreme racialist policies (Noakes,
Lower Saxony, p. 29).
175 Falter, Wahien, p. 43.
176 Noakes/Pridhani, Nazi sin, p. 36.
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was released from prison shortly after the December elections. He
took his followers out of the alliance and started to re-build the
NSDAP in early 1925. The leadership of the DVFP re-founded their
party under the new name Deutsch-VOlkische Freiheltsbewegung
(DVFB).
(ii) The Saxon Nazis during Hitler's imprisonment: the
development of the NSDAP in Saxony and its relations to other
right-wing parties
How did the Saxon Nazis react to the new party ban and Hitler's
imprisonment? The NSDAP organisation itself disintegrated. Only a
tiny number of hard-core Nazi activists, mainly Storm-troopers,
stayed together, and continued in their attempts to spread Nazi
ideas.' 77 The SA went undercover in the Frontbann. 178 It is
important to recall what Noakes rightly emphasized about the
situation of the völkisch movement in Germany at the time: "In
this early period there did not exist the disciplined parties within
the vOlkisch movement which were to emerge after 1925. The
situation was exceptionally fluid and confused ... It was only after
1925 that Hitler was successful in overcoming this multiple
membership of vOlkisch organizations, in order to create a
disciplined party." 79
 This was true in Saxony too where the
vOlkisch movement and all forces on the right, were split into
177 The Nazis in Markneukirchen and Chemnitz were active during 1924
(NSDAP Markneukirchen, pp. 19-22; NSDAP Chemnitz, p. 20), and in south-
western Saxony the Nazis started to build up an own newspaper, 'Der Streiter'
(Der Gau Sachsen, (1938), p. XVI). In Freiberg, however, only "a tiny
number" of Storm-troopers remained in touch and carried out walks in the
neighbourhood (NSDAP Freiberg, p. 14).
178 Sächsische SA, p. 28. The Frontbann was a paramilitary organisation
which was created by ROhm with former Free Corps and Army comrades in
1922 (K. D. Bracher, The Nazi Dictatorship (Middlesex, 1985), p. 170).
179 Noakes, Lower Saxony, p. 25.
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many different groups and organisations which often overlapped,
but also competed against each other.' 80 The vOlkisch movement
in Saxony only united in a fragile alliance when the situation
desperately needed It during election campaigns.181
Above, we have already noted the wide-ranging contacts between
Nazis and right-wing paramilitary organisations. Some members of
other paramilitary organisatlons even participated at SA
exercises. 182 As in other regions in Germany, the relationship of the
Saxon Nazis with other parties of the radical right varied from co-
operation to rivahy and competition. On the local level, much more
than on the provincial level, co-operation occurred frequently. The
lack of a tight and central party structure, and the pressure from
the Marxist governments In Saxony and the strong organised
working-class movement pulled together local supporters of
vOlkisch groups. 183 The Deutschsozialistische Partei (DsP) had
already lost its Influence in the region by mid-1922. 184 Whereas
180 Examples were the DSP's opposition to the VSB, or when in July 1924
opposition forces within the DVFP under Dr. Gronau split away from the VSB
in eastern Saxony and called themselves 'Nationalsozialistische Freiheits-
partei Ostsachsens'. Overall there were four different groups amongst the
vOlkisch political parties in Saxony at the time ('Vier vOlkische Richtungen
in Sachsen', MeiBner Tageblati; Nr. 160, 10.7.1924).
181 E.g. before the December 1924 Reichstag elections (see 'Zusammen-
schlu1 der vOlkischen Gruppen in Sachsen', Dresdner Nachrichten, Nr. 455,
3.11.24).
182 E.g. seven former members of the Deutschnationaler Jugendbund in
Chemnitz and members of the Jun gdo participated at the SA exercises in May
1923 (BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, Bericht Uber NSDAP; Zwickauer Tageblatt und
Anzeiger, 22.2.1924).
183 E.g. the Stahlhelm leader Wagner in Leipzig organised that members of
the StahTh elm, NSDAP and other supporters of vOlkisch groups attended a
consecration of a flag (Stoschek, 'Entwicklung', p. 269).
184 The DsP, similar to the DAP, had been founded in order to win over the
organized working class for the vOlkisch movement. Julius Streicher's
defection to the NSDAP in October 1922 lead to the final dissolution of the
party (D. Fricke (Hrsg.), Lexikon zur Parteiengeschichte. Die burgerlichen
und kleinburgerlichen Parteien und Verbãnde in Deutschland (1789-1945),
Band 2 (Leipzig, 1984), p. 548).
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the Saxon Nazis, as In the rest of the Republic, co-operated on many
occasions with the DVFP, their relation with the Deutschsozlale
Partei (DtsP) was much more determined by rivalry. 185 The DtsP
did not join the vOlkisch alliance between DVFP and NSDAP during
the elections to the Reichstag In 1924, and NSDAP and DtsP fought
hard to attract the others supporters. 186
 Overall, however, the DtsP
only proved to be a serious competitor for the NSDAP in the towns
of Dresden and Leipzig.187
Relations between Saxon Nazis and DVFP were much better. Before
the NSDAP was banned in Saxony in March 1923, it was the
increasing opinion of Nazis from north-west and east Saxony that
they should work more closely together with the DVFP, as the
latter would be a powerful ally and could prove useful in case of a
party ban. 188
 However, the Nazis' intentions became pointless when
the DVFP was baned in Saxony too. 189 As in the rest of Germany,
the NSDAP and DVFP, but also other vOlkisch groups, allied during
the elections to the Reichstag in May and December 1924. 190 After
the failed Hitler putsch most of the Saxon Nazi activists went under
cover in the VSB. 191
 In Saxony, in contrast to most other regions,
the VSB and NSFB were dominated by local Nazis. The Saxon
intelligence service reported in February 1924 that the VSB was
185 The DtsP was founded by the extreme anti-Semite Richard Kunze in
Berlin in October 1921 (Fricke, Parteien, p. 81).
186 E.g. seventy-five members of the DtsP branch in Marienberg joined the
NSDAP in September 1924 (STA D, SaStKa, Nr. 135, Chemnitz, 25.9.1924).
187 In November 1923 the Saxon inteffigence noted that the DtsP did "not
possess a special significance" (BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, Deutschsoziale Partei,
15.11.1923).
188 Ibid., Polizei-VerhOr von FOrster, 11.5.1923; and Blatt 99-100.
189 The DVFP was baned in Saxony in early April 1923 (STA D, AH Glauchau,
Nr. 24, PP Chemrntz, 4.4.1923).
190 E.g. the DVSTB and Deutscher Herold joined the VSB in the KH Leipzig
(ibid., SäStKa, Nr. 134, Leipzig, 27.5.1924).
191 See 'Em Leben für Deutschland', FK, 9.3.1939.
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more or less Identical with the former NSDAP.' 92 This was certainly
true for most of Saxony, as two of the three election lists of the VSB
and DVFP were headed by Nazis. Only in the KH Leipzig, where the
DVFP had more Influence than the NSDAP, a candidate of the
former party was heading the election list. 193 Furthermore, the
leadership of the Saxon VSB and NSFB were held by Nazis (first by
Tittmann, then by Mutschmann). At the Deutscher Tag in Plauen In
October 1924 and other similar events, the Saxon Nazis vowed their
loyalty to Hitler.194
Table 2 shows that the vOlkisch alliances did not do well in both
Reichs tag elections. In May It was 0.1 per cent above the average
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Chemnitz	 24,385 (2.7)	 1,730 (0.2)
	
41,497 (4.4)
Saxony	 37,725 (1.6)	 10,356 (0.4)	 74,343 (2.7)	 5,549 (0.2)
Reich	 810,127 (2.6) 266,370 (0.9)
VSAG (VOlkisch-soziale Arbeitsgemeinschaft) : DVFB and DtsP; VNB:
VOJkjsch-natjonaler Blocic DVFB and DtsP. 1: DtsP and Reichsbund für
A ufwertung.
Source: StJbSa, (1924/26, 1927/28); Falter, Wahien.
192 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11130, Politische Abteilung, 8.2.1924.
193 In the December 1924 Reichstag elections MUcke headed the election list
of the NSFB in the district of Dresden, and Feder, Tittmann, Waisleben and
Blume headed the list in Chemrntz/Zwickau. All of them were Nazis. The
DVFP's only candidate with chance of election was Emil Fritsch, who headed
the list in Leipzig. He was elected to the Reichstag in May 1924. Tittmann was
elected for the NSDAP in May, and Feder in December that year.
194 See 'Em Häuflein', FK, Nr. 143, 24.5.1935.
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in the Reich, but dropped to 0.7 per cent below the average in
December. It is striking that the VSB gained most of Its votes in the
KH Leipzig in the town of Leipzig Itself, whereas its electoral
support was much more evenly spread In urban and rural areas In
the KHs Chemnitz/Zwlckau.' 95 Moreover, when one looks closely at
some election results at the local level some striking election
results for the NSDAP become apparent (see Table 3). The Nazis not
only scored astonishing election results far above the national
average in the area of the Vogtland in the May elections, but they
were also able to keep the election results in these strongholds
Table 3: Percentage of the votes for the VSB and NSFB in some towns and











Source: StDR, (1924, Band 315).
above the 10 per cent mark in December. The Nazis were able to
mobilize voters In towns like Piauen and Werdau as well as in the
AHs Oelsnitz and Plauen. The area of the Vogtland, an extremely
industrialised region which was dominated by small and medium
scale textile Industry, was a stronghold of the vOlklsch
movement. 196 This area continued to be the greatest Nazi bastion in
195 StI)R, (1924), Band 315.
196 A monthly report of the Saxon intelligence service in September 1924
stated: "Scharnhorstbund, Stahiheim, Wehrwolf, Jungdo organised public
meetings, like consecration of flags, founding of local branches, exercises in
the countryside. The vOlkisch idea is winning ground particularly in
western Saxony, mainly in the Vogtland and Erzgebirge" (STA D, SäStKa, Nr.
135).
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Saxony and became one of the greatest NSDAP strongholds In the
Republic.
A significant event was Martin Mutschmann's appointmrnt as
provincial leader (Landeslelter) of the vOlklsch alliance in Saxony
in Weimar in August 1924.197 Mutschmann probably received the
post because of his position as established textile manufacturer in
Plauen' 98 and his determined appearance' 99. He was extremely
anti-Semitic200, nationalist and worried about his business because
of the impact of the First World War and the November Revolution.
This watershed signalled Mutschmann's rise as NSDAP leader in
the state and the simultaneous emergence of Plauen as Nazi centre
in Saxony.
197 NSDAP Zwickau , p. 13. He succeeded Tittmann who had occupied the post
in the first half of the year. Martin Mutschmann, born on 9.3.1879 in
Hirschberg/Saale, was dismissed from the army in December 1916 with the
'Iron Cross' Second Class due to a wound he received in Verdun. He joined the
NSDAP in April 1922 (BDC).
198 Mutschmann owned a lace factory in Plauen since 1907 (Mal
'Mutschmann', p. 21).
199 Goebbels described him as a "decent, brutal leader" (E. FrOhlich (Hrsg.),
Die Tagebucher von Joseph Goebbels. Särnthche Fragmente (Munchen, New
York, London, Paris, 1987), 1925 XI 23).
200 Before he joined the NSDAP Mutschmann was member of the DVSTB. In
one of his many extremely anti-Semitic speeches he said in Weimar in June
1931: "The day of reckoning will come and the synagogues will smoke" (Zum
sechzigsten Geburtstag von Gauleiter Mutschmann. Markante Worte von
Martin Mutschinann (Gauverlag, 1939)).
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6. The NSDAP from Its re-founding In 1925 untIl 1928
(i) Germany
The Importance of the period between 1925 until 1928 for the
NSDAP was the creation of an efficient organization and
administrative structure which enabled the Nazis to exploit the
crisis which began in the late 1920s. The disintegration of the
NSDAP during 1924 proved "the indispensability of Hitler to the
movement. Without his unifying influence and strong leadership,
the somewhat fissiparous NSDAP was a political nonentity." 20 ' The
most crucial consequence of the failed Beerhall Putsch was Hitler's
adoption of a new political strategy when he was released in
December 1924: Hitler decided to work within the Constitution and
attempt to win power through elections. Not only did this allow him
to re-found the party again In February 1925, but "the NSDAP's
overall character underwent a fundamental change. It ceased being
exclusively dependent on an elite of fanatical followers oriented
towards putschlsm. Instead It became more and more after 1925
an evolutionary movement of totalitarian aims, eager for electoral
success." 202 The consequences of this new strategy were twofold.
First, the organisation of the party changed In order to appeal to
the masses. This explains the development of several ancillary
NSDAP organisations after 1925. Second, the NSDAP began to
develop significantly outside Bavaria. 203 It was in northern, central
and eastern parts of the country that the NSDAP made the most
progress. After his release Hitler also rejected all future alliances
201 Stachura, 'Strategy', p. 267. For the importance of Hitler's leadership
among the Nazis in Lower Saxony see Noakes, Lower Saxony, p. 58.
202 Stachura, 'Strategy', p. 268.
203 Ibid., p. 269.
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with other vOlklsch groups and continued to build up a strictly
authoritarian style of leadership. Everyone who refused to "equate
the völkisch movement with Hitler as FUhrer' made himself an
enemy of the NSDAP.204
(ii) The re-founding of the NSDAP in Saxony
The period after 1925 saw the rise of Martin Mutschmann, a loyal
Hitler supporter205 , as the undisputed Nazi leader in Saxony. Hitler
officially ordered him to re-build the organisation in Saxony at the
end of March206, and was full of praise for Mutschmann's work at
the annual party meeting in Weimar a year later: "The struggle of
last year was difficult, particularly during summer. There were
regions where we were able to come out on top right away,
especially in Saxony. There the leader Mutschmann has currently
taken Saxony into his firm control, brought it united into the
NSDAP, and kept it in an exemplary way in his hands so that no
counter current could develop." 207 The extremely fragmented
Saxon Nazi movement made great progress to become a centralised
and efficient party. However, it was a slow process before the
NSDAP became the strongest force on the radical right and its
influence remained limited to western Saxony. Overall the party
was still only a small political force by early 1929. Its main
characteristics were its radicalism, and enormous propaganda
activities. The number of Nazi districts grew in Saxony and
204 Noakes, Lower Saxony, p. 59.
205 Apparently he visited Hitler several times in prison in Landsberg (see
'Em Hauflein Fanatiker erobert Sachsen', FK, Nr. 143, 24.5.1935).
206 See 'Die NSDAP in Sachsen', Sachsen, (2) (1938), P. 2.
207 v, 26.5.1926.
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reflected the continuous growth of the movement. The NSDAP had
five districts after the re-organisation In 1925 208 , eight In 1928209,
nine In 1929, fourteen in the first half of 1930, eIghteen in the
second half of the year, twenty-one In 1931 and finally one district
for each 4J-J 210
There was an appeal to former Nazi activists to join the re-founded
NSDAP in Saxony In January 1925. 2 11 The leaders of the Saxon
DVFB decided unanimously to join the NSDAP In late February.212
As In other parts In Germany, there were meetings in which the
vOlkisch party locals discussed the polItical situation and whether
to join the NSDAP or DVFB. 213
 The groups who joined the NSDAP
started to meet again once a week. 214
 In contrast to the Nazis In
north and western Germany215 , the Saxon Nazi leaders had no
quarrels with the headquarters in Munich, did not voice radical
socialist tendencies, and did not condemn participation in
elections.216
 Hitler spoke several times In Saxony in 1925 217, and
various prominent Nazi leaders toured the state from the second
208 The NSDAP had about 3000 members organised in five districts (each
headed by a Gauleiter) and thirty-five party branches in autumn 1925 (STA
D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, October 1925).
209 The districts (Arbeitsgebiere, or Unter-Gaue) were: Vogtland, Zwickau,
Chemnitz, Freiberg, Leipzig, Dresden, Bautzen, Zittau (NS.tS, Nr. 25, 24.6.1928).
21O Jr Gau Sachsen, p. XVII.
211 See 'Aufruf an die Nationalsozialisten Sachsens!', Der Streiter, 17.1.1925.
212 See 'Die vOlkischen Sachsens für Hitler', LNN, Nr. 56, 25.2.1925.
213 STA D, SaStKa, Nr. 134.
214 See 'Sachsen', DerStreiter, Nr. 8, 28.2.1925.
215 The Nazis in north and western Germany set up a working group in
September 1925 which represented an amalgam of "national bolshevik
ideas", "elitist racial extremists" (against participation in elections), "the
desire to participate in the formation of policy", and a reluctance to confirm
to the centralizing tendencies from Munich (Noakes, Lower Saxony, p. 84).
216 E.g. the Nazis in Plauen participated in municipal elections in early 1925.
217 Hitler spoke in Plauen in June (where he attended a leadership meeting
of Saxony) and in Zwickau in July 1925 (STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 132, Juni-Juli
1925). He was banned to speak in Chemnitz in July (ibid., Mdl, Nr. 11126/6,
Juli 1925), but gave a short speech in Plauen on the way through in early






half of 1925 onwards. 218 The Nazi leadership In Munich paid great
attention to the movement In Saxony. An article in a local SPD
newspaper which speculated that Hitler would move his
headquarters from Munich to Zwlckau, shows how much the local
Table 4: NSDAP party members in Saxony and the Reich (ranking of
Saxony among all thirty-two Ga ue in brackets)219
Party entry	 Saxony
before 14.9.1930	 11,383 (1)
between 15.9.1930-
30.1.1933	 75,696 (1)
before 30.1.1933	 87,079 (1)
Source: NSDAP Parteistatistik 1935.
Table 5: Local NSDAP party branches and bases in Saxony and the Reich




1928	 132 (1)	 1,378
1930	 341 (2)	 4,964
1932	 783 (4)	 11,845
Source: NSDAP Parteistatistik 1935.
vOlkisch movement was regarded as loyal to Hitler. 22 ° Indeed,
although Saxony was was only a middle-size Nazi Gau, it had by
far the largest population of all Nazi Gaue and was ranked between
first and fourth of all Gaue in terms of the number of party
branches and bases before 1933 (see Tables 4 and 5).
218 Dinter, Feder, Goebbels, several other Nazi leaders, and particularly G.
Strasser, spoke in many different places in Saxony between 1925-26.
219 Recently Jurgen Falter argued convincingly that the membership
figures in the NSDAP Parteistatistik are too high as they do not account for
the high number of those who left the party (J. F. Falter, 'Die Jungmitglieder
der NSDAP zwischen 1925 und 1933. Em demographisches und soziales Profil',
in W. R. Krabbe (Hrsg.), Politische Jugend in der Weimarer Republik
(Bochum, 1993), p. 209)). The figures, however, are still useful to look at
Saxony's standing in the Reich.
220 See 'Hitler will nach Sachsen gehen', LVZ, Nr. 147, 27.6.1925.
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(ill) Characteristic features of the Saxon Nazi movement
The most characteristic feature of the Nazi movement after its re-
founding was its liveliness. The Nazis were by far the busiest
organisation on the radical right, and one of the most active parties
from the end of 1925 onwards. In a typical report the police noted
in early 1926: "The NSDAP was publicly the most active among all
the parties on the right. The Party developed a level of activity,
which is only comparable with the KPD." 221 Active Nazi branches
organised one internal meeting every week 222 , and set up monthly
plans with a schedule of events. Furthermore, Nazis played a
prominent role in vOlkisch meetings like Deutsche Tage and on
other occasions.223 However, even the Nazis ceased most of their
propaganda during the summer vacations 224 , and they were not
able to match the output of agitation of other parties during
election campaigns until 192 8.225
Most visitors at Nazi meetings were political enemies until the
early 1930s. About two-thirds of all visitors at a Goebbels meeting
In Chemnitz were Communists in November 1925. 226 The Nazis
often had problems carrying out their programme, or were
221 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, April 1926.
222 E.g. the NSDAP branch in Zwickau met every Thursday for a talk and an
internal discussion (NSfS, Nr. 9, 2.5.1926).
223 E.g. at the Deutscher Tag in Aue in May 1925,which was visited by 5400
people and also attended by Ludendorif, there were swastika-flags and
pictures of Hitler placed in several windows in the town (STA D, SaStKa, Nr.
131, Aue, 2/3.5.1925).
224 E.g. the Nazis described it as a great risk to orgamse a meeting in St.
Egidien during the summer vacation in August 1926 (NSIS, Nr. 23, 8.8.1926).
225 E.g. see the number of public meetings of political parties in the KH
Dresden before the 1928 Reichstag elections: SPD: 119, KPD: 85, DNVP: 41,
DDP: 27, DVP: 25, NSDAP: 18 (STA D, KH Dresden, Nr. 262, Ma! 1928).
226 Ibid., Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, November 1925. This was similar in the Ruhr area
(BOhnke, Ruhrgebiet, p. 122).
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sometimes thrown out by political opponents. 227 Nazi meetings
frequently ended in meeting-room-brawls as they continued to be
visited by Marxist supporters.
It Is noteworthy that the official NSDAP newspaper In Saxony, the
Nationale Sozlalist für Sachsen (NSfS) and later the Sächslscher
Beobachter (SB) were published by the Kampfverlag In Berlin.228
The Saxon Nazis did not possess their own newspaper before they
founded Der Freiheitskampf (FK) In August 1930. The newspaper
was crucial for the growth of the movement. It functioned as a
newsletter which announced all events In Saxony, but also
provided the activists with information about Nazi ideology and
politics.229 This was Important during a time when no sophisticated
central leadership existed.
The Saxon Nazis were noticeable for their radical and aggressive
propaganda, and did not stick to commonly accepted codes of
behaviour In their agitation. The police reported: "There were lively
and objective discussions about the Locarno Treaty and the League
of Nations In November 1925, except for a few organisations like
the NSDAP which launched tasteless attacks against the
President." 230 Typical were their warnings of what they would do
to their opponents once they were In power. 231 Furthermore,
227 Communists broke up a Nazi meeting in one of the great venue halls in
Leipzig in March 1926 (NSfS, Nr. 8, 25.4.1926).
228 The NSfS, a weekly newspaper, existed from March 1926 until it was
replaced by the SB in January 1929. Its section 'Nachrich ten aus Sachsen'
covered the state in one to two pages and it became the official Saxon NSDAP
newspaper in October 1927, replacing the VOlkische Nachrich ten für
Sachsen (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Dezember 1926).
229 Also see Noakes, Lower Saxony, p. 101.
230 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, November 1925.
231 The NSfS expressed: "Hopefully God will give us the strength ... to the
day, when we wifi take revenge for all the disgrace one has done to us for
ten years ... We will not forget anything!" (NSIS, Nr. 36, 9.9.1928).
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extreme anti-Semitism 232 , and physical violence continued to play
a crucial part In the local Nazi movement. A Communist was killed
at a çarty rally with Goebbels in Chemnitz, and the police reported
that the Nazis in Dresden "systematically disturbed" meetings of
the Democrats at the end of 1925. 233 Meeting-room-brawls
between Nazis and Communists caused the Saxon Ministry of the
Interior to decree preventive measures against increased violence
In spring 1926. 234 However, the violence between both groups
continued and the Nazis proclaimed repeatedly in public their
readiness to "answer Communist terror with even greater
terror."235
(iv) Ancillary organisations of the Saxon NSDAP
Another general phenomenon of the NSDAP was the development
of various ancillary NSDAP organisations after 1925. There was the
creation of Nazi women's groups236 , scientific associations 237 , a
group for salaried employees 238 , a freedom union
232 E.g. members of the SS ambushed Polish Jews in Plauen in October 1926,
and the police reported several molestations of Jewish citizens (STA D, Mdl,
Nr. 11126/6, Oktober 1926). The Nazi branch of Markneukirchen hung up
placards with the text 'Death to the Jews' (NSfS, Nr. 25, 24.6.1928).
233 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, November 1925. Lu contrast to Saxony, Nazi
meetings seemed to be peaceful in the Ruhr area until 1928 (BOhnke,
Ruhrgebiet p. 111).
234 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, April 1926.
235 NSIS, Nr. 14, 3.4.1927.
236 The NSDAP women's group (NSF) in Plauen was created in July 1925, and
in DObein in September 1926 (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Juli 1925; NSfS, Nr. 27,
5.9.1926). Elsbeth Zander, leader of the Deutsche Frauenorden (DFO), held
several meetings in Saxony which led to the creation of several branches of
the DFO. The DFO was officially incorporated into the NSDAP in early 1928
(NSIS', Nr. 2, 15.1.1928).
237 The scientific association of the NSDAP in Dresden organised two talks by
Professor Gregor on 14/15.5.1926 (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Mai 1926).
238 The Nazis in Dresden founded a group for salaried employees in March
1927 (NSIS, Nr. 17, 24.4.1927). Leaders and members of the German Nationalist
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(Freih el tsbund) 2 39, organisations to attract the middle classes2 40,
and the Saxon students Tempel and Podlich founded the National
Socialist Studer.t Association (NSStB) in early 1926 241 . Leipzig was
the seat of the NSStB from winter 1926 until Baldur von Schirach
succeeded Tempel as Reich leader In mid-1928. 242 The Nazis also
carried out sport activities 243 , organised nationalist celebrations at
the border regions (Grenzlandtag) 244 , and the NSIS started to cover
municipal politics and local art245.
One of the earliest and most important ancillary organisations was
the GroIdeutscheJugendbewegung (GDJ B), founded in 1924.246
The GDJB was led by Kurt Gruber from Plauen, had adopted the
"Fuhrerprinzip, sworn allegiance to Hitler and acknowledged the
vOlkisch idea", but "was still organisatlonally independent of the
Commercial Employees' Association turned up to an NSDAP meeting for
salaried employees in Leipzig in early 1928 (ibid., Nr. 4, 29.1.1928).
239 Ibid., Nr. 37, 11.9.1927.
240 The Nazis reported about the infiltration of apprenticeship unions and
guilds, particularly of the baker apprenticeships in Leipzig (ibid., Nr. 39,
30.9.1928).
241 See A. Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund.
Studen ten und Nationalsozialismus in der Weimarer Repu bilk (Düsseldorf,
1973), p. 37.
242 STA D, Mdl, 11126/2, June 1928.
243 Ibid., Nr. 11126/6, Oktober 1926.
244 E.g. Nazis from Saxony, Thuringia, Bavaria, and the 'suppressed
Bohemian brothers' met in September 1928 in Adorf/Vogtland (NSfS, Nr. 35,
31.8.1928).
245 Ibid., Nr. 31, 5.8.1928. The NSIS had a frequent column about local
theatre and music productions from 1928 onwards (ibid., Nr. 41, 14.10.1928).
246 The GDJB was a successor of various v011dsch youth organisations Kurt
Gruber had created from 1922 onwards. He had established a branch of the
Jugendbund, the first NSDAP youth organisation, in Plauen in October 1922.
Gruber then was appointed leader of the Saxon Jugendbund. The branch in
Plauen continued its activities as Wandersportverein Vogtland during the
time of the party ban in 1923. In 1924, Gruber affiliated his group with
Lenk's GDJB. While Lenk's organisation in the south failed within a few
months, "Gruber enjoyed considerable success in Saxony." Gruber published
a newspaper and "there was a total of fifty-six branches in Saxony,
representing 2500 members in December 1924" (P. D. Stachura, Nazi Youth in
the Weimar Republic (Santa Barbara, Oxford, 1975), pp. 13-14).
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NSDAP." 247 Until the GDJB was officially absorbed Into the NSDAP In
summer 1926, Kurt Gruber was anxious to retain Independence for
his movement, and to :emain loyal to the ideas of his youth
movement. This explains his unwillingness to be incorporated by
Hitler Into the Schilljugend248 , and a declaration of the GDJB in
which they rejected bourgeois tendencies within the NSDAP in
spring 1926.249 The great success of the Saxon GDJB, which
established a widespread organisational network and membership
throughout the state and in particular in the Vogtland250, had
important consequences. First, the Saxon GDJB quickly spread Into
Mecklenburg, Franconia, the Rhineland, and Rheinpfalz 251 , and
became the official NSDAP youth organisation, the Hitler Youth
( HJ), in July 1926. Kurt Gruber, who lead the organisation from his
headquarter in Plauen, became the first leader of the HJ.252
Additionally, the strength of the GDJB and later the HJ in Saxony253,
facilitated and helped the work of the local NSDAP.
It was crucial for the Nazis to be organised among the youth, one of
the most active groups in public life during the Weimar Republic.
247 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
248 The Schilljugend was founded and led by the former member of the
Freikorps and ROhm friend, Gerhard RoI,bach (ibid., p. 16).
249 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Marz 1926. However, Stachura's assessment that
the GDJB was the "youth auxiliary of the party in all but the name" In the
first half of 1926, seems accurate (Stachura, Nazi Youth, p. 16).
250 In autumn 1925 Gruber claimed that the GDJB's organisational structure
was nearly completed. Saxony was divided in five Gaue (Dresden, Chemnitz,
Zwickau, Vogtland, and Leipzig). Vogtland was the strongest Gau with 600
members at the end of 1924 (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Oktober 1925). The
Vogtland was the national centre of Nazi youth organisations at the time (H.-
C. Brandenburg, Die Geschichte der HJ. Wege und Iriwege einer Generation(KOin, 1982), p. 25.
251 Stachura, Nazi Youth, p. 15.
252 Brandenburg, I
-LI, pp. 26-29.
253 The HJ members of Saxony accounted for 10.9 per cent of all HJ members
in the Reich in early 1931 (1428 Out of 13130), and 8.8 per cent in early 1932
(3008 out of 34121). Calculated from Stachura, Nazi Youth, Appendix VIII.
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The Saxon police reported the repeated participation of youth of all
age groups at all political, cultural and sports events in 1925.254
Many of the local vOlkisch youth organisations sympathized
strongly with the NSDAP. The branch of the Wiklngbund in
Zwickau (twenty-four members) declared its unreserved loyalty to
Hitler, and members of the Wehrjugendbund Schill in Dresden
(thirty-six members of age between fourteen and twenty) wore
Hitler-jackets and symbols of the NSDAP. 25 Despite the fact that
only few members of the organised youth movement sympathized
with the NSDAP during the Weimar Republic 256 , and the overall
comparatively small size of the GDJB or later HJ In Saxony, the
determination and devotion of these hard-core Nazi activists
contributed to the enormous propaganda of the local NSDAP.
Between 18.-31.1O.1928 the NSDAP in the district of Freiberg
organised seven meetings which were protected by the SA, and the
local HJ organised four meetings and participated at one Deutscher
Tag.257
(v) The development of the SA in Saxony
Due to the failed coup attempt Hitler decided to change the SA from
a military formation into a more political one in order to conciliate
the army, and have more control for himself. 258 The Frontbann
had not been replaced by the SA in Saxony by the end of 1925.259
254 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, August 1925.
255 Ibid., Juli 1925.
256 See P. D. Stachura, 'German Youth, the Youth Movement and National
Socialism in the Weirnar Republic', in P. D. Stachura, The Nazi Mach tergrei-
fung (London, Boston, Sydney, 1983), pp. 68-84.257 NSTh Nr. 41, 14.10.1928.
258 Stachura, 'Strategy', pp. 270-271.
259 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Oktober 1925.
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The Nazis explained that this was due to lack of money. The truth
was, however, that the Saxon Frontbann had not completely
submitted Itself to Hitler, as they had declared loyalty to both
Hitler and Ludendorff. 260 In early 1926 the leaders of the Saxon
Frontbann discussed its relationship with the NSDAP and decided
to break away immediately if the Nazis created Schutzstaffeln
disguised as rambling units.261 In summer 1926, however, the
majority of the Saxon Frontbann joined the SA262, and there was
an official call to create SA units in all party branches 263 . The
timing of this development was similar In other parts of
Germany.264
The former Saxon SA leader Bennecke described the sacrifices of
time, money and physical exhaustion of the young members of the
Frontbann, and later SA, in order to attend vOlkisch celebrations
and to agitate for the party. He recalled that the most active SA
members were young and unmarried. This only changed because of
an influx of older unemployed from 1929 onwards. He states that
he was the oldest in his unit at twenty-three years of age in
Dresden in 1925. The common feelings which held the members of
the unit together, were an interest in military affairs and in
nature.265
 As in other parts of Germany, "the NSDAP attracted all
260 Ibid., September 1925, November 1925. The Frontbann in Leipzig was
split into two factions in November 1925 (ibid.).
261 The Frontbann leaders even declared they would wear a black arm band
with a red cross instead the swastika if an SA was created (ibid., Januar 1926).
262 The majority of the Frontbann in Plauen joined the SA in July 1926. All
members of the Frontbann in Chemnitz joined the local SA in the same
month (ibid., Juli 1926). After ROhm disagreed with Hitler on the role of the
revived SA (he favoured a military role rather than a political one), he
resigned as leader in May 1926.
263 NSIS, Nr. 25, 22.8.1926.
264 E.g. the Frontbann in Stettin were all enroled in the NSDAP by mid-1926
(Bessel, Political Violence, p. 16).
265 Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', p. 23.
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the most anti-bourgeois elements in the vOlkisch movement -
predominantly students, apprentices and young white collar.
workers." 266 Parallel to the Frontbann's conversion t the SA, the
first branches of the SS were founded in Saxony in summer
1926.267
The Saxon SA, as in other regions in Germany, grew slowly, and
was still a small force in 1929. Bennecke estimates that the SA in
the KHs Leipzig and Dresden only had about 600 members each by
1929.268 Several factors explain this. It was linked with the slow
expansion of the party Itself, and the existence of other
paramilitary organisations. The SA was only one paramilitary
organisation among many. According to the Saxon police Jun gdo
and Stahiheim were the strongest organisations on the radical
right in mid-1925. 269
 Additionally, there was a "boom" in the
founding of small organisations on the radical right. Seven new
right-wing organisations were founded in September 1925
alone. 270
 Most of the members of these paramilitary organisations
resisted initial Nazi attempts to attract them. Storm-troopers who
tried to win over right wing activists during a meeting of
paramilitary organisations in Grimma, were forcefully thrown
out.271
 The SA was only slowly able to absorb these activists on the
far right. 272
 Continuous disputes between other paramilitary
266 Noakes, Lower Saxony, p. 86.
267 At the end of 1926 the police reported that the SS protected Nazi meetings
and handed out leaflets. At the time there were 951 SS members organised in
seventy-five squadrons in Saxony (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Dezember 1926).
268 Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', p. 24.
269 The police also reported that the Jun gdo attracted most supporters
among the rural youth (STA D, SaStKa, Nr. 132, Mai 1925).
270 Ibid., Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, September 1925.
271 NSIS, Nr. 42, 16.10.1927.
272 E.g. when the local branch of the Wehrwolf in Plauen was dissolved in
spring 1926 eighteen members joined the Frontbann ( STA D, Mdl, Nr.
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organisations 273 , their failure to unite all forces on the radical
right274 , and their slow disintegration from 1927 onwards were
crucial in driving their members to the SA 275 . The Nazis managed
to win over many of these devoted activists of the far right by
1930 and benefited from the foundation other paramilitary
organisations had laid. The NSDAP held its first meeting in
Olbernhau/Erzgebirge in spring 1928. The seeds sown by other
right-wing paramilitary organisations largely explains why
Olbernhau later became a Nazi stronghold, gaining 23.1 per cent in
the 1930 Reichstag elections.276 Additionally, the local Nazis were
able to build up branches with former members of the vOlkisch
movement who had stopped their activities in the course of the
first half of the 1920s. 277 The influx of these supporters from the
radical right into the NSDAP in the second half of the 1920s was
crucial for the continuously growing propaganda activity of the
Nazi party.
11126/6, April 1926). When the Hermannsbund in Leipzig (former
Sta.hlhelm members) was dissolved at the end of 1928, most of the activists
joined the NSDAP, the rest went back to the Stahiheim (ibid., Nr. 11126/3,
Marz 1929).
273 In May 1927 the police in the KB Dresden speculated that the discord and
publicly fought disputes had a paralysing effect on the work of Stahlhejm,
Jungdo, and Wiking in their districts (ibid., KH Dresden, Nr. 262, Mal 1927).
274 The attempt of the leading paramilitary organisations in Saxony
(Jungdo, Stahlhelm, Wehrwolf, Wiking Bund, Reichsflagge, and also Bund
der Frauen) to form a united movement on the right in defence against the
left failed at the end of 1926 (ibid., Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, September 1926).
275 A slow process of dissolution of these nationalist organisations took place
after the radical right failed to unite in 1926. The Saxon police observed the
trend among various paramilitary organisations that individual leaders tried
to form independent organisations (ibid., Dezember 1926).
276 NSIS, Nr. 17, 29.4.1928.
277 E.g. the foundation of a NSDAP branch in Bockau (near Aue) was facili-
tated because there had been a branch of the VSB in the village before. All
former members joined the NSDAP in autumn 1926 (ibid., Nr. 31, 3.10.1926).
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(vi) Limits and success of the NSDAP in Saxony
The NSDAP faced several obstacles in Its expansion in Saxony until
the late 1920s. The unification of the disintegrated Nazi movement
into the re-founded NSDAP was a slow process: "In Dresden as in
other bigger towns there were various groups and factions, who
often fought each other claiming they were the true
representatives of Hitler and of the National Socialist party."278
Gauleiter Mutschmann needed several years to impose his sole
control over the movement and create a central command
structure. Until mid-1926, Saxony was divided into several Gaue.
Mutschmann's control as Lan desleiter (state leader) varied
considerably within Saxony. He had continuous problems in eastern
Saxony279, where Hellmuth von MUcke even attempted to establish
his own Gau in 1927. 280 Mutschmann's control over western
Saxony was much tighter. He had no problem in merging Gau
Chemnitz and Freiberg and appointed a loyal follower as new
leader. 28 ' His authority was considerably strengthened because of
a reorganisation at the annual party meeting in Weimar in July
1926. The Saxon Gaue lost much of their status and were renamed
Unter-Gaue, and Landesverband Saxony became Gau Saxony with
Mutschmann at the top. 282 Compared with other Gaue,
278 Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', p. 21.
279 Mutschmann removed the leader of eastern Saxony and Dresden from
their offices in late 1926 (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Oktober 1926). In early
1928 Mutschmann dissolved the branch of Dresden and submitted the
individual members to the central control of Plauen (VB, Nr. 12, 15.1.1928).
Strasser, Mutschmann, and Fritsch were present when the branch was re-
founded in February 1928. They made sure that the former leaders were not
allowed to re-enter the party, and that the loyal Hermann Gerischer was
made leader of the branch (STA D, Mdl, 11126/2, Februar 1928).
280 See 'Helmuth von MUckes FUhrerpersOnllchkeit', SB, Nr. 34, 25.8.1929.
281 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Februar 1926.
282 It is likely that Mutschmann received the title Gauleiter on this occasion
(ibid., August 1926).
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Mutschmann's hold over his movement, at least in western Saxony,
was comparatively firm283 , and he belonged to the most important
Gauleiter of the NSDAP284 . He tried very hard to impose his
authority over the local movement by appointing loyal people Into
important positions 285 , and was particularly sensitive when his
chain of command as Gauleiter to the headquarters in Munich was
undermined by iocal party branches.286
It took a long time before the leadership principle was practised in
the appointment of local leaders. Most NSDAP branches functioned
like normal clubs and elected their leader in annual, democratic
elections. 287 A Nazi leader in Dresden complained about
widespread Verelnsmeierel in various local branches in autumn
1929. He stressed that the NSDAP organisation was built up around
leadership and not democratic principles, and found It Incredible
that in many cases the members and not the branch leaders had
drawn up the list for the council elections.288
283 P. HUttenberger, Die Gauleiter. Studie zum Wandel des Mach tgefuges in
derNSDAP (Stuttgart, 1969), p. 39.
284 Before Hitler excluded Dinter, the Thuringia leader, from the NSDAP, he
asked his seven most important Gauleiter, including Mutschmann, about
their opinion (HUttenberger, Gauleiter, p. 45).
285 In early 1928 Mutschmann replaced Fritz Tittmann with Erich Kunz, a
loyal associate, as leader of the Unter-Gau Zwickau (VB, Nr. 12, 15.1.1928). He
also brought Karl Fritsch, another ioyal supporter of his, to Plauen, and
made him his deputy, and responsible over the party administration (STA D,
Mdl, 11126/2, Februar 1928).
286 E.g. Mutschmann complained in Munich that the party branch in
Zwickau was informed before him that there would not be a general party
meeting in 1928. He wrote annoyed: "The authority suffers and the work of
the Gauleitung is superfluous" (BA, SlSch, Nr. 208, Band 1, Mutschmann an
Munchen, 3.7.1928).
287 DOnicke was re-elected as leader in Leipzig in summer 1928 (NSfS, Nr. 29,
22.8.1928).
288 SB, Nr. 38, 22.9.1929.
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Various party branches had continuous internal disputes 289 , did
not respond to directions from the district or Gau level290 , had
problems in collecting membership dues, and attracting their
members to meetings. 29 ' Additionally, the Saxon NSDAP was
hampered by financial and organisatlonal problems during
elections.292 Most branches grew slowly, and frequently there was
a lack of interest. Mutschmann dissolved the branches of Borna and
DObeln because of low membership numbers in October 1927.293
The NSDAP's affiliated organisations were still extremely small. The
NSStB In Leipzig was not very active and only had twenty members
at the end of 1926. 294 And there were only five HJ branches in the
KH Leipzig in early 1927.295
Many blank spots remained on the map of Saxony, particularly in
rural areas, where the Nazi party often had no representative at all.
After two meetings the Nazis from Baderitz (near DObeln)
commented in frustration: "It is incredibly difficult to make any
289 The police reported about the NSDAP in Leipzig: "The local branch is
very disrupted due to personal frictions and the existence of a large
financial debt. Members who have left the party or who have been excluded
from it try to win over the remaining supporters for a new founding" (STA
D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Oktober 1926).
290 In October 1927 the Gau headquarters complained that not all party
branches had responded to circulars (NSfS, Nr. 42, 16.10.1927).
291 The NSDAP branch of BUhlau (near Dresden) warned to ban everyone
from the party who did not pay his outstanding membership fees. The
branch also ordered that every member had to attend two internal party
meetings (Sprechabende), and the membership meeting every month. The
branch leader made clear that Sprechabende were essential for training,
and that the meetings were not similar to those of a rifle club, where
everyone comes when he fancies to (ibid., Nr. 29, 19.9.1926).
292 The delivery of NSDAP placards for poll stations for the south-western
part of Saxony for the 1926 state elections failed due to a lack of demand and
organisational problems (ibid., Nr. 36, 7.11.1926).
293 Ibid., Nr. 42, 16.10.1927.
294 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, November 1926. The Nazis only won one of
fifteen seats (165 votes) at elections to the student body at the University in
Leipzig in early 1928 (ibid., Nr. 11126/2, Februar 1928).
295 In Leipzig, Grimma, Wurzen, Rochlitz, and Borna (NSIS, Nr. 7, 13.2.1927).
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progress in this area ... the population is indifferent." 296 There were
only a few party members In Leipzig, Colditz, Naunhof, and Borna
in north-western Saxony, and the local NSDAP did not start to build
up a party network and make propaganda In the rural areas of the
KH Leipzig before 1929/1930. 297 The Nazis demonstrated their
limits in their attempt to organise the eastern part of the state,
which remained nearly free of Nazi presence until 1931.
Furthermore, the NSDAP was still not the only party on the far-
right298 , and they were not able yet to seriously challenge the
traditional working-class parties In their strongholds. Bennecke
recalls the situation in Leipzig: "Everyone who was so careless as to
show up with National Socialist symbols in working-class districts
was ruthlessly beaten up." 299 Moreover, the influx of members into
the NSDAP was volatile and declined drastically at the end of 1925.
The party branch of Plauen lost one-third of its members between
spring and winter 1925 (from 1200 to 800).300 It is also true that
the Nazis were confronted with problems of communication, and
often had to carry out their work on bicycle or on foot.301
The limits of the Nazi Party became evident in elections too. They
only gained 1.6 per cent of the vote in the 1926 state elections, and
2.7 per cent in the 1928 Reichstag elections. There were, however,
positive signs. In May 1926 the NSDAP won Its first seats In the
Saxon state parliament. However, the two NSDAP members were
296 Ibid., Nr. 23, 5.6. 1927.
297 Das nadonalsozialisrische Sachsen, p. 59.
298 E.g. there was the foundation of a vOlkisch alliance (VOlkisch-soziale
Arbeitsgemeinschaft) in the electoral district of western Saxony in May
1926 (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Ma! 1926).
299 Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', pp. 23-24.
300 STA D, SaStKa, Nr. 132, November 1925.
301 SA men from Bautzen, Zittau and Strahwalde "walked, cycled or took the
train" to carry out propaganda in Seifhennersdorf (NStS, Nr. 41, 9.10.1927).
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not very active in parliament between 1926 and 1929. 302 They
backed the bourgeois coalition government of Heldt. Additionally,
In 1929 the NSDAP faction drifted towards the right. This was a
result of Helimuth von MUcke's replacement by another Nazi in
parliament. The former was a left-wing party activist and had
resigned his seat In 1929.303
The NSDAP was still a predominantly urban movement, and was
restricted to the major towns and a few party branches in the
countryside. 304 However, the Nazis made slow, but continuous
progress in rural areas, particularly the Erzgeblrge/Vogtland, and
gradually covered former blank regions with propaganda. 305 Active
party branches spread the movement into surrounding villages306,
and large branches in towns had to be divided into districts. The
NSDAP branch in Plauen had five districts and organised
Sprechabende in each of them in mid-1925.307
302 Tittmann declared that they would reject joining the useless chatter in
the state parliament, and that they would only occasionally voice their
opinion (VdSL, 3. Wp, Sitzung Nr. 68, 21.2.1928, p. 2451).
303 The Social Democrat Neu observed that the NSDAP was moving more and
more to the right after MUcke's departure from the parliament (ibid., 108.
Sitzung, 26.2.1929, P. 4044).
304 In the municipal elections in 1926 the NSDAP had lists in the free towns
of Leipzig, Chemnitz, Plauen, Zwickau, Mei1en, Bautzen, Reichenbach, and
Aue. The party had no representation in any village with less than 500
citizens, and in the towns of Zittau, Freital, Freiberg, Pirna, Glauchau,
Crimmltschau, Riesa, Meerane, DObeln, Werdau, Mittweida, Wurzen. The
NSDAP only gained 4,455 votes (of overall 19,549) in all places with less than
10,000 citizens in Saxony (StJbSa, (1927/28), pp. 402-405).
305 E.g. the Nazis held their first meeting in Freital in March 1927 (NSIS Nr.
20, 15.5.1927), and in Crimmitschau in spring 1928 (ibid., Nr. 18, 6.5.1928).
306 E.g. Lengefeld possessed a small, but active Nazi branch (fifteen
members), who successfully agitated in the surrounding villages for the
1928 Reichstag elections (ibid., Nr. 25, 24.6.1928).
307 'A D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, August 1925.
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7. The breakthrough of the NSDAP 1929-1930
(i) Germany
Despite the Nazis' increased propaganda activities for seeking
power through elections, and their progress in establishing a
central and efficient party machine, the NSDAP's electoral success
was limited until the late 1920s. The Nazis had few
representatives in the state parliaments of Prussia, Bavaria,
Thuringia, and Saxony at the beginning of 1928 308, and only won
2.6 per cent of the vote in the 1928 Reichstag elections. Several
factors helped change the Nazis' fortune and brought about their
breakthrough as a political force and mass party. First, the years of
comparative political stability and economic prosperity after 1924
came to an end. The political, social and economic conditions
deteriorated rapidly at the end of the 1920s. Peasants and middle
classes were facing increasing difficulties from the end of 1927,
and Germany was hit by a severe economic crisis after the Wall
Street crash in October 192 9•309 Additionally, a radicalization and
polarisation of the political system began after the election of 1928,
and brought the breakdown of the DVP and SPD coalition
government In March 1930. 10 Chancellor Bruning's use of
emergency decrees from summer 1930 onwards ended
parliamentary government in Germany. Second, after the NSDAP's
unsuccessful attempt to attract the urban working classes, the
party reorlentated most of its attention towards winning over the
Protestant middle classes and peasantry after "its relatively
308 Stachura, 'Strategy', p. 276.
309 Noakes/Pridham Nazism, pp. 57-58, 64.
310 thid., p. 67.
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positive performance In some rural-agrarian areas in northern and
southern Germany" In the 1928 Reichstag election. 31 ' And lastly,
there were "the special dynamics of National Socialism itself' 312 , i.e.
the Nazis' increasingly efficient party organisation, their relentless
propaganda drive, and the populist magnet Hitler. The success of
the NSDAP in elections of various state parliaments signaled Its rise
from mid-1928. When the NSDAP won 14.4 per cent of the vote in
the state elections in Saxony in June 1930 it sent shock waves
round Germany. One month later, Chancellor Bruning chose to
ignore the NSDAP's recent election success and made the fateful
decision to dissolve the chamber and announced new elections
because he had failed to win the necessary backing for his
programme of financial retrenchment In the Reichstag. The Nazis
exploited the situation and achieved a dramatic national
breakthrough in the September Reichs tag elections. The NSDAP
won 18.3 per cent of the vote and became the second largest party
In the Republic.
(ii) 1929: the political breakthrough of the NSDAP in Saxony
The general atmosphere changed dramatically In Saxony In 1929,
particularly in the second half of the year. The economic crisis set
in and affected more and more people in the state. In autumn 1929
the police reported about the situation in the AH Schwarzen berg:
"The economic situation is regarded as bad due to the generally
high food prices and unemployment. The mood In the population is
311 Stachura, 'Strategy', pp. 277-279.
312 Thid., p. 279.
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depressed." 313 The radical right, led by the Nazis, suddenly
appeared In large groups in the streets. The Communists smelt the
end of the capitall3t system and increased their agitation. There
was a swift upturn in violence. 314 A report from the KH Leipzig
described the Increasing division and polarization of Saxon society,
and the rise of the NSDAP: "The year 1929 brought an increase of
political tensions; on the one hand on a general level between
bourgeois and Marxist parties ... on the other hand within the
bourgeoisie during the referendum about the Young plan, where
there was a dividing line between DNVP and DVP, and among the
paramilitary organisations between Stahlhelm and Jungdo.
Additionally, the National Socialists (Hitlerblock) showed extreme
activity, particularly in propaganda meetings, what resulted In
counter activities from the Marxist organisations."315
After many years of slow growth and stagnation the momentum of
the local Nazi movement accelerated In 1929. This was similar In
other parts of the Republic. 316 The Saxon Nazis, however, were
noted for their relentless activity already from early 1929
onwards317 , and the increased number of activists among the
313 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1942, September 1929.
314 There were several clashes and fights between Nazis and Communists,
and five people were killed and fourteen severely wounded when police
fired at textile strikers in Hartmannsdorf in late 1929 (ibid., Mdl, Nr. 11126/3,
Oktober 1929).
315 STA L, All DObein, Nr. 2409, Rückblick auf das Jahr 1929.
316 The turning point for the NSDAP in Thuringia were the state elections in
December 1929 where it won 11.3 per cent of the vote (Tracey 'Thuringia', p.
40). BOhnke observed "a distinct improvement" for the NSDAP "from summer
1929 onwards ... The NSDAP increased its propaganda activities now,
tightened up its agitation methods, and substantially increased the number
of public meetings" (BOhnke, Ruhrgebiet, pp. 122-123).
317 In early 1929 the Saxon Nazis reported that more people joined the party
and more branches were founded than in the years before (SB, Nr. 8,
24.2.1929). The SPD reported: "So far these people were insignificant in
Saxony. Recently, however, one could observe that they unfolded great
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SA.318 This development ran parallel to, and was enhanced by, two
election successes which marked a turning point for the NSDAP in
Saxony. The NSDAP was the main winner in the state elections in
Saxony in May 1929, the first significant electoral test after the
1928 Reichstag elections.319 Although the party only won a modest
five per cent of the vote (the Nazi vote nearly doubled from 74,343
to 133,958 within one year; see Table 6), the winning of five seats
suddenly catapulted the Nazis into the political limelight, and gave



























May 1928	 May 1929
18,245 (1.8)	 36,589 (2.8)
14,601 (1.9)	 25,901 (3.5)
41,497 (4.3)	 71,468 (7.5)








them a key position in the state parliament by tolerating the
coalition of the middle and right under Wilhelm BUnger. The Nazis
activity in meetings even before the verdict of the court dissolved the state
parliament" (DVZ Nr. 111, 15.5.1929).
318 The Saxon intelligence service reported: "The NSDAP was very active
again. Particularly active was the uniformed SA, which has grown
considerable in size (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/3, Oktober 1929).
319 The Social Democrat's successfully appealed to the Saxon court of Justice
to declare the 1926 state elections invalid due to "a minor discrepancy"
between the state electoral system and the Reich constitution. The SPD's
strategy was to "re-enact its success" of the 1928 Reichstag elections and to
remove the ASPD from the political scene (B. N. Lapp, 'Political Polarization
in Weimar Germany: The Saxon Burgertuni and the Left, 1918/1919-1930',
(PhD Berkeley/California, 1991), pp. 242-243).
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exploited their powerful position and constantly threatened to
bring down the new government when their demands were not
met. Additionally, the Nazis also started to become a political force
in local government due to their gains in the municipal elections at
the end of the year. After the elections the Saxon police intelligence
service observed that the NSDAP had again Increased its electorate
and gained the position of "Zunglein an der Waage" between the
two political blocks of the middle and right. They found "a general
move to the right." 320 Even the SPD admitted that the NSDAP
managed "to win support among the proletariat" in many medium
and small sized towns in the south-west.32'
In contrast to the 1928 Reichstag elections, the parties on the
middle and right (DVP, WP, DNVP, Z, VRP) and representatives of
industry, agreed to concentrate their main energies on preventing a
red dictatorship of the Left rather than fighting each other during
the May 1929 election campaign. 322 The block on the right tried "to
prevent a Soviet Saxony", while the Left tried to achieve exactly
this. The Vogtlandischer Anzeiger reported: "Two broadly fighting
fronts are facing each other, on the one side international Marxism,
on the other side nationalists with a strong sentiment towards their
Volk and fatherland." 323 The conservative LNN described a dull
election campaign in which "the right had no programme or Idea"
except using the threat of a "Soviet-Saxony" again to rally their
320 STA D, Mdl, 11126/3, Oktober 1929. However, this was mainly limited to
the Vogtland, where the Nazis were able to become the largest party in fifty-
two villages and towns (SB, Nr. 22, 2.6.1929). Overall, the NSDAP only gained
4.3 per cent of all votes in the municipal elections in 1929 (StJbSa, (1930)).
321 DV4 Nr. 275, 27.11.1929
322 See 'Die Zusammenarbeit burgerlicher Parteien', Dresdner Anzeiger, Nr.
162, 7.4.1929; and 'Die sAchsische Industrie zu den Landtagswahlen', Dresdner
Anzeiger, Nr. 174, 14.4.1929.
323 See 'Kampf dem Marxismus', VogtlandischerAnzeiger, Nr. 95, 24.4.1929.
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support, while the divided Left attempted to gain votes from each
other. 324 What was new and noticeable was the activism of the
Nazis between these traditional blocks. The NSDAP "had become the
single political representative of the far right ... and had created a
unified organization highly proficient in electioneering skills."325
The Nazis gained from the traditional middle-class parties. 326 Their
stronghold was still south-western Saxony, where they gained
support In settlements of all sizes. Additionally, they were quick to
respond to their electoral success and to the Influx of new
members, and continued to build up the party organisation.327
(ill) 1930: the dramatic rise of the NSDAP in Saxony
1930 was the most important year for the Nazi movement in
Saxony before the seizure of power in 1933. The NSDAP accelerated
its momentum from the previous year, grew dramatically, and
became a mass party.
Although the Nazis continually warned the bourgeois government
that they should follow their demands, they nevertheless backed
BUnger as Prime Minister until February 1930. But when Btinger
voted for the ratification of the Young plan in the Reichsrat, the
Nazis used the occasion to withdraw their support from his
324 LNN, Nr. 131, 11.5.1929.
325 Tracey, 'Thuringia', p. 48.
326 It is unlikely that the NSDAP gained from new voters in 1929. The
participation of all eligible voters in elections in Saxony was as follows: LW
1920: 70.12 per cent; LW 1922: 81.8; LW 1926: 71.1 (Chemnitz: 70 per cent); RW
1928: 79.7 (Chemnitz: 77.3); LW 1929: 77.4 (Chemnitz: 75.7); LW 1930: 73.7
(Chemnitz: 72.9); RW 1930: 88.5 (Chemnitz: 85.8) (StJbSa, (1924-1930)).
327 E.g. Mutschmann divided the district of Vogtland due to "continuous
growth" of the NSDAP (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/3, August 1929). The Nazis in
Leipzig reported busy internal activities in the whole district, and the
success of political training and speaker courses (SB, Nr. 22, 2.6.1929; ibid.,
Nr. 29, 21.7.1929).
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government.328 BUnger's government resigned when the Nazis
motion of no-confidence was supported by DNVP and SLV on the
right, and SPD and KPD on the left on 18 February 93O.329
Thereafter, Saxony was "in a state of political limbo for several
months."330 The SPD's offer to enter a grand coalition with the I)DP
and DVP was rejected by the DVP. After all attempts to form a new
coalition government failed, the DDP suggested the appointment of
a 'neutral cabinet of experts' under Walter Schieck, a member of
the DVP. In late February/early March the Nazis put forward
several conditions under which they would support such a
bourgeois coalition government (see Appendix 3). However,
Schieck's cabinet only lasted from 6 to 20 May when SPD, KPD, and
NSDAP voted to dissolve the state parliament and forced new
elections.33'
All three parties hoped to gain from new elections. But the KPD
only gained one new seat, while the SPD saw Its share of the poll
decline. The NSDAP gained the most from the elections. The Nazis
achieved their first breakthrough In a major province in Germany
by gaining 14.4 per cent of the votes in the elections on 22 June.
The national Nazi leadership had participated in the NSDAP's first
centrally organised, massive election campaign.332 The NSDAP had
concentrated all its energies on Saxony to create a 'central German
block of National Socialism' - "a bastion against Bolshevism and
328 See 'Schlu1 mit dem sächsischen Erfullungskabinett!', ibid., Nr. 7, 16.2.30.
329 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Januar 1930.
330 Lapp, 'Saxon Btirgertum', p. 264.
331 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Februar-März 1930. On 6 May the NSDAP had
handed in blank ballot papers and made possible the election of Schieck.
332 See 'Befehlsausgabe vor der Schlacht', FK, Nr. 3, 4.8.1930. The Nazis'
started the election campaign with their state meeting in Plauen in early
June 1930. Hitler, Strasser, Goebbels, Schemm, and Epp spoke on this occasion
(Dresdner Nachrich ten, Nr. 255, 2.6.1930).
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slavery" - together with neighbouring Thuringia (see Appendix 4).
The plan was to make Gregor Strasser, like Frick in Weimar,
Minister of the Interior in a bourgeois coalition government. And
indeed, the Nazis increased their seats from five to fourteen. After
the elections Hitler expressed his willingness to co-operate with the
bourgeois parties in an article in the VOlkischer Beobachter, and
put forward comparatively moderate demands. 333 However, the
constellation of power in the state parliament prevented them from
reaping the same benefit as in neighbouring Thuringla. The
negotiations to make Gregor Strasser Minister of the Interior, in
which Hitler participated personally in Dresden 334 , were
unsuccessful because the Democrats and the VNR (former Jungdo)
were not willing to give the Nazis the necessary support in
parliament.335
 Unlike Thuringia, where the DNVP, Landbund, DVP,
WP and NSDAP held a majority in parliament,336
 this was not the
case in Saxony. The Nazis' hope to gain more bargaining power
333 Hitler made following demands: 1. financial revitalization, 2. protection
of the professional national economy, 3. protection of the states from
centralization, 4. nationalization of the citizens, 5. Christian-German culture
(V Nr. 149, 25.6.1930).
334 Hitler stayed in Dresden between 14.-iS. July 1930 (LVZ Nr. 167,
21.7.1930). Kilhinger's replacement by Karl Fritsch as leader of the NSDAP's
parliamentary faction was a partial result of this (Volkszeitung für LObau,
Nr. 164, 17.7.1930). Kilhinger appeared too wavering in the support of the
Munich party line during the dispute between 0. Strasser and Hitler. At the
time he preferred the opposition role for the NSDAP in the Saxon parliament
(Volkszeitung fur Plauen, Nr. 147, 27.6.1930). Additionally, Mutschmann was
keen to replace the potential rival with the loyal Fritsch.
335 Additionally, the willingness of the DNVP, WP and DVP to include Gregor
Strasser as Minister of the Interior in a coaiition cabinet received a "cold
shower" when Berlin warned Frick that it might cut subsidies for the
Thuringian police. The DVP's and WP's attempt to win Strasser for a different
cabinet post fell through because the Nazis were not prepared to
compromise. Most importantly, a coalition government with the NSDAP
would not have had the backing of a majority in parliament ('Hitler Fiasko
in Sachsen', Vossische Zeitung, Nr. 180, 30.7.1930).
336 Tracey, 'Thuringia', pp. 42-43.
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after a victory in the Relchstag election in September 1930 was
not fulfilled although their party achieved a remarkable national
breakthrough and was able to increase its vote In Saxony to 18.3
per cent. The NSDAP unsuccessfully continued to voice its demands
that "Gregor Strasser must become Minister of the Interior in
Saxony" 338, or that "Saxony's only hope of overcoming the crisis is
new elections" 339.
The Saxon NSDAP remained condemned to the powerless opposition
benches due to the attitude of the DDP and VNR, but also because of
a change of tactics by the SPD. The Saxon SPD - similar to their
colleagues' behaviour towards BrUning in the Reichstag - tolerated
a bourgeois government without Nazi participation as the lesser
evil rather then facing new elections in which the NSDAP would
increase its electorate even further. 34° As the parties were not able
to agree on a new coalition government after the June 1930
elections, Schieck's 'cabinet of experts' remained in power as
caretaker government until the Nazis' dissolved the parliament in
March 1933. This was the only solution that kept the
parliamentary system Intact in a state that faced extreme political
divisions and polarization. Fenske rightly argued that "Saxony was
thus the first state government In the Weimar Republic in which
337 See 'Der Stun der Reichstagswahl. Entscheidung un Reich ist Kiarung in
Sachsen!', FK, Nr. 24, 28.8.1930.
338 thid., Nr. 43, 19.9.1930.
339 See Stra&er's speech at the Gau meeting in late 1930 (ibid., Nr. 80,
3.11.1930).
340 E.g. the SPD supported Schieck when the KPD, NSDAP and DNVP voted to
dissolve the parliament on 7.10.1930 (Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung, Nr. 235,
8.10.1930).
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the parliamentary system ceased to function prior to its abolition
by the National Socialist."341
The reasons for the rapid rise of the NSDAP in Saxony were similar
to those in other regions of the Reich: rapidly deteriorating social,
political and economic conditions, and the Nazis' own dynamic. The
Intelligence service summed up the situation In the KH Leipzig:
"1930 was the year of the greatest economic decline so far, and
therefore at the same time a year when political radicalism grew
rapidly." 342 A distinctive feature of Saxon society was the further
increase of violence in the streets and during party meetings -
mainly between Communists and Nazis - which sometimes ended in
killings.343 Both sides provoked each other, and the clashes were
particularly frequent when the Nazis attempted to hold meetings in
working-class districts. 344 The fact that most NSDAP meetings
continued to be visited by a majority of opponents was the major
reason for violence. 345 The Nazis blamed the inactivity of the
government for the violence, and warned that they would take
matters into their own hands if the police did not act. 346 There was
341 H. Fenske, Wa.hlrecht and Partelensystem. Em Beitrag zur Deutschen
Parteiengeschichte (Frankfurt, 1972), P. 304 (in I.app, 'Saxon BUrgertum', p.
282).
342 STA L, All DObein, Nr. 2409, Rückblick auf das Jahr 1930.
343 E.g. two people were killed in clashes between the NSDAP and KPD in
Eythra and Reinholdshain in June 1930 (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Juni 1930).
344 The police reported on the June 1930 election campaign: "The
challenging behaviour of members of the NSDAP contributed to a large
extent to disturbances and clashes, but it cannot be denied that the KPD ... is
determined to use violence ... 'to prevent the penetration of the Fascists in
working-class districts" (ibid., Kit Dresden, Nr. 264, Juni 1930). Clashes
between Nazis and Marxists in the KH Dresden happened all in Marxist
strongholds during the campaign to the 1930 Reich stag election (Freital,
GroIenhain, Radeberg, MeiIen, and Riesa) (ibid., September 1930).
345 In the 154 NSDAP meetings in the KH Dresden in December 1930 "a great
proportion of the participants were supporters of other parties, mainly the
KPD" (ibid., Dezember 1930).
346 E.g. Killinger complained in parliament about Communist terror and
their anti-Nazi slogan 'beat them where ever you meet them'. He continued:
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also an increase of violence between the police and demonstrators.
The often brutal confrontations, some of which also ended with
deaths347 , expressed the growing tensions and divisions in Saxon
society.
There was a general increase of political activity from early 1930
onwards, particularly on the radical left and right. The KPD tried to
exploit the economic crisis to win supporters among the
unemployed 348, and the NSDAP became by far the most active and
conspicuous party, even during election campaigns 349 , and was able
to attract an Increasing number of visitors to their meetings.35°
Both groups agreed that the Republic had to be destroyed as
quickly as possible.35 ' The increased politicisation became most
evident during election campaigns, e.g. in June 1930: "The election
campaign was fought with particular sharpness and great effort in
methods of agitation by all political parties ... There was a vigorous
fighting spirit particularly among the KPD and NSDAP." 352 The
"The government should be aware that we will not allow anyone to terrorize
us and that we will ward off violent attacks by opponents with all our means
We draw the government's attention that it is responsible for the
consequences of this murder-chase and not ourselves" (VdSL, 4. Wp, 11.
Sitzung, 23.10.1929, pp. 355-356).
347 E.g. the police used its firearms during an unemployed demonstration in
Leipzig at the end of 1930. Nine demonstrators were injured, three of them
died soon later (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, November 1930).
348 E.g. see ibid., KH Dresden, Nr. 264, Februar 1930.
349 Ibid., Juni 1930, August 1930.
350 E.g. see the typical police report from the KH Dresden in February 1930:
"There was busy political agitation ... The NSDAP ranked first regarding the
number of meetings ... The meetings of this party were often surprisingly
well visited even in small places" (ibid., Januar 1930).
351 This agreement became very evident in parliamentary debates, e.g.
during a speech of Renner, the leader of the Saxon KPD, in late 1929: "It is
not possible to celebrate this Republic, this Republic should be (member of
parliament von Killinger: sent to hell) - must be quickly destroyed by the
proletarian masses (...) The masses have to overcome all the forces who
attempt to rescue the Republic (Well spoken! From the Communists and the
National Socialists)" (VdSL, 4. Wp, 18. Sitzung, 10.12.1929, pp. 561 if.).
352 STA D, KH Dresden, Nr. 264, Juni 1930.
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atmosphere in Saxony changed markedly in 1930. The peaceful and
tranquil times were over and the bleak economic prospects led to a
fear of disturbances.353 The police in the KH Dresden reported In
December 1930: "There was no sign of a quiet phase In political life
as usually at this time of the year. Due to the wide-spread
propaganda activities of the NSDAP all other parties, particularly
the KPD and SPD, felt obliged to organise a great number of public
events and protest meetings."354
(iv) Features of the NSDAP in Saxony
The Nazis promulgated a set of themes In Saxony. Most Important
was their demand to rid the administration of Marxism and to fight
corruption in the state and local administration. 355 These demands
were the main conditions for tolerating a bourgeois government
between May 1929 and early 1930.356 They used their
unsatisfactory implementation to help bring down the government
353 Various district administrations voiced the fear of disturbances because
of the depressed economy (ibid., Juli 1930).
354 Ibid., Dezember 1930.
355 E.g. the Nazis reported that the two leaders of the town administration in
Bautzen received seventy-five Reichsmark bonus on their electricity bill
every year (SB, Nr. 80, 28.5.1930), or that Social Democrats received the
highest wages and quickest promotions in the local health insurance group
in Leipzig (ibid., Nr. 81, 29.5.1930).
356 Kilhinger put forward the first serious warning to Bunger in August
1929. He warned about the appointment of Eisner (ASPD) as Minister of
Employment and reminded BUnger that the whole administration was still
full with Marxists (see 'Eine Nationalsozialistische Warnung an Bunger',
ibid., Nr. 35, 3 1.8.1929). In early 1930 Fntsch gave a speech in parliament
about the corruption since 1918 and argued that it was a mirror of the system
the society lived in. He focused on the corruption within the Saxon Ministry
of Employment and Welfare under Eisner and the state insurance (with
president Tempel, ASPD). The NSDAP proposed a vote of no confidence for
Eisner (seventeen yes, two no, rest: abstentions), but backed the government
when the KPD proposed a vote of no-confidence (VdSL, 4. Wp, 20. Sitzung,
14.1.1930, pp. 679 if.).
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of Bunger and Schieck in the first half of 1930, and used
corruption again as the main theme in their election campaign in
June 1930. The Nazis portrayed themselves as the only group
outside the traditional parties, and thus the only ones capable of
solving the problems. They demanded: "Make room you old ones,
the young generation wants to save what you were not able to sell
off yet." 358 Additionally, they delivered lively speeches against
international capitalism and put forward "accusations against
companies and trusts, against their price fixing and exploitation,
and criticized high pensions, wages, and other incomes." 359 Even
the SPD admitted that this was a powerful appeal to all groups in a
society which was dominated by small and medium scale
industries.360
The Nazis' aggressive stand against Marxism came increasingly to
the forefront in the course of 1930. After they managed to make
major inroads into the middle-class parties in the elections in June
and September 1930 they announced: "Clear front in Saxony!
National Socialism against Marxism. The bourgeoisie is crushed
We will go into the factories, we will go to the unemployed." 361 The
emphasis on combatting the traditional working-class parties in
earnest came one year after the Nazis had seriously started to woo
357 Before the Nazis helped to topple the Schieck government they
explained: "The determination to clean the Saxon administration from all
corruption motivated our attack against Eisner and other corrupt civil
servants, and we will continue this fundamental struggle ... We do not want
an election campaign because of party-egoistic interests and hope that the
new parliament will thoroughly sweep away all remnants of the Marxist
betrayal once and for all" (SB, Nr. 75, 22.5.1930).
358 See 'Landtagsauflosung und Neuwahl', ibid., Nr. 77, 24.5.1930.




the middle classes. 362 The Nazis did this most forcefully In their
campaigns against Marxist consumer cooperatives (Konsumgenos-
sezschaften) 363 , and department stores364, which played an
Important role in Saxony. 365 Another general theme of the NSDAP
was their determination to fight against the Young Plan 366, and to
blame the 'system' for the economic crisis. 367 The Nazis also
frequently blamed the Reich for lack of aid for Saxony368, and the
government in Dresden for not pressing the Reich hard enough for
orders from the Reich for Saxony.369 The NSDAP also emphasized
Saxony's position next to Czechoslovakia, and the importance of
keeping contact with Germans living across the border. 37° And
lastly, the Nazis continued to express extreme anti-Semitism.37'
362 E.g. see Kiffinger's appeal to the government in August 1929 to pay the
salary for the civil servants in Saxony before they go on holidays (VdSL, 4.
Wp, 8. Sitzung, 11.7.1929).
363 The NSDAP passed motions in town councils throughout Saxony to cancel
their links with consumer assodations in 1930.. They failed in Leipzig and
Chemnitz only due to the resistance of SPD, KPD and DDP (SB, 21.3.1930, and
16.4.1930), but succeeded in Oelsnitz/Erzgebirge (ibid., Nr. 1/2.3.1930).
364	 SB described how unemployed people sold tinsel outside the Karstadt
department store in Dresden: While the unemployed starved and froze, the
Jewish owner of Karstadt rejoiced about his profit (ibid., Nr. 1, 5.1.1930).
365 K. Lobmeier, 'Die sozialOkonomische Lage und das politische Verhalten
der "alten" Mittelschichten in der Kreishauptmannschaft Chemnitz 1927 bis
1935' (PhD Leipzig, 1989), pp. 16-17.
366 E.g. see Fritsch's speech in VdSL, 4. Wp, 11. Sitzung, 23.10.1929.
367 The SB introduced the section 'Under the sign of Young' in which it
reported very personally how the depression affected the local population.
In one issue they reported that the innkeeper Meyer had shot himself and
the worker Langer hanged himself in Annaberg, and in Chemnitz a twenty-
one year old female worker poisoned herself because of the bad economic
situation. Additionally, the two old hardware shops Meyer and Neunieister
were in financial difficulties in Chemnitz (SB, 18.3.1930; also ibid., Nr. 76,
23.5.1930).
368 See 'Die Berliner Absage. Leere Worte für die sachsische Not', ibid., Nr.
77,24.5.1930.
369 E.g. see FK, Nr. 93, 18.11.1930.
370 thid., Nr. 87, 11.11.1930.
371 The Nazis in Plauen wrote in early 1930: "You are aware - as long as you
read our newspaper with interest - that the Jew is to blame for our
incredible misery" (SB, Nr. 2, 12.1.1930.) The FK had a section with jokes
about Jews: 'Laugh about our Jewish friend' (ibid., Nr. 50, 27.9.1930.).
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The police had to Intervene when Nazi supporters sang: "The
revolution will only march when the Jews bleed" during a meeting
in Dresden.372
On a lower level, the Nazis tried to attract different professions and
groups in society by appealing directly to them. For this purpose
the NSDAP continued to set up more and more special Interest
groups. Again, the Nazis concentrated most of their propaganda on
the middle classes and set up NSDAP groups for farmers373,
teachers374 , doctors375 , lawyers376 , and stenographers377 . At the
same time the Nazis made great efforts to woo white collar workers
in the DHV378 , civil servants 379 , workmen (Handwerker)380,
bakers 381 , innkeepers382 , policemen383 , and cottage workers
372 DW4 Nr. 204, 2.9.1929.
373 The Nazis set up an agricultural organisation and a news letter in early
1930 (SB, 7.3.1930). They frequently demanded aid for the farmers (ibid.,
5.3.1930), printed reports about the agricultural chamber (ibid., 18.3.1930),
and increasingly organised meetings for farmers (ibid., 29.3.1930).
374 The first meeting of the 'National Socialist Teacher Organisation' took
place in Plauen on 2 March 1930 (ibid., Nr. 8, 23.2.1930).
375 The Gau leadership asked for the creation of the 'National Socialist
Doctors Association' in August 1930 (FK, Nr. 1, 1.8.1930).
376 The Association of 'National Socialist Lawyers' held their first public
meeting in Leipzig on 2 October 1930 (ibid., Nr. 70, 21.10.1930).
377 Ibid., Nr. 88, 12.11.1930.
378 In early 1930 the Nazis rejoiced about their success in the DHV (SB,
4.3.1930). Half a year later, after Nazi activist were expelled from the DHV,
the Nazis attacked DHV leaders of representing the interest of the
industrialist, and not those of older impoverished or unemployed employees
(FK, Nr. 36, 11.9.1930).
379 There was a meeting for civil servants in Leipzig in autumn 1930 (ibid.,
Nr. 35, 10.9.1930), and the Nazis published an official statement that they
stood behind this group without reservation (ibid., Nr. 46, 23.9.1930).
380 E.g. the SB reported about a conference of the Saxon craft (SB, 25.3.1930).
381 Nazis spoke to members of the union of baker apprentices (ibid.,
9.4.1930).
382 The Nazis tried to appeal to innkeepers by condemning the planned new
liquid tax during the campaign for the 1930 Reichs tag election. Later that
year they promising 'i to back the incredibly threatened profession with all
their means", and supported those innkeepers who refused to pay the new
tax (FK, Nr. 83, 6.11.1930).
383 The NSDAP branch in Dresden announced that all plain-clothes
policemen bad free entrance to their meetings (ibid., Nr. 93, 18.11.1930).
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producing musical Instruments384. Additionally, a 'National Socialist
Economic Association' for the threatened middle classes 385 , a
'NSDAP Automobile Ccrps' 386 , a pressure group for German culture
(Kampfbund für Deutsche Kultur) 387 , an organisatlon with
sentiments for fatherland and nature (Heimatfreunde) 388 , and a
newsletter for the NSDAP members of local government389 were
set up. The NSDAP in Leipzig offered free judicial advise for
subscribers of the SB.39°
Meanwhile the 'older' organisations affiliated with the party made
progress too. The NSDAP's female organisations expanded and were
busy in their work for the party. Jill Stephenson wrote about the
NSF In Leipzig: "Lotte RUhlemann's groups were kept busy
providing food for the needy, making Party uniforms, and
somehow 'procuring boots." 39 ' The NSF In Leipzig had to be divided
Into four districts after the work of four years 392 , and Saxony
became the heartland of the newly created League of German Girls
(BdM) and the Nazi Schoolgirls' League (NSS1). 393 The Nazi youth
movement grew too. 394 At the same time, the Nazis continued their
384 The Nazis propagated to fight against tax on music instruments (ibid., Nr.
89, 13.1 1.1930).
385 SB; Nr. 46, 17.11.1929.
386 FK Nr. 89, 13.11.1930.
387 Ibid., Nr. 88, 12.11.1930.
388 It aimed at the cultivation of rambling, mountain, and winter sport (SB,
Nr. 41, 13.10.1929).
389 The district leader Kunz announced to publish a local community
newsletter for party activists in autumn 1930 (F Nr. 73, 24.10.1930).
390 SB; Nr. 7, 17.2.1929.
391 j• Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women (London, 1980), p. 73.392 H< Nr. 79, 1.11.1930.
393 Stephenson, Nazi Women, p. 86.
394 The Nazi Jungmannschaft met for the first time on 28.5.1930 in Leipzig
(SB, Nr. 80, 2 8.5.1930).
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efforts In trying to recruit working class support 395 , and to get a
foothold at the work place. 396 The NSDAP also increasingly
attempted to attract the unenployed from the end of 1930
onwards.397
The dramatic membership Influx (see Figure 3 below) made It
necessary to split up municipal party branches Into sections.
Leipzig had eleven sections in June 1930 398 , Plauen was divided
into twelve sections in late 1930, and the movement in Chemnitz
was thriving. 400 The division into sections strengthened the
395 On May the First 1930 about )00 Nazis marched through Plauen (STA D,
Mdl, Nr. 19086). A new colunm, 'From the Work Place' ('Aus den Betrieben')
s introduced in the SB from early 1929 onwards. In a speech in the Saxon
parliament Fritsch emphasized the SPD's betrayal of the working class by
supporting the Young Plan. He elaborated: "The concentration of foreign
capital in Germany and the nationalization and concentration of industries
will lead to more and more closures of these industries. Currently we
experience in Zwickau - you all know this too - that there are three factories
whose chimneys do not smoke any more: the Zwickau vehicle factory, the
chemical factory Dr. Ebert and the Zwickau founding factory. You are aware
that the Audi factory is going to lay off, you are aware, that the Horchwerke
will close. These are important symptoms which will increase in the future,
which will not stand alone, and which will lead to an incredible worsening
and slavery for the German worker" (VdSL, 4. Wp, 11. Sitzung, 23.10.1929, pp.
374 ff.). A Nazi in Leipzig was excluded from the party because he was a
strike-breaker during the strike of the local lorry drivers in early 1930 (SB,
5.3.1930). The Nazis reported about the disputes between Social Democrats and
Communists in the workers' gymnast club Jahn in Chemnitz. They blamed
Marxist officials for the divisions of the working class, and predicted that
workers would eventually join the NSDAP (ibid., Nr. 86, 5.6.1930). The NSDAP
supported a KPD motion to protest against the decrease in unemployment
benefits in the town council of Plauen (ibid., Nr. 38, 22.9.1929).
396 NSDAP members who worked in the building, metal, or textile industry in
the district of Chemnitz were asked to report if they were member of a trade
union and where their work place and party branch were (ibid., 12.3.1930).
397 The Saxon intelligence service reported in September 1930: "Recently it
was observed that the NSDAP, like the KPD, also attempts to attract the
unemployed for its aims. This caused several sharp clashes and fights
between Communists and National Socialists in front of employment offices
(STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, September 1930).
398 See 'Unser Kampf in Leipzig', SB, Nr. 92, 13.6.1930.
399 See FK, Nr. 88, 12.11.1930.
400 In early 1929 the Nazis in Chemnitz described themselves as "a small
bunch of old and proven fighters, most of whom had become disillusioned
because of the set-backs." The May 1929 state elections brought them only
600 more votes than in 1928. However, the Nazis were rewarded for their









organisational base of the NSDAP401 , and safeguarded the personal
tie of new party members with the growing movement. The Nazis
Figure 3:
NSDAP Membership increase in Saxony between January
1929 and March 1931
J FMAMJ J ASONDJ FMAMJ J ASONDJ FM
1929	 1930	 1931
January	 4,609	 8,557	 22,665
February	 4,584	 9,121	 24,790










Source: BA, NS 22, Nr. 1067.
in Chemnitz reported that they brought new visitors who had
attended big party rallies into small internal party meetings. They
the Young Plan and the municipal elections later that year (see 'Em Jahr
Kainpf in Chemnitz!', SB, Nr. 98, 20.6.1930).
401 FX Nr. 87, 11.11.1930.
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were greeted by handshakes and everyone was encouraged to
contribute to the discussions which were led by local speakers.402
A striking feature of the Saxon NSDAP remained the enormous
extent of their activities, which doubled from 1929 to 1930. 403 At
the end of 1930 Nazis from the district 'Upper Elbe' reported that
the number of meetings was even higher than during the campaign
for the Reichstag elections in September 1930. 404 The increase in
number of meetings ran parallel with an increase of visitors. 405 The
Nazis tried to win new territory by swamping small areas with
Table 7: Increase of NSDAP members, voters, and the number of its public
meetings between May 1929, June 1930, and September 1930 (increase in
percentage in brackets)
May 1929	 June 1930	 September 1930
members	 5,515	 11,800 (46.7)	 14,893 (8.0)
voters	 133,958	 376,769(64.4)	 561,371 (32.9)
meetings 1	 2	 45 (73.3)	 51 (11.8)
1: NSDAP meetings in the AH Schwarzenberg between April-May 1929, May-
June 1930, August-September 1930.
Source: StJbSa, (1929-30); BA Koblenz; STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1942-
1943.
leaflets, meetings and parades 406, and active local party branches
spread the movement407 . Between 1929 and 1930 the Nazis
experienced most success In increasing the amount of propaganda
402 SB 8/9.3.1930.
403 E.g. the NSDAP of Leipzig and surrounding area organised thirty-two
public meetings in 1929and sixty-two in 1930 (FK, Nr. 18, 22.1.1931).
404 Ibid., Nr. 91, 15.11.1930.
405 E.g the Nazis in Rochlitz reported great demand to purchase tickets for a
meeting with Gregor Strasser in March 1930 (SB, Nr. 8, 23.2.1930).
406 E.g. four prominent speakers spoke in three big meetings on one day in
Leipzig (ibid., 23.4.1930). The Nazis held twelve meetings around Gaschwitz/
KH Leipzig on one Sunday in late 1930 (see 'GroKkampfsonntag of the district
Leipzig around Gaschwitz', FX, Nr. 102, 29.11.1930).
407 E.g. the branch in Borstendorf organised forty public meetings in 1929.
The Gauleitung organised a meeting with Gregor Strasser In January 1930
which led the foundation for meetings in three neighbouring villages and
the creation of a party branch in Schellenberg (SB, 12.3.1930).
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and the number of their electorate. They were able to attract new
members, but not to the same extent (see Table 7 above).
At the heart of the expansion of the Saxon NSDAP stood Gat'leiter
Mutschmann, who was extremely determined and ruthless in
establishing his personal control in the state. His complaint to the
headquarters in Munich about the creation of a NSDAP insurance
group in East Saxony was typical: "If the Gauleiter should be solely
responsible for his own Gau it is intolerable that a post is set up
without his preceding involvement and about whose existence he
will only hear as an established fact." 408
 He appointed loyal
followers to important positions in the Gau, and his strong hold
over the movement prevented his Gau - as happened In several
other cases - from being divided into smaller Gaue.409 However,
Mutschmann's control was far from complete at the time. In
February 1929 he Inquired in Munich whether Hitler had approved
the fact that Tittmann and the other NSDAP members of parliament
missed the chance of bringing down the Saxon government in a
vote of no confidence.410
The growth of the Nazi movement was facilitated by an increasing
disintegration of the rest of the far right411 , and their growing co-
operation with the Nazis from 1929 onwards. 412 The most
408 BA, SlSch, Nr. 208, Band 1, Gau Sachsen an Reichsleitung, 16.9.1929
409 E.g. the Gau Ruhr was divided into Gau Essen, Gau Düsseldorf, and Gau
Westfalen In October 1928 (A. Tyreil, Führer befiel... Selbstzeugnisse aus der
'Kanipfzeit' der NSDAP (Neuauflage, Leipzig, 1991), pp. 373-376).
410 The vote ended 47:47. Because both Nazis had abstained, the government
survived (BDC, Tittmann, OPG, Mutschmann an Uschla, 25.2.1929).
411 E.g. three DNVP members of the town council in Freiberg joined the
NSDAP at the end of 1929 (SB, Nr. 44, 3.11.1929). A prominent Jungdo leader,
von Tschammer und Osten, joined the NSDAP in Dresden in March 1930 (ibid.,
5.3.1930).
412 E.g the police reported about co-operation between the StahThelm and
NSDAP in various places of the KH Dresden in March 1930 (STA D, KH
Dresden, Nr. 264, Marz 1930). The NSDAP and Wehrwolf campaigned together
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prominent example was when NSDAP, Stahiheim, DNVP and other
conservative groups fought together in the campaign for the
referendum against the Young plan at the end of 1929. 413 The
NSDAP assumed leadership of the campaign in the streets, while
the parties on the right helped with office work. The bourgeois
parties and groups too, started to co-operate with the NSDAP. 14 At
the same time the Nazis increasingly attempted to infiltrate
bourgeois organisations.415 The slow rapprochement between the
NSDAP and the bourgeoisie was also reflected in the style of the SB
and later FK, whose section 'Our Fight in Saxony' became much
more moderate and lost its inflammatory style in 1930. While the
crisis deepened and the NSDAP advanced, not only the far right,
but also the left started to disintegrate.416
Despite the breakthrough of the NSDAP as a mass movement in
Saxony in 1930, the party continued to be hampered by severe
limits. Most importantly, the movement continued to have a weak
in one list during the Asta elections at the University of Leipzig in February
1930 (ibid., Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, February-March 1930). The SB introduced a
section 'Wehrwolf. Bundesnachrichten' in early 1930 (e.g. see SB, 4.3.1930).
413 In the electoral district of Leipzig the following organisations allied
during the anti-Young campaign: DNVP, Stahiheim, NSDAP, SLV, Deutscher
Offiziersbund, Nationaiverband Deu tscher Offiziere, Gesellschaft der Freunde
des Stahiheims, Deutsche Adelsgenossenschaft, Band KOnigin Lwse, Verband
Sächsischer Arbeiter und Werkverekne im RvA, Alldeutscher Verband,
Schutzengeselischaft, Kolonialer Jugendbund. The local police noted that the
NSDAP was most active in the campaign, and that NSDAP meetings were
attended by many members of the Stahllielm (STA L, PP-St, Nr. 31).
414 E.g. the bourgeois parties supported the NSDAP's motion to cancel their
links with consumer associations in the town council of Oelsnitz/Erzgebirge
(SB, Nr. 1/2.3.1930). The town council in Zwickau supported a NSDAP motion
to make the SB official newspaper of the municipal services (ibid., 3.3.1930).
The Nazis reported that the alliance of small pensioners in LObau (Klein-
rentnerbund), which had been affiliated with the DVP, decided to join the
local NSDAP in late 1930 (FK, Nr. 96, 22.11.1930).
415 E.g. several Nazis worked in the 'National Emergency Aid', which was set
up by nationalist organisations as response to the KPD's 'Red Aid' (STA D,
Md!, Nr. 11126/4, Oktober 1930).
416 E.g. the Communist leader of the district of Zwickau joined the SPD in
May 1930 because he regarded the official party line as harmful for the
working class (ibid., Mal 1930).
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party network and electoral support outside south-western Saxony,
particularly in eastern Saxony. 417 The elections in 1930 showed
that the NSDAP continued to score results high above the average
in the south-western part of the state. The further east the
electoral districts were, the weaker were the results for the NSDAP,
particularly In rural areas.418 However, even this limitation was
partially overcome by the NSDAP's good performance in the
eastern towns of Bautzen and Zittau. 419 The Nazis also faced severe
limits in their attempt to infiltrate traditional Marxist
strongholds. 42° Areas with a deep-seated organisational network of
the traditional Marxist parties, particularly SPD strongholds, like
the towns of Freital and Riesa, and the rural AHs of Pirna, Leipzig
and Oschatz, remained an organizational desert for the NSDAP.
However, the NSDAP managed to make astonishing electoral gains
In some old working class strongholds like Chemnitz, Plauen,
Werdau, and the AHs Oelsnitz and Plauen which had an extremely
high percentage of working-class citizens. The Nazis increasingly
challenged the Marxists in their strongholds.421
417 The Nazis reported about a propaganda tour through the "completely
unworked eastern Saxony" in September 1930. "There were villages in which
the people had not heard about Hitler" (FI< Nr. 30, 4.9.1930). The NSDAP only
had one party branch (Mittweida) and forty-five party members in the All
Mlttweida until late 1930 (Das Nationalsozialistische Sachsen, pp. 60, 62).
418 The NSDAP only gained 11.9 per cent of the vote in the AH Zittau, 12.4 per
cent in the AH LObau, and 14.3 per cent in the All Kamenz and AH Bautzen in
the 1930 Reichstag elections.
419 The NSDAP gained 21.7 per cent of the vote in Zittau, and 21.2 per cent in
Bautzen in the 1930 Reichstag elections.
420 E.g. a NSDAP meeting in Sebnitz was attended by 600-700 people and had
to be dissolved due to disturbances of Marxist visitors, who accounted for
eighty per cent of all visitors (SB, Nr. 8, 23.2.1930.) The Nazis reported that
they were not able to organise a single meeting in Wilsdruf because
landlords would not risk renting them a meeting place because of Marxist
threats (FK, Nr. 51, 29.9.1930).
421 E.g. thirty-four Nazis visited the SPD's anti-Fascist meeting with
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 (BA, NS 22, Nr. 1067; except January 1933:
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high (see footnote 219).
2: all figures are from 1. Januar of each year from JbSPD, (1929-3 1).
financial difficulties424 , and there were signs, that the party had
lost its drive and aggressiveness at the end of 1930.425
The Nazis started a meeting-room-brawl and injured several Social
Democrats (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Februar-Mä.rz 1930).
422 The NSDAP's electorate in Plauen (its overall percentage of the NSDAP's
vote in Saxony in brackets): RW 192411: 7991 (11.8%), RW 1928: 7751 (10.4%),
LW 1929: 10408 (7.8%), RW 1930: 22017 (3.9%).
423 E.g. the NSDAP branch in Glauchau was dissolved due to fierce internal
group fighting in August 1930 (ibid., Nr. 19086, NSDAP 1929-32).
424 The Nazis in Aue reported that they had no money for leaflets to
campaign for the elections to the factory councils in early 1930 (SB,
22.3.1930). The Nazis in eastern Saxony reported about their financial
difficulties due to the high costs of the election campaigns in 1929.
Thereafter they were only able to rent a cheap room which was located a one
hour walk away from the town. However, this did not seem to limit their
activities (ibid., Nr. 68, 14.5.1930).
425 Der Fretheitskampf appeared dull and with increasingly more
advertisement (e.g. nine-and-a-half pages of sixteen on 13.12.1930) at the
end of 1930. Overall there was surprisingly little about the economic crisis.
113
Overall, it is important to see the organisation and activities of the
Saxon NSDAP in perspective. The Nazis' political plans had received
a bitter rejection in the state parliament and they were co idemned
to the opposition benches in Dresden. It is true that the party had
become the most active political force, however, compared with the
mighty SPD organisation it was still only a small affair (see Figures
4 above and 5 below). The NSDAP had about one-quarter the
Figure 5:
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1: NSDAP Parteistatistik. 1935 (except 1931: FK Nr. 109, 12.5.193 1).
2: all figures are from 31.12. of each year from JbSPD, (1926-31).
3: 1.1.1930: ZPA, I 3/8-10/158; 1.1.193 1: ZPA, 1 3/8-10/148.
number of party branches that the SPD had in Saxony by the end of
1930, and the NSDAP's affiliated organisations were still extremely
small. E.g. there were only 673 NSF members' in Saxony in 1930426,
and the HJ only had 1,428 members in early 1931 427 . However,
426 Stephenson, Nazi Women p. 59. The figure seems particularly small
compared with the 32997 women organised in the local SPD (JbSPD 1930).
427 Stachura, Nazi Youth, Appendix '1111.
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there were also signs that the NSDAP was seriously challenging the
SPD's dominance on the party organisational front in some areas.428
(v) Were the Saxon Nazis left wing? The formation of the
government in Saxony after the state elections in May 1929
The winning of five seats In the May 1929 state elections
catapulted the Nazis into the political limelight, and gave them the
key position in Saxon's parliament between the blocks of the
bourgeoisie and the Left. However, the question of whether to
participate In a coalition government or to remain in opposition,
suddenly exposed fundamental disagreements between two
different strands within the NSDAP. The so-called 'Nazi Left'
underlined its belief In a true revolutionary struggle and a
simultaneous fight against Capitalism and Marxism, while the 'right
wing' of the NSDAP tried to use the opportunity to prove to the
bourgeois parties its ability to work in a coalition.429
Traditionally, historians argued that there was a 'left wing' within
the NSDAP which shared certain ideas which stood in sharp
contrast to the course followed by Hitler and the party leadership
in Munich 430
 The clearest manifestation of the 'Nazi Left' was the
428 This was particularly so in south-western Saxony. E.g. the SPD district of
Annaberg had eighteen party branches and 1218 party members in 1929.
These numbers probably declined during the depression. In contrast, the
NSDAP's party membership grew from 250 in late 1929, to 545 in 1930, to 1,215
In 1931, and to 1,750 in 1932 in the area (E. L Lang, 'Kampf und Sieg der
Nationalsozialistischen Bewegung im Grenzlandkreis Annaberg/Obererz-
gebirge', in Voni silbernen Erzgebirge. Kreis Annaberg (Band I), p. 224).429 See KUhnI, Die nadonalsoziaiistische Linke, 1925-30 (Meisenheim, 1966),
p. 220. The following investigation varies in several aspects with KUhnl's
account.
430 Kühnl described the programme of the 'Nazi Left': 1. an emphasis on
anti-capitalism, identification with the interests of employers, the rejection
of alliances with the national right; 2. the fight against all kind of
Imperialism, and a friendly attitude towards Russia; 3. the demand for an
extra-parliamentarian, 'revolutionary' fight, and the rejection of Hitler's
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existence of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Nord und Westdeutschen
Gaue (AG) during 1925-26, and the left wing Kampfverlag under
the leadership of Gregor and Otto Strasser from 1926 onwards.
Recently this traditional interpretation of a 'Nazi Left' was
challenged by Peter Stachura, who underlined the great divisions
within the AG431 , and concluded that "the whole idea of a 'Nazi Left'
in the NSDAP at this time has little meaning" because such an
"identifiable entity within the party did not exist."432
Despite the lack of a detailed study about the NSDAP in Saxony,
historians have traditionally described the local Nazis as heavily
influenced by the party's left wing. 433
 The official NSDAP Gau
newspapers in Saxony, the NSfS and later SB, were published by
the Kampfverlag.434 Otto Strasser, who became the most significant
representative of the left within the NSDAP at the end of the
1920s, was the editor of the Kampfverlag and used his position to
put forward his radical national socialist, and revolutionary ideas
in north and middle Germany. 435
 Additionally, Gregor Stra1er's
attachment to Saxony became clear on many occasions 436 , and even
'legal' course which aimed at coalitions with the bourgeois parties (KUhnl,
NSLinke, pp. 54-55).
431 P. D. Stachura, Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism (London, 1983),
pp. 45,48.
432 Stachura, Gregor Strasser, p. 49.
433 Kuhnl described the Nazis In Saxony within the 'sphere of influence' of
the AG from 1925 onwards (KUhnl, NS Linke, p. 17). Schildt writes about a
friendly relationship between Mutschmann and the AG (G. Schildt, 'Die
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nord-West. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der NSDAP
1925-26' (PhD Freiburg, 1964), pp. 123-124).
434 Der Nadonalsozialist caine into being in March 1926, and was published
in five different regional issues, one of which was Saxony (NSfS). KUhn!
argued that the SB, the successor of the NSfS, was published with the special
wish of Mutschmann (Kuhn!, NS Linke, p. 4).
435 KUhn! analysed: "The Kampfverlag's press stood In one front with the
Marxists' during every labour dispute, during every protest against price
rises, and against the dismantling of the social services" (ibid., p. 192).
436 E.g. Gregor Strasser said in Plauen in mid-1930: "My heart and my work
is particularly attached to Gau Saxony (SB Nr. 84, 3.6.1930). He was the most
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the jealous Goebbels acknowledged that Saxony was Gregor
Stra1er's "domain".437
 Gregor Strasser was seen as one of the main
proponents of the 'left wing' within the NSDAP, and was the second
most powerful Nazi leader until he left the party after his dispute
with Hitler at the end of 1932. The NSDAP's 'left wing' felt
particularly attached to Saxony due to its large working-class
population. This became most evident after the state elections in
May 1929 and June 1930, and during the strike of the metal
workers in April 1930. And lastly, Kurt Gruber's HJ in Plauen438 , as
well as Wilhelm Tempel's NSDStB in Leipzig 439, held strong social
revolutionary believes.
However, Stachura convincingly refuted Gregor Stra1,er's role as
champion of a 'Nazi Left' after 1928.440
 The radical left wing voice
of the Kampfverlag's SB reflected only one side of the political
outlook of the NSDAP in Saxony in the 1920s.441
 As in most other
regions, the local NSDAP made attempts to woo the working classes
and middles classes (most of the ancillary groups aimed to attract
middle class support; most NSDAP members came from the middle
classes before 1929). Saxony was a region where the influences of
frequent speaker of the NSDAP leadership In Saxony, attempted to become
Minister of the Interior in Saxony in 1930, and represented the electoral
district of Dresden-Bautzen in the 1930 Reichstag elections.
437 FrOhlich, Tagebucher Goebbels, 1930 V 14.
438 Stachura assessed: "Gruber was instrumental in infusing the HJ with his
own social revolutionary Ideals" (Stachura, Nazi Youth, pp. 52).
439 Stachura wrote: "Tempel sought to give the NSDStB a leftist direction
which oniy incurred the disapprobation of Hitler and led to Tempel's
dismissal in July 1928" (ibid., p. 54).
440 Stachura, Gregor Strasser, pp. 10, 77.
441 The NS!S became the official Saxon Gau newspaper after a decision at
the party meeting in Weimar in summer 1927, replacing the 'VOlkischen
Nachrichten' from Plauen (STA D, Md!, Nr. 11126/1, Juni 1927). The fact that
the decision was made in Weimar, and that many Saxon Nazis already read
the NSIS (e.g. NSfS, Nr. 23, 8.8.1926) suggests that Mutschmann had no other
option than accepting the Kampfverlag's paper as official Gau newspaper.
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the Munich party leadership and that of the AG, and later the
circle around Otto Strasser, came together. Prominent Nazis who
spoke In the state after 1925 were a mix between 'left wing' and
'right wing' activists. Saxony had never been a member of the AG,
and Mutschmann did not attend any of Its meetings. Mutschmann
was never a true friend of the Strasser brothers 442 , and must have
felt uneasy about their interest in his Ga u. He exploited Gregor
Stra1er's powerful position within the NSDAP to strengthen his own
influence in Saxony, and did not hesitate to turn against the
influential 'competitor' as soon as an opportunity arose.443
Heavily industrialized Saxony with its marxist strongholds
produced many "national socialists who, in addition to their
nationalism, cherished notions of a new socialist order of
society." 444
 Mutschmann was influenced by this environment too.
However, as a textile industrialist who was increasingly threatened
by the process of modernisation and the gains made by the
organised working class, he did not champion a 'socialist
revolution'. He was a fierce supporter of a 'national revolution'
which would sweep away with the 'November system'. Above all,
Mutschmann was an extreme opportunist and used every chance to
442 As Kuhn! admits himself (Kuhn!, NS Linke, p. 52).
443 Goebbels wrote in early June 1930 that Mutschmann and DOnicke, the
leader of Leipzig, "were against Strasser" (FrOhllch, Tagebucher Goebbeis,
1930 VI 3). This was probably a result of the Kampfverlag's support for the
metal workers' strike in April. Additionally, Mutschinann rallied behind
Hitler in Berchtesgaden during the dispute with G. Strasser at the end of 1932(ibId., 1932 XII 29). Mutschinann called Strasser a "Jew" and "Judas" at the
conference of the Gauleirer in January 1933 (ibid., 1933 I 17). The fact that
Mutschmann was in Berchtesgaden in late 1932 supports Jordan's account
that Hitler sent Mutschniann to Gregor Strasser to bring the latter back into
the party (R. Jordan, Erlebt und Erlitten. Weg eines Gauleiters von Munchen
bis Moskau (Leoni am Starnberger See, 1971), p. 90). Mutschmann, who
knew Strasser well and was a loyal Hitler supporter, seemed to be the ideal
person to do this.
444 Stachura, Nazi Youth, p. 52.
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assert his leadership over the Saxon movement. After the 1928
Reichstag elections, which were disappointing for the NSDAP even
In workirg-class Saxony, he followed the re-orientation of the
Munich leadership and put most emphasis onto the middle classes.
Clear evidence for this was the appointment of Kiuinger as leader
of the parliamentary NSDAP shortly after the state elections in May
1929. Despite his often radical rhetoric, Killlnger pursued a slow
rapprochement with the bourgeois parties. The local Nazis
increased their anti-Marxist activities446 and their readiness to
work together with other organisations on the right.447
The events after the May 1929 elections showed that the local
NSDAP was firmly on Hitler's line. The negotiations for the
formation of the new government were extremely complicated as
the Left (SPD and KPD) had forty-five seats, while the bourgeois
parties had forty-six seats. The Nazis tipped the scale between both
groups with their five seats. There was a great deal of perplexity
and uncertainty about a possible coalition government. Several
different candidates unsuccessfully competed in the state
parliament in the first two elections for the post of Minister
President on 18 and 20 June.448 The confusion only ended when
the Nazis made it clear that they would only support a completely
'marxist-free government' with Wilhelm BUnger, member of the
445 Kühnl's view that Killinger replaced Mücke after the latter resigned
from the party In early July that year is wrong (Ktthnl, NS Linke, p. 222).
Mucke had already resigned his seat In the previous parliamentary session
and was not even a candidate for the May 1929 state elections.
446 E.g. the Nazis and Communists opposed the appointment of Weckel, a
Social Democrat, as president of the parliament in June 1929 (SB, Nr. 24,
16.6.1929). It was not common, even for opposition parties, to obstruct the
candidate of the strongest parliamentary party at the election to this post.
447 E.g. the Wehrwil1 co-operated in the NSDAP's campaign for the state
elections in May 1929 (Stachura, Gregor Strasser, p. 75).
448 See VdSI, 4. Wp, 2. Sitzung, 18.6.1929, and ibid., 3. Sitzung, 20.6.1929.
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DVP, as Prime Minister.449 Before this offer, the Nazis had not been
approached by the parties on the middle and right regarding the
formation of the gc vernment.450 This was due to the radical anti-
parliamentarian agitation In the SB. With their sudden change of
tactics the Nazis clearly determined the agenda from 20 June
onwards. Their influence was decisive for the appointment of the
Prime Minister and his cabinet. BUnger, who had only received one,
and then seven votes in the first two ballots, was elected Prime
Minister with forty-four votes on 25 June. 451 Hitler Instructed
MUcke, one of the most prominent Saxon Nazis with a personal link
to him, to negotiate the formation of a new government with
BUnger. 452
 MUcke wrote to BUnger the day after he was elected
Prime Minister. The content of the letter is not clear, but there are
two possibilities. The first is, that Mücke demanded the Ministry of
the Interior for his party in exchange for supporting Bunger's
coalition government. Indeed, a week later the Nazis indicated in
parliament that they would be interested in this post (see
Appendix 1). It Is interesting that the Saxon Nazis also thought of
Wilhelm Frick, who became the Minister of Interior and Culture
between January 1930 and April 1931 in Thuringia, as their
449 See 'Vor der Regierungsbildung in Sachsen', Crimmitschauer Anzeiger
and Tagblatt, Nr. 143, 22/23.6.29.
450 See 'Unsere Politik im Landtag', SB, Nr. 28, 14.7.1929.
451 VdSL, 4 Wp, 4. Sitzung, 25.6.1929. The five Nazis voted for Bunger
(Kiuinger 'Unsere Politik im Landtag', SB, Nr. 28, 14.7.1929). The election of
Bunger with forty-four votes was only possible because the KPD handed in
blank ballot papers.
452 See 'LUgen-Nazis!', SVB, Nr. 184, 8.8.1929. Hitler was involved in the
NSDAP's coalition negotiations from the start. The Neue Leipziger Zeitung
(Nr. 153) reported on 2.6.1929 that a planned meeting between Hitler and the
five NSDAP members of the Saxon state parliament from the day before was
re-scheduled to the following week.
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candidate for the post (see Appendix 1). 453
 However, it is very
unlikely that the Nazis demanded the post at that time In Saxony.
TF eir five per cent of the vots were a far less powerful position to
bargain as the 11.3 per cent of their colleagues In Thuringia half a
year later. The combined opposition of SPD, KPD, ASPD, and DDP
against Nazi participation In a government would have ended
Bunger's time as Prime Minister very quickly. When the Nazis
boasted in the state parliament: "We do not want a post as
minister! We do not attach importance to it!"454 they merely
expressed something out of their reach anyhow. 45
 The fact that
the Nazis were not prepared to accept anything less than the
important Ministry of the Interior 456 , makes Tt unlikely that the
Saxon Nazis demanded any post in BUnger's government at all. The
more realistic possibility is that MUcke put forward similar
conditions to Bunger, as those the Nazis proclaimed a week later in
Parliament (see Appendix 1). Indeed, BUnger complied to all
immediate Nazi demands by not appointing a Democrat as Minister
of the Interior or Culture, and creating a 'complete marxist-free'
government by leaving the ASPD out of the government. Bunger's
only hope of establishing a majority government, despite the
different wishes from the various bourgeois parties, was to appoint
two 'neutral' civil servants as Minister of the Interior and Minister
453 Frick was Hitler's choice. This supports the argument that the Saxon
NSDAP was firmly on the line of the leadership in Munich.
454 VdSI, 4. Wp, 6. Sitzung, 9. Juli 1929, p. 145.
455 This argument thus disagrees with Kuhnl's view that the Saxon Nazis did
not enter a bourgeois coalition government because of a compromise with
the left-wing of the party (Kühnl, NS Linke, p. 222).
456 F. Dickmann, 'Die Regierungsbildung In Thurmgen als Modell der
Machtergreifung. Fin Brief Hitlers aus dem Jahre 1930', Vierteljahreshefte
für Zeirgeschichte, 14(4) (1966), pp. 454-464.
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of Justice. 457 Additionally, BUnger took over the Ministry of
Culture, a post which traditionally caused heated disputes between
different plitical groups. The LVZ 'ommented: "Never in the
history of the Saxon parliament stood a government on such shaky
feet than that of Herrn Bunger who is totally dependent on the
Swastika party." 458 The radicalization of politics, and the growing
importance of the Nazi Party led to the first severe crack in the
'conventional' running of the parliamentary system in Saxony.
The Nazi parliamentarians were quick to justify their toleration of
the new bourgeois coalition government under BUnger 459 , and
warned to abandon their support as soon as Bunger acted against
the "interest of the German people".46° Opportunist reasons made it
necessary to keep a distance from the government and left the
door open for the Nazis to withdraw their support whenever they
wished. Additionally, the 'limited' backing of the bourgeois
government was to appease those Nazis who rejected an alliance
with bourgeois parties.
The Kampfverlag was not prepared for the election success in
Saxony in May 1929, and had no clear strategy about what to do
with their powerful position in parliament. They had frequently
discussed the necessity of an alliance with the working classes, but
had never put this into practice.46 ' The day after the elections the
457 See Bunger's government statement (VdSI, 4. Wp, 5. Sitzung, 4. Juli 1929,
pp. 88 ff.).
458 L Nr. 158, 10.7.1929.
459 Killinger explained that Bunger had met their demands by excluding the
Democrats, and that they were confident that their other conditions would be
met. He elaborated then: "The National Socialist managed to put together a
cabinet that has no red Prime Minister for the first time since the
revolution" (see 'Unsere Politik im Landtag', SB, Nr. 28, 14.7.1929).
460 VdSL, 4. Wp, 6. Sitzung, 9. Juli, p. 146.
461 KUhnl, NS Linke, p. 220.
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SB emphasized the Nazis' revolutionary Ideals, their rejection of
alliances with the Burgerrum or Marxists, and their aim to exploit
their position on a dy to day basis.462
 Howeve', although the SB
continued to proclaim its hatred against the system and the aim to
overthrow It ('Katastrophenpolitik'), there were also clear
indications that It would tolerate a Marxist government If It
fulfilled the Nazis' socialist demands. 463
 For several weeks the
articles in the SB wavered between their radical revolutionary
strategy and the toleration of a Marxist government. 464
 It Is not
clear to what extent this was a tactical move to reconcile the SB's
claim to represent the interest of the working class, or a serious
offer of an alliance with the traditional parties on the Left. Which
ever it was, the political reality quickly shattered any possibility of
an alliance between the NSDAP and the Marxist parties, and
showed how senseless the Kampfverlag 's position was in the
parliamentary system. While the 'Nazi Right' In Saxony was able to
exploit the NSDAP's position in parliament by allying with the
bourgeois forces and working for a future participation in
government, the 'Nazi Left' was politically Isolated and had nothing
to offer.
462 See 'Sieg als Verpflichtung. Em Nachwort zur Sachsenwahl' (signed by
G. Strasser, but written by his brother Otto), SB, Nr. 20, 19.5.1929.
463 The SB made clear to support a Marxist government under certain
conditions: "A government (SPD government) would have our absolute
support, if it lifted the ban of the Rotfrontka.mpferbund ... supported our
nationalization of advertising, and demanded the all-out eight-hour day"
(ibid., Nr. 21, 26.5.1929). Two weeks later Otto Strasser claimed to support
everything that helped to destroy the existing order because the collapse of
the liberal system would clear the way for a National Socialist revolution
('Katastrophenpoiitik'). However, in another article in the same edition the
Nazis repeated their conditions to support an SPD government. If these
conditions were met, the Nazis claimed they "would certainly be prepared to
support such a labour government" (ibid., Nr. 23, 9.6.1929).
464 KUhn! argued that the SB rejected any coalition with the Left or the
Right after the state election in Saxony in May 1929 (KUhn!, NS Linke, p.
220).
123
This became evident when the left wing Mücke wrote a letter to
the leader of the parliamentary faction of the SPD and KPD on 29
June, and offered to support Marxist government if it met the
demands of the NSDAP (see Appendix 2). When the KPD, and then
the SPD, publicized MUcke's secret offer465 and caused
embarrassment for the Nazi leadership, the parliamentary party in
Saxony quickly distanced itself from MUcke, and described it as a
personal move by him. 466 MUcke, who was no longer even a
member of the state parliament, and whose only power base was
his link with Hitler, had no choice but to resign from the party. In a
series of articles he blamed Gauleiter Mutschmann indirectly for
the right wing course of the local NSDAP. 467 It seems clear that
Hitler and the Saxon parliamentary party knew about MUcke's
secret letter to the SPD and KPD. 468 Several reasons explain why
MUcke approached the Marxists, and why the NSDAP leadership
tolerated MUcke's move. First of all, the Nazis hoped to increase the
pressure on BUnger by contacting the Marxists. 469 Additionally,
465 See 'Der Streit urn den Brief, SVB, Nr. 153, 4.7.1929.
466 VdSL, 4. Wp, 6. Sitzung, 9. Jull 1929, P. 146.
467 MUcke also accused Hitler of having broken promises to him on several
occasions due to the intervention of Mutschmann, and that Hitler was
financially dependent on Mutschmann. He explained his resignation
because of the entry of Killinger into the NSDAP (see 'Enthullungen Uber die
Hitler-Partei', SVB, Nr. 180, 4.8.1929).
468 Hitler admitted that he knew about Mucke's action (VB, 10.7.1929).
469 Bunger was informed about MUcke's intention to contact the Marxist
parties (see 'LUgen-Nazis', SVB, Nr. 184, 8.8.1929). However, MUcke's claim
that it gave the Nazis an alternative in case no majority was found on the
right, is not convincing (ibid.). The bitter divisions between the KPD and
SPD excluded any realistic chance of a Marxist government in Saxony.
Additionally, the Saxon DVP was opposed to any alliance with the SPD, and
the SPD faction would not have been able to justify a NSDAP toleration before
its constituency. MUcke's letter indicated that the Nazis were worried about a
possible ban of the SA (the Communist paramilitary Rotfrontkâmpferbund
had been banned in Prussia and most other states on 6 May 1929). It is
unlikely, however, that this made Hitler seriously consider an alliance with
the Marxists (Tyrell, Führer befiel, p. 308). This has to be seen rather as a
single issue on which the NSDAP wanted to co-operate with the Marxists.
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MUcke himself was a left wing supporter within the NSDAP47O, and
preferred to tolerate a Marxist rather than a bourgeois
government. This line was shared by sorte voices In the SB during
the first weeks after the elections. The fact that the Nazi leadership
tolerated Mücke's approach to the Marxists, also expressed the
sensitivity of the leadership to the feelings of the 'left wing' within
the party. After the publication of Mücke's letter embarrassed the
NSDAP leadership, Hitler explained angrily that there was never
any intention to go into an alliance with the "Marxist plague". The
offer was only made to prevent a situation in which the "red
demagogues will wrongly accuse them of willingly tolerating a
bourgeois government in Saxony and representing 'capitalist
interests'."471
In fact, the Marxists intention to harm the Nazis backfired because
it sealed the fate of the 'socialist' Nazis. As soon as the scandal
erupted MUtschmann exploited the situation, strengthened his
control472 , and brought the Saxony NSDAP even more onto
'mainstream' party line. The party's programme for the local
municipal elections at the end of the year changed from a socialist
revolutionary one in July, to a much more moderate and bourgeois
oriented one only two months later. 473 Additionally, the
470 Mucke was a supporter of the AG and participated at its conference in
Harburg on 7.9.1924 (W. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution.
Ursprung und Geschichte der NSDAP in Hamburg 1922-1933. Dokumente
(Frankfurt, 1960), p. 147).
471 VB, 10.7.1929.
472 Mutschmann was more than happy to get rid of Mucke, one of his
formerly fiercest competitors for the leadership over the local NSDAP (e.g.
in 1927 MUcke had failed to establish Gau East Saxony; see 'Helmuth von
MUckes FUhrerpersOnlichkeit', (C. Meyer), SB, Nr. 34, 25.8.1929).
473 Compare the NSDAP's July programme with its October programme (ibid.,
Nr. 30, 28.7.1929; ibid., Nr. 40, 6.10.1929). During the campaign the Nazis
concentrated most of their propaganda on the middle classes (e.g. see
'Nationalsozialistische Kommunalpolitik', ibid., Nr. 42, 20.10.1929).
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establishment of a Saxon press bureau for the SB under Heinrich
Bennecke in Dresden was not only a consequence of the growth of
the movement, but also a move towards greate; independence
from the Kampfverlag's hold over the Gau newspaper.474 The
activities of the Nazis, including their extremely aggressive
speeches in the state parliament, were mainly directed against the
Marxist parties475 , and they continued to back the bourgeois
government in exchange for concessions from BUnger. 476 The
NSDAP's conditions for supporting a bourgeois government led by
Schieck in March 1930 (similar to the ones given to BUnger in July
1929), were anti-Marxist, vaguely anti-Capitalist and pro-working
class, but also put forward specific demands for the middle classes
(see Appendix 1 and 3).
474 The control of the Kampfverlag over the local content eroded further
when the SB was published daily from March 1930 onwards. The SBs main
bureau remained in Dresden and local bureaus were established in Leipzig,
Chemnitz, Plauen, Zwickau (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Januar 1930).
475 In October 1929 Killinger warned the Left - in one of the most notorious
NSDAP speeches - that "one day the heads of their bigwigs will roll" (VdSL, 4.
Wp, 11. Sitzung, 23.10.1929, p. 394). In the same session the NSDAP supported
the government's motion to abandon the Ninth of November holiday, and
brought in an additional motion to abandon the holiday on May the First too.
Furthermore, NSDAP members were threatened to be expelled from the party
if they visited meetings from other parties during the campaign for the 1930
state election (Kuhnl, NS Linke, p. 227). This was clearly aimed to prevent
NSDAP members from visiting Marxist meetings.
476 E.g. the NSDAP demanded the closure of the Saxon embassy in Berlin and
Munich. Bunger must have closed the second one because the Nazis' demands
to Schieck in February 1930 only mentioned the embassy in Berlin (compare
Appendix 1 and 3). Lapp writes: "A good example of the delicacy with which
the BUnger cabinet treated the NSDAP is provided by the debate over the
activities of the National Socialist youth organizations in the Saxon schools.
Whereas the SPD demanded a prohibition of the activities of the Nationalso-
zialistischer Schulerbund (pointing out that the Saxon government had
issued a prohibition of the Communist Jungspartakusbund in the Saxon
schools in 1927) Bunger refused to take any action against the Nazi youth
group: unlike the Communist youth organisations, he argued, the National
Socialists were not committed to the violent overthrow of the Republic ... In
the same vein, the government removed the Old Socialists' Minister of
Labour, Georg Elsner, largely as a result of National Socialist pressure"(Lapp, 'Saxon Burgertum', pp. 259-260).
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(vi) The final defeat of Otto Strasser and the Kampfverlag
The events after the state elections in Saxony in May 1929
signalled the beginning of complete defeat for the Kampfierlag
group and paved the way for the Nazis' first participation in a
bourgeois coalition government In Thuringia in January 1930.
Frick's appointment as Minister of the Interior and Culture did not
lead to an immediate clash between the Otto Strasser group and the
Munich leadership because the state had never been In the
Kampfverlag 's sphere of influence. The final show-down took place
again over Saxony, because the Kampfverlag regarded the state as
their domain and felt very sensitive about the increasing challenge
of the right. The occasion was provided when Hitler and the
Kampfverlag disagreed about the position to take towards the
strike of the Saxon metaiworkers in spring 1930, and soon
afterwards, whether to participate in a bourgeois coalition
government following another state election in June that year.
The NSDAP, who had helped to topple the Saxon government in
May 1930, increased its electorate and demanded the Ministry of
the Interior for Gregor Strasser. A fortnight after the election Otto
Strasser and a small group of loyal followers broke away from the
NSDAP due to their revolutionary and socialist beliefs, and in
protest against Hitler's co-operation with the bourgeoisie.478
477 In April 1930 the SB supported the ADGB led strike (e.g. see SB, Nr. 67,
13.5.1930). KUhn! writes that the industrial leaders of Saxony responded to
this by giving Hitler the ultimatum either officially to condemn the strike
and stop the Kampfverlag's support of it, or the Reichsverband der
Deutschen Lndustrie would cease all its payments to the NSDAP. After Hitler
was unsuccessful in changing the Kampfverlag's supportive attitude to the
strike, he saw himself forced to publish a resolution in the VB which
banned all party members from participating in the strike (KUhn!, NS
Linke, p. 243).
478 Kühnl, NS Lin.k-e, p. 252. In retrospective it is ironical, that the coalition
negotiations failed and that the Saxon Nazis were in fact in opposition to the
new bourgeois government.
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Overall, the defection of the Otto Strasser group led to little reaction
among the local Nazis.479 However, a few activists expressed their
disapproval with the official party line. 480 The most noticeable
consequence was that Hitler quickly banned the SB as the official
NSDAP newspaper. 48 ' The first edition of Saxony's own Gau
newspaper, Der Freiheitskampf, came out on 1 August 1930.
The group around Otto Strasser lost the battle as soon as It became
apparent that the party's new strategy of concentrating on the
middle classes was rewarded by election gains for the NSDAP after
1928. The party leadership in Munich was not prepared to
endanger this progress by tolerating a group of left wing
revolutionaries within the NSDAP. The complete insignificance of
Otto Stra1er's 'Black Front' organisation in Saxony and Germany as
a whole,482 supports Stachura's thesis that there did not really exist
a 'Nazi Left' as a coherent entity. There is a need to re-focus
attention away from the group around Otto Strasser at the 'top',
and to concentrate more on the background, desire, and role of the
masses of NSDAP working class-members at the 'base'.
479 E.g. 0. Stra1er's 'Kampfgemeinschaft Revolutionare Nationalsozialisten'
appeared to have been even more insignificant in Saxony than elsewhere.
(BDC, Strasser, Dr. Otto, p. 43).
480 least two Nazi members of the town council in Plauen were excluded
from the party ( Volkszeirung für Plauen, Nr. 155, 7.7.1930). One NSDAP
member of the town council in Leipzig left the party too, and the SPD
reported about disputes among the NSDAP in Chemnitz (ChVSt, Nr. 182,
7.8.1930). Several SA members in Leipzig proclaimed they would continue
their fight against bigwigs even within their own party (Vorwärts, Nr. 476,
10.10.1930), and in early July 1930 the VB felt the need to confirm that all
NSDAP members of the Saxon state parliament supported Hitler (VB, Nr. 159,
6/7.7.1930).
481 Volkszeitung für Plauen,Nr. 151, 2.7.1930.
482 Not a single Nazi from Saxony signed Otto Stra1er's declaration of the
creation of the 'Revolutionary National Socialists' (Kuhnl, NS Linke, p. 297).
Otto Stra1,er's 'Black Front' organisation only attracted a few hundred
dissident National Socialists in Germany (Stachura, Gregor Strasser, p. 81).
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Nazi electoral success depended on flexibility and crude
opportunism. Gauleiter Mutschmann pursued a flexible path in
order to assume complete control in Saxony. From 1926 he used
the Kampfverlag and the influence of Gregor Strasser as an ideal
vehicle to strengthen his position in working-class Saxony. This was
also in line with the party strategy until 1928. However, he never
completely committed himself to the cause of the 'left wing'. When
the Nazis failed to make inroads into the Saxon working classes by
the late 1920s483 , Mutschmann was quick to follow the party
leadership by reorientating the movements main focus towards the
middle classes.
483 E.g. the SA of Zwickau carried out a propaganda trip through several
industrial villages on May the First. The locals were taken aback, and "only a
few hands were raised". When a Nazi attempted to give a short speech in a
market square, he was shouted down (SB, Nr. 23, 9.6.1929).
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8. The NSDAP as a mass party (1931 and 1932)
(i) Germany
Between 1931 and 1932 Germany was plunged into a social,
political and economic crisis of unprecedented proportions.
Minority governments ruled with emergency decrees in the
Reichstag, and 38 per cent of the total work force were
unemployed in erly 1932. The capitalist economic system and
parliamentary government faced their greatest challenge. The
NSDAP grew rapidly and consolidated itself in these years of crisis.
Between late 1930 and late 1932 the number of party branches
and bases increased from 4,964 to 11,845 484, and its membership
mushroomed to around 500,000 485 . Additionally, the NSDAP was
represented in several state governments 486 , and became by far
the largest single party by gaining 37.3 per cent of the votes in the
July 1932 Reichstag elections. The advance of the Nazis seemed
unstoppable. However, the party's strategy of gaining power
through the electoral process was disappointing. The NSDAP failed
to achieve an absolute majority in elections to the Reichstag, and
Hindenburg, the President, was not willing to appoint Hitler as
Chancellor. It is true that the Right "began to base their hopes on
the Nazi movement as the means of acquiring mass support"487,
however, at the same time there were many aspects of the NSDAP
484 NSDAP Parteistatistik 1935.
485 Falter, 'NSDAP Jungmitglieder'. p. 209. Diehi estimated the SA
membership to be around 77,000 by the end of 1930, and well over half a
million by January 1933 (J. M. Diehi, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar
Germany (Bloomington, London, 1977), p. 295).
486 In Thuringia, Braunschweig, Anhalt, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-
Schwerin, and Mecklenburg-Strelitz (Tyrell. Führer befiel. pp. 384-385).48 / Noakes/Pridham, Nazism. p. 89.
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of which the former disapproved: "It was too radical, too violent, its
economic policies smacked too much of Socialism, and the
characters of some of its leaders were dubious." 488
 At the end of
1932 the NSDAP was In a deep crisis. For the first time the Nazis
lost votes in the November Reichstag elections, the morale of many
activists was low, the party faced financial difficulties, and Hitler's
all-out demand for the Chancellorship seemed to have manoeuvred
them into a dead end.
(ii) Society in Saxony during the years of crisis: radicalization,
polarization, and divisions
Tensions came to a head in Saxon society between 1931 and 1932.
The economic crisis reached dramatic proportions, the parties
increased their activities, the rise in violence grew steadily, and the
division within the society widened ever more. The growth of Nazi
propaganda stimulated their Marxist opponents to more agitation
too. The police reported many well attended meetings and parades
of the SPD; the Reichsbanner became more active and increased its
membership. 489
 Meanwhile the KPD tried to attract the
unemployed and to increase its influence at the work place. 49° The
radical parties benefited from the desperate economic situation.
The AH Schwarzenberg reported in July 1931: "The widespread
discontentment makes itself felt more and more ... Large sections of
society are driven into the hands of the radical parties." 49 ' More
and more people, particularly in south-western Saxony, became
convinced that the rise of the NSDAP was inevitable. The same AH
489 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Februar 1931.
490 Ibid
491 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1944, Jull 1931.
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reported in early 1932: "Most people expect that the NSDAP will
become the strongest of all political parties in due course, and that
the party will take over the government In the spring. Only this
party Is expected to change the current very bad economic and
political situation."492
The enormous increase In public meetings - between 1929 and
1932 the number roughly doubled each year - led to a
simultaneous growth in violence. Additionally, the brutality of the
clashes increased. Seven people were killed In Leipzig alone in
193 Frequent bans on meetings or parades were not sufficient
to prevent this.494
 Many citizens did not understand why the
government did not introduce measures to stop the violence.495
Overall, the judiciary seemed to be lenient towards the Right, and
tough against the Left496 , and the clashes were increasingly
provoked by the Nazis.497
 The Nazis, like their opponents, always
portrayed the other side (mainly Communists) as brutal attackers.
They accused the government in Dresden or the local police of
492 thid., Januar 1932.
493 STA L, AH DObein, Nr. 2409, Ruckblick auf das Jahr 1931.
494 In mid-1931 the Saxon intelligence service reported about bans in the
AH Leipzig, the town of Leipzig, Zittau, Mittweida, Leisnig, Crimmitschau, and
Radebeul. The Saxon government declared a ban on all propaganda trips
between 20.7.-15.9.1931 (STAD, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4,Juni 1931).
495 The All Schwarzenberg reported in early 1931: "The attacks and bloody
clashes between KPD and NSDAP ... are sharply condemned by all peace
loving citizens. Most citizens do not understand that the government does
not introduce measures to stop the attacks" (ibid., AH Schwarzenberg, Nr.
1944, Marz 1931).
496 E.g. a court acquitted the Nazi Spengler, who shot dead two Communists in
Plauen on 29.11.1930, from manslaughter. The court regarded it as an act of
self-defence, and sentenced him to three months prison because of illegal
possession of a weapon. The verdict caused irritation even in bourgeois
circles (ibid., Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Februar 1931).
497 Between 1.8.-20.11.1932 of 351 clashes and insults 128 were provoked by
the NSDAP, eighty-one by the KPD, and twenty-seven by the Eiserne Front in
Leipzig (the remaining 115 were unpolitical or the attacker was not clear)
(STA L, PP-St, Nr. 92).
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tolerating the violence inflicted on them by the Marxists, while
preventing the Nazis from defending themselves.498
During the years of ':ris1s the divisions within Saxon society
Increased further. Some radical Social Democrats split away from
the SPD to form the SAP In October 193 which was strong in
the KH Zwlckau. Five of twelve SPD members of the town council In
Plauen joined the SAP.500
 Moreover, the gulf between the local SPD
and KPD widened more and more. At the same time the traditional
right disintegrated even further. A DVP member of the town
council in Chemnitz joined the NSDAP In late 193 1.501
The Right failed in its attempt to imitate the dynamic and
determined NSDAP. The DNVP founded a Schutzstaffel in late
1930. The organisation was dissolved in March 1931 because of
Internal disputes and lack of members. 502 Smaller right wing
organisations were swallowed by the NSDAP. When the
Reichsflagge, a paramilitary organisation, was dissolved in Zwickau
in March 1931, one-quarter of its members joined the Stahiheim,
and the rest the NSDAP.°
At the same time Saxon society was increasingly polarized between
left and right. When the Social Democrats from MeI1en were visited
by a group of French sportsmen they hoisted the 'Tricolor' and put
up placards In both languages with the slogan: 'Welcome, French
Brothers'. The local Nazis were outraged that "the colours of the
498 See 'Limbacher Polizeiskandal', FK, Nr. 253, 29.10.193 1. The 'Isidor Weit'
of Saxony was Flei1ner, the head of the Leipzig police and SPD member.
499 STA D, Md!, Nr. 11126/4, September 1931.
-	 50Gii., Oktober 1931.
501 Chemnitzer Tageblatt, Nr. 279, 9.10.1931. Furthermore, parliamentary
members of the WP and SLV joined the DNVP in the state parliament in early
1932 (Der Tag, Nr. 32, 6.2.1932).
502 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, November 1931.
503 Ibid., März 1931.
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french Erbfeind waved above a town in Saxony." 504 They became
even more furious when their own swastika flag, which they had
raisei at the town hail of Mar'neukirchen to welcome an SA
parade, was removed. 505 Furthermore, during the campaign for the
elections to the 'parents councils' in May 1931, the Right put
forward the choice between Christianity or barbarity in Saxon
schools. The Nazis underlined their support of Christianity, faith,
family values and nationalism, and warned about the evil effects of
the spread of unchristian Bolshevism from the Soviet Union, which
they described as the "sinister moloch and patronizer of
ungodliness."506
The divisions were also reflected in electing the president of the
state parliament. In July 1930 all bourgeois parties followed the
tradition that the largest faction in parliament provided the
president, and indirectly supported the Social Democrat Weckel as
candidate by handing in blank ballot papers. The Democrats voted
for Weckel. Only the NSDAP and KPD put forward their own
candidates. 507 The situation changed only four months later. In
November 1930 the Social Democrat Weckel just managed to be
elected with thirty-five votes compared with thirty-four for Kunz,
the candidate of the NSDAP. 08 Again the KPD put forward its own
candidate and the Democrats supported Weckel, however, this time
the bourgeois vote was split. Some still stuck to tradition and
504 FK, Nr. 105, 7.5.1931.
505Thjd
506 See 'Für em positives Christentum', ibid., Nr. 109, 12.5.193 1. The NSDAP
advised all parents to vote for the christian lists (ibid., Nr. 112, 16.5.193 1).
The elections brought an increase for the christian lists (STA D, Mdl, Nr.
11126/4, Ma! 1931).
507 VdSI, 5. Wp, 1. Sitzung, 10.7.1930.
508 Ibid., 12. Sitzung, 13.11.1930.
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handed in blank ballot papers (fourteen), but the majority
supported the Nazi Kunz (twenty). The NSDAP's campaign to bring
down Weckel just failed.509
However, the clear failure of the NSDAP-KPD referendum to
dissolve the state parliament in spring 1932 showed that It was
still only a minority who wanted the complete destruction of the
parliamentary system. Even in south-western Saxony, where the
economic situation was particularly desperate and the NSDAP had
one of Its greatest national bastions, the radical parties were not
able to mobilize a majority of the population to topple the
system.51°
(iii) The NSDAP in Saxony: years of continued and accelerated
growth
1931 was the year in which the local NSDAP grew most rapidly and
consolidated its organisation. 1932 was the year of continued
growth, six elections 511 , and permanent propaganda. Gaulelter
Mutschmann announced before the elections for the president of
the Reich in early 1932: "Each party member needs to focus on one
thing day and night: I have not got time for anything, even the
family has to take a back seat, my bowling club, other clubs or
meetings, everything, and really everything has to give way;
henceforth I only know the complete devotion to my
509 E.g. see the article 'Weckel must resign! Never again Weckel as president
of the state parliament' (FK, Nr. 205, 3.9.1931). See the chapter about the
'Nationalist Milieu'.
510 For some results see FK, Nr. 292, 16.12.193 1.
511 13 March: first election for the president of the Reich, 10 April: second
election for the president of the Reich, 17 April: referendum to dissolve the
state parliament, 31 July: Reich stag elections, 6 November: Reichstag
elections, 13 November: local elections.
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movement!" 512 The NSDAP became by far the largest party In
Saxony in the elections in 1932 (see Table 8). This was even true
for the KH Bautzen in the east, where the NSDAP won 39 per cent
of the vote in the July 1932 Reichstag elections.
Table 8: NSDAP election results in Saxony between 1932 and 1933
electoral	 RPW	 RW	 RW	 RW


























RPW: second vote in the elections to the president of the Reich on 10.4.1932
Source: StJbSa, (1924-1934).
The growth of the local party was best seen in the rising
membership figures and the expansion of the party apparatus. The
membership of the NSDAP in Saxon grew from 8,557 to 87,079, and
the number of party branches and bastions increased from 132 to
783 between 1930 and late 1932/early 1933. To pick some local
examples: The membership of the NSDAP in the district of Dresden
increased from 800 in early 1930 to 6,000 in October 1931, and
12,000 a year later. 513 In 1931 the NSDAP in Limbach increased
from 179 to 656 members514 , and from 136 to 370 members In
Radebeul. 515 Big towns like Dresden had thirty-two sections in
August 193 1.516 A dense party network was created particularly in
the south-west of the state. In the district of 'Upper Erzgebirge' (AH
512 See 'Imposante Gautagung in Chemnitz', ibid., Nr. 38, 15.2.1932.
513 Das narionalsoziaiistische Sachsen, p. 55.
514 1% Nr. 23, 28.1.1932.
515 Ibid., Nr. 32, 8.2.193 2.
516 Ibid., Nr. 180, 5.8.193 1.
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Annaberg, AH Marlenberg, and part of AH Freiberg) the NSDAP
boasted seventy party branches at the end of 1931. 517 This meant
that there was an NSDAP party branch in two of every three
villages, and that the NSDAP had at least as many party branches
as the SPD, who traditionally used to have by far the most
widespread party network. 518
 There was also a massive increase of
visitors to NSDAP meetings. In autumn 1931 prominent party
leaders like Goebbels and Strasser were regularly able to attract an
audience of 5,000-15,000 people, and meetings by other prominent
Nazis still pulled crowds of between 1,600 and 3,000.'
Another sign of the growth of the Nazi movement was the
simultaneous creation of new ancillary organisations and the rapid
growth of established ones. There was a 'National Socialist
Automobile Corps' 520 , a Nazi teacher organisation 521 , an NSDAP
service for imprisoned and injured party members 522 , groups for
children and pupils S23 , an organisation for Nazi doctors 524 , Nazi
517 Ibid., Nr. 259, 6.11.1931.
518 The SPD districts of Annaberg, Olbernhau, and FlOha, which covered
roughly the same area, had eighty-four party branches in 1929 (Jahresbe-
richt der SPD Chemnitz-Erzgebirge 1929, P
. 
9). The number of its party
branches and members fell dramatically afterwards (see the chapter
'Working-Class Milieu')
519 sTA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, September 1931.
520 The NSAK was set up in summer 1930 and was divided into five districts
by the end of the year. In Chemnitz there was a motor vehicle unit with at
least one-hundred vehicles and a motorcycle unit with at least ninety motor-
bicycles in early 1932 (ibid., Nr. 19085, NSDAP 1930).
521 The NSLO held its first meeting in Saxony in 1931. At the time they were
particularly strong in Franconia, Thuringia and Saxony. There were
branches in Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Zwickau, Plauen, Zittau-Bautzen,
Aue-Schwarzenberg (ibid., Nr. 19086, NSDAP 1929-32).
522 Ibid., Nr. 11126/4, Mai 1931.
523 There were NSDAP children groups in Leipzig, Dresden, Chemnitz and
Plauen in August 1931 (ibid., Jull 1931). There were NSDAP pupils groups in
Leipzig, Wurzen, Oschatz, Borna, Rochlitz and Grimma in the KH Leipzig
(ibid., November 1931).
524 It was founded in Chemnitz on 15.2.1931 (FK, Nr. 37, 13.2.1931).
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musicians525 , an NSDAP flying association 526 , and the NSF increased
its membership and became centralized527. By 1932 the party and
most of its affiliated organisation were well organised. Helmut
Körner, the leader of the NSDAP's agricultural organisation in
Saxony, reported to Darré about progress in 1932: "The whole
apparatus is strongly centralized, and I am confident in saying that
nothing happens in the field of agriculture in Saxony about which I
am not immediately informed. The opposition Is therefore
completely surveyed ... It Is possible for me to spread specific
Information to the whole agricultural sector in Saxony ... The good
relations I have built up enable me to have a good insight in every
agricultural organisation in Saxony, even up to the agricultural
section in the Ministry of the Economy."528
The Saxon SA grew to 19041 men in October 1931, which was
roughly ten per cent of the SA in the Reich. 529 The local SA put an
emphasis on discipline and duty530, and tried to present the image
of the protector of property. During the SA ban in spring 1932 the
Saxon Storm-troopers went under cover in a so called 'emergency
security section' (Notschutz) to protect property in case of
525 Ibid., Nr. 54, 5.3.193 1.
526 The 'National Sozialistische Flugsportverband Westsachsen' was founded
in March 1932. The first Nazi air show took place in Plauen on 26 June 1932
(see 'Die NSDAP in Sachsen', Sachsen, p. 3).
527 The organisation of the NSF moved from Munich to the Gau
headquarters in Plauen (FX Nr. 6, 8.1.1931). The NSF's membership in
Saxony increased twentyfold between October 1931 and the end of 1933, to a
total of 80,000 (Stephenson, Nazi Women, pp. 148-9).
528 Stadtarchiv Goslar, Nachla1 Darré Nr. 140, Bericht Uber die Tatigkeit der
Landwirtschaftlichen Abteilung der NSDAP im Gau Sachsen, p. 4.
529 The police reported a rapid growth of the SA in the district of Chemnitz
to 1,600 men in early 1932 (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 19088, SA 1928-32).
530 The SA members in Leipzig had eight different events on their schedule
in August 1930. Five were regarded as particularly important. A member was
automatically excluded if he missed three of the important events. Every
Storm-trooper had to pay at least 50 Pfennig every week for the acquisition
of a helmet and a coat (ibid.).
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disturbances. 531
 The SA made efforts to follow the tradition of the
local army. They frequently turned up at meetings and parades of
war veterans, and many of the numbers of the local SA units
corresponded with the numbers of former local army regiments.532
They also increased their co-operation with the Stahlhelm533 , and
were not affected by the SA rebellion in Berlin in September 1930
or the Stennes rebellion In April 193 The high percentage of
unemployed among Storm-troopers 535
 enhanced their mobility and
activity.
The local Nazis became more involved in local government and
Introduced a newsletter about local affairs in Saxony at the end of
1931. 536 The NSDAP tried to woo the church and religious
individuals with meetings on topics like 'faith and education'537,
531 Vossische Zeitung, Nr. 188, 19.4.1932.
532 The SA in Chemnitz was divided into seven Sturme (groups of 70-100
men) at the end of 1931, three of which carried the number of the former
infantry regiment in Chemnitz (104, 181, 244). At the same time Sturm 134,
also the number of a former local infantry regiment, was created in Plauen
(STA D, Mdl, Nr. 19088, SA 1928-32).
533 Several members of the Stahlhelm participated at an SA meeting in
eastern Saxony in mid-1931 (ibid., Nr. 11126/4, Jull 1931).
534 The Saxon intelligence service reported that the dispute within the SA in
Berlin did not affect Saxony in April 1931. Also see Bennecke 'SA Sachsen', p.
45. However, the weekly paper 'Workers, Peasants, Soldiers', published by
Stennes, was read by some Storm-troopers in Leipzig (ibid., April 1931).
535 The NSDAP in Dresden attempted to bring together unemployed party
members in their local SA and SS houses (FK Nr. 52, 3.3.1931). The Nazis
claimed that forty-four per cent of all members of the SA in Saxony were
unemployed in spring 1931 (Der Gau Sachsen, p. XVIII). At the end of 1931
appareniJy 80 per cent of the SA and SS were unemployed in Plauen (FK, Nr.
251, 27.10.193 1).
536 BA, NS 22, Nr. 1067. Kunz, who was responsible for NSDAP community
politics, summarized that the main task of the NSDAP was to gain power, and
that they were against new taxes (FK Nr. 150, 1.7.1931).
537 The Nazi teacher GOpfert held many meetings with similar topics to
middle class audiences (e.g. see ibid., Nr. 65, 18.3.1931). The priest Brussig
greeted Nazis on the streets with "Hell Hitler' in eastern Saxony, and
proclaimed at a solstice celebration of the NSDAP: "As red as these flames
shine, as red may the blood of our enemies flow in due time!' (Volkszeitung
für LObau, Nr. 162, 13.7.1932).
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and the FK introduced a little section on 'church news' in 1932538.
The FK also introduced a special page for farmers in September
193 and were active among the police. In August 1932 the
Gauleitung in Plauen reported to the headquarters in Munich that
they had "infiltrated the ranks of the police in Saxony
comparatively well"540.
Most of the NSDAP's affiliated organisations continued to be geared
to the middle classes. In early 1931 the NSDAP in Leipzig had
special advisers for civil servants, social benefits, economic policy,
independent traders and artisans, gymnastics and sport, war
invalids, and culture. 541
 Additionally, the Nazis made great efforts
to infiltrate bourgeois organisations. The NSDAP won twenty of the
forty seats in the elections to the agricultural chambers (LK) in May
1931, and the FK became one of its official newspapers.542
 The
Nazis also claimed to be represented in the home owner association
in ChemnitZ543 , and wooed the powerful VSI, the organisation of
the Saxon industrialists. 544
 Furthermore, the FK was portrayed as
the only newspaper which supported the middle classes.545
A rapprochement between the Nazis and bourgeoisie was
frequently made difficult by some radical features of the NSDAP.
538 F1 Nr. 132, 28.5.1932.
539 Ibid., Nr. 212, 11.9.193 1.
540 BA, NS 22, Nr. 1067. Already in late 1930 the SPD reported that the
'Sachsischer Polizeibund', who had about 200 members, identified with the
NSDAP (D'.'Z, Nr. 263, 11.11.1930).
541 FK, Nr. 79,4.4.1931.
542 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Mai 1931.
543 FK, Nr. 57, 9.3.193 1. For the continuous attempt of the NSDAP to infiltrate
the DHV see the article 'Die Kritik der Jugend. Sturmische DHV-
Versamnilung in Leipzig (ibid., Nr. 260, 7.11.193 1).
544 E.g. see the article about the VSI in ibid., Nr. 147, 27.6.193 1.
545 The Nazis claimed that the FK was the only newspaper who was against
department stores, consumer cooperatives and against Jews which made it
the only paper which supported the middle classes (ibid., Nr. 108, 11.5.193 1).
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The leader of the home owners' association in Leipzig and member
of the local town council, Ackermann, expressed reservations
against Article 17 of the NSDAP programme546
 in a meeting with a
Nazi representative for Industry in June 1930. However,
Ackermann was willing to strengthen the links with the party once
he was convinced that the Article was not a general statement.547
The Nazis made efforts to shed some of their radicalism and
appeared moderate and rather bourgeois in some respect. Their
anti-Semitism became less pronounced. The FK abandoned its
section 'The State and the Jews' in spring 193 1.548 Furthermore, the
FK became more engaged in unpolitical issues like regional
traditions and Heimat and introduced a section 'Across Saxony'
('Quer durch das Sachsenland'). 549 These features helped to bring
about frequent co-operation with bourgeois associations 550, and a
government in Dresden which was lenient towards the NSDAP.
Saxony, together with Braunschweig, whose Ministry of the Interior
was in Nazi hands, rejected participation in the meeting of the
major states (Bavaria, WUrttemberg, Baden and Hessen) to discuss
a ban of National Socialist paramilitary organisations.551
546 Article 17 put forward "a law for the expropriation of land for communal
purposes without compensation" (Noakes/Pridham, Nazism, pp. 14-16).
547 BA, NS 18, Nr. 5011.
548 FI, Nr. 90, 18.4.1931. However, see Mutschmann's violently anti-Semitic
speech in Zittau in ibid., Nr. 7, 9.1.1933.
59 Ibid., Nr. 132, 8.6.1932. Additionally, the official Saxon Gau history
concentrated prominently on .the cultural traditions of Saxony (see Der Gau
Sach sen).
550 The chamber of handicraft and trade, the association of trade guilds,
business association, Association of Businessmen in Vogtland, Associations of
German Launderettes, Association of German Flower Shops, Association of
Master Baker, Association of Upholsterer, and the Association of Decorators
appealed to come to an NSDAP meeting in Plauen on 4.5.1932. Additionally,
the council, the inland revenue office, and other organisations sent official
delegates to the meeting ( Volkszeitung für Plauen, Nr. 104, 4.5.1932.
551 Ailgemeine Zeitzmg Chemnitz, Nr. 88, 5.4.1932. After the SA was banned
in the Reich on 13 April 1932, the Saxon government asked Groener if the
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The main emphasis of Nazi propaganda was still directed against
the alleged corruption of Marxist officials. Fritsch asked NSDAP
memb r
-rs to report salaries from mayors, members of local councils
and civil servants who came to power in the wake of the revolution
after the First World War.552
 They portrayed themselves as honest,
decent, and responsible people. After the Nazis' success in the
elections for the agricultural chamber in 1931 they decreed that
henceforth members of the chamber would only receive travel
expenses for third class train tickets, and that their expenses would
be cut by fifty per cent. KOrner, who had been elected deputy
leader of the chamber, even cut his new salary by sixty per cent.553
The Nazis' self-portrayal of 'renewing' society from its ills was
strongly linked with their emphasis on being a youthful movement.
The FK boasted that 61.3 per cent of the members of the NSDAP in
Grimma were younger than thirty years, while the figure for the
local SPD for this age group was 19.1 per cent.554
The NSDAP continued its attempt to attract the working classes.555
The lecture series by the former KPD member Karl KlOtzner, who
spoke in well attended meetings about his negative experiences in
Soviet Russia556, had the dual purpose of winning over workers
from the Marxist parties and enhancing the fear of the middle
classes about a 'Soviet Saxony'.
existence of military like organisations would not apply to organisatiops of
other parties too (LNN, Nr. 114, 23.4.1932). This obviously reflected the wish
to ban the Reichsbanner and Eiserne Front.
552 FK, Nr. 32, 7.2.193 1. In early 1932 the Nazis' main demand in Leipzig for
the new year was a clean administration (ibid., Nr. 1, 2.1.1932).
553 Ibid., Nr. 242, 16.10.193 1.
554 Ibid., Nr. 81, 8.4.193 1.
555 The NSDAP organised a 'German Celebration of May the First' in Leipzig
in 1931 (STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, April 1931), or organised an SA meeting in
working-class Limbach (FK, Nr. 108, 11.5.1931).
556 STA D, Md!, Nr. 11126/4, Juli 1931.
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Above all, the Nazis tried to exploit the economic crisis by
portraying it as a crisis of the whole system. 557
 They copied the
slogan 'Saxony 'ieeds work' ('Sachsen braucht Arbeie) from the
VS1558 , and appealed to the richer sections of the society to take
over responsibility for the poor masses during the crisis.559 The
NSDAP in Rochlitz reported that its winter aid programme was
targeted at any unemployed, even those linked to opposition
parties. The Nazis claimed that the goods they collected enabled
them to look after 400 people, that more than one-hundred people
received four pounds of bread each week for ten weeks, and that
there was a Christmas donation.560
The growth of the NSDAP ran parallel to Mutschmann's increasing
control of the party in Saxony. The fact that he had financial
difficulties and had to give up his business in early 1930s 561 , made
him even more determined to have undisputed control in his Gau,
and to resist vehemently any power-sharing. 562
 His powerful
position within the national NSDAP became clear when he was
557 See the article 'Wie lange noch?', FK, Nr. 116, 21.5.193 1; and 'Zur Losung
des Arbeitsiosenproblems', ibid., Nr. 242, 16.10.1931.
558 Ibid., Nr. 25, 30.1.193 1.
559 E.g. the Nazis appealed to home owners in Leipzig not to bar rooms for
German children and the German future (ibid., Nr. 252, 28.10.1931).
560 The Nazis collected: "255 Zentner potatoes, 32.25 Zentner rye, 34.25
Zentner wheat, 23.16 Zentner fruits, 15.25 Zentner carrots, 153 pounds rice
and lentils, 500 litre milk, 1/2 Zen tner quark, 43 pounds meat and sausage,
clothes, wood, coal, 500 Reichsmark in cash (overall worth 3000 Reich s-
mark)" (ibid., Nr. 32, 8.2.1932).
561 See Das nationalsozialistische Sachsen. Goebbels mentioned
Mutschmann's great economic difficulties in April 1930 (FrOhlich,
Tagebucher Goebbels, 1930 JV 23).
562 In 1932 Strasser ordered the Landesinspektew-e Mutschmann and
Bruckner to divide their Gaue in Untergaue according to electoral districts
and to appoint Gauleiter for these. Mutschmann, in contrast to Bruckner,
probably never carried out the order (U. Kissenkoetter, Gregor Strasser und
the NSDAP (Stuttgart, 1978), p. 71).
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appointed Landesinspekteur of Saxony and Thuringia in August
1932.563
(iv) Limits of the NSDAP in Saxony
Although the NSDAP made enormous electoral gains in 1930 and
became by far the largest party in Saxony two years later, the
frustration of the local Nazis grew more and more because they
continued to be excluded from power in the state parliament. 564 All
attempts at changing this situation were unsuccessful. The NSDAP's
motion of 'no-confidence' for the Schieck government in February
193 1, its support of the KPD motion to dissolve the parliament in
March 1931, and the same motion by the NSDAP in June and
October 1932 all failed.565
 The referendum by the radical parties
on the left and right seeking to dissolve the state parliament in
April 1932 was unsuccessful too.566
Additionally, although the Nazi movement made breath-taking
advances in many areas, the party continued to be hampered by
several limitations. The NSDAP reduced the gap between itself and
the SPD in terms of the number of party members and party
branches. However, the Nazis still lagged behind the Marxist
organisations by the end of 1932, particularly the SPD (see Tables).
563 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 19088, SA 1928-32.
564 E.g. see the article 'Wer regiert in Sachsen', FK Nr. 103, 5.5.193 1.
565 VdSL, 5. Wp, 31. Sitzung, 17.2.193 1; ibid., 38. Sitzung, 24.3.193 1; ibid., 80.
Sitzung, 23.6.1932; ibid., 88. Sitzung, 18.10.1932.
566 The KPD initiated the referendum 'the Saxon parliament is dissolved'
between 2.-iS. December 1931. The referendum was supported by KPD, SAP,
NSDAP, DNVP and SLy. The group managed to get the necessary ten per cent
support of the Saxon electorate in order to hold an official referendum (STA
D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, November 1931). The percentage of those in favour of
the referendum on 17 April 1932 in the electoral districts were: Dresden:
30.4%, Leipzig: 30.0%, Chemnitz: 46.0%, Saxony: 36.0% (FK Nr. 90, 18.4.1932).
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This was especially true outside south-western Saxony. In the AH
Grimma and AH Oschatz, for example, the NSDAP Increased Its
members from 200 to around 2,001 between the end of1930 and
September 1931.567
 The SPD had at least 4,622 party members in
the region at the end of 1930 568 . It is true, however, that the
NSDAP was catching up with the SPD with enormous speed and that
it possessed a quasi-monopoly of a local party network on the
right.
Nevertheless, not everything went as smoothly as the local Nazis
liked. The NSDAP's attempts to infiltrate bourgeois professional
organisations were often rebuffed. A Nazi speaker was not able to
put forward his views during a meeting of the shoemaker guild in
Dresden in early 193 1.569 They continued to face limits on
infiltrating Marxist strongholds (see the Chapter 'Working-Class
Milieu'). Additionally, the NSDAP only started to make progress in
eastern Saxony in 1931. The Nazis from Kamenz reported about a
"difficult struggle" in their district, the town of Bautzen was only
divided into two sections on May 1931, and there were not more
than 300 Storm-troopers in eastern Saxony in early 193 1.570 The
disparity between the NSDAP's electoral success in the south-west
and the rest of Saxony continued in national and local elections
until 1933.
Behind the mask of Invincibility, some local party branches
complained about a lack of new visitors to internal party
567 Thid., Nr. 220, 21.9.193 1.
568 JaJresj,richt des Bezirksvorstandes der SPD Bezirk Leipzig 1930
569 FK, Nr. 53, 4.3.1931.
570 Ibid., Nr. 190, 17.8.193 1; ibid., Nr. 110, 13.5.193 1; ibid., Nr. 247, 22.10.193 1.
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meetings571 ; there were Internal tensions and disagreements about
the direction of the movement 572 ; and Mutschmann's arrogant
leadership style offended some party riembers (e.g. Nazi
teachers573 ). Some party branches faced financial difficulties. An
internal NSDAP auditor described "Inadequate spending practices"
In the party branch of Dresden; membership dues worth 20,000
Reichsmark had not been paid.574
 The NSDAP branch in
Hohenstein explained their low figures of only eighteen party
members through the inability of the many unemployed in the
area to pay for the membership dues.575
In some respects the organisation of the NSDAP was unable to cope
with the rapid growth of the movement. In early 1931 the Nazis
were not able to satisfy the great demand by the local party
branches for prominent speakers, and district leaders warned
impatient branches to follow the internal command structure
regarding propaganda planning. 576 The Nazis from MUhlau, a town
with about 3,200 citizens in the AH Rochlitz, reported a whole list
of problems they faced: In July 1932 their election meeting was
571 The NSDAP leadership in Plauen asked the party members to bring more
visitors into the internal meetings (ibid., Nr. 58, 10.3.193 1).
572 The FK tried to calm and assure their members because of rumours of a
'Sti-a1er group', a 'Stennes group', and a 'Scheringer group', and pleaded for
loyalty: " Enormous sacrifices were made in every respect. We have always
stayed ioyal to Adolf Hitler, and we will keep this loyalty now in particular.
Who ever knows how many more months it will be until we achieve our aim,
the power in the state' (ibid., Nr. 195, 22.8.193 1). The SPD reported about
tensions in Leipzig between DOnicke and the other leaders Haake and
Studentkowski. The former acquired a Chrysler from the USA, and created
modern offices, while the SA homes were primitive (LVZ, Nr. 287, 8.12.1932).
573 Mutschmann said about the NSLB that it was not more than a bunch of
idlers, and let the SS throw them out of a meeting in Plauen in 1931. This
caused a heavy reaction among Nazi teachers in the Vogtland against
Mutschmann ( Volkszeitung für Plauen, Nr. 173, 28.7.1931; and BA, NS 22, Nr.
1067, Rink an G. Strasser, 21.7.1931).
574 BDC, Cuno Meyer, OPG.
575 BA, NS 22, Nr. 1067.
576 FK Nr. 7,9.1.1931.
146
badly attended despite good propaganda. Local builders refused to
continue to work when a swastika flag was raised. The creation of a
women's group failed because only three women wanted to
participate, and the local organisation was undermined because one
party member ran away with the money from the branch.577
It Is also true that the SA, despite Its rapid growth, remained a
small force compared with the Reichs banner, the largest
paramilitary organisation at the time. While the Storm-troopers
rallied about 4,000 men at the NSDAP Gau meeting in May
1931 578 , the Reichsbanner were able to mobilize about 10,000
activists at a district meeting of western Saxony in Chemnitz in
June that year579. Additionally, the growth of the SA was checked
by financial difficulties580 , internal disputes581 , and by competition
from the SPD paramilitary organisations. In early 1932 the SA in
Leipzig reported that there were hardly any new members because
of the growth of the Social Democratic Eiserne Front.582
Furthermore, Mutschmann was sometimes so uncooperative with
the leader of the Saxon SA, Klllinger, that ROhm had to ask him for
more support. 583 Lastly, the NSDAP's activities also faced some
limits from 'above'. The FK was banned for four weeks from
577 Geschich te dei- NSDAP Ortsgruppe Muhla u (1941).
578 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Ma! 1931.
579 Ibid., Juni 1931.
580 A home for the SA was closed in Dresden because no rent had been paid
(ibid., Nr. 19088, SA 1928-32).
581 The SPD reported about a dispute within the SA in Dresden because of the
dismissal of a popular local SA leader ('Meuterei in der Dresdner SA', DVZ, Nr.
227, 27.9.1932). There was also a the dispute between Killinger and Lasch
(BDC, SA, Kiuinger, Killinger an G. Strasser, 5.10.193 1).
582 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 19088, SA 1928-32.
583 BDC, Killinger, SA, Rohm an Mutschmann, 7.7.1932.
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18.3.1931 onwards, and the SA, SS, and HJ were banned between
13.416.6.1932.584
584 FK, Nr. 68, 2 1.3.1933 (or ibid., Nr. 69, 22.3.1933).
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9. The Seizure of Power by the NazIs (1933)
(i) Germany
The Nazis did not win power In elections and did not seize power
through force, but were brought Into office by a deal with the
traditional elites. Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on 30 January
1933 was a compromise between the old authoritarian elites who
needed the NSDAP as mass base, and Hitler, who was desperate to
gain power In the face of the decline of his party. Once in office,
Hitler quickly used his power to "strip the Constitution of its
guarantees for civil liberties." 585
 The Reichstag election on 5 March
1933, in which the NSDAP won 43.9 per cent of the vote, were only
'semi-free'. Communists were already persecuted, and the NSDAP
had exploited the state machine in the Reich and Prussia for their
propaganda campaign. Immediately after the elections the local
Nazi organisations carried out a violent 'revolution from below' and
as Noakes and Pridham argued "interfered in a totally arbitrary
manner with the State administration, with the course of justice
and with commercial life." 586
 Simultaneously at the local level, the
Nazis quickly exploited the situation and seized power In the states.
After the Enabling Law on 23 March the demise of the political
parties followed. It became apparent, however, that Hitler was
against a complete overthrow of the old society and believed that a
period of stability was essential. In a speech to the Reich
Governors (Relchsstatthalter) on 6 July 1933 "he formally ended
585 Noakes/Pridham, Nazism, p. 125.
586 Ibid., p. 125.
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the revolution which, he Insisted, must from now on take the form
of evolution."587
(ii) The last months of comparative freedom in Saxony: From the
crisis of the Nazis to their last powerful campaign
In some respect, the NSDAP's take over of power on the local level
started earlier in Saxony than anywhere else. In Saxony - unlike in
most other states - municipal elections took place on 13 November
1932 and made the NSDAP a formidable force in local parliaments,
particularly in the south-western region. 588
 The party won 27.6
per cent of all seats in local councils. 589
 It is true that the election
result was a further serious blow for the Nazis. The vote for the
NSDAP had already dropped from 41.3 per cent to 36.6 per cent
between the July and November 1932 Reichstag elections in
Saxony, thereafter they lost another 9 per cent in the space of one
week. This emphasized the dramatic decline of the party, and the
continuous failure of the Nazis to convince the electorate about
their abilities on the local level. 590
 However, the NSDAP gained an
absolute majority in 121 of the roughly 1,820 communities in
587 Ibid., p. 170.
588 In most states the last local council elections took place in late 1929 (H.
Matzerath, Nationalsozialism us und kornmunaie Selbslverwaitung (Stuttgart,
Berlin, KOin, Mainz, 1979), p. 48).
589 The percentage of local council members from the NSDAP in all districts
were (number of councils with an absolute majority for the NSDAP in
brackets): Vogtland: 50.4 per cent (21), Obervogtland: 44.7% (22), Floha:
4 1.8% (5), Obererzgebirge: 39% (16), Mittweida: 35.97% (8), Aue: 32.2% (3),
Zwickau: 31,97% (7), Freiberg: 31,96% (3), Stollberg: 30,9% (1), Gro1enhain:
30,8% (19), Chemnitz: 29,69% (0), Kamenz: 27,6% (2), Oschatz: 27,1% (1),
MeiI,en: 26,7% (3), DObeln: 26,2% (2), Grimma: 25,4% (1), Dresden: 24,4% (-),
Dippoldiswalde: 20,6% (1), Glauchau: 20,3% (2), Lobau: 18,9% (-), Zittau: 18,4%
(-), Borna: 15,93% (4), Pirna: 13,78% (-), Leipzig: 12,4% (-), Bautzen: 12,2% (-)(FK, Nr. 22, 26.1.1933).
590 The NSDAP gained five per cent of the votes in the state election in May
1929, but only 4.3 per cent of the seats in the municipal elections at the end
of 1929 (StJbSa, (1930)).
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which voting took place and became strongest party In most local
councils in the Erzgebirge/Vogtland. 59 ' In south-western Saxony
the Nazis managed to make great Inroads into the tradlUonal SPD
electorate. 592 The advance of the NSDAP on the local level
enhanced the division between Left and Right in Saxony,
particularly when the local councils elected their presidents.
Alliances between the bourgeois parties and the NSDAP secured
their candidates the leading positions In many :places s93 , and in
some councils the SPD and KPD formed a long-awaited 'united front'
to establish a Marxist council leadership. 594 The SPD reported that
the KPD voted for Social Democratic chairmen in the runoffs, but
stuck to its own candidates for deputy mayors. 595 Selbmann, a
Communist member of the Reichstag, spoke at an SPD meeting in
Leipzig on 20 January 1933 596 , to which the Communists had been
invited by the SPD. Since 1923 the confrontation between Marxist
parties on the one side and bourgeois parties and NSDAP on the
other side had never been more pronounced.
The Nazis' influence in the state apparatus in Saxony remained
very limited until March 1933. While Marxist supporters had
already been purged in the Prussian administration well before
591 Election took place in 1,820 communities in November 1929 (ibid.).
592 E.g. the SPD in the AH Stollberg reported "considerable losses" to KPD and
NSDAP (Sozialdemokratisches Gememdeblatt. Mitteilungen für die Ge-
memdevertreter des Bezirkes Cheninitz-Erzgebirge, 8 (1), 1.1.1933, pp. 15-16).
593 Ibid., 8 (3), 1.2.1933, pp. 54-56.
59' E.g. in Leipzig (LVZ Nr. 3, 5.1.193 3). The SPD and KPD did not co-operate
in Dresden, which enabled the bourgeois parties and the NSDAP to vote their
candidates as council leaders (DVZ, Nr. 14, 17.1.1933).
595 SPD Gemeindevertrerer Cheninitz-Erzgebirge, 8 (3), 1.2.1933, p. 53.
596 STA L, PP-St, Nr. 19, Versammiung der SPD am 20.1.1933.
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March 1933, a large part of the Saxon administration were still
SPD supporters.
From autumn 1932 until January 1933, the local NSDAP was
shaken by the general decline of the movement, Internal problems
and disputes. In early 1933 the Gauleltung in Plauen asked the
party headquarters for advice about the dispute between newly
created NSBO orchestras and the established SA orchestras.
Important financial gains were at stake. 598 At the same time the
SPD reported about a crisis In the SA in Leipzig. 599 And finally, the
murder of the Storm-trooper Hentsch In Dresden by his own
comrades at the end of 1932, caused serious embarrassment for
the NSDAP leadership during a very critical phase for the party.600
At the same time the Marxist parties seemed more hopeful. They
entered 1933 in new heart. But tensions still ran high in early
1933. Nine workers were killed and eleven seriously injured by the
police at a KPD meeting in Dresden on 25 January 1933.601
The lethargic outlook of the local Nazis suddenly changed when
Hitler was appointed Chancellor on 30 January, and two days later
new elections were announced for 5 March.602 The Nazis used the
momentum created by Hitler's appointment to mobilize all energies
597 This process started with the 'Papen coup' in August 1932 and
accelerated when Goring became the Prussian Minister of the Interior in
early 1933.
598 BA, NS 22, Nr. 271. At the same time Mutschmann suspended Arno
Schreiber, NSDAP member of the state parliament, from most of his posts
because of a lack of radicalism (Berliner Tageblart, Nr. 71, 11.2.1933).
599 LV2, Nr. 22, 25.1.1933. The SPD also reported the creation of a new right
wing paramilitary organisation in Saxony, which also included former
Freikorps members (ibid., Nr. 20, 23.1.1933).
600 While Goebbels stayed with Hitler in Berchtesgaden he wrote in his diary
in late December 1932: "We are very worried about the 'Fememord' in
Dresden. A disgraceful smear campaign. Our papers are not up to it"
(FrOhlich, Tagebucher Goebbels, 1932 XII 31).
601 DVZ Nr. 22, 26.1.1933.
602 F1 Nr. 28, 2.2.1933.
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for the election campaign, and the NSDAP's membership figures
tripled in many places between 30.1.-1.5.1933. 603
 At the same
time the Marxist parties were pushed onto the defensive. Although
they continued to stage impressive rallies 604 , they now appeared
cautious and resigned. At a large SPD meeting at the end of
February the comparatively radical party leader of Leipzig,
Llebmann, asked the party members to behave in a disciplined
way to prevent the police dissolving the rally.605
The NSDAP's powerful position in the Reich made the Saxon
government Increasingly comply with Nazi wishes. The Saxon
Minister of the Interior, Richter, banned all public fund raising
campaigns by the Communists on 27 February.606
 The Decree of the
Reich President for the Protection of People and State, of 28
February, provided the background for Richter to instruct all
districts on 1 March to carry out house searches of all known KPD
officials, and to take them into custody if suspicious material was
found.607
 At the same time all meetings and publications of the
KPD were banned, and a wave of arrests of Communists started.608
The government also banned all SPD newspapers several days
before the elections.609
 They were not to go into print again.
The NSDAP's electorate rose to 45 per cent of the votes in the
March elections. However, this was Dnly an increase of 8.4 per cent
603 In Markranstadt the membership rose from 75 to 500, in Lindentahl from
65 to 280, and Zwenkau from 55 to 400 (BA, NS 22, Nr. 271).
604 The largest rally took place in Leipzig in mid-February when around
25,000 Social Democrats, including some Communists, demonstrated for
freedom (LVZ, Nr. 37, 13.2.1933).
605 STA L, PP-St, Nr. 19, SPD Wahiversanunlung, 24.2.1933.
606 Bramke, 'Freistaat', p. 1068.
607 Autorenkollektiv, KPD Westsachsen, p. 368.
608 Ibid
609	 SVB was banned from 1. March, the DVZ and the ChVSt were








for the NSDAP vote in Saxony compared with a national increase of
10.8 per cent (see Table 9). The reason for this was that the local
Iarxist parties defended their position exceptionally well
considering the circumstances. Saxony, as in the November election,
became the greatest bastion of the Marxist parties before the Nazis
destroyed what was still left of democratic institutions and
organisations. The elections showed the great polarization in the
state. The electoral districts of Leipzig and Dresden-Bautzen were
Table 9: Reichstag elections results of NSDAP, SPD and KPD in Saxony on 5
March 1933 (percentage of 6 November 1932 in brackets)
electoral	 NSDAP	 SPD
districts
Leipzig	 40.0 (31.0)	 30.1 (32.2)
Dresden	 43.6 (34.0)	 28.4 (29.5)
Chemnitz	 50.0 (43.4)	 21.3 (22.3)
Saxony	 45.0 (36.6)	 26.2 (27.6)
Reich	 43.9 (33.1)	 18.3 (20.4)
Source: StJbSa, (1932/1934); Falter, Wahien.
the SPD's two strongest electoral districts in the Reich, and the
electoral district of Chemnitz-Erzgebirge was the fourth best for the
KPD, and eighth best for the NSDAP.
(iii) The Nazis seize power in Saxony
As in the rest of the Reich, the Nazis quickly exploited the
momentum created by the election campaign and seized power.
They seized the Saxon state machinery from 'above' and curbed all
opposition, particularly from the organised working-class. The day
after the elections Der Freiheitskampf proclaimed: "An end to the
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friendly line towards the Marxists in Saxony!"610 Henceforth,
everything went very quickly. Manfred von Killinger was
appointec Relchskommlssar by Frick on 7 March and was
instructed to take over control of the state machinery. 61 ' Schieck
and his government were forced to resign and Killinger formed a
provisional government on 10 March.612 All Democratic or Social
Democratic paramilitary organisations were banned on 13
March.613 The move of the NSDAP's headquarters from Plauen to
Dresden in that month was symbolic for the Mach tergreifung.614 On
4 April Killinger issued a decree for the new formation of the state
parliament, which stated that parties were able to send delegates
according to their result in the Reichstag election in March.615 This
enabled the NSDAP to win an absolute majority in the parliament
because the KPD and SAP were already banned. 616 In April the
local councils and district councils (Bezirkstage) were formed
according to the same principle.617
 At the same time parliamentary
work was made very difficult or impossible for the Social
Democrats. Leaders of the SPD and trade unions were arrested, and
some sent to concentration camps. Several leaders of the SPD in
Leipzig, among them Paul Liebmann, were arrested in a pub in
Leipzig on 21.4.1933 and ended up in concentration camps 618 , and
610 H' Nr. 55, 6.3.1933.
611 Ibid., Nr. 58, 9.3.1933.
612 Ibid., Nr. 60, 11/12.3.1933.
613 Sächsisches Verwaltungsblatt, Nr. 21, 13.3.1933.
614 LNN, Nr. 74, 15.3.1933. Bennecke argues that the late move of the NSDAP
headquarters to Dresden suggests that the local Nazis were not prepared for
the Mach tergreifung (Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', p. 89).
615 Bramke, 'Freistaat', p. 1070.
Ibid.
617 Ibid.
618 STA L, PP-St. Nr. 19, April 1933. Liebmann died in Leipzig shortly after
his release in September 1935. 1200 people, mainly older citizens, attended
the funeral (ibid., Juli 1935).
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twenty-five trade union leaders were arrested In Leipzig on 2 May
1933.619
 The SPD was officially banned in Saxony, as in the Reich,
on 23 June 1933.620
 On 5 May Mutschmann was appointed Reich
Governor of Saxony and the new cabinet under Killinger was
named. 62 ' When the SA paraded in front of Hitler at the Gau
meeting in Leipzig on 15/16 July 1933 the Nazis' seizure of power
was long completed.622
Immediately after the Relchs tag elections In early March the SA
and SS seized power at the local level. They occupied and searched
buildings of the Marxist parties, occupied town halls and hoisted
the swastika flag, and started a wave of arrests. 623
 Much of this
was done spontaneously and with violence. For example an SA
leader in Chemnitz shot dead a Jewish lawyer and drowned three
young former Communists in a pond. 624
 The Jews were a particular
target for the SA. In Chemnitz the SA forced all Jews who were in
custody to clean the walls and buildings in the town of Marxist
slogans625, and the FK announced a ban on kosher butchering in
the state.626
In early May 1933 Mutschmann made it clear in his speech before
the state parliament that he regarded himself as the head of the
state in Saxony.627
 Killinger's government statement was a mixture
619 Thid., PP, V3104.
620 Ibid., PP-St, Nr. 19.
621 Killinger was president, Dr. Fritsch was Minister of the Interior, Dr.
Thierack was Minister of Justice, Professor Gerullis was Minister of Culture,
Lenk was Minister of the Economy, Dr. Karmps was Minister of Finance, and
Dr. Schmidt was Minister of labour (F7 Nr. 105, 6/7.5.1933).
622 See 'Die NSDAP in Sachsen', Sachsen, p. 3.
623 FI Nr. 58, 9.3.1933
624 BDC, Mutschmann, OPG, Wettengel an Oberstes Parteigericht, 4.12.1936.
625 FK, Nr. 67, 2O.3.133.
626 Ibid., Nr. 70, 23.3.1933.
627 Ibid., Nr. 114, 17.5.193 3.
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of the regimes' radical nationalist and racist aims, and appeals to all
groups in society, particularly to the middle classes. 628 Killinger
admitted indirectly the governnent's limits in solving theeconomic
crisis: "The greatest upswing can only come through private
initiative." He also conceded Saxony's great dependence on the
Reich in financing the social benefits and boosting industrial
production through government orders.629 In a confident report to
Darre in early 1933, KOrner had already warned- him not to raise
the material hopes of the farmers too much, but rather to
concentrate on the ideological aspect of the National Socialists'
'blood and soil' ideology.630
The seizure of power by the Nazis was anything but a smooth
process. The Nazis encountered difficulties in hoisting the swastika
flag at many town halls, e.g. the mayors of Dresden and
Crimmitschau resisted their action.631 There were massive SPD and
KPD demonstrations in Annaberg on 31.1.1933 against the Hitler
government, and the continuous activities of left wing groups
required the Nazis to organise a second purge after 13 March 1933
In the whole AH Annaberg.632 There were not any great 'victory'
celebrations and demonstrations of the NSDAP in Leipzig in the
first half of 1933. The local Nazis obviously did not want to stir the
great resentments against them, and observed that "only the Gau
meeting in July brought the occasion for the long waited first mass
parade." 633 In the referendum in November 1933 12.5 per cent of
628 Ibid.
629Thid
630 Darré, 'Gau Sachsen', pp. 4-5.
631 FK, Nr. 58, 9.3.1933; NSDAP Crimmitschau, p. 16.
632 NSDAPAnnaberg, pp. 231-232.
633 Das nationaisoziaiistische Sachsen, p. 59.
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all voters voted against the Nazi state In Leipzig. The local police
reported afterwards: "Leipzig is politically the most vulnerable spot
in Saxony ... It Is likely that there is a need for the greatest
employment of political force to control the Communists and to
avoid security being endangered in a serious way. The recent
arrests of several leading KPD activists made It clear that the KPD
has no intention of giving up its activities in opposition to the
state." 634 The Mach tergreifung was often a mixture of extreme
brutality and accommodating action. In MUhlau, a small town in the
AH Rochlitz, Storm-troopers shot dead two Communists who tried
to escape imprisonment.635
 However, the former mayor remained
in his position. The local population remained divided in their
attitude towards the Nazi regime. There were only seventy-seven
party members in the town in May 1933 (3.3 per cent of the
electorate), and 17 per cent of the electorate (404 votes) voted
against the Führer in the national referendum in August 1934.636
It is also true that the enormous growth in membership brought
additional problems for the NSDAP. In July 1933 the district of
Leipzig complained to Mutschmann that it was increasingly difficult
to find suitable party officials. 637
 Additionally, the Communists
reported growing disillusionment even among Nazi voters at the
end of 1933 (see Appendix 5).
634 STA L, PP-V, 4943.
635NSDAYMÜIJaU
636 Ibid
637 BA, NS 22, Nr. 271.
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(iv) A revolution?
It is true that the SA and SS committed many atrocities In the
course of the Mach tergreYung. However, Killinger attempted to
follow Hitler's orders: "Make sure that the revolution does not get
out of hand, and that everything goes along orderly lines." 638 On 7
March, the same day Hitler had given him these instructions,
Killinger personally prevented the shooting of a Jewish reporter by
the SS Inside the state parliament.639 On 9 and 10 March 1933
Killinger sanctioned the violence already meted out by the SA and
SS, but announced an official ban on further spontaneous action of
any kind640 and repeatedly warned that the state would prosecute
anyone who committed personal infringements.64'
The Nazis even felt obliged to justify some of their radical actions.
When they arrested 135 'criminals' in the AH Annaberg shortly
after the March Reichstag elections they explained that the
Communists had planned to bomb attack the SA and all important
plants and public buildings In the area. 642 In June the FK boasted
that the new government had secured "new orders from the Reich
for Saxony". 643 Local NSDAP papers explicitly forbade any activity
against department stores. 644 It makes sense that Hitler trusted
Killinger, and not the radical and brutal Mutschmann, with the
'delicate' task of seizing power without alienating the traditional
ruling elites and the rest of society too much. Killinger had good
638 BDC, Killinger, OPG, Kilhinger an Oberstes Parteigericht, December 1936/
January 1937, p. 3.
639 Ibid., p.4.
640 Bramke, 'Freistaat', p. 1069.
641 E.g. see Killinger's government statement in FK Nr. 114, 17.5.1933.
642 Ibid., Nr. 65, 17.3.1933.
643 Ibid., Nr. 134, 12.6.1933.
644 Allgemeine Zeitung Chemnitz, Nr. 158, 9.7.193 3.
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links with nationalist circles in Saxon society, and as one of the
highest ranking SA leaders, he had the authority to control the
revolutionary apirations of the Storri-troopers.
The 'moderate' approach annoyed Mutschmann and other Nazis
who were more radical In their aspirations. Studentkowski
complained that Killinger appointed mainly people from 'society'
(he mentioned the 'Nationaler Kiub') and who were completely
unknown to the old core of the local Nazi movement. He elaborated:
"From the beginning the whole line of Killinger's politics remained
unchanged. He made efforts, and even declared it repeatedly as his
programme, that the revolution should be carried through in legal
ways and with the preservation of peace, order and justice ... a
complete emphasis in favour of the national society."645
Mutschmann too mentioned Killinger's links to the 'Nationaler Kiub'
and the so called 'better society'. He stated: "Although he was really
fuming during the time of struggle, I realised very quickly that he
had not given up his bourgeois manners ... When I demanded a
tough and necessary measure it was either not carried out at all or
only partially." 646
 Mutschmann also claimed that Killinger's
hesitant behaviour at the beginning forced him to intervene, and
personally bring down the old government under Schieck.647
 The
personal and ideological frictions between Reichssta tthalter
Mutschmann and president Killinger continued even after
Mutschmann took over the leadership of the Saxon government in
early 1935.648
645 BDC, Killinger, Studentkowski anWettengel, 27.11.1936.
646 BDC, Mutschmann, Mutschmann an Oberstes Parteigericht, 4.12.1936.
647 Ibid.
648 Mutschmann was ordered to lead the Saxon government on 28.2.1935 (E.
Stockhorst, 5000 KOpfe. Wer war was im Dritten Reich (Bruchsal, 1967)).
Bramke's assessment that Mutschmann's appointment as Reichssratthalter
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Mutschmann and other radicals would have liked a more thorough
revolution, nevertheless there were obviously drastic changes in
Saxony's society. The p€rsecution of working-class activists was
particularly ruthless in Saxony. Killinger reported 10,000 arrests
by July 1933 and more than one-sixth of all concentration camps In
the Reich were on Saxon soil in 1933. 649
 Exceptionally brutal
atrocities were reported from the concentration camp in
Hohenstein. 650
 Civil servants who were 'non-aryan', former
members of the KPD, SAP, or SPD, or were in opposition to the
Nazis, were dismissed. 651
 Mutschmann boasted on 1 August that he
had dismissed 2,000 people from the state service.652 The
Communists reported the situation in Leipzig in November 1933:
"The Nazis have not only dismissed the last Communists, but also
all SPD workers from the companies. The Nazis built their nest in
the former strongholds of the SPD in the municipal companies of
gas, water, electricity, tram, slaughterhouse, etc" (see Appendix 5).
However, reports form smaller towns give the impression of
continuity rather than change after March 1933. Several leaders of
the local bourgeoisie, with no long party affiliation or beliefs in
National Socialist ideals, headed the new NSDAP leadership in
Raschau/ Erzgebirge. The former branch leader and his wife, both
prevented the normal frictions between the Gau and the state organisation
is wrong (Bramke, 'Freistaat', p. 1071). For the numerous disputes between
Mutschmann and Killinger see the personal files in the BDC.
649 The largest ones were Colditz, Dresden, Hainichen, KOnigstein, castle
Oberstein, Sachsenburg, and Hohenstein (Mai, 'Mutschmann', p. 130).
650 Mter the guards of the concentration camp in Hohenstem were tried
because of the brutal atrocities they committed on inmates, Mutschmann
asked Hitler to pardon the SA members because of 'humanitarian reasons'
(BDC, Mutschmann, OPG, Wettengel an Oberstes Parteigericht, 4.12.1936, p.
12).
651 E.g. the secretary of the Association of Saxon policemen was dismissed
(Leipziger Tageszeitung, 13.3.1933).
652 Mal 'Mutschmann', p. 114.
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loyal Nazis who did not want to co-operate with these circles, were
thrown out of the party.653
 A local KPD activist continued his job as
local teacher after a short imprison.nent.654
The extent of the new measures are difficult to assess. However,
the few figures available do not suggest a great 'upheaval'.
Matzerath wrote that nine of twenty mayors left their posts in
Saxon towns with more than 20,000 cItizens between the end of
1932 and the end of 1933.655
 About 1,600 of an overall total of
15,800 town employees in Leipzig were dismissed between
January and September 1933 because of their party affiliation with
the KPD656 , and 250 people of a total of 18,700 employed in the
judiciary were dismissed657.
The lack of serious resistance to the NSDAP's Mach tergreifung
remains one of the most crucial questions. The bourgeoisie was
either already infiltrated by the Nazis or conformed quickly658 , or
was indulged in self-delusion because the violence, suppression
and persecution initially concentrated on the Left, or they simply
feared for their life or position.
The lack of resistance amongst the organised working class is more
difficult to explain. Hardly any one took it seriously when the
prominent guest speaker Grzesinskl ended an SPD party rally in
Leipzig at the end of February 1933 with the slogan: "We want to
653 BDC, OPG, Piffinayer, 'Geschichte der Ortsgruppe der NSDAP zu Raschau',
pp. 8-9.
654 Thid., p.9.
655 Matzerath, Selbstverwalttmg, p. 80.
656 Bramke, 'Freistaat', p. 1071.
657 M. Habicht, 'Verfolgung und Widerstand nichtproletarischer Kräfte im
Raum Leipzig-Westsachsen 1933-1945' (PhD Leipzig, 1990), P. 52.
658 The Nazis reported that most members of the master bakers guild in
Dresden supported Hitler in mid-March 1933 (FK, Nr. 66, 18.3.1933).
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be free as our fathers were. Rather dead, than a slave!" 659 Overall,
the great majority of leading SPD and trade union officials were
against violence even in the face of their own extinctior..
Approximately 2,000 members of the Kampfstaffeln In Leipzig, an
SPD paramilitary organisatlon which had been set up to combat the
Nazis' with violent means, waited in vain for a signal to strike
between 5.-8. March 193 3•660 The report of a Nazi informant in
mid-April 1933 summarized the indecisiveness and self-delusion
of the organised working-class: "SPD members and members of the
working-class sport organisations propose again and again that
they will behave quietly during the next half a year in order to see
how they can win over those with resentments once again."661
659 STA L, PP-St, Nr. 19, Wahiversanunlung der SPD, 24.2.1933.
660 PDS Archiv Leipzig, Nr. 15/329, 'Die Kampfstaffeln'.
661 STA L, PP-St. Nr. 19, April 1933.
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Part II: Themes:
Social Conflict, Polarization, Economic Crisis, Propaganda
and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Saxony
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10. The Rise of the Nazis In the Working-Class Milieu of
Saxony
(1) Introduction
Specific features favoured the rise of widespread support for the
SPD and the development of a whole network of socialist
organisations in Saxony from the mid-nineteenth century onwards.
Saxony was one of the earliest regions to industrialize in
continental Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and
quickly developed into the centre of the organised working-class
movement in Germany. Due to the early industrialisation a large
percentage of the population were wage earners and employed in
industry. This was also the case in rural areas, where the typical
village with a peasant population ceased to exist. Instead, there
were 'industrial villages' with people employed in small- or
medium scale industries and cottage industries, some of them
pursuing only part-time work in agriculture. Due to a high
population density, Saxony had an urban outlook with large urban
centres and many villages bordering each other. Other factors
favouring the development of a dense working-class organisational
network were a good network of communications, and
Protestantism as the dominant religion. The 'democratic-
revolutionary t tradition of the region and the national prominence
of its first leaders, August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, also
helps explain why Saxony became one of the earliest strongholds of
the SPD.662
662 H. Zwahr, 'Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung im Lander- und Territonen-
vergleich 1875', Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 13 (4) (1987), pp. 448-507; G. A.
Ritter, 'Das Wahlrecht und die Wth1erschaft der Sozialdemokratie im
KOnigreich Sachsen 1867-1914', in G. A. Ritter (Hrsg.), Der Aufstieg der
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (MUnchen, 1990), pp. 49-102.
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Until recently, scholars commonly accepted the traditional view
presented by Geiger and Lipset, that the Nazi movement was a
'middle class' phenomenon whose typical supporter was protestant,
belonged to the independent middle class, and lived in a rural
area.663 This interpretation has changed in the last decade as a
result of sophisticated computer-based analyses about Nazi voters
and members. 664 Today most historians agree that the Nazi
movement had a much more complex social composition than once
assumed. It seems widely accepted that the NSDAP, although
middle class groups played the most prominent role, was a true
Volkspartei (people's party) which attracted voters and members
from all groups in society.
An insufficiently researched and still disputed field remains the
extent to which the Nazis were able to attract working-class
support and what the exact relationship was between both players.
This chapter attempts to give new answers by looking at the rise of
the Nazi Party in the predominantly working-class area of
Saxony.665 The focus will be mainly on the role of the SPD and its
constituency during the rise of the NSDAP in the region. Saxony
was not only one of the greatest strongholds of the SPD, but the
Social Democrats were also by far the biggest party in the Saxon
parliament and more active than any other party in the defence of
the Republic.
663 See T. Geiger, 'Panik irn Mittelstand', Die Arbeit, (7) (1930), pp. 637-654; S.
M. Upset, 'Fascism of the Left, Right, and Center', in S. M. Upset, Political
Man, The Social Bases of Politics (New York, 1960).
664 See especially the numerous articles by J. W. Falter, and recently his
Hitlers Wa.hler (Munchen, 1991); but also T. Childers, The Nazi Voter. The
Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, NC,
London, 1983); D. MUhlberger, Hitler's Followers. Studies in the Sociology of
the Nazi Movement (London, 1991).
665 Some of the views expressed in this chapter are similar to those in F.
Walter's excellent article 'Stammiand'.
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(ii) Divisions in Saxon Society
A traditionally strong, socialist working-class movement was facing
an extremely conservative class of employers, ci vu servants, shop-
keepers and other middle class professionals, landowners and, up
to the revolution in 1918, a powerful aristocracy. In contrast to the
south German states, where the Social Democrats had the
possibility of finding alliances in parliament or during election
campaigns, the SPD was completely isolated in the party system of
Saxony before the First World War. All other parties, despite their
great differences in interest and ideology, combined in their efforts
to prevent an SPD majority in parliament. In the decades before
the First World War they joined forces twice to completely change
the electoral system (1896 and 1909) in order to prevent a strong
socialist influence or even majority in parliament. 666 This
possibility seemed real as the Saxon Social Democrats were able to
win the highest percentage of votes of any German province in
every election to the German parliament between 1874 and 1912.
They also gained their greatest ever election victory with 58.8 per
cent of the vote and twenty-two of the twenty-three mandates in
the 1903 Reichstag elections. From that time onwards, Saxony was
called the 'red kingdom'. Nowhere else suggested a greater
polarization between the socialist working-class movement and the
bourgeois forces than Saxony. The kingdom not only became a
centre of radical working-class activists, but also possessed one of
the most conservative and reactionary forces in the political
666 Ritter, 'Wahlrecht', p. 49. Retallack rightly points out that the strength
of the SPD unified the parties of 'law and order'. King Albert of Saxony even
"conceded that the existence of a viable socialist caucus ... brought the
bUrgerlich caucuses tightly together" and thereby provided the government
th "a strong majority which stands by it on all questions and makes united
cause against Social Democratic attacks" (Retallack, 'Antisocialism', p. 88).
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spectrum of the middle and the right. This split was enhanced due
to the negligible role of the Centre Party which played a decisive
role in the political middle in other provincial parliaments.
The tension and polarization between both camps reached its
climax during the Weimar era. Firstly, having been an opposition
party since its foundation, the Social Democrats suddenly found
themselves in power in Saxony during the first five years of the
Republic. They used the time to introduce a major programme of
progressive legislation, which caused enormous resentment
amongst those on the middle and right. 667 The breaking point came
when the left-wing Social Democrat Erich Zeigner held office in
1923. When the Communists joined a coalition government in
October that year the alarm bells rang not only with the bourgeois
forces in Saxony but also with those at the top Reich level. 668 The
famous Reichsexekution against Saxony toppled the legal SPD/KPD
coalition government which was replaced by a coalition of the
middle which increasingly drifted to the right. Henceforth,
everything that had been introduced by the SPD was replaced piece
by piece by conservative legislation. On both sides the political
principle was neither harmony nor co-operation, but outright
667 The Saxon SPD reported in a 'proud' manner before the provincial
elections in 1930: "The Burgerturn is frightened by the power of the
proletariat and the ghost of a 'red Saxony' ... Because in no other German
province but Saxony, was the working class able to introduce greater
fundamental achievements in the areas of local authority, education, social
policy and social services, and making the administration more democratic
and justice more republican" ('Urn das rote Sachsen', LVZ, Nr. 123, 26.5.1930).
668 Herrman MUller expressed at the SPD party conference in Berlin in June
1924 that the Saxon and Thuringian Social Democrats had not acted very
wisely in political terms: "The attempt to form a government with the
Communists has welded the BUrgertum together to an extent, which
otherwise would not had taken place ... As a matter of fact I would like to
argue, that the Zeigner era has not benefited, but harmed German politics."
H. A. Winkler, Der Schein der Normalität. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in
der Weimarer Republik 1924 bis 1930 (Berlin, Bonn, 1988), p. 196.
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confrontation and rule according to the principle of 'winner takes
all'.
Although SPD and KPD together never received less than 46.6 per
cent of the vote in any provincial elections in Saxony during the
Weimar Republic, they were not involved in the policy-making
process any more until 1933. The disenfranchisement of the
working class in 1896 and 1909, the experience of the
Reichsexekution, the non-existence of a moderating middle force in
Saxon politics, the increasingly ultra-radical stance of Saxon
Communists, and the rightist orientation of the DVP and DDP led to
non-cooperation and more and more polarisation between the
representatives of the working classes and the rest. In addition,
further isolation of the party was caused by the fact that "the
electorate of the Saxon Social Democracy was not composed of
different groups of middle- and working classes as in other regions,
but consisted mainly of the working class."669
The SPD-led governments during the first five years, and
particularly the left-wing SPD/KPD coalition of Zeigner in late 1923,
brought together the opposition forces of the middle and right.
Their slogan became "Never again a Soviet Saxony" and they did
everything in their power to ensure that a Marxist government
would not come to power again. A government, which in their eyes
had not only introduced socialist legislation, but was also
responsible for violence, lóotings and disruption of the social order,
had allowed the Communist rebel leader Max Hölz to terrorize the
669 'Das Koalitionsproblem in Sachsen',DVZ, Nr. 57, 8.3.1930.
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Vogtland670, and, finally, had terrorised the population with its
Proletarische Hundertschaften 671 , could not be tolerated.
The following examples highlight the tensions between the
organised working class and the majority of remaining Saxon
society, and the deep-seated divisions and often open hatred
between both groups. Two completely different ways of life,
traditions, values and ideologies were clashing with extreme force
in the region. The threat of disturbances and violence had not left
Saxony since the revolutionary movement in late 1918.
So tense was the general political atmosphere in Chemnitz even
during a 'normal' period at the end of 1922, that some remarks by
"political agitators" proved enough "for business people to close
their shops at lunch time." 672 In early 1923, the police reported
that "a group of forty to fifty men marched on various villages
outside the town of Werdau and demanded that the peasants hand
out potatoes to the unemployed ... Due to the great number of those
670 Max HOlz was one of the founding members of the KPD in the town of
Falkenstein/AH Auerbach and a popular hero amongst the revolutionary
workers. The Saxon conservative forces reminded the Saxon public again
and again about his terror and revolutionary activities between 1919 and
1921 in order to rally them against the Marxist parties. Hölz organised
revolutionary disturbances in April 1919, after which he had to flee the
region. During the Kapp-Putsch Hölz returned to the Vogtland and agitated
for a proletarian revolution. The Reichswehr needed to move in with 10,000
troops to put down an uprising. However, HOlz continued to carry out bomb
attacks until he was arrested and imprisoned between mid-1921 and July
1928. During the September 1930 Reichstag elections he campaigned for the
Communists and also appeared in the Vogtland. See G. Hortzschansky, 'Max
Hölz - KAmpfer für Freiheit und soziale Gerechtigkeit, fur die Macht dr
Arbeiter und Bauern', Beitrage zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, 31 (6)
(1989), pp. 775-790.671 Proletarische Hun dertschalten were workers contingents and set up by
various Lander governments to defend Republican institutions against
counter-revolutionary activities from the far right. While the
Hundertschaften quickly expanded in Saxony after SPD and KPD had come to
an agreement in March 1923, they were outlawed in Prussia in May that
year. The Saxon Hundertschaften were dissolved from the Reichswehr on
13 October 1923, shortly before the Reichsexekution against Saxony took
place (Winkler, Stabiisierung, pp. 620-62 1, 650).
672 STA D, AH Glauchau, Nr. 24, Wochenbericht 25.11.1922.
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involved, the farmers felt bound to give potatoes to the
unemployed free of charge." In the town itself "a group of thirty
men marched to the bakery and demanded free bread, which they
got, as they threatened to smash the windows."673
Enormous tensions were caused by the Proletarische
Hundertschaften in Saxony during 1923. The Saxon police reported
how Hundertschaften disrupted celebrations of conservative and
nationalist citizens in the Erzgebirge in July 1923: "Two
Hundertschaften visited two towns, allegedly to counter National
Socialist intrigues. The former Sergeant Schüler had organised a
memorial consecration in Marienberg ... and in Röhrsdorf the
'Association of Young Farmers' celebrated its 25th anniversary ... To
negotiate, both localities turned to the state commissioner in charge
In the first town it was possible to avoid disturbances although
both sides carried out parades ... This was not the case in Röhrsdorf
More than 100 persons from Chemnitz disrupted the parade.
Knife fights took place. One of the injured had to be taken to
hospital." 674 In Plauen the police complained that the
Hundertschaften were carrying out tasks which were solely under
the authority of the police. Members of the organisation had
carried out identity checks and searches among nationalist citizens
who had visited a Deutscher Tag in Hof.675 This incident in Plauen
in September 1923, was not an isolated case. The presence of the
police did not stop a large group of workers In Klingenthal from
beating up National Socialists who came back from the same
meeting in Hof.676
673 Ibid., Halbwochenbericht 93.1923.
674 Ibid., Halbwochenbericht, 18.7.1923.
675 Ibid., SäStKa, Nr. 128.
676 Ibid.
171
It becomes clear that during the first five years of the Republic,
many citizens with nationalist or conservative sympathies were not
really able to practice their activities freely in Saxony. The period
ended in bloodshed and further hatred between the working class
and the rest of Saxon society. When General MUller, the commander
of the Reich swehr in Saxony, was ordered to 'establish order' again
in Saxony, he made sure that all resistance on the left was brutally
suppressed. There were casualties in Mei1,en, Pirna, Chemnitz,
Erzgebirge and the Vogtland when his troops marched in. When a
crowd refused to disperse in the town of Freiberg, troops started
firing, killing twenty-three people and injuring thirty-one.677
After the Marxist parties went onto the opposition benches these
tensions within society continued. This time, however, the
pressure came from the other side. From 1924 onwards, it was the
supporters of the Marxist parties who felt pursued and who were
limited in their activities. The Social Democrats in Zwickau
complained that the bourgeois forces used their majority in the
town council to prohibit the traditional annual party festival on the
forest clearing close to the town. Instead, they had to celebrate on a
sports ground. 678 One of the clearest examples of how little the
feelings of the local working class were taken into consideration
during that time was shown when the bourgeois majority in
parliament in Dresden abolished the holiday on the Ninth of
November in December 1929. 679 For the organised working-class
movement the traditional celebration to commemorate the day
when the Revolution broke out in 1918 had been one of the most
677 Winkler, Stabilisierung, p. 655.
678 'Feste unter rotem Himmel', SVB, Nr. 156, 8.7.1929.
679 VdSL, 4. Wp, 18. Sitzung, 10.12.1929.
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important events of the year. The abolition of this holiday caused
enormous resentment on the left. The incident was also a clear sign
of how far the government and the burgerliche members of
parliament had already moved to the right to abolish what a large
percentage of the citizens, i.e. liberals and Social Democrats,
regarded as the symbol of democracy and unity of the Republic.
The divisions in society on this occasion were well expressed in a
police observation of 1928: "Everywhere the SPD staged well
attended Revolution celebrations on 9 November ... This caused the
NSDAP, Stahlhelm and Alldeutscher Verband to organise several
commemoration rallies."680
These tensions erupted into open violence because of the
devastating effects of the economic crisis from the end of the 1 920s
onwards. The bourgeois groups and the government were no longer
capable of guaranteeing security and order. An account from a
village in the AH Bautzen in March 1931 stated: "Due to the
recently uncontrollable spread of left wing radical elements and
their appearance in large numbers the local organisation of the
Landbund, Stahlh elm and NSDAP united to form a self-defence
force ... In the event of lootings they would be able to protect the
citizens until the arrival of stronger police forces."68'
(lli) The development of a socialist Solidargemeinschaft and
Milieu in Saxony
When the working-class movement established itself in earnest
after the 1848 revolution in Germany, Saxony was the most
important centre of its activities. It was here that the Allgemeiner
680 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/1, November 1928.
681 thid., Nr. 19087.
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Deutscher Arbeiterverein was founded and various workers
organisations developed. 682 In the elections to the parliament of
the North German Union in August 1867, five out of seven socialist
mandates came from Saxony. In 1874 the Saxon Social Democrats
became the strongest party for the first time in any German
province.683 The kingdom of Saxony was a stronghold of Bebel's
and Liebknecht' s Sozialis tisch e Arbeiterpartei Deu tschlands (SAPD).
Not only did most of the socialist members of the Reichs tag came
from Saxony in the 1870s, but the SAPD also had a much higher
party membership in the kingdom than in the rest of the Reich.
Most of the members of the SAPD lived in the KHs Chemnitz and
Zwickau with its traditional textile regions around Chemnitz (linked
with machine building), Plauen, Glauchau and Meerane. It was here
as well that the SPD press, which became the party's most
important method of agitation, originated and developed most
forcefully from the late 1860s. The 'rimmitschauer Burger- und
Bauernfreund', was the SPD's first daily newspaper. Nearly a third
of all its newspapers were published in Saxony by the end of the
1870s.684
With the growth of the SPD during Imperial Germany, a whole
network of party organisations developed in the fields of leisure,
culture and sport. The rapidly expanding network of socialist clubs
and organisations around the SPD provided the working class with
an alternative to the bourgeois organisations. An SPD sympathizer
682 T. Offermann, 'Die regionale Ausbreitung der fruhen deutschen
Arbeiterbewegung 1848/49-1860/64', Geschich te und Gesellschaft, 13 (4)
(1987), PP. 43 1-432.
683 Ritter, 'Wahlrecht', p. 62.
684 F. Heidenreich, "...Das Wichtigste Agitationsmittel für die Partei." Zur
Geschichte der Sozialdemokratischen Presse in Sachsen vor 1933',
Internationale Wissenschaftliche Koi-respondenz zur Geschichte der
deu tschen Arbeiterbewegung, 27 (2) 1991, p. 145.
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was not only approached as a political citizen, but the attempt was
to reach him as a whole human being. The SPD not only preached
cla,s struggle to change the political and economic consciousness of
the citizen, but also to liberate the spirit. An attempt was made to
remove education, leisure time, family, even love life, in fact, the
whole private sphere, from the influence of the bourgeois class
enemy and his spiritual-ideological agencies, particularly the
church.685
The effect of the development of separate organisations for
different groups and classes in society was twofold. On the one
hand these organisations provided security and an identity for
their particular members, but on the other hand they tended to
isolate their members in their specific surroundings and prevented
communication with other groups in society. The sharp divisions
between socialist and bourgeois organisations continued during the
Weimar years. In Saxony, but also in Thuringia, the organised
working class cut itself off from the rest of the society to a greater
extent than in any other region in Germany.686
Peter Lösche and Franz Walter describe the development of a
Solidargemeinschaft ('unified community') among the socialist
working class. They define it as a consciousness, a feeling of
solidarity and practical, mutual support resulting from similar
living conditions or political experiences, which creates mutual
685 D. Kienke, 'Hermann Liebmann (1882-1935). Vom Architekten der
"proletarischen Mehrheit" in Sachsen zum "Tolerierungs"-Politiker der Ara
Brünmg', in P. LOsche and M. Scholmg and F. Walter (Hrsg.), Vor dem
Vergessen bewahren. Lebenswege Weimarer Sozialdemokra ten (Berlin,
1988), p. 205.
686 See F. Walter, 'Thurmgen - Einst Hochburg der Sozialistischen Arbei-
terbewegung?', internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur
Geschichte derArbeiterbewegung, 28 (1) (1992), pp. 21-39.
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requirements and interests.687 Both political historians distinguish
between this Solidargemeinschaft and a socialist milieu. Whereas
the So1idargmeinschaft was a more loose-knit community of
people with a similar identity and interest, where divisions and
competition existed, the milieu was a much stronger and tighter
centralization of working-class culture. A socialist milieu was able
to develop in working-class districts where active members and
voters of the SPD (or, more generally, supporters of Marxism), lived
closely together and where this even led to the development of a
specific socialist family culture.688 This concept is important for our
attempt to explain the rise of the Nazis in the region, specifically in
the KHs Zwickau and Chemnitz which was not only their stronghold
in Saxony, but also one of their major bastions in the Reich. Nazis
(and Communists) were able to make major inroads into areas of
SPD Solidargemeinschaft, such as the Erzgebirge/Vogtland, but
faced enormous opposition and were not very successful in regions
where an SPD milieu existed, as in Mei1,en, Freital, Riesa or leipzig.
Saxony was undoubtedly the most important stronghold of socialist
workers culture during the Weimar era. The region around Dresden
was the stronghold of the Jun gsozialisten (Young Socialists) and
also various health organisations. The Verband Volksgesundheit
(Association for People's Health) had its headquarters in Dresden
and the Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (Workers' Samaritan Union) sat
in Chemnitz. Leipzig was the centre of the Arbeiter-Turn-und-
Sportbund (Workers' Gymnastic and Sport Union; ATSB). The
Sozialis tische Arbei terjugend (SAJ) and the Freiden ker
687 P. LOsche and F. Walter, 'Zur Organisationskultur der sozialdemokrati-
schen Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik', Geschichte und
Gesellschaft, 15 (4) (1989), P. 521.
688 LOsche/Wa.lter, 'Organisationskultur', p. 535; Walter 'Stammland', p. 213.
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(Freethinker) in Saxony boasted the greatest membership in
Germany. 689
 The ATSB, too, the biggest of all socialist leisure
organisations, had a prominent position in the region. Not only did
40.2 per cent of all assets of the organisation lie in Saxony, but 22.4
per cent of all members were organised in the region, and it was
also here that the biggest football clubs were to be found.69°
It was in the most solid SPD strongholds such as the towns of
Mei1en, Freital, Riesa, Leipzig, and the AHs around Döbeln, Dresden
and Leipzig, that the Nazis encountered most problems in gaining
mass support. In Freital, a centre of SPD activities, seven out of
every hundred citizens were organised in one of the ten Socialist
Sport Clubs. 69 ' Leipzig was the headquarters of the Arbeiter-Turn-
und-Sportbund and the 'Mecca' of football in the Republic. In the
whole region of the AHs Grimma, Leipzig and Borna, there were
149 ATSB sport clubs with 18,071 members in 1929. This meant
that in more than one third of the villages (35.1%) there was an
SPD sport club where nearly six out of every hundred citizens
(5.7%) were organised. In the region where the SPD vote collapsed
in the last years of the Republic and the Nazis scored their highest
percentage, in the AHs Plauen, Oelsnitz and Auerbach, only one
fifth of the villages (20.2%) had an SPD sport club and only two out
of every hundred citizens (2.0%) were members.692
Saxony was also a stronghold of the Ailgemeiner Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB), by far the largest organisation
689 LOsche/Walter, 'Organisationskultur', p. 525; Walter 'Stammiand', p. 214.
690 GeschJftsbeñcht über die Jahre 1928/29 des Arbeiter-Turn-und-
Sportbundes e.V. (Leipzig, 1930).
691 Very recently, see also F. Walter, 'Freital: Das "Rote Wien Sachsens", in F.
Walter and T. DUrr and K. Schmidke (Hrsg.) Die SPD in Sachsen und
Thuringen zwischen Hochburg und Diaspora (Bonn, 1993).
692 Calculated from AISB 1928/29, StDR, (1933), pp. 10/59-10/76.
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representing workers in the work place (see Table 10). Forty-three
per cent of the local industrial work force were members of the
Table 10: The ADGB in Saxony and the Reich in 1931
branches members	 female	 juvenile
Reich	 1,295	 3,669,257	 501,903
	 179,384
Saxony	 117 (9%)	 603,735 (16.5%) 120,258 (24.0%)	 24,843 (13.8%)
Source: Jahrbuch Ailgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 1932.
ADGB.693 The very high female percentage reflects the prominence
of the textile industry, which was by far the largest employer in
the region.
(iv) The four SPD districts in Saxony and the Rise of the Nazis
The better the network of Social Democratic organisations was, the
more problems the Nazis faced in gaining mass support and in
making inroads into the working class. What then was the role of
the SPD in the rise of the Nazi Party in Saxony? There were four
SPD districts in the province. The SPD district of Leipzig covered the
KH Leipzig, the SPD district of Dresden/Bautzen the equivalent KH.,
and the SPD district of Chemnitz/Erzgebirge and Zwickau/Plauen
covered respectively the KH Chemnitz and KH Zwickau. Each of
these SPD districts was independent in the management of its
internal affairs and possessed varying party networks in their
region.
693 In the Republic (excluding Saxony and the Saarland), 27 per cent of the
industrial working class were organised in the ADGB (Heidenreich,
'Agitationsmittel', p. 141).
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Each district faced distinct challenges and responded differently to
the enormous economic crisis which unfolded from the late 1920s
and the simultaneous rise of the Nazi Party. The SPD districts of
Dresden, and especially Leipzig, were extremely successful in
defending their position against the rapid Nazi expansion and
proved to be the greatest bastion for the SPD in the last elections of
Table 11: Percentage of the vote for NSDAP, SPD and KPD in the top eight
Nazi strongholds in AHs and towns in Saxony in the July 1932 Reichstag






































 At the same time, however, a dramatic
collapse of the SPD voting strength took place in the SPD district of
Chemnitz/Erzgebirge, and particularly Zwickau/Plauen. The party
694 In the July 1932 Reichstag elections, the SPD scored highest in the
electoral district of Leipzig (33.1%), while Dresden managed the party's fifth
best result (31.1%). In the November 1932 Reichstag elections the district of
Leipzig kept the position of the SPD's best electoral bastion (32.2%) and
Dresden improved its position to fourth place (29.5%). In the March 1933
Reichstag elections, Leipzig and Dresden became first and second regarding
the SPD vote (30.1%/28.4%). Overall it is remarkable how the Left was able to
defend its position in Saxony for more than two decades after its stunning
election victory in 1903 with 58.5 per cent of the votes. See below all
Reichstag elections between 1903 and 1933 in Saxony and the percentage of
the votes for the Left:
year	 1903 1907 1912 1919 1920	 1924a 1924b 1928
Left	 585 48.3	 54.7	 60.1 53.9	 45.9	 46.7	 505
year	 1930 1932a 1932b 1933
Left	 48.3 45.8
	 47.2	 42.7
Source: Ritter'Wahlrecht', p. 63; StJBSA, (19 19-34).
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nearly disintegrated in the last years of the Republic in the area of
the Erzgebirge/Vogtland and lost up to 20.5 per cent of its vote
between the May 1928 and July 1932 Reichstag elections (see
Table 11 above). This dramatic decline of the SPD vote from the
late 1920s onwards was the acceleration of a process which had
already started after the first elections in the Republic in 1919. It
was here that the combined parties of the left lost up to 36.9 per
cent of their vote between 1919 and 1932 (see Table 12).
The collapse of SPD support in the south-west of Saxony took place
in two stages both with a similar degree of decline. The first was in
the early 1920s, and the second from the late 1920s onwards. The
Table 12: Percentage of loss of the Left (SPD and KPD) in administrative




















































Source: calculated from ZSäStL4, (1920/2 1); StDR, (1932).
elections to the Reichstag in 1919 was primarily a vote of protest
against war, defeat, misery and disorder, and a hope of a new
beginning. When the SPD became a government party and the
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harsh realities of life became apparent, many of its former voters
turned towards other parties. The near disintegration of the SPD in
the Erzgebirge/Vogtland - to as little as 10.6 per cent of the overall
vote in the AH Auerbach in 1932 - took place between 1928 and
1932. This was partly a result of the enormous scale of the
economic crisis combined with the skilful Nazi activities in the area
(see the Chapter 'Key study'). However, it was not only that the
voting support for the SPD collapsed, but also that the party itself
seemed to disintegrate in the Erzgebirge/Vogtland. This was a
result of fierce internal disputes over how to respond to the
economic crisis, and intense Nazi activities. When, amongst others,
the local leader of the left wing, the prominent Max Seydewitz,
founded the SAP in October 1931, the SPD district Zwickau/Plauen
lost about one-fifth of all its members. 695 In early 1932 the district
still reported the continuing activities of Spalter in the party.696
The SPD party district of Zwickau/Plauen was confronted with
economic misery and Nazi attacks far earlier than the strong
district of Leipzig. Neither did it show such strong party unity as
the latter. 697
 Party disunity, the sheer scale of Nazi activities and
695 'Bezirksparteitag Zwickau/Plauen', SVB, Nr. 44, 22.2.1932.
696 'In der Einheit liegt unsere Stärke', ibid., Nr. 38, 15.2.1932. There was a
fierce struggle between the radicals and moderates in the SPD district of
Zwickau/Plauen. Alter Seydewitz was thrown out as editor in chief of the
SVB on 29. September 1931, he was rehabilitated only three days later due to
pressure from party members (H. A. Winkler, Der Weg in die Katastrophe.
Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik 1930 bis 1933
(Bonn, 1990), p. 402).
697 The SVB started to report about the miserable economic situation in the
Erzgebirge/Vogtland from early 1929 onwards ('Das Elend im Erzgebirge',
SVB, Nr. 28, 2.2.192 9) and about increased Nazi activities from April 1929
onwards ('Bonzen Betrug', ibid., Nr. 80, 6.4.1929). In numerous appeals, the
party members were called to fight the growing Nazi threat. The left-wing
tendencies within the SPD district of Zwickau/Plauen became evident during
the discussion at the annual district conference in April 1931. One official
accused the left wing of being responsible for the bad condition of the
district. The majority of the delegates attacked the moderate party leadership
in Berlin and 188 Out of 226 delegates supported the SPD Reichstag members
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the extent of the crisis in the south-west of Saxony, however,
cannot solely explain the Social Democratic collapse in the
Erzgebirge/Vogtland. It was also crucial, that in this area the
network of socialist party and leisure organisations did not prove
strong and elaborate enough to withstand the attack of the Nazis as
they did in many parts of the KH Leipzig and Dresden. As a result,
the Nazis managed to make major inroads into the working class.
There were far fewer SPD party members in the population in the
SPD district of Zwickau than in the rest of Saxony (see Table 13).
Whereas the membership figures in the SPD district of Dresden,
Table 13: Percentage of party membership to population in Saxon SPD
districts
year	 Leipzig	 Dresden	 Chemnitz	 Zwickau
1926	 2.9	 2.4	 2.2	 1.8
1929	 3.2	 3.0	 2.6	 2.0
1931	 3.4	 2.9	 2.6	 1.4
Source: JbDSd, (1926, 1929, 1931); StJbSa, (1924/26).
Chemnitz and Leipzig rose by 6.8%, 5.7%, 2.4% per annum between
1926 and 1929 and stayed fairly stable until the end of 1931,
membership grew slowly in Zwickau by 2.2 % p. a. before 1929 and
collapsed dramatically after 1930 when the district lost more than
a third of its members in 1931 (see Table 14 below). When the
enormous crisis started to unfold in the late 1920s, the SPD in the
district of Zwickau had a much less sophisticated and deep rooted
network of party organisations than the rest of Saxony. The
who had voted against the building of the Panzerkreuzer (ibid., Nr. 85,
13.4.1931). The LVZ mentioned increased Nazi activities for the first time in
north-western Saxony in September 1929 ('Die Augen aufi', LVZ, Nr. 214,
13.9.1929). According to their own figures, about fifty party members and 10
per cent of the SAJ members left the SPD district of Leipzig alter the creation
of the SAP (ibid., Nr. 38, 15.2.1932).
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membership of the SPD and Its affiliated organisations. in the
Erzgebirge/Vogtland, once one of the heartlands of the organised
working-class movement in Germany, had not grown in the
twentieth century as it had done in the districts of Leipzig and
Table 14: Development of SPD membership in the four SPD districts of






















































































Source: JbDSd, (1926-1931); 'Jahresbericht 1927 der sozialdemokratischen
Bezirksorganisation Chemnitz-Erzgebirge'; 'SPD Bezirksverband Dresden.
Geschaftsbericht vom 1. Januar bis zum 31. Dezember 1928'; *: calculated
from G.A. Ritter, 'Das Wahlrecht und die Wahlerschaft der Sozialdemokratie
un KOnigreich Sachsen 1867-19 14', in G.A. Ritter (ed.), Der Aufstieg der
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (MUnchen, 1990), pp. 65-68.
Dresden. One of the reasons for that was that the
Erzgebirge/Vogtland, with its many valleys and its position at the
edge of Saxony, bordering with Czechoslovakia, was isolated from
the rest of the region and also developed specific regional
differences and interests. It is no surprise that the SPD experienced
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considerable difficulties in establishing a party press in the district
of Zwickau at the turn of the century.698
It was In this area that the SPD lost massive voting support and the
Nazis were able to establish their greatest strongholds from the
mid-1920s onwards. By 1930 the Nazis were already the strongest
party in the AHs Oelsnitz, Plauen, Schwarzenberg and the towns
Werdau and Plauen. At the same time they were reaching for
control in the towns of Glauchau, Crimmitschau, Freiberg, Zwickau
and Chemnitz (see Table 15 below), places which were the cradle of
the German working class. It is true that there were more party
branches compared to the number of villages and towns in the
Erzgebirge/Vogtland than in most other parts of Saxony, 699 but this
network was rather a 'remnant' of the flourishing time of the late
19th century after which the local SPD failed to tie more people to
the influence of the party or other affiliated organisations. At the
end of 1930 there was only one SPD member for every hundred
citizens in the AH Annaberg, 1.1 in the AH FlOha, 1.2 in the AH
Marienberg and 1.8 in the AH Glauchau (including Glauchau and
Meerane). 700
 However, there were also some blank spots on the
map where there was no SPD representation at all. The Social
Democrats from the AH Marienberg reported in 1929 that there
698 Heidenreich, 'Agitationsmittel', pp. 148-149.






The comparatively few and large villages in south-western Saxony also
favoured the development of a dense party network.
700 Jahresbericht der sozialdemokratischen Bezirksorganisation
Chemnirz/Erzgebirge. SPD Bezirksverband Chemnitz/Erzgebirger 1929., p.
27.
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Source: calculated from StJbSa, (1930), StDR, (1928, 1932).
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were only sixteen party branches in the thirty-five villages in their
district. In nine villages the party only had single members and in
ten villages the SPD had no success at all in recruiting active
followers. 70 ' When the economic crisis set in, the party network
was far too loose and there were not many SPD activists to respond
to increasing Nazi activities. Party officials expressed a willingness
to "counter the attack of the Nazis through [party] loyalty". With
this tactic they also hoped to be able to "attract the thousands of
uprooted middle class citizens." 702 (!) Moreover, the SPD youth
organisation, which was needed so desperately to counter the
youthful and active Nazi movement, hardly existed in the
Erzgebirge. There were only 108 SAJ members in the AH
Marienberg and 157 in the AH Annaberg.703
Areas which had no Social Democratic party branches, secured an
SPD vote far below the average in the Erzgebirge/Vogtland. The
SPD Chemñitz/Erzgebirge reported after the 1928 Reichstag
elections, where it had scored 33.3 per cent of the vote, that in
eighty-nine villages with a population of 50,720 where there were
no SPD branches, the party had only received 5,243 votes. 704 In the
same report the Social Democrats praised the small town of GlOsa,
situated at the northern periphery of Chemnitz, with about 4,000
citizens, as having the best membership ratio with 15.3 members
for every 100 inhabitants. This was due to a large settlement in
which many SPD officials lived together in a tiny area. This was a
place were a deep rooted socialist milieu developed and which
701 Ibid.
702 Ibid.
703 jajiresberjcht 1930 Sozialdemokratische Bezirksorganisation Chemmtz
Erzgebirge, p. 28.
704 JaJiresbencjt 1928 Sozialdemokratische Bezirksorganisation Chemnitz /
Erzgebirge, p. 8.
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remained a solid SPD stronghold even in the greatest crisis. The SPD
still scored 50 per cent of the votes in the July 1932 Reichstag
elections (a loss of 6.8 per cent since 1929), while t'ie Nazis only
managed to get 23.3 per cent. The Left combined, polled 69.6 per
cent of the vote (a loss of 3.8 per cent since 1929).705
The importance to the SPD of a good membership ratio to the
population in their attempt to withstand the Nazi onslaught
becomes evident in the KHs Leipzig and Dresden, which did much
better in defending the Socialist voting strength. The two party
sub-districts which had the worst SPD membership figures per
head of the population in both KHs, Freiberg and Döbeln706 , were
the ones where the Nazis were most successful in the region.
There were severe limits to a well organised and functioning SPD
party organisation in the KHs Zwickau and Chemnitz. In the district
of Chemnitz the SPD headquarters complained at the end of 1928
that 146 out of 203 party branches had not reported their local
results of the traditional annual campaign week to attract new
members. 707 Either they did not participate in the campaign or
there was simply no success to report. In the campaign a year later,
twenty-nine SPD branches only managed to win one single new
party member in the AR Rochlitz. 708 In the AH Annaberg, sixteen
SPD party branches organised as little as thirty-five public
meetings throughout the whole of 1929. The remaining twelve
705 ChVSt, 13.5.1929 and ibid., 1.8.1932.
706 See SPD Bezirksverband Dresden. Geschãftsbericht vom 1. Januar bis zuni
31. Dezember 1928, p. 63; 'Mitteilungen des Bezirksvorstandes der Sozialdemo-
kratischen Partei Leipzigs', Nr. 31, 10.2.1928.
707 SPD Cheinnitz/Erzgebirge 1928, p. 9.
708 Ja1u-esbencht des Bezirksvorstandes der SPD Bezirk Leipzig 1929, UB
Rochlitz-Burgstadt-Mittweida.
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branches of the district did not have a single public meeting. 709 The
Nazis did their part to destabilize the Social Democrats by
challenging them with numerous meetings in local SPD
strongholds. 71 ° SPD officials described their own performance as
"not satisfying", and concluded in a resigned tone about their
organisational weaknesses and limits in the Erzgebirge: "Although
there was a will to work, there were too many difficulties".711
Whereas the Social Democrats in Leipzig were able to match the
Nazis' increasing propaganda activities and led the fight of the
organised working-class movement against them up to the very
end, their colleagues in the Erzgebirge/Vogtland could not
adequately respond to the continuous Nazi onslaught (see tables).
There Nazis not only organised increasingly more public meetings
than the Marxist parties, but also managed to attract more people
to their meetings than the latter.
Throughout Weimar Germany, the SPD encountered severe limits
to its expansion in rural areas which were far away from urban
working-class strongholds. In Saxony, the feature of the 'industrial
village' together with a long socialist tradition made the SPD also
strong in many rural areas. This was particularly so around the
SPD's urban strongholds in Mei1en, Riesa, Leipzig and Dresden. In
other rural regions, however, the local SPD only possessed a very
loose organisational network. Again and again party officials
complained about the difficulty of attracting female supporters. In
the AH Rochlitz there were fifty SPD branches with not a single
709 SPD Chemnitz/Erzgebirge 1929, P. 9.
710 The SPD district of Glauchau and Stollberg reported that the Nazis held
numerous meetings in their best places in order to challenge their strong -
holds (SPD Chemnitz/Erzgebirge 1930, p. 15).
711 SPDChemnitz/Fi-zgebirge 1929, p.27.
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female party member. 712 But it was exactly here, that the Nazis
were most active in their propaganda activities and also managed
to attract working-class support. In 1929 SPD party officials from
the same district warned that the Nazis "need to be closely
watched. Unfortunately, if workers face poverty and misery, (they)
run into the arms of ... the Hitlerguard."713
Although the Saxon Nazis were active in urban and rural areas
from 1925 onwards, they found it naturally much easier to recruit
mass support in the 'organisational vacuum' of the countryside. An
alleged 'urban plan', in which the Nazis tactic was to concentrate on
winning urban strongholds until spring 1929, cannot be
observed. 714 The Saxon police reported in January 1928: "Again
the NSDAP preferred to be active in rural areas." 715 Furthermore,
due to enormous resistance the Nazis encountered in urban areas,
they were often simply forced out into the countryside. The Nazis
themselves admitted that their SA in Freiberg was not able to
protect two local party meetings in 1926, "which would have been
a sweeping success if they had not been disturbed by the
Kommune (Marxists)." 716 Instead, the SA was beaten up twice on
these occasions by Marxist supporters. Henceforth, "the activities of
the Freiberg SA was limited mainly to meetings in villages."717
In places where long socialist traditions combined with increased
party and organisational activities before the end of the Weimar
Republic, Nazi electoral success was limited even in the
712 SPD Cheinnitz/Erzgebirge 1928, p. 9.
713 SPD Leipzig 1929, UB Rochlitz-Burgstadt-Mittweida.
714 Orlow, Nazi Party, pp. 90 ff., 138 ff.
715 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/1, January 1928.
716 NSDAP Freiberg, p. 14.
717 Ibid.
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Erzgebirge/Vogtland. In the small town of Auerbach/AH Stollberg,
the organised working-class movement began to develop during
the time of Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Laws. For some years seven
local SPD members walked fifteen kilometres to the party meeting
in Chemnitz once a week. Usually they came back late in the night
with Socialist leaflets and newspapers in their rucksacks. In 1899
they founded their own local SPD branch. A consumer cooperative
was established in the 1890s, a workers singing club in 1900 and a
workers gymnast club in 1905. During the Weimar era these
organisations were joined by Workers' Samaritans, freethinkers,
the SAJ, a building cooperative and a house renting club. In
addition, about twenty workers were active in the socialist theatre
group in Chemnitz. When a local KPD branch was founded in March
1920 the working class possessed a second political
representative. 718 The small town with its roughly 4,100 citizens
was clearly dominated by the working class. Less than 5 per cent of
the population was employed in agriculture and nearly all of the
2,826 strong industrial work force were employed in the textile
industry producing socks. The town was the perfect place for a
socialist stronghold. It was predominantly working class, with
nearly two-thirds of the work force employed in places with more
than fifty workers. The town possessed a long socialist tradition,
celebrating the first Maifeier in 1893 and experiencing its first
strike in 1907. Moreover, in contrast to most other places, Social
Democrats and Communists often co-operated to secure a socialist
718 for this discussion see H. Dittmann, 'Zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewe-
gung in Auerbach', Der Heimatfreund für den Kreis Stollberg/Erzgebirge,
(Marz-Juli) (1963), pp. 57-59, 74-75, 93-94, 115-117, 133-135.
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majority or to fight the growing threat of the Nazis. 719
 In that kind
of environment, the Nazis encountered difficulties even in the
Erzgebirge. The SPD managed to stay above 30 per cent of the vote
and the combined Left kept its majority in the town until the
March 1933 elections. Still, the Nazis managed to make major
inroads even in this 'model working-class community' by becoming
the biggest party in July 1932 and scoring more than 35 per cent of
the vote.
The towns of Mellen, Freital, Pirna, and the towns and surrounding
region of Dresden, Leipzig, Riesa and DObeln were areas with a high
level of SPD activity. The SPD sub-district of greater Leipzig was
pursuing the most sophisticated and effective socialist educational
work in Weimar Germany. This was at the same time the area
where the Nazis admitted encountering most difficulties when they
reflected on their 'seizure of power' in Saxony: "In and around
Leipzig ... the clashes were the most severe and took the heaviest
toll of human life." 720
 The Workers Education Institute trained
officials and organised events in the whole country, and a Local
Educational Committee organised an enormous number of
educational events. In 1930 it organised thirty-three educational
courses on 138 evenings concentrating on current political affairs
and questions on socialism. The courses were attended by 1,137
people (717 male/420 female) of which 47 per cent were workers
and 15 per cent white collar workers. 721 The Leipzig' SPD managed
719 Kreisleitung Stollberg der SED (Hrsg.), Well du auch em Arbeiter bist!
Der Kampf der Arbeiterkiasse des Kreises Stoflberg gegen das
Wiedererstarken des Imperialismus und Militarism us in der Weimarer
Republik, gegen Faschismus und Kriegsgefahr (1924-1933) (1986), p. 87.
720 Seven Nazi members lost their life in the region during the Kampfzeir
(Der Gau Sachsen, p. 125).
721 SPD Leipzig 1930, p. 368.
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to attract high calibre national and international speakers
throughout the year and supported their educational efforts with a
network of forty-five libraries, book shops and the use of mass
media (the Educational Committee organised the showing of 130
films). The cultural and political climax for the local Social
Democrats were the commemoration ceremonies for the
Marzgefallenen (those who died during the Kapp-Putsch), May the
First celebrations, constitutional and revOlutionary celebrations and
ceremonies in commemoration of Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Wilhelm
Liebknecht or Rosa Luxemburg. Mass participation in these events
underlined the deep rooted socialist conscience and tradition of the
working class of Leipzig and the region around it. 722 Table 16
shows that the SPD managed to mobilize far more supporters at
Table 16: Participants at SPD and KPD Maifeiern ( percentage of all citizens
in brackets)
1930	 1931
SPD	 KPD	 SPD	 KPD
Leipzig	 15,000 (2.2)
	 ?	 17,000 (2.5)	 8,200 (1.2)
Plauen	 1,500 (1.3)
	 1,500 (1.3)	 1,700 (1.5)
	 1,900 (1.7)
Source: STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Mai 1930, April 1931.
these events in Leipzig than their party colleagues were able to
rally in Plauen. The latter was a town where the Nazis were
already the biggest party in 1930.
722 The police in Leipzig reported wreath-laying ceremonies at all
cemeteries in commemoration for the Marzgefallenen on the morning of 21
March 1926 (STA L, PP-v 3103, Wochenbericht Nr. 9, 1926). The SPD and
Socialist unions celebrated May the First with 18,000 participating in a long
demonstration march and 30,000 visitors viewing the spectacle in a stadium.
Afterwards 4,000 torchbearers marched into the city centre (ibid., Wochen-
bericht Nr.4, 1928). 10,000 SPD supporters gathered to witness the
consecration of the Bebel-Liebknecht commemorative plaque in Borsdorf/
AH Grimma (ibid., AH Döbeln 2409, Jahresbericht 1930, p. 2).
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Other SPD districts showed activities similar to those In Leipzig. Not
only did they organise many educational courses or lectures, but
also a very high percentage of pupils participated in
Jugendwei hen723 , expressing open rejection of the bourgeois state
and of the traditional role of religion and the church (see Table 17).
Moreover, SPD strongholds were areas with the highest rate of
people leaving the church. They were also the region where there













































Source: SPD Bezirksverband Dresden. Geschaftsbericht vom 1. Januar bis zum
31. Dezem bet 1929.
was a sharp confrontation between protestant and nationalist
thinking bourgeoisie and freethinking socialist working class.
Between August 1919 and December 1926, 21.3 per cent of all
protestants left the church in Freital, 17.3 per cent in Leipzig, 15.7
per cent in the AH Leipzig,. 13.1 per cent in Mei1en, 12.3 per cent in
the AH Zwickau and 11.2 per cent in the AH Chemnitz. 724
 These
were areas where the combination of socialist traditions and dense
723 Literally 'Youth Consecration'. An act of consecration for juveniles in
the socialist, non-denominational movement.
724 calculated from F. Burkhardt, 'Die Kirchenaustritts- und Kirchenein-
trittsbewegung im Zeitraum 1919 bis 1930 mit einem Ruckblick auf die
Entwicklung der kirchlichen Statistik', ZSäStLA, (1931), p. 194.
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party and organisational networks had created a socialist milieu
which proved firm and solid even when the society plunged into a
crisis of enormous proportions and the National Socialists promised
a way out.
(v) National Socialist Factory Cell Organisation (NSBO)
A crucial area to examine in any investigation of working-class
support for the Nazi Party is their strength in the actual work
place, on the factory councils. Since the re-foundation of the NSDAP
in 1925 there were discussions within the party about the creation
of their own union organisation. Claiming to be a workers party
which also aimed to win support amongst the working classes,
there was a need for the NSDAP to take a stand towards strikes,
wage disputes and reduction in working hours, especially in the
industrial areas of the Reich. However, it was only due to pressure
from below - NSDAP party members in Berlin had started to set up
their own factory cells from 1927/28 onwards - that the party
leadership decided on the creation of the NSBO at the party
conference in 1929. Initially, the task of the NSBO was purely
propagandist and there was no intention of setting up an
opposition organisation to the established unions which would
carry out simply economic functions. It was only in spring 1931
that the NSBO officially participated In the elections of the factory
councils for the first time. The NSDAP party leadership had
recognised the NSBO as an official employee organisation and had
given out orders that employed party members had to join only a
few months before the elections.
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The reason for the delayed and half-hearted development of the
NSBO was that it presented somewhat a contradiction for the Nazi
strategy in Munich. Hitler wanted workers to vote for the NSDAP,
become members of the party and join the SA, but was far less
enthusiastic about the creation of their own trade unions. For him it
did not seem very promising to take on the ADGB. Moreover, his
strategy was to come to power through elections in the Reichstag,
not like the Communists through a general strike. Getting directly
involved in the relationship between workers and employers, the
Nazis were bound to alienate one side. And lastly, there was a
contradiction between forming employee unions and advocating a
'national community'.
As Saxony was the most industrialised region in Germany with a
large working class, one would expect the local Nazis to be
particularly active in the attempt to build up a foothold amongst
workers at their work place. However, the NSBO leadership organ,
Der Betrieb, stated that the Gau Saxony only ranked sixteenth
amongst all Nazi Gaue regarding NSBO membership numbers in
May 1931, tenth in June, and third in July and August of the same
year. 725 This was surprising, because Saxony possessed by far the
largest working class and most party members of all Nazi Gaue. A
rather small Gau like Danzig, with 9,093 party members, had more
NSBO members in May and June 1931 than Saxony, which had
nearly ten times as many party members than the former in early
1933 (87,079).726
725 v Kratzenberg, Arbeirer auf dem Weg zu Hitler? Die Nationalsozialisti-
sche Betriebszellen-Organisation. lhre Entsrehung, Ihre Programmatik, Ihr
Scheitern 1927-1934 (Frankfurt/Main, Bern, New York, Paris, 1989), p. 209.
726 NSDAP Parteistatistik 1935.
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Several reasons explain the late and slow development of the NSBO
in Saxony. First of all, as in the Ruhr area, there were no influential
personalities like 3ngels or Muchow in Berlin, who did so much in
fostering the development of the NSBO in the Reich capital.727
Secondly, the urban centres in Saxony were a stronghold of the
ADGB. 728 Success for the NSBO seemed very unlikely. Overall, the
Saxon Nazis were much more active in the establishment of special
organisations for the middle classes than for the working classes in
the second half of the 1920s. 729
 Finally, the Nazi stronghold in
Saxony, the Vogtland/Erzgebirge, was dominated by small and
medium scale industries where union organisations were not
widespread at all. There were no need for NSBO cells in these areas.
When local Nazi officials met for a district meeting in the
Erzgebirge in late 1931, there was no NSBO branch represented.
Instead, a group for 'trade, business and industry' discussed the
latest policies.730
This explains why the propaganda of the Saxon Nazis was rather
aimed to win over the working class as such, until the end of the
1920s, rather than trying to gain a foothold at the actual
workplace. Still, throughout the 1920s there were some noticeable
Nazi efforts to establish themselves in the factories. Saxon Nazis
already targeted factories and their work forces with leaflets as
727 BOhnke, Ruhrgebief, pp. 171-172.
728 Forty-three per cent of the industrial work force in Saxony were
members of the ADGB, which compared to 27 per cent in the rest of Germany
(excluding the Saarland). Heidenreich, 'Agitationsmittel', p. 141.
729 In contrast to special party organisations for middle class people, the
Saxon Nazi press does not really mention any specific organisations directed
towards the working classes before 1930. For the former there was e.g. the
creation of a white collar group on 9 March 1927 in Dresden (NSfS, Nr. 17,
24.4.192 7); there were Nazi activities in the DHV from 1928 on; and in
November 1929 the National Socialist middle class groups merged together to
an economic union (SB, Nr. 46, 17.11.1929).
730 F!. Nr. 250, 6.11.193 1.
196
early as 1923.731 National Socialists were involved in the VOlkische
Kampfgewerkschaft, a nationalist union which founded a branch in
August 1924 and organised a propaganda evening in Zwickau in
April 1925. 732 The first mention of Nazi factory cells in Saxony was
in July 1929. The police reported that there was an "effort to build
'white cells' in all work places of industry and agriculture
Through a tight organisation the Nazi members have the task of
attempting to create cells in every big factory."33
The first public NSBO meeting in Leipzig was on 15 April 1930.
Soon after that the Nazis reported their success in the infiltration of
large factories in the town 735 , there were reports of success in
factory council elections in Zwickau736, and in May 1930 the Nazis
started with the creation of NSBO cells in Dresden 737 . However, the
establishment of the NSBO in Saxony was a slow process. Not only
did the Nazis themselves not mention the NSBO organisation as
such during their Saxon Gau meeting in Plauen in June that
year738 , the police alike reported: "The attempts of the Nazis in
spring 1930 to create the NSBO in the region only started to show
some concrete success at the end of 1930."	 The development
gained a decisive push by the stunning election success of the
NSDAP in the September 1930 Reichstag elections. The next day
the Saxon Nazis issued the slogan: "Clear front in Saxony! National
Socialism against Marxism. Burgertum is crushed ... We are going
731 STA D, AH Glauchau, Nr. 24, Halbwochenbencht 9.6.1923.
732 Ibid., SaStKa, Nr. 131.
733 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/3, Juli 1929.
734 SB, Nr. 48, 17.4. 1930.
735 Ibid., Nr. 63, 8.5.1930.
736 Ibid., Nr. 56, 29.4.1930.
73 Ibid., Nr. 68, 14.5.1930.
738 Ibid., Nr. 84, 3.6.1930.
739 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 19087.
197
into the factories, we are going to the unemployed." 740 Soon
afterwards, official orders to create NSBO cells were given out for
Chemnitz and Dresden. Der Freihiitskampf requested that in
Chemnitz "in all work places, everywhere where there is manual
work, there is to be the immediate creation of NSBO cells along
tight organisational lines ... Every work place Is going to send at
least two members to the NSBO leadership meeting on 5
October."74'
On a general level, the aim of the Nazis was to win over workers
from the Marxist parties. More specifically, however, they clearly
aimed to attract disillusioned workers with nationalist sentiments.
Nazi officials explained to their party members in Dresden: "Our
fight is against Marxism which destroys every aspect of the Volk
We must expose the guilt of the Marxist parties, their leaders and
supporters, for this endless misery and poverty of the German
Volk. This work is to be done through the NSBO."742
The NSBO in Dresden seemed the most active during this phase.
Two meetings were announced and a lecture series was planned to
cover issues like works council legislation, labour law and wage
settlement law during the winter 1930/3 1. 743 Der Freiheitskampf
also mentioned NSBO existence in Plauen (FK, Nr. 28, 3.2.1931; FK,
Nr. 109, 12.5.1931), Zwickau (FK, Nr. 89, 17.4.1931), and Mei1en
(FK, Nr. 231, 3.10.31). By the end of 1931 the police noted the
lively Nazi propaganda for the NSBO. 744 By that time Saxony had
740 FK, Nr. 39, 15.9.1930.
741 thid., Nr. 54, 2.10.1930.
742 Ibid.
743 Ibid.
744 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, November 1931.
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eight NSBO Gau speakers, four from Dresden, two from Chemnitz,
and one each from Zwickau and Plauen.745
Overall, however, these were isolated efforts ir some major towns.
The creation of the NSBO network proved to be a rather slow and
difficult process for the Nazis in Saxony. In Dresden no Nazi
speaker was allowed to put forward his ideas in a meeting of
landlords, employees and consumers against the beverage tax in
early 1930. 746 In Aue, union representatives imposed silence on
Nazis when they tried to influence a meeting in a paper factory in
July 1930. For the elections to the factory councils in spring
1931 there was only one small article in Der Freiheitskampf
attempting to rally workers behind the NSBO. 748 The hand-written
leaflet which announced a public NSBO meeting of the 'insurance'
group in Leipzig in August 1931, does not give the impression of
very sophisticated NSBO propaganda capabilities at the time.749
This not only stood in sharp contrast to the massive propaganda in
the press and the campaign that was especially set up for the
elections to the Agricultural Chambers in Saxony in May the same
year, but it was also a pitiful effort by comparison with what
BOhnke describes in the Ruhr as "incredible propaganda effort" for
the factory council elections in 1931 750
What kind of NSBO cells existed in Saxony before 1932? One
quarter of Saxon NSBO members was working in the textile
industry, about one-sixth in mining, and the rest belonged to the
745 FK, Nr. 188, 14.8.3 1.
746 thid., Nr. 84, 7.1.1930.
747 The NSDAP responded, however, by calling the work force to a protest
meeting (ibid., Nr. 194, 21.8.193 1).
748 Ibid, Nr. 58, 10.3.3 1.
749 BA, NS 26, Nr. 2113.
750 Bohnke, Ruhrgebiet, p. 174.
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branches 'transport', 'electricity and water', 'chemicals', 'metals',
'foodstuffs', 'tobacco', and 'employees in banking and insurance' and
'blue collar workers'. 751
 When one compares the m.mbership
figures with the distribution of the work force in the different
industrial sectors in Saxony, it becomes clear how important
regional conditions were for the specific spread of Nazi cells.
In Dresden there were cells within the categories 'tram', 'civil
service' ('state insurance institution', 'courts', 'public prosecutor's
office', 'inland revenue office west', 'town hall Johannstadt'), and
'employees'. As Dresden was the administrative capital of Saxony, it
is no surprise that local Nazis were particularly active among the
civil service. In a public meeting they advised them to make ample
use of their right to freedom of speech against the Marxists. 752 In
Chemnllz there were NSBO cells in the following sectors: 'municipal
removal service', 'trams', 'SchOnherrwerke', 'J. E. Reinecker',
'bakers', 'butchers' and the 'catering trade'. 753 The Nazis were also
trying to infiltrate skilled professions like brick yard workers,
brick carriers, toy-makers, basket-makers, brush-makers and box-
makers. 754
 By the end of 1931 the Chemnitz' NSBO had established
an organisational framework. There was a treasurer and other
officials in charge of office work, press, propaganda, intelligence
and Uschla. 755 In Leipzig there were NSBO cells in the following
sectors: 'civil service', 'post' (assistants and workers), machine
751 Der Betrieb, 2 (4) 1932 (in Kratzenberg, Arbeiter und Hitler, p. 228).
752 FK Nr. 89, 13.11.1930.
753 The Nazis were supporting the bakers against the partial lifting of the
night baking ban, which brought advantages for big bakeries (ibid., Nr. 175,
30.7.3 1). The 'catering trade' was founded on the 26.6.1931 with seventeen
members (ibid., Nr. 186, 12.8.1931).
75 Ibid., Nr. 275, 26.11.1931.
755 Ibid., Nr. 229, 1.10.193 1.
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factory Brehmer (FK, Nr. 32, 7.2.3 1), 'theatre' (FK, Nr. 201, 29.8.31),
'municipal workers', 'banking and insurance', 'Kraftdroschke', 'life
insurance' (FK, Nr. 237, 10.10.3 1), 'artisans', and factory cells a
LNN and Interverga (FK, Nr. 277, 28.1 1.31). The NSBO 'workers
school' in Leipzig covered issues like 'accident insurance at the
work place' or 'public welfare' and needed to be attended by all
party officials once a week from the end of 1930 onwards. 756 The
NSBO 'speaker school' was so "successful" that the course had to be
split into two groups757 , and an NSBO circular was introduced in
Leipzig in November 1931 758. However, the first two public NSBO
meetings in Leipzig did not take place until 13 November that
year.759
Nazi activists openly admitted their difficulties in setting up a
dense NSBO network in Saxony. The NSBO district leader of Leipzig
and the surrounding area, Peitsch, reported at the end of 1931 how
slow and difficult the creation of the NSBO had been in the
traditional working-class party stronghold: "Since its creation the
NSBO has had to go through the same difficult struggle as the local
NSDAP party organisation has had for more than five years."76°
According to Peitsch the 'civil servant' groups were the most
successful, but the Nazis also had strong positions in the
'Kraftdroschken', 'catering business' and the 'bakers' guild'. "In
particular the groups 'insurance', 'banking', 'municipal utilities' and
'post' staged successful meetings." 761 There were fifteen special
756 Ibid., Nr. 254, 30.10.193 1.
75?' Ibid., Nr. 264, 12.11.193 1.
758 Ibid., Nr. 283, 5.12.193 1.
75 Ibid., Nr. 260, 7.11.193 1.
760 Ibid., Nr. 264, 12.11.3 1.
761 Ibid.
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organisations with fifty-two cells in the district. This was an
extremely small figure, as it meant that in every 1,000 companies
in the area there were only six NSBO cells. 762
 It was not so much
the industrial structure which made Leipzig a less favourable place
than Peitsch wanted (i.e. publishing, tobacco and metal industry),
but rather the strong and widespread support for the traditional
working-class parties, their affiliated organisations and unions.
The situation was not very different in other regions. NSBO activists
found it "incredibly difficult in the former 'red bastion' of
Crimmitschau. Only about five to six workers from factories with
several hundred employees came to our factory council meetings
at the end of 1931 the membership had risen to 120, and by the
middle of 1932 it only exceeded 300." 763 Counting only the
seventy-three large-scale factories with 10,122 workers, the NSBO
had only thirty members for every 1,000 workers in this
traditional textile town by the middle of 1932. However, as the
NSDAP received 41.7 per cent of the vote in the July 1932
Reichstag elections, beating the SPD's 32.6 per cent to become
largest party, it seems likely that a substantial number of workers,
who were organised in SPD trade unions, must have voted for the
Nazis at the same time.
The Saxon NSBO, however, had some successes too. An example of
this was the mining town of Oelsnitz/AH Stollberg, a traditional
Marxist stronghold. 764 The great economic crisis did not hit local
762 Calculated from StJbSA, (1924/25).
763 lsJahreorrsgruppeC.rimmitschau (1937),p.29.
764 For this discussion see J. Keller, 'Drei Jahrzehnte spater - Aus dem Kampf
der Bergarbeiter unter Fuhrung der KPD gegen Krisenpolitik und Faschis-
mus in Oelsnitz/Erzgebirge', Der Heimatfreund für den Kreis Stollberg




coal mining before spring 1930, when overall coal output fell by
14.8 per cent and by another 10 per cent in 1931. However, the
miners in the town had been hit by severe economic rationalisation
throughout the 1920s. Between 1924 and 1931, eight pits (out of
thirteen), seven boiler houses (out of ten) and four power stations
(out of five) had been shut down. Small business was also hit by
the economic slump. There were two bankruptcies or petitions for
bankruptcies in 1929, three in 1930, seven in 1931, and two in
1932. At the end of 1930 nearly 1,000 people were registered as
unemployed out of about 19,000 inhabitants. By January 1932, the
figure had risen to 1,502. Throughout the 1920s the mining unions
were dominated by the SPD. When the crisis in coal mining set in,
however, the Communists organized a vigorous agitation amongst
the suffering miners and received most votes in the three biggest
mines in the elections to the factory councils. The Nazis, who for the
first time participated in the elections of 1931, received 8.2 per
cent of the votes in the four mines where they participated.765
Furthermore, as in many places in Saxony, they also made
considerable efforts to attract the unemployed by agitating in front
of the employment office in Oelsnitz.
However, the fact that the Saxon Nazis hardly published any results
of the elections to the factory councils suggests that overall they
did badly. Der Freiheitskampf reported vaguely about "success" in
the factory council elections in the 'Saxon state insurance' in
765 Keller 'Bergarbeiter', (1964), P. 119. This is along the lines of the NSBO
results in the mines in the Ruhr, where it only received an average of 3.5
per cent average in all mines in 1931, but was able to gain up to 20 per cent
of the vote in single mines (G. Mai, 'Die Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen-
Orgamsation. Zum Verhältms von Arbeiterschaft und Nationalsozialismus',
Vierteljahreshefte für Zeirgeschichre, 31 (4) (1983), p. 597.
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Dresden. 766 In Chemnitz the NSBO gained 296 votes at J. E.
Reinecker (SPD: 789, RGO: 587) 767 , and 152 votes in the 'tram'
sector In June 1931 (SPD: 812, RGO: 268, Saxon Community Civil
Servants: 184).768 Despite the Nazis public joy about success in the
metal industry in Leipzig 769 , in reality they only received 0.3 per
cent of the vote. 770 Table 18 includes the few results published by
the Nazis in Leipzig. It shows that the NSBO gained votes among




















Machine factory Kleim & Ungerer
Arbeiterrat	 130 (5)
Betriebsrat	 ? (4)





Betriebs rat	 ? (7)
Municipal Electricity Board
Angesreiltenrat 	 ? (4)
Spinning mill Tittel & Kruger
Betriebsrat	 ? ( 9)
Transport Anlagen A. Bleicher & Co.
Arbeiterrat RGO 91 (2), SPD 246 (5)
Source: FK, Nr. 80, 7.4.193 1.
office workers and manual workers. The incomplete listing of
results which the Nazis thought were somehow presentable,
suggests further weakness.
766 FK, Nr. 82, 9.4.193 1.
767 Thid., Nr. 76, 31.3.193 1.
768 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Juni 1931.
769 Flç Nr. 80, 7.4.193 1.
770 see Table 18.
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Although the Saxon NSBO showed increased activity by the end of
1931, its impact remained very limited. The intelligence service of
the KH Leipzig observed in its annual report for 1931 that "the
NSDAP had created factory cells and Fachgruppen-Verbande after
the Communist pattern and is likely to have some success in some
factories at the end of the year." 771 However, the report went on:
"The old union organisations, led by the ADGB, still continues to be
decisive for the economic life and union movement." 772 The
Communists admitted their failure bluntly by writing that "a
serious deficit of the whole party work is the completely
insufficient representation of the party in the work place." 773 The
NSBO did even worse (see Table 19).
Table 19: Factory council election results in Saxony in 1931 (gains or losses
compared with 1930 in brackets)
sector/	 work-	 Free trade
town	 force	 unions	 RGO	 NSBO	 Nationalists
Mining	 18,160	 73.0 (-9.5)	 23.7 (+7.1)	 0.8 (+0.8)	 1.7 (+ 1.7)
Metal:
-Leipzig	 11,100	 70.0 (-5.5)	 8.0 (+2.9)	 0.3 (+0.3)	 0.3 (+0.1)
-Dresden	 8,300	 84.4 (-1.3)	 14.4 (+0.5)	 -	 -	 -	 -
Textile:
-Chemnitz	 51,458	 74.0 (-3.8)	 10.8 (+1.4)	 1.8 (+1.2)	 3.9 (-0.1)
-Zittau	 17,285	 84.7 (-3.3)	 2.9 (+2.3)	 0.2 (+0.2)	 0.2 (+0.2)
Source: H. A. Winkler, Der Weg in die Katastrophe. Arbeiter und Arbeiter-
bewegwig in der Weimarer Republic 1930-1 933 (Bonn, 1990), Anhang.
In early 1932 the Saxon Nazis reported that "nearly 1,000 NSBO
cells were created in the state in 193 	 Even taking this
probably exaggerated figure as true, it would mean that there were
771 STA L, AH DObeln, Nr. 2409, Jahresbericht 1931, p. 9.
772 Ibid.
773 'Mange!, Fehier, Schwächen', Der Bolschewik, Nr. 10, September 1931.
774 FK Nr. 1, 2.1.1932.
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only thirty-four Nazi cells in every 1,000 middle-sized and large-
scale companies in Saxony. As hardly any elections to factory
councils took place in 1932 due to government fear of political
disturbances, it is difficult to assess the further development of the
NSBO in Saxony until the Nazis' seized power in 1933. Some growth
and success, especially in the south-western part of the province,
must be assumed.775 Ma! argues that Saxony was one of the five
most important regional NSBO strongholds in early 1933.776
However, in large areas the NSBO did not even exist before 1932 or
even 1933. After the 'seizure of power' NSBO officials from Bautzen
commented on their experiences before 1931: "It was completely
unrealistic to think about an organisational fusion, as there were
only isolated party members in some few factories." 777 Only in
spring 1932 was the first big cell founded. 778 In Markneukirchen,
the first small town to bring the Nazis an overall majority in the
1920s, the NSBO was only founded on 15 February 1933 by a mere
four party members. 779 As the town was dominated by small and
medium scale industry it did not seem necessary to establish NSBO
cells.
(vi) Nazis in Saxon working-class districts
While all the efforts by the Nazis to gain a foothold in the work
place of the Saxon working classes made extremely slow progress,
775 C. J. Fischer, The German Communists and the Rise of Nazism (London,
1991), Chapter 9.
776 Together with Berlin, Westphalia-North, Silesia, and Cologne-Aachen
(Mai 'NSBO', p. 596).
777 Zehn Jahre NSDAP, Ortsgruppe Bautzen, pp. 43-44.
778 Ibid.
779 NSDAP Markneukirchen, p. 65.
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they also also faced stiff resistance in their attempts to recruit
followers in urban working-class districts. In 1926 the Nazis
r corded that a "deep seated, or rather injected hatred, amongst
the masses against Adolf Hitler and his National Socialism assumes
an unparalleled form of fierceness" in Saxony. 78° It was so
dangerous for the Nazis to show up in some working-class districts
in Leipzig, that they did so very rarely. When on occasion they
organised meetings in the 'red West' of Leipzig - a Marxist
stronghold -, most of the meetings ended in wild brawls between
the SA and Marxist activists. The police then usually closed the
meeting and the Nazis had to leave again, highly frustrated. 781
 The
situation was similar in the town's southern districts 782 , and the
local Nazis were often prevented from speaking a single word in
public in Leipzig's working-class districts. During the September
1930 election campaign, the Nazis were brave to hold an election
meeting in the town of Freital, the greatest SPD stronghold. This too
ended in a violent brawl.783 Even in Plauen, the stronghold and
headquarters of the NSDAP in Saxony, the Nazis faced stiff
resistance in their attempt to spread their ideas in solid working-
class districts. The Nazis in Plauen specifically targeted factory and
non-factory workers in their autumn campaign of 1931. It is
noticeable that the campaign was directed at the 'homes' rather
than the work-place of the working class. This seemed to promise
greater success for the local Nazis. The strengthening of the NSBO as
a specific target was not mentioned at all. The Nazis in Plauen
explained: "The hand and factory worker is ... as indispensable as
780 'Adolf Hitler und das rote Sachsen', NSIS, Nr. 15, 13.6.1926.
781 E.g. see FK, Nr. 79, 1.11.1930.
782 E.g. see ibid., Nr. 105, 3.12.1930.
783 Ibid., Nr. 31, 5.9.1930.
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any other working group ... in the Third Reich! Because of this we
also carry the swastika banner into the red town districts
Therefore v e are issuing the slogan: forward also into the working-
class districts!" 784 The task was expected to be a hard physical
battle which could only be started after a "mobilization of all
National Socialists of Plauen, uniting all party members and
supporters fit for military service ... to wake up the many
Volksgenossen who are still so far away from us."785
Der Freiheitskampf reported one attempt: "This time it went
through Haselbrunn. There was amazement amongst the extremely
'red residents' of the Lange- and Herd erstra1e (well known
specialists in the building of barricades) ... naturally they were
everything but fascinated ... as we came so unexpectedly they could
not demonstrate their skill in building street barricades and limited
themselves to throwing beer bottles ... (and) the usual shouting of
"Red Front" and "Down! Down! Down!" 786 Three months before
Hitler was appointed Chancellor the Nazis reported a similar
account from "red Pieschen", one of the working-class districts in
Dresden: "The fight in our district is incredibly hard. Marxism
defends it as its sole domain. SA members who walk home alone
are attacked; party members, as soon as they are known as such,
are watched every step they make; their family members are
harrassed, even children suffer due to the terror from the red
comrades; business people are boycotted ... the pack does not even
shrink back from attacks in apartments." 787 Overall the Nazis did
worst and faced enormously stiff resistance in large working-class
784 thid., Nr. 227, 29.9.193 1.
785 Ibid
786 Ibid., Nr. 228, 30.9.193 1.
787 Ibid., Nr. 242, 14.10.193 2.
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districts with a traditional support for the Marxist parties, i.e. in
places where a socialist milieu existed.
However, the Nazis' r'lent1ess and flexible efforts to gain a foothold
even in the most solid Marxist strongholds, helped to dilute and
break down strong resistance in some places. Even in purely
working-class districts the Nazis were able to gain votes during
elections. To be sure, workers could hardly show their sympathies
for the Nazis openly due to the pressure exerted on them by their
environment. They rather chose to vote quietly for the NSDAP in
secret parliamentary ballots. Nazis from Belgershain, near Leipzig,
reported about the "solid" position of the SPD in their village and
explained: "Its backbone was the local Social Democratic Party
organisation with thirty members. At its side was a red gymnastic
club with fifty members and a workers singing club with thirty
members ... The discipline of the workers who were organised in
these Marxist organisations was so good, that the NSDAP did not
manage to attract these workers to its meetings. However, it is
beyond doubt, that a good part of them had voted for the NSDAP,
who already scored an absolute majority in the elections in July
193 2." 788
 Furthermore, a purely proletarian housing estate was not
necessarily a guarantee of solid support for the Marxist parties.
Even during tranquil times workers voted for bourgeois parties.
The SPD in Chemnitz reported: "It is an unpleasant phenomenon,
that we do not have outright success in proletarian districts, which
ought to be ours." 789
 They illustrated this with the housing estate
'Chemnitz-Gablenz', which only had 404 party members among the
1,984 residents eligible to vote. To the disappointment of the SPD
788 Geschichte der Ortsgruppe Belgersharn (Belgershain, 1934).
789 'Chemnitz Erzgebirge auf dem Vormarsch!', ChVS Nr. 29, 4.2.1929.
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261 residents voted for bourgeois parties in the May 1928
Reichstag elections.79°
The Nazis were extremely flexitle in adopting propaganda methods
in working-class districts according to the local situation. In places
where they faced overwhelming resistance, the Nazis normally
avoided outright confrontation. As parades or public meetings in
the west of Leipzig only fueled tough resistance from Marxist
activists, they preferred to be active 'underneath the surface' in
several local party branches and a women's group. 791
 In working-
class districts, where resistance against Nazi infiltration was not so
organised and tenacious, the Nazis were much more prepared to
use violence to conquer new terrain. In Chemnitz, where in
addition large sections of the police sympathized with their cause,
the Nazis wore down Marxist activists in a brutal battle over the
control of the streets by the end of 1931. 792
 The exceptionally
brutal confrontations between Nazis and KPD and SPD activists
became evident in the enormous extent of violence which spread
through Saxony in the last years of the Republic. 793
 The KPD in
particular "was highly prepared to use violence in order to prevent
the infiltration of Nazis into working-class districts."794
790 Ibid.
791 LV4 Nr. 194, 22.8.1931; ibid., Nr. 6, 8.1.1932
792 E.g. see ChVS1 Nr. 197, 25.8.193 1.
793 A statistic published in the VB shows that according to Nazi records
forty-eight out of 129 violent attacks against National Socialists in the Reich
took place alone in Saxony between 8 March and 25 April 1931 (VB, Nr.
130/31, 10/11.5.1931).
794 STA D, KH Dresden, Nr. 262, Juni 1930.
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(vii) Nazi success among Saxon workers
We have seen the limited success of the Saxon Nazis in establishing
widespread support for the NSBO, and tleir apparent problems in
infiltrating large working-class districts. Despite this, the Nazis
were still able to mobilize a significant working-class membership
and voting support in Saxony. In Chemnitz, the Nazis claimed that
thirty out of 100 party members came from the working class.795
Even in the Marxist stronghold of Leipzig, the SPD observed a
"quite considerable number of workers" amongst a Nazi parade
through the town in 1932. 796 As the Nazis own membership figures
in Saxony, as in other parts of Germany, seem to underestimate the
working-class presence by about 10 per cent, it seems likely that
about 40 per cent of the Saxon NSDAP membership came from the
working class in autumn 1930 and probably even more by early
1933. Additionally, the latest research by JUrgen Falter shows
that up to 40 per cent of the NSDAP vote came from the working
class in the last elections of the Weimar Republic. 798 The figures for
Saxony were similar, if not higher. Already after the provincial
election in June 1930 the Nazis rejoiced: "Particularly gratifying is
the enormous success of the National Socialists in purely working-
795 FtC, Nr. 88, 16.4.193 1.
796 'Der Nazi-Aufmarsch - Eine Pleite', LV74 Nr. 10, 13.1.1932.
797 According to the NSDAP statistic from 1935, 29.2 per cent of NSDAP
members came from the working class in the region before 14 September
1930, and 35 per cent before 30 January 1933. Detlev Muhlberger has shown,
that the NSDAP statistic for 1930 underestimated the working-class presence
by about 10 per cent (13.3 per cent in the Gau Wurttemberg and 6.5 per cent
in the Gau South-Hannover-Brunswick). MUhlberger explains: "The Nazi
Party did mobilize considerable lower-class support by 1930, but found it
much more difficult to retain it over time, giving rise to a significant
understatement in the Partei-Statistik of the worker element active in the
party" (Muhiberger, Hitler's followers, p. 82). Bennecke estimates that 60 per
cent of the SA members came from the working class in the KHs Leipzig and
Dresden (Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', p. 25).
798 Falter, Hitlers Wähler, pp. 225, 371.
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class areas." 799 This referred to their stunning gains in the
Erzgebirge/Vogtland, a solid working-class area. The Communists
suggested the following diagnosis: " A great part of the National
Socialist vote is recruited from the proletariat ... Especially in the
Vogtland a number of our voters definitely switched over to the
fascists." 80° The Communists admitted how "bad" the performance
of the traditional working-class parties had been in the south-
western corner of Saxony and compared the September 1930 with
the July 1932 Reichstag elections: "The SPD has lost (support) in
the Vogtland to a greater extent than in any other district. We did
not profit from this but lost too." 80 ' Some areas of working-class
Saxony had become Nazi strongholds.
The electoral district of Chemnitz/Zwickau became the second best
Nazi electoral district with 43.4 per cent of the vote in the
November 1932 Reichstag elections. From the 49 regional districts
of Saxony, 40 were above the average result of 37.3 per cent of the
vote for the NSDAP in the July 1932 Reichstag elections. In nine
districts the Nazis even won more than 50 per cent of the vote (see
Table 15). In the highly industrialised AH Auerbach (68.8 per cent
of the workforce was employed in industry) the NSDAP received
57.9 per cent of the vote in the elections in July 1932, and in the
similarly industrialised town of Werdau (67.5 per cent of the
workforce was employed in industry) the party won 53.3 per cent
of the vote. In the thirty-four electoral districts in Saxony in which
more than 50 per cent of the working population were employed in
799 VB Nr. 151, 27.6.1930.
800 Der Bolschewik, Nr. 7, August 1930.
801 'Die Wahlergebnisse in Sachsen', ibid., Nr. 14, August 1932.
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industry (between 50 and 77.7 per cent), the Nazis scored an
average of 42.7 per cent of the vote.
The Nazis did particularly well in attracting working-class s'.tpport
in small scale, medium scale and cottage industries in the
'industrial villages' of the Erzgebirge/Vogtland. Eight out of nine
election districts where the NSDAP scored the absolute majority in
July 1932, came from this area. Seven of them were extremely
industrialised, rural districts, and the remaining two were the
towns of Werdau and Plauen. The villages of PillmansgrUn and
KottengrUn in the AH Auerbach are good examples to illustrate the
collapse of the SPD support in the area throughout the fourteen
years of the Republic and the rapid rise of the NSDAP at the end of
the 1920s. Most of the 831 citizens worked in the textile industry
and produced embroidery at home. At the beginning of the
Republic both villages were solidly voting SPD. The SPD gained 73.4
per cent of the vote in the 1919 Reichstag elections. This fell to
45.2 per cent in the elections in 1920. By 1930, the SPD vote had
completely collapsed, as only a mere five citizens voted for the
party (3.8%) in the June state elections. The Communists gained
11.3 per cent and the Nazis were close to an absolute majority with
46.6 per cent. Complete triumph came for the Nazis only two years
later in the July 1932 elections, when they received 79.5 per cent
of the vote. The combined vote of the left was reduced to 15.8 per
cent (5% for SPD). The roughly 80,000 workers in cottage
industries in Saxony were a good example of how the SPD drove
some members of the working class virtually into the hands of the
Nazis. The SPD sympathised with the extremely miserable situation
of the cottage workers, but at the same time welcomed the













































as a natural step towards the concentration of industries. 802 The
Nazis, on the other hand, offered them an honourable existence,
emphasised the values of Voiks turn and promised welfare through
the creation of a 'national community'.
The Nazis were also very successful in urban areas. The NSDAP
scored more votes in the very industrialised towns of Werdau,
Plauen, Glauchau, Aue, and Chemnitz than at the Reich level in July
1932. Table 20 shows that the Nazis did not only win over votes
from the Marxist parties in the rural areas, but also managed to do
Table 20: Losses and wins of votes for SPD, KPD and NSDAP between the
September 1930 and July 1933 Reichstag elections
Source: StDR, (1930-1932).
so in urban areas. These were towns where the SPD - as in those
rural areas where the Nazis did so well in the Erzgebirge/Vogtland
- had lost enormous voting support throughout the Weimar era, but
particularly after 1928. In no other town did the SPD lose more
votes between 1928 and 1932, than in Glauchau and Meerane
(17.4%/15.2%) (see Table 21 below). Local SPD officials reported
that their members suffered badly due to the depression of the






































































































Table 21: Percentage of loss for the SPD in administrative district in Saxony
between the Mai 1928 and July 1932 Reichstag elections
Source: calculated from StDR, (1928, 1932).
textile industry in both towns. 803 By 1932, they had become solid
territory for the Nazis (43.4%/39.6%) and bastions for the
Communists (24%/24%) (see Table 22 below).
803 SPD Chemnitz/Erzgebirge 1930, pp. 15-16.
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Table 22: Percentage of votes in descending order for NSDAP, SPD and KPD in












































































































































































































Source: calculated from StDR, (1932).
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(viii) Conclusion
The Nazis found extremely favourable conditions to attract mass
support amongst the working class in the south-west of Saxony.
The local Social Democratic party and organisational network was
not widespread, sophisticated, dedicated, determined and united
enough to ward off and respond successfully to the enormous
challenges posed by the Nazis and the disastrous economic crisis.
Specific regional interests, the isolation in the valleys, and the
predominance of small, medium scale and cottage industries,
prevented the growth of working-class milieus, which would have
been able to withstand Nazi infiltration. In contrast to the stable
SPD districts of Leipzig and Dresden, the Nazis were able to
'overrun' and absorb large parts of former SPD supporters in the
Erzgebirge/Vogtland. In 1931 it was reported from the AH
Schwarzenberg: "The SPD seem to be on the way to extinction.
Apparently the party is continuously losing party members, who
join the NSDAP, KPD or the newly formed SAP." 804 The local Social
Democrats appeared stagnant and helpless, while the Nazis were
active, dynamic and thriving. The Communists reported at the end
of 1930 that the workers' support for the NSDAP was particularly
strong in regions, "where there is a numerous, impoverished
working class (cottage, small and medium scale industry) and
where old social democratic traditions still exist." 805 Additionally,
the poor distribution of the SPD press in rural areas, allowed the
strong bourgeois press, which increasingly sympathised with the
804 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1943, Dezember 1931.
805 Staatsarchiv Bremen (SB), Polizei-Direktion Bremen (Rep. 4,65)/253/47.
Aus Mitteilungen Nr. 21 des Polizei Präsidenten Berlin, 1. November 1930. N.
Stelle Nr. 2762/30 geh. v. 7.11.30.11. Linksradikale Bewegung. Quoted from C.
J. Fischer, 'Gab es am Ende der Weimarer Republik einen Marxistischen
Wahlerblock?', Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 21 (1) (1995), p. 65.
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Nazis, to exert a quasi-monopoly over public opinion. SPD officials
in the Erzgebirge summed this up with resignation: "We will only
be able to make any progress when we have removed the
bourgeois newspapers from working-class houses."806
In mid-1929, a Social Democratic union official blamed the terrible
economic situation in the Erzgebirge/Vogtland for the loss of his
party amongst the local working class: "There was enough work in
the musical instrument- and Posamen ten industry in the
Vogtland/Erzgebirge until 1912. However, this changed after the
war. A complete shift in demand and taste set in. The demand for
beadwork and laces decreased, and the zither, the accordion and
other musical instruments were replaced by gramophones and
radios. These changes took the income from thousands of formerly
secure existences. These people had run into the arms of the first
prophet that came along. This explains, why ten years ago Max
HOlz, and more recently Hitler, found conditions so favourable."807
People who needed the SPD most, those who lived in miserable
conditions in the valleys of south-west Saxony, found it more
difficult to find help from the SPD's welfare association, than in
other parts of the region. Whereas there was a local branch of the
Workers' Welfare Association in almost every tenth village in the
district of Leipzig, there was only one branch in every fourteenth
village in the district of Zwickau. 808 Overall, there were only ten
places where SPD women sewed clothes for the poor in the 423
villages and towns of the KH Zwickau.809
806 See 'Der Wahlausgang im oberen Erzgebirge', ChVS Nr. 272, 23.11.1929.
807 See 'Versammlung der Zwickauer Betriebsrate', SVB, Nr. 165, 18.7.1929.
808 See 'Die Arbeiterwohlfahrt', LVZ, 28.5.1932; and 'Arbeiterwohlfahrt im
Bezirk Zwickau/Plauen', SVB, Nr. 30, 5.2.1932,.
809 Ibid.
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The Social Democrats in Mei1en, Freital, Riesa, Döbeln and Leipzig
proved that a deep-rooted and sophisticated organisational
network enabled them to mobilize their support even when they
were hit by similarly grave economic effects and vigorous Nazi
activities as in the Erzgebirge/Vogtland (also see the chapter 'Key
Study' and tables). The feeling of direction, strength and
determination, which the SPD in Leipzig displayed through
activities and mass meetings, was completely lacking in
Zwickau/Plauen. 810 However, even areas where a working-class
milieu had developed were not completely immune to Nazi success
in secret ballots.
Many of the voters who had voted for the SPD at the beginning of
the Republic, were already firmly on the way to supporting
conservative and even anti-democratic forces by the early 1920s.
There were only a handful of places in the whole KH Zwickau, in
which Hindenburg did not receive the overall majority in the
presidential elections of 1925. The Nazis themselves analysed this
drift to the right well at the end of 1931: "The belief in the Reich,
more specifically in the government, was eroded in the years after
the November revolution amongst the people of the Erzgebirge.
They too had heard the promises which were made at that time
and had followed developments with distrust, suspicious as to what
the outcome might be. Yes, the people from the Erzgebirge even
followed the call to vote for one of the many bourgeois splinter
810 See the impressive party meeting in Leipzig to celebrate the thirteenth
anniversary of the constitution ('Wir glauben an der Freiheit Sieg', LVZ, Nr.
188, 12.8.1932), or the series of powerful Eiserne Front meetings against
Hitler and Schleicher in Leipzig ('Machtvolle Kundgebung der Eisernen
Front', ibid., 10.9.1932), or the mass demonstration of 25,000 people for
freedom and against dictatorship in February 1933 ('Aufmarsch der
Fretheitsfront in Leipzig', ibid., Nr. 37, 13.2.1933).
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parties and many even followed the Marxists, because their
agitators made most promises. Year after year the Erzgebirgler
waitei in vain for the promises of the various parties to be
fulfilled. However, they sensed with their own ears and eyes that
things increasingly got worse. Word spread quickly that another
farmer or business man had reached the end of his strength, and
people became alarmed that there were more and more businesses
collapsing under the burden of taxes and interest rates. One could
see the army of the unemployed with one's own eyes. There was no
need to read newspapers to be informed about the misery of our
Volk." 81 1
The SPD was mainly blamed for the misery as it had taken over
government responsibility after the First World War.
Simultaneously, it had lost its function as rallying point for all
opposition views. The Nazis had something unique to offer for all
sectors of Saxon society: The creation of a strong nation and a
Volksgemeinschaft to overcome the divisions of the society. This
appeal, which centred around extreme nationalism812 , also
attracted large sectors among the working classes: It offered a
Heimat to those who were uprooted, unorganised and not affiliated
to organisations or parties. The SPD was aware of this and
concentrated their efforts before elections to win these "indifferent
masses, who are workers, but nevertheless stand in the bourgeois
camp."813
The SPD's efforts, however, were not rewarded with success. A
considerable part of the working class began to support the Nazis
811 F Nr. 250, 6.11.193 1.
812 Also see the chapter 'Nationalist Milieu' and 'Key Study'.
813 See 'Und nun in den Wahlkamp?, SVB, Nr. 87, 15.4.1929.
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when they were not firmly embedded In a working-class milieu
and their traditional parties did not respond to these deep rooted
nationalist desires for a strong nation and a Volksgemëinschaft,
which came out into the open during the crisis. Even before the
First World War, patriotic, militarist and xenophobic tendencies had
emerged in traditional SPD bastions like the city of Chemnitz. 814 In
the late 1920s local KPD organisations experienced the impact of
working-class nationalism during the NSDAP's and DNVP's anti-
Young Plan campaign, to which It seemed that their own party
offered no positive solution. 815 Again and again, Saxon Nazis
emphasized the comradeship, which "overcame all class
differences" and "bound them together beyond the grave" during
the Kampfzeit.816 Nazis from Bautzen aimed at "the restoration of a
strong and united Volk" and at "moving forward, towards a nation
in which everyone enjoys honour, freedom and justice."817
814 Fischer, German Communists, p. 24.
815 Ibid., p. 112.
816 Lang, 'NSDAP Annaberg', pp. 228-229.
817 NSDAP Ba utzen, p. 49.
221
11. The Rise of the Nazis in the Nationalist Milieu
of Saxony
(i) Introduction
The national right was united by its rejection of the democratic
system and its support for an authoritarian state in which
outstanding leaders would rise above the masses. Central to its
political belief was the fight against the Marxist working-class
movement and the peace of Versailles, which was regarded as a
national disgrace. 818 The national right tried to unite the black-
white-red front against the 'Weimar Coalition', which was seen as a
left-wing front supporting the Republic. 819 However, the anti-
democratic right was organisationally divided and hampered by
internal conflicts during the Weimar era. When the NSDAP made
astonishing gains in the September 1930 Reichstag elections, it
became clear that the party under the leadership of Hitler had
legitimate prospects of leading Germany out of the Weimar 'swamp'
into a new future.82° Anyone who wished to see the victory of the
national movement over the Republic, could only welcome the
political success of' the Nazi Party. 82 ' A decisive factor in the
support of the national right for the NSDAP was the lack of any
alternative way of getting rid of the Republic. Furthermore, the
national right hoped to incorporate National Socialism into its
818 K. Reimus, '"Das Reich mu1 uns doch bleiben!" Die nationale Rechte', in
D. Lehnert and K. Megerle (Hrsg.), Politische Identitat und nationaie
Gedenktage. Zur polidschen Kultur in der Weinarer Republik (Opladen,
1989), p. 231.
819 Reimus, 'Rechte', pp. 237 if.
820 K. Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik.
Die politischen Ideen des deurschen Na tionalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933
(Munchen, 1962), pp. 357-358.
821 Thid., p. 360.
222
rebuilding of society. 822 Many Germans supported the Nazis not
only as a result of economic hardships, or the appealing features of
the NSDAP (appearance, programme, charisma of Hitler), but also
because the party had become the rallying point of the 'away from
Weimar' movement.823
Anti-democratic ideology developed in a powerful way during the
Weimar era because it was supported by traditional ruling elites in
industry, the administration and the army, many bourgeois clubs,
the press, the church, the schools, and universities. 824 In part one
we discussed the evolution of the local Nazi Party from the vOlkisch
milieu after the First World War. This chapter looks at the powerful
nationalist, anti-democratic milieu in Saxon society which was
firmly embedded in bourgeois circles and provided an essential
breeding ground for the rapid rise of the local Nazis from the late
1920s onwards. The nationalist milieu undermined the republican
system and prepared the ground for a new nationalist state, which
was eventually realised in the National Socialist 'Führerstaat'
('leader state').
(ii) Bourgeois clubs and organisations in Saxony
The development of modern clubs was linked with the emergence
of bourgeois industrial society at the beginning of the nineteenth
822 For an introductory survey see J. Noakes, 'German Conservatives and the
Third Reich: an ambiguous relationship', in M. Blinkhorn (ed.), Fascists and
Conservatives: The Racial Right and the Establishment in Twentieth Century
Europe (London, 1990), pp. 71-97.
823 Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken, pp. 375-376.
824 Also see H. A. Winkler, Mittel stand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus.
Die politische Entwicklung von Handwerk und Kleinhandel in der Weimarer
Republik (KOin, 1972), p. 181.
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century.825 The vast number of clubs and their influence not only
at a local, but also national level, ensured them a powerful position
in German society. Clubs developed along cuss divisions in society,
were an instrument of social control, and were often used to put
forward the particular interest of their members. 826 Clubs formed
primarily for leisure or social activities often had a political
function too, particularly in local politics. 827 Voluntarily created
clubs were dominated by the upper and middle classes in
Germany. 828 The development of working class clubs in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century created an 'alternative'
organisational network to the existing bourgeois one. However,
bourgeois clubs continued to dominate society particularly in rural
areas and in small and medium sized towns.
Clubs were extremely widespread and attracted a large
membership. The middle sized town Annaberg/Erzgebirge, with
19,818 citizens, had 249 clubs alone. 829 There were 343 clubs with
21,559 members in the forty-six villages and small towns in the
AH Marienberg/Erzgebirge in the early 1920s. 83° This meant that
roughly one in three citizens was a member of a club and that
there were about thirteen clubs in every village/town in the
district. The largest organisations were military clubs (thirty-eight
clubs with 3,563 members), sports clubs (mainly gymnastic clubs;
825 See H.-J. Siewert, 'Zur Thematisierung des Veremswesens in der
deutschen Soziologie', in 0. Dann (Hrsg.), Vereinswesen und burgerliche
Gesellschaft in Deutschiand. Historische Zeitschrift (Beiheft 9) (Munchen,
1984), p. 154.
826 K. Tenfelde, 'Die Entfaltung des Vereinswesens wAhrend der Industriel-
len Revolution in Deutschland (1850-1873)', in Dann, Vereinswesen, pp. 98,
114, 112. Also see Siewert, 'Vereinswesen'.
827 Tenfelde, 'Vereinswesen', p. 96.
828 Ibid., p. 76.
829 Adjef^buch der Stadte Annaberg, Buchholz und des Obererzgebirges 1928.
830 For this see STA D, AH Marienberg, Nr. 2207.
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44/3,146), women's clubs (33/1,983), choral societies (3 1/1,338),
agricultural associations, rifle clubs, Heimat clubs, voluntary fire
brigades, societies for the ill, and artisan associations. Most of these
organisations, which were mainly founded after 1860, were
bourgeois clubs. The number of working-class clubs was
comparatively small (mainly sports clubs and choral societies).
There were only six SPD branches with 264 members (founded
between 1909 and 1919) in the whole district.
Research about bourgeois clubs and their role in Weimar society
remains scarce. However, a few studies have investigated the role
of bourgeois clubs in the collapse of the Republic and the rise of the
Nazi Party. 831 This section concentrates on the extreme nationalist,
anti-Republican and military rhetoric of bourgeois clubs and
organisations.832
A random survey of reports (Mitteilungen) of bourgeois clubs and
organisations in Saxony between 1927 and 1933 showed their
extreme nationalist and anti-republican sympathies. 833 Of twenty-
eight Mitteilungen, twenty-six could be classified as
831 H. Mommsen, 'The Decline of the Burgertum in Late Nineteenth- and
Early Twentieth-Century Germany', in H. Mommsen, From Weimar To
Auschwitz. Essays in German History (Oxford, 1991); Koshar, Marburg 0.
Heilbronner, 'Der verlassene Stammtisch. Vom Verfall der bUrgerlichen
Infrastruktur und dem Aufstieg der NSDAP am Beispiel der Region
Schwarzwald', Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 19 (2) (1993), pp. 178-201. Due to
lack of sources the author was not able to discuss the disintegration of Saxon
bourgeois clubs here.
832 Also see W. Wette, 'Ideologien, Propaganda und Innenpolitik als Voraus-
setzungen der Kriegspolitik des Dritten Reiches', in W. Deist and M. Messer-
schmidt and H.-E. Volkmann and W. Wette (Hrsg.), Ursachen und Voraus-
setzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik (Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 25-99.
833 Heilbronner's observation that 'anti-Socialism' was the most important
common feature of bourgeois club rhetoric could not be confirmed (Heil-
bronner, 'Stammtisch', pp. 183-184). The theme of 'anti-Socialism', however,
featured heavily in the rhetoric of bourgeois newspapers (see the next
section).
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nationalist/extreme nationalist, and two as conservative. 834 All
Mitteilungen , whether from professional or leisure clubs, featured
nationalist or conservative ideas in some form. The
Landwirtschaftlicher Anzeiger für Sachsen und Thuringen wanted
"to save the German farmers abroad from extinction" 835 ; the higher
civil servants, in Saxony announced in mid-1931: "We all want to
believe that a historic hour is awaiting us at which a Fuhrertum
ends the tedious, corrupting material competition of the Stãnde"836;
the Saxon draughtsmen described the 'devastating' impact of the
1918/19 revolution on education: "Complete neglect of technology
and methods, unscrupulous application of cheap sources [workforce
834 Nationalist/extreme nationalist: Deutsche Sangerbundszeitung; Die
höhere Schule im Freistaat Sachsen. Zeitschrift des Sächsischen
Philologenvereins; Landwirtschaftlicher Anzeiger für Sachsen und
Thuringen; Leipziger Schutzenzeitung. Monatliche Mitteilungen der
Leipziger Sch u tzengesellschaft; Mitteilungen der Familienforsch er-
Vereinigung Zwicka u; Mirreilungen der Kam era dschaftlichen Vereinig ung
ehemaliger Angehoriger des Reserve-In van terie-Regimen ts 241, Ortsgruppe
Dresden; Mitteilungen der Vereinigung Sächsischer HOherer Staatsbeamter
e.V.; Mitteilungen des Chemnirzer Bezirksverein des V.D.J. und der
Arbeitsgemeinschafr Deutscher Betriebsingenieure im V.D.J. und E.V.;
Mi tteilungen des Lan desverbandes Sächsischer Heima tsch u tz; Mi tteilungen
des Polizei Sport-Vereins 21 Leipzig (e.V.); Mitteilungen des Verems für
Chemnitzer Geschichte; Mirteilun,gen des Vereins für Vogtlandische
Geschichte und Altertumskunde iu Plauen im Vogtland; Mitteilungen für die
Kirchengemeinden Nieder- und Oberwurschnitz; Mitteilungen für
Reichswehrangehorige betreffend dem Besuch von Theater, lich tspielen
und sonsrigen Unterhalrungsstatren in Standort Dresden, Mirteilungen
Reichsveremigung ehemaliger Kriegsgefangener e. V., Ortsgruppe Leipzig;
Mona tliche Mitteilungen des A.11gemeinen Turnvereins Leipzig-SchleuEig,
e.V.; Monatliche Mitteilungen des Vereins für Kanusport Leipzig, e.V.;
Mona tliche Mitreilungen Schmm-K1ub Chemnitz von 1892 e.V.; Sachsen,
Militär-Vereins-Kalender, Sächsische evangelisch -soziale Blä tter;
Sachsische Industrie. Organ des Verbandes Sächsischer Industrieller;
Sächsische Landwirtschaftliche Zeitschrift. Amtsblatt der Landwirt-
schaftskammer für den Freistaat Sachsen; Sachsische Schutzenzeitung;
Sãchsisches Milita.rvereinsbla tt; Verein für Volkswohl, Leipzig.
Conservative: Mitteilungen des Landesverbandes der christlichen-
Elternvereine Sachsens; Mitteilungen des sächsischen La.ndesverein für
Zeichner.
835 Landwirrschaftlicher Anzeiger für Sachsen und Thürmgen, Nr. 21,
24.3.1932.
836 Mitteilungen der Vereinigung Sachsischer HOherer Staatsbeamter e.V.,
Nr. 7/8, Juli/August 1931, p. 3.
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and materiafl"837; in early 1932 the 'Association of Saxon Artisans'
organised a state meeting under the motto: "Living-space for the
artisans serves the self-preservation of the nation". 838 Bourgeois
leisure organisations were extremely nationalist too. When the
Saxon members of the 'German Gymnastics Association' organised a
gymnastics meeting in June 1929, the participants used the
occasion to demonstrate against Germany's war guilt. 839 The organ
of the swimming club in Chemnitz (1892 e.V.) argued in spring
1932: "We must regard sport as a substitute for general military
service ... We practice sport to be able to give the fatherland a
strong and vital man who will be prepared to give his life for the
Heimat one day." 84° In early 1931 the Chemnitz historians
explained why the study of local history was important: "It is the
strong root from which grows the love for the greater fatherland.
The bond with the native soil should tie closer and closer; ... there
should be more and more desire to get to know our Heimat ... The
love for the Heimat ... will extend into a firm and deep-rooted
tribal and national identity, to a German mind." 841 The organ for
Reichswehr members in Dresden called on its readers to "get rid of
the pacifist madness" and "if necessary to fight for German freedom
with blood." 842
 The article continued: "History is made by men, not
837 Mitteilung des sächsischen Landesvereins fur Zeichner, Nr. 4, 1932, p.
227.
838 See 'Handwerk in Not - Volk in Not!', Dresdner Nachrich ten, Nr 193,
25.4.1932.
839 SB Nr. 26, 30.6.1929.
840 Monatijche Mitteilungen Schwimm-Club Chemnitz V. 1892 e.V., Nr. 4,
April 1932.
841 Mitteilungen des Vereins für Chemnitzer Geschichte. Jahrbuch 1931-
1932, p.9.
842 Mitteilungen für die ReichswehrangehOrigen betreffend dem Besuch
von Theatern, Lichtspielen und sonstigen Unrerhaltungsstatten im Standort
Dresden, Dezember 1932.
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by majority decisions, parties, ideologies and demagogues. Only the
strong will of the conscientious, God-sent leader ... who rests on the
divine power of the Volkstum, is able to lead a Volk from deep
misery to ascent, and from slavery to strength." 843 The organ of
Saxon rifle clubs advised all members in early 1932: "Hold out,
because the last period of conflict for Germany's freedom has come
This final fight can only be successful, when the German Volk is
united on the soil of the German fatherland." 844
 One of the rifle
clubs' most important duties was to prepare the citizens militarily
according to the slogan: "Train eye and hand for the fatherland."845
In early 1931 the leadership of the 'Alldeutscher Verband', Gau
Vogtland, solemnly promised to "increase their contribution in the
fight to overthrow the existing corrupt system and the preparation
for the rebuilding of a vOlkisch state."846
Throughout the Weimar years there were serious strains between
the Saxon state and the local Protestant church because the clergy
resented progressive Saxon school laws, the local church tax
policies, and liberal procedures to leave the church.847 Additionally,
many representatives of the church, whose opinion still exerted a
strong influence over large sections of the population, particularly
the middle classes, shared the enthusiasm for nationalist,
sometimes even racial ideas. In their eyes the governments of the
Reich or in Saxony were clearly not nationalist enough. In mid-
1924 a priest from Kirchbach (AH Flöha) preached in a camp
service at an annual meeting of the Saxon Military Association: "We
843 Ibid.
844 Sächsische SchUrzen-Zeitung, Nr. 1, 1932, p. 2.
845 Ibid.
846 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4, Januar 1931.
847 Lobmeier, 'Mittelschichten', p. 94.
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demand a state which leads the Volk with power and strength and
with a clear will." 848 The priest expressed his gratitude to the
vOlkisch groups which had opened their eyes to the link with
blood. He elaborated: "We agree with them, that it is decisive for
Germany's ascent that the influx of alien blood is avoided."849
Another priest complained in a speech to the Gymnastic Club
Leipzig-Schleu1ig in mid-1932: "In the first years after the war
some would have liked to erase the words war, Kriegerverehrung
(the honouring of war heroes), and commemorations from the
German language ... but the German Volk has a right to defend its
honour and its Heimat." 850 He then went on to consecrate a new
memorial: "I consecrate you, block of granite from the German past,
to be a stone of memory and gratitude, to be a witness for heroism
and love for the fatherland, to be a symbol for the willingness to
make sacrifices and for loyalty." 851 The same gymnastic club
carried mainly NSDAP's swastika flags at a march through Leipzig
in late 1932. 852 Another local protestant church paper demanded
in 1929: "We want Germans to feel German again, think German
and act German."853
During election time the main aim of bourgeois organisations was to
prevent a Marxist victory. Before early 1930 they only rarely
expressed a preference for any bourgeois party in this task
(compare the similarities with bourgeois newspapers in the
discussion below). Before the May 1929 state elections the
848 Sächsisches Militarvereinsblatt, Nr. 14, 25.7.1924.
849 Ibid.
850 Mona tliche Mitteilungen des Ailgemeinen Turn vereins Leipzig-
Sch1euJig e.V., Nr.7/8, Juli/August, 1932.
851 Ibid.
852 VdSI, 5. Wp, 88. Sitzung, 18.10.1932, p. 3917.
853 Sächsisch evangelisch-soziaie Blärter, Nr. 20, 1929.
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leadership of the Saxon crafts stated: "If you are clear where you
belong, that you have to stand on the right if you do not want to
help to dig your own grave, you easily recognise that the
differences between the bourgeois parties are not very great ... the
essential question is: vote and vote at all costs bourgeois! ... You
know the meaning of a 'social economy'. Should the crafts become
proletarian? Do you as a free and independent man want to become
a mere number in this social economy?"
In the second half of the 1920s many professionals and bourgeois
organisations became increasingly disillusioned with the bourgeois
parties or other representatives they were traditionally allied with,
and looked for help elsewhere. 854
 When the crisis unfolded at the
end of the 1920s, many of these middle class professionals and
organisations became radicalized and moved closer to the NSDAP.
Additionally, some were encouraged to support the Nazis when the
NSDAP achieved spectacular election results, particularly in the
September 1930 Reichstag elections. Before these elections the
president of the 'Saxon Home and Land Owner Association',
Kohlmann, regretted that in the past his association had orientated
itself one-sidedly towards the middle-class parties. Kohlmann
stated: "The home owners will be driven to despair by the
bourgeois parties and many will turn to the radical parties if finally
nothing is done to improve the situation of the home owners."855
854 E.g. Saxon professionals founded a working group for craft, trade and
business in 1928 because they were dissatisfied with their traditional
representatives (Lobmeier, 'Mittelschichten', p. 90). Also see L. E. Jones, 'The
Dying Middle: Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation of Bourgeois Politics,
Central European History, 5 (1972), pp. 23-54; P. Fritzsche, Rehearsals for
Fascism. Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany (Oxford,
New York, Toronto, 1990).
855 Grund und Hausbesitzerzeirung fur Sachsen, 15.9.1930 (quoted from
Lobmeier, 'Mittelschichten', p. 91).
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According to him, many home owners, particularly the youth, had
already joined the NSDAP. 856
 The organ of the higher civil servants
in Saxony described the NSDAP sympathetically as "Volkstümlich"
and "active" in November 1930, and proclaimed eight months later:
"The NSDAP's educational programme stems from an emotional
idealism which aims to create a politically strong Germany with the
German citizen." 857 After the July 1932 Reichstag elections the
same paper grieved that the NSDAP had not gained an absolute
majority: "The experience with the German electorate proves that
only clear statements, which are comprehensive even for the most
simple voter, will create clear electoral decisions. It is true that the
National Socialists' Reichstag faction with its 230 members is now
larger than any other faction ever in the German Reichstag.
However, the Reichstag has no majority of one party or of a group
of similar parties." 858 From early 1932 onwards the organ of the
Saxon philologists looked in a series of articles at the NSDAP's
stance towards schools and complained about the lack of a
coherent educational programme. In September that year,
however, they praised a book about National Socialist education as
"fruitful" and "stimulating" and predicted "a lasting value for this
intellectual piece full of blood (blutvoll)."859
The single most powerful professional interest group in Saxony, the
'Association of Saxon Industrialists' (VSI), turned away from
parliamentary democracy in the years of crisis and indirectly
helped to prepare the ground for a new political system, i.e. the
856 Lobmeier, 'Mittelschichten', p. 91.
857 Mitteilungen der Vereinigung Sachsischer HOherer Staatsbeamter e.V.,
Nr. 11, November 1930; Nr. 7/8, Jun/August 1931.
858 Ibid., Nr. 9, September 1932.
859 Die hohere Schule im Freistaat Sachsen. Zeitschrift des Sächsischen
Philologenvereins, Nr. 13, 15.9.1932, pp. 213-2 14.
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Nazi dictatorship.86° Throughout the Weimar era the VSI used all
its influence to prevent Marxist governments and to ensure that
the conservative bourgeoisie was in charge of state affairs in
Dresden. The VSI's anti-Zeigner campaign and its pressure on
Berlin were decisive when the Reich overthrew the legal SPD-KPD
coalition government in Saxony at the end of 1923 861 , and the
organisation was one of the prime forces in uniting and rallying the
bourgeois groups against the Marxist parties in election campaigns.
When the growth of the NSDAP became apparent, the VSI
examined in detail Mussolini's economic policies at the turn of
1929/1930. The VSI's organ, the weekly paper Sächsische
Industrie (SI), printed among other things, a long speech on this
subject given at the VSI's branch in Dresden. The speaker
concluded: "It is impossible to suppress a certain admiration for
this organically built economic theory, even if one has to recognize
at the same time that it could not be put into practice without the
backing of dictatorial powers."862
860 Overall, most historians have concentrated on the relationship between
big business and/or agrarian elites and the Nazis (see especially H. A.
Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler (New York, Oxford, 1985);
H. Gies, 'NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organisationen in der Endphase der
Weimarer Republik', Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 15 (4) (1967), pp.
341-376). The author agrees with Werner Bramke that there is a need to
investigate the relationship between the Nazis and medium scale
industrialists (in H. Winkler (Hrsg.), Die deutsche Staatskrise 1930-1933:
Handlungsspieiraume und Alternativen (München, 1992), p. 257). Gau
Saxony was financially comparatively well off. This was due to a large
income from membership dues, profits from meetings, but also due to
donations from Saxon industrialists (Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen, p. 45; H. R.
Trevor-Roper, Hitler's Table Talk 1941-44. His Private Conversations
(London, 2nd. ed. 1973) p. 464). It is not clear to what extent Turner's claim,
that smaller businessmen frequently supported the NSDAP financially, was
true for Saxony (Turner, Big Business, pp. 343-344; Bramke's source is not
clear: see Winkler, Staatskrise, p. 258).
861 In spring 1929 the VSI wrote that 'above all it was its interference' that
caused the Reichsexekution and "prevented the dictatorship of the streets"
in 1923 (SI, Nr. 14, 16.4.29, p. 317).
862 Thid., Nr. 9, 1.3.1930, p. 195.
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The cautious interest the VSI showed towards fascism was checked
by the NSDAP's role in overthrowing the BUnger and Schieck
governrr.ents which led to new elections in June 1930. More than
anything else the Saxon industrialists feared instability and
uncertainty. The VSI attacked the Saxon Nazis indirectly for
causing "the most unnecessary of all election campaigns" and was
unhappy with the election result because the new government
would depend either on the NSDAP or the SPD. The VSI declared:
"In both cases industry cannot hope for anything positive in the
way of a quiet and continuing recovery."863
The VSI's increasing dissatisfaction with the whole system was
shown by its mounting attacks on the social services (SI, Nr. 34,
23.8.1930, p. 771), its desire to become more involved in politics
(SI, Nr. 35, 30.8.1930, p. 787), and its increasing propaganda
against the reparation payments ('Tributzahlungen') (SI, Nr. 2,
10.1.1931). The VSI's language became more and more aggressive
and nationalistic, and its attitude towards the national government
increasingly distrustful. In spring 1931 the VSI's branch in
Annaberg demanded a strengthening of Germany's military power
and an end to any discussion of pacifist ideas. The local
industrialists claimed that "Mussolini, the best current statesman",
practised this fundamental principle. 864
 The chairman of the VSI,
Wittke, accused BrUning of breaking his promises and spoke of
"twelve-years of government failures" 865 ; and another member of
the organisation said bluntly in a discussion: "We do not have
confidence in the government!"866
863 Ibid., Nr. 26, 2 8.6.1930.
864 Ibid., Nr. 16, 18.4.3 1, p. 270.
865 Ibid., Nr. 27, 4.7.193 1, p. 445.
866 Ibid., Nr. 28, 11.7.193 1, p. 458.
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However, although the VSI allowed an economic expert of the
NSDAP to speak in front of the organisation 867 , it did not support
the Nazis. There Nere several reasons for this. First, there was
concern about several aggressive features of the NSDAP; second,
local industry depended on foreign markets - the NSDAP's
emphasis on extreme nationalism thus only had a limited appeal.
Finally, the Nazis' economic policies were based on emotions rather
than professional analysis before early 1932. 868 However, the VSI
too adopted a more emotional and nationalist language in the face
of the desperate economic situation and some representatives
openly demanded a change of the system. When all VSI districts
summarized the bleak economic situation in their regions, the
representative of the district of Zwickau stated: "We are not in a
crisis, no, we struggle in the throes of death ... we cannot win this
struggle to the death without regaining freedom (Lu ft und Raum)
for our development at home and beyond the borders ... The
system has to be changed." 869
 The representative from the
Vogtland declared: "The chains of the German economy kills the
spirit of every progressive employer ... The German, and
specifically vogtlandisch', employer will do his best, but it is
essential that he finally gains the necessary freedom to work."870
At the VSI's annual meeting in March 1932, which adopted the
motto "For loyalty and faith", a speaker described the German
social insurance system as providing "a land of milk and honey"
867 Ibid., Nr. 2, 9.1.193 2, p. 11. Already in June 1924 Gottfried Feder spoke
about the current economic situation to about 150 Saxon industrialists in
Chemnitz. He argued that the German Volk would completely depend on
international capitalism if the Dawes plan would be ratified. (STA D, SäStKa,
Nr. 134, Bezirk Chemnitz, 16.6.1924).
868 E.g. see SI, Nr. 2, 9.1.1932, p. 11.
869 1bid.,Nr. 11, 12.3.1932, p. 113.
870 Ibid., pp. 124-125.
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and argued: "We long for a strong state leadership which will
restore our respect and confidence in the state ... for the first time
since the first war years, we notice a new 'Storm and Stress'
('Sturm und Drang') among our youth, which wants to be young
again, which is turning away from the intellectuals and the years
without blood after the war and fights for new ideals ... There are
signs that a new power in the Volk is emerging ... Is the
undeniable destruction of our vOlkisch and economic life ... to
continue, or will it be halted and lead to a new rallying
(Sammlung)?" 87 ' Wittke expressed the helplessness of the VSI
during a meeting of the VSI's branch in Annaberg and accepted
any new system that got rid of the current one and promised
improvement: "The precondition for every recovery remains that
the economy is finally allowed again to follow its own laws, and
every leader who restores this possibility for our economy, no
matter where he comes from, is welcome." 872 Local industrialists
announced during the same meeting: We will "no longer allow the
fruits of honest and hard work ... to be destroyed." 873 The VSI
openly withdrew its support for the democratic system a week
before the November 1932 Reichstag elections, several months
before Hitler was appointed Chancellor. Wittke emphasized that the
new elections would underline the absurdity of parliament: "The
employers have never really liked the modern form of
government, the parliamentary system." 874 The VSI remained the
most powerful extra-parliamentary pressure group and, unlike the
871 Ibid., Nr. 12, 19.3.1932, p. 162.
872 Ibid., Nr. 17, 23.4.1932, p. 199.
873 Ibid.
874 Ibid., Nr. 44, 29.10.1932.
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leaders of the Ruhr heavy industry 875 , did not voice active support
for the NSDAP before Hitler's appointment as Chancellor.876
However, its apparent helplessness ir the face of the crisis and its
gradual drift to the right helped to undermine the democratic
system and to broaden support for a Nazi state.
Winkler has described how the Nazis gradually came to control
many artisan and small trade middle-class interest organisations
by infiltrating them at a local level and mobilising the members
against their leaders until the whole organisation was run on
NSDAP lines.877 In Saxony too, the Nazis were able to infiltrate
several powerful professional middle-class organisations from
below eventually to control them. The determination of the
organisations' leadership to ward off Nazi infiltration failed due to
increasing pressure from their members. In early 1932 the organ
of the trade council (Gewerbekammer) in the AH Borna reacted to
internal pressure by some members in favour of a move towards
the NSDAP and warned: "Our organisation should only have
economic objectives and definitely has to remain free from party
political influence." 878 Nine months later, before the new elections
to the trade councils in autumn 1932, the paper regretted that the
use of a single list was prevented by the NSDAP which had put up
its own lists for all trade council elections. The organ emphasized
875 E.g. see the organ of the Ruhr heavy industry Deutsche Fuhrerbriefe:
Politisch-wirtschaftliche Privatkorrespondenz (D. Abraham, The Collapse of
the Weimar Republic. Political Economy and Crisis (1986, second edition,
New York, London), pp. XXXI ff.).
876 The DNVP member of parliament and VSI supporter Dr. Eckardt became
President of the Saxon parliament in late 1932 and defeated the NSDAP
candidate Kunz. Eckardt received support of some Nazi votes in his election
(VdSL, 5. Wp, 89. Sitzung, 19.10.1932).
877 Winkler, Mittelstand, pp. 171, 173.
878 MJtteilungen des Gewerbeverbandes in der All Borna e.V., Nr. 1, Januar
1932, p. 2.
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its warnings: "The trade association has nothing to do with party
politics. On the contrary, it is a purely professional body ... Party
political lists are therefore generally to be rejected. No vote should
be given for these lists because the political divisions would spread
to our professional representation at the cost of objective work."879
However, its appeal fell on deaf ears and the NSDAP, as in other
parts of Saxony880, won a majority of seats.88'
The Nazis were also successful in infiltrating the most important
agricultural organisation in Saxony, the Landwirtschaftskammer
(Agricultural Chamber: LK). The LK was one of the most powerful
professional interest groups in Saxony and was controlled by the
Sächsische Landvolk (SLy), a right-wing farmers organisation
which boasted 64,000 members in 1930 882 and was affiliated with
the DNVP. The Nazis benefited from the extremely conservative
and nationalist attitude of many farmers, an increasing agricultural
crisis since the mid-1920s, and their own propaganda skills during
the elections to the LK in 1931 (for the last aspect see the chapter
'Key Study'). In September 1923 the association of farmers in the
AH Marienberg demanded that all Volksgenossen had to stick
together and proclaimed: "The German Reich and Volk, our Heimat
and Fatherland are on the brink of ruin and disintegration; the aim
of our sworn enemy, the French, namely the destruction of
Germany, is close to becoming reality. 883 In early 1924 the
'Association of Young Farmers', which claimed to have 20,000
879 Ibid., Nr. 10, Oktober 1932, P. 13.
880	 NSDAP won 68.5 per cent of the vote among the 'crafts' trade
councils, and 82.1 per cent among the 'trade and business' trade councils in
the elections in the KH Chemnitz (Lobmeier, 'Mittelschichten', p. 104).
881 Gewerbeverband Borna, Nr. 11, November 1932, p. 5.
882 Reinhold, 'Landwirtschaftskammer', pp. 190-191.
883 STA D, AH Glauchau, Nr. 24, p. 10.
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members in Saxony, organised a fatherland demonstration in
Wurzen. A military band participated too. 884 The president of the
LK, Vogelsang, cited an article of the Nazi-rriendly Dresdner
Nachrich ten in a speech to the chamber in March 1931 and argued
that the First World War was a long-planned conspiracy under
England's leadership to "destroy Germany's trade and Germany's
power".885 He demanded an end to reparation payments imposed
by the dictated settlement of Versailles.886
First signs of a serious crisis in Saxon agriculture were felt in
1927. 887 One year later, as in other parts of Germany, Saxon
farmers demonstrated against high taxes and for tariff barriers and
made clear their readiness to use anti-democratic ways to put
through their demands. 888 The SLV responded to the radicalized
mood among the farmers by attempting to portray itself as an
unpolitical professional interest party and participated with their
own lists in elections - independent of the DNVP - from 1928
onwards. Despite this, however, the SLV lost more and more of its
constituency to the more radical NSDAP. 889 New elections to the LK
took place on 17 May 1931. 890 Several weeks before the poil the
SLV leaders warned the electorate to make sure "that the election
of members into the LK remains free of political influence and
884 STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 135, Bezirk Leipzig, 10.1.1925.
885 Sächsjsche Landwirtschaftliche Zeitschrift (SLZ), Nr. 12, 22.3.193 1, p.
158.
886 Ibid.
887 Lobmeier, 'Mittelschichten', pp. 23 if.
888 Ibid., pp. 84 if.
889 The SLV's election results: RW 1928: 3.2%; LW 1929: 5.2%; LW 1930: 4.6%;
RW 1930: 4.0%; RW 19321: 0.2. Also see Lobmeier, 'Mittelschichten', p. 86.
890 Elections to the LK took place every six years and were open to anyone
whose main or part-time profession was in agriculture and who was twenty-
five years old. Additionally, voters needed to possess at least three hectare
agriculturally used land (SLZ, Nr. 12, 22.3.193 1, p. 159).
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prevailing trends." 89 ' One week before the elections the SLV
regretted that it was not possible, as in 1925, to put forward single
lists because supporters of several political parties participated
with their own lists. Indeed, the KPD, but particularly the NSDAP,
participated with Its own lists and made frantic efforts In the
election campaign. The NSDAP won twenty-two of the forty
seats. 892 The only reason why the NSDAP did not gain an absolute
majority in the LK was because another eleven members of the
chamber were elected by small professional bodies 893 which had
not been infiltrated by the Nazis yet. The members of the newly
elected LK, twenty-two Nazis and twenty-nine members of the
nationalist bourgeoisie, co-operated in their work. The former
chairman, Vogelsang, was re-elected with thirty-nine out of fifty
votes. In his view the victory of the National Socialists was "a sign
of the national will"; they were all "united by the national idea".894
However, Vogelsang expressed the hope that the chamber would
remain free of party political activities as this would disrupt its
efficiency. Paul KOrner, who was in charge of the Nazis' agricultural
organisation in Saxony and who was elected deputy president,
declared that his party was willing to co-operate and would not
pursue party political activities. 895 However, Der Freiheitskampf
became an official organ of the LK after the elections 896 and the
Nazis began to infiltrate the SLy897 . There was some resistance
891 Ibid., Nr. 13, 29.3.193 1, P. 177.
892 Ibid., Nr. 25, 21.6.1931, pp. 351-352.
893 Ibid., Nr. 12, 22.3.193 1, p. 159.
894 Ibid., Nr. 28, 28.7.193 1, p. 393.
895 Ibid.
896 H Nr. 31, 4.7.193 1.
897 After the elections to the LK the Nazis demanded 51 per cent of the
management seats of the SLV, and a Nazi was elected into the management of
the SLV in early 1932 (Lobmeier, 'Mittelschichten', pp. 87, 95).
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among SLV leaders over subjection to the Nazis, and the SLZ
continued to report professionally and without political bias, until
the end of 1932.898 Additionally, in early 1932 the leader of the
association for farmers in the Erzgebirge condemned political
activities which took place in the chamber899.
The Nazis were not always successful in the task of wooing
bourgeois organisations. The nationalist 'Christian Association of
Pupils' Parents' in Saxony shared many beliefs with the NSDAP.900
However, Nazi incompetence hampered a rapprochement for a long
time. In early 1931 the association complained bitterly because the
NSDAP repeatedly failed to answer its questionnaires.90 ' Only after
this complaint did the Nazis improve their public relations with the
association.
There were contacts between bourgeois organisations and the
NSDAP in the 1920s, but they were not very frequent. The youth
section of the rifle club in Aue came mainly from the NSDAP and
Wehrwolf. 902 At a celebration of the gymnastics club Jahn in
Dresden a swastika flag was seen in autumn 1924.903 The Nazis
attempted to make contact with the nationalist 'Bund Sachsen im
Reich'. 904 There were contacts between the GDJB and the
898 The only exception was in one edition in autumn 1931 when the Sf2
hinted its opposition to the existing system and argued that in a new system
the state would create possibilities that everyone could help himself (SLZ, Nr.
42, 18.10.193 1, p. 561). The NSDAP's motion to to transform the SLZ into a
periodical (Sf2, Nr. 28, 28.7.1931, p. 393) was not carried through.
899 STA D, AH Schrzenberg, Nr. 1945, März 1932.
900 E.g. in early 1932 it supported the referendum to dissolve the state
parliament (Mitteilungen des Landesverbandes der christlichen
Fiternverbande Sachsens, 1. Quartal 1932, p. 5).
901 Ibid., 1. Quartal 1931, p. 17.
902 STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 131, Dresden, 27.2.1925.
903 Ibid., Nr. 135, 27.9.1924.
904 BA DH, Kunz, Schreiben FOrster/Leipzig an Führer von Bund Sachsen im
Reich (on behalf of Tittmann), p. 14.
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Sãchsischer Heimatschutz. However, the latter refused to join the
GDJB. 905 The Deutscher Alpenverein Südmark in Dresden, whose
membership consisted mainly of Nazis, organised frequent hiking
and ski trips. 906 Several Saxon restaurants subscribed to the NSfS
for their guests.907 In early 1928 the poultry-breeders' club in
Annaberg wrote to the NSDAP headquarters and asked if Hitler,
"our leader", would speak in their town.908 There were contacts
between the Nazis and the home owners association in Leipzig in
summer 1930.909
The Nazis had good links with the influential right-wing 'National
Club for Saxony' (Nationaler Klub für Sachsen: NKfS), which aimed
at uniting DNVP, DVP and DVFP members for combined nationalist
activities. The NKfS was founded in Dresden in May 1924 and had
around 600 members throughout the state. 910 The organisation had
strong links with the 'Saxon Association of Fatherland Clubs'
(Vereinigte Vaterlãndische Verbände Sachsen), which aimed at
uniting all nationalist clubs and associations in Saxony. 9 ' 1 In
particular Helmuth von Killinger's connections with these
organisations912 gave the Nazis respectability in powerful right-
905 STA D, Mdl, Nr.11126/6.
906 NSIS, Nr. 27, 5.9.1926.
907 E.g. the NSfS was available in five restaurants in Wittgensdorf (ibid., Nr.
1/2, 9.1.1927).
908 BA, NS 18, Nr. 5011, 11.3.1928.
909 Ibid., Nr. 5011.
910 BeiJjner Tageblatt, Nr. 232, 16.5.1924.
911 The VVVS organised its first state meeting in the rooms of the NKfS in
Dresden in February 1925 (SäStKa, Nr. 131, Dresden, 6.2.1925).
912 Mutschmann and Studentkowski declared that Killinger had links with
the NKfS and the 'high society' ('bessere Gesellschaft'). BDC, Mutschmann an
Oberste Parteigericht der NSDAP, 4.12.1936, p. 2; BDC, Killinger, Studentkows-
ki an Wettengel, 27.11.1936.
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wing circles in the state. Hitler accepted an invitation of the NKIS
and spoke in Dresden on 11.4.193O.
The Nazis' efforts to woo the Reichswehr were not very successful
during the Kampfzeit. In late 1923 the Reichswehr rejected the
offer of the Zwickau Nazis' to support them in case of
disturbances. 914 NSDAP support from army officers was the
exception. 915 The reserved attitude of the local Reichswehr to the
NSDAP only changed with the deepening of the crisis in the early
1930s and the growth of the SA. In spring 1932 the army
(Wehrkreiskommando IV) established contact with the SA
regarding the formation of border guard units.916
(iii) Celebrations of the national right
At no time were the divisions in Saxon society more evident than
during public celebrations, when the completely different attitudes
of various groups became apparent.917 This was particularly true
during public holidays, which expressed identification with the
democratic system and the Republic. The most important were the
annual celebrations to commemorate the start of the revolution on
9 November 1918, and the passing of the constitution on 11 August
1919. On the republican side of the political spectrum the Social
Democrats and liberals celebrated these occasions with mass
913 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/4.
914 STA D, SäStKa, Nr. 128, Zwickau, 9.11.1923.
915 E.g. see BA DH, Z/C 17411, EK, 'NS Sachsen'.
916 BDC, Killinger, SA, Schreiben, 7.7.1932.
917 Also see G. L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses. Political Symbol-
ism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the
Third Reich (New York, 1975).
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parades and festivals, while the national right expressed their open
hatred.918
The November revolution was the greatest trauma of the national
right. On its first anniversary they claimed: "All our misery is
caused by the revolution." 919
 The celebration of 11 August was
regarded as the symbol of discord in the German Volk, the point
when the nation split into two hostile camps. 92 ° The most
important celebration of the national right was 18 January, the day
the German Empire was founded in 1871 ("Day of the
Fatherland" 921 ). Although the Nazis' attitude was uneasy and
ambivalent towards the idea of the Reich (Reichsidee) 922 , they
frequently participated in celebrations with other supporters of the
national right. The Saxon war hero and Nazi leader Helimuth von
MUcke was invited by the national right to their
Reichsgrundungsfeier in Dresden in January 1927. MUcke spoke
about his war adventures in front of 500 guests.923
Deutsche Tage (literally 'German Days'), which took place at
weekends throughout the year, were occasions where various
groups of the national right came together and celebrated their
nationalist/right-wing beliefs. The local Nazis, particularly in south-
western Saxony, played an important part in these celebrations.924
918 When the bourgeois government in Dresden abolished the holiday of
Ninth November in late 1929, it caused enormous resentment among Social
Democrats and liberals as they regarded the day as symbol of democracy and
unity of the Republic (see the Chapter 'Working-Class Milieu).
919 Reimus, 'Rechte' p. 235.
p. 243.
921 thid., p. 247.
922 See G. Paul, 'Der Sturm auf die Republik und der Mythos vom "Dritten
Reich". Die Nationalsozialisten', in Lehnert/Mengerle, Gedenktage, pp. 258.
923 STA D, KH Dresden, Nr. 262, Januar 1927.
924 Paul also observed Nazi speakers at nationalist celebrations in the Saar
region (Paul, Saarland, p. 43).
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The schedule and rituals during these events were normally very
similar. In Saxony Deutsche Tage featured particularly frequently
between 1923-1925 and took place in small and medium sized
towns. Typical was the Deutscher Tag in Mylau in May 1925, at
which many national right supporters from the Vogtland gathered.
The guests were welcomed with a concert on the market square on
Saturday afternoon. In the evening there was a Vaterländisch
celebration at which Lieutenant Uhlemann from Berlin spoke. Early
next morning, while the Frontbann band woke up the guests, the
police sent home Communists from Netzschkau, Mylau, and
Reichenbach who came to disturb the celebrations. The guests
marched from the market square to the field service on the sports
ground. Afterwards there was a concert on the market square. In
the afternoon the participants marched in rows of four through the
town. There were about sixty flags, and the participants included
members of the Frontbann, military- and war clubs, officers' union,
Reichsflagge, Jun gdo and others. The victims of the war were
honoured by standing still and lowering the flags for two minutes.
Afterwards the participants sang 'I had a comrade'. "Gregor
Strasser, chemist from Landshut and member of the Reichstag,
gave a speech on the sports ground where the parade ended. He
attacked, among others, the Communists and Social Democrats,
Wilson's fourteen points and the damaging influence of the Jews.
The speech was received with great applause. The play 'Schlageter'
was very successful too."925
The VSB's Deutsche Tag in Neuwelt was visited by 200 supporters
of the national right in mid-February 1925. Four swastika flags
925 VogtlandischerAnzeiger, Nr. 109, 12.5.1925.
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were consecrated, there was a performance of the play 'German
loyalty', and the Nazi Erich Kunz from Zwickau gave the speech
'Heimat - Fatherland and Volk'.926 450 people visited the Deutscher
Tag in Crimmitschau on the same weekend. Among others, the
later Nazi leader Killinger gave a speech. The participants honoured
the dead soldiers at the war memorial, there was a service with
consecration of flags, and 1,100 people marched in the parade.
There were also some fights with members of the Reichsbanner.927
However, it would be wrong to suggest that the Nazis were always
welcome visitors during nationalist festivals. Some participants in a
fair in Zwickau in mid-1925 were appalled because the Frontbann
participated with Swastika-banners. They decided not to take part
in the parade.928
The national right was also united by the stab-in-the-back legend
(Do1chstoI-Legende), which assumed that the German army was
not defeated by the enemy from outside in the First World War,
but by the treacherous left from within. The right-wing Stoliberger
Anzeiger und Tageblatt wrote in April 1924: "The SPD is to blame
for the collapse and therefore the shameful Diktat of Versailles
and the misery of the German Volk." 929 The FrauensteinerAnzeiger
claimed to show "how the people around Flei1ner and Menke in
Dresden systematically ... worked for the collapse of our front and
therefore for our destruction and misery." 93° Other right-wing
papers like the Chemnitzer Tageblatt, Dresdner Nachrich ten,
926 STA D, SäStKa Nr. 131.
927 Ibid.
928 Ibid., Nr.132, Juni 1925.
929 StollbergerAnzeiger und Tageblatt, Nr. 98, 26.4.1924.
930 Frauensteiner Anzeiger, Nr. 95, 22.4.1922. The same article was also
printed in the Sächsische Elbzeitung, Nr. 93, 21.4.1922.
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Erzgebirgisch e Volksfre u n d, Ch emni tzer Nach rich ten, Pirna er
Anzeiger used the stab-in-the-back theory to attack the SPD.931
Ti-ese were also the first papers which sympathized with the local
Nazi movement. However, even 'independent' newspapers like the
Wurzener Tageblatt and the Bautzener Nachrich ten made the
same accusations.932
The Nazi youth also participated at nationalist celebrations. At the
third Saxon Reich youth day in May 1925 there were 2000 visitors
from the Fron tbann, Reichsflagge, Jun gdo, Bund Sachsen im Reich,
vOlkisch gymnasts, and other patriotic people.933
Another powerful uniting experience for the national right, but also
for most other bourgeois groups, was the cultivation of war
memorials in commemoration of soldiers killed in the war. Here
too, the Nazis were sometimes successful in assuming a leading
role. The NSDAP reported of the consecration of a war memorial in
RuppertsgrUn (AH Zwickau) at the end of 1927: "A large number of
local inhabitants participated at the consecration of the memorial
for the heroes killed in the world war on Sunday the sixth of
November. It was a special day for us National Socialists. We
helped to create the warrior memorial with pick and shovel. All
local bourgeois organisations, the united military association of
Werdau-Leubnitz with flag bearers and the local branch of the
NSDAP with twenty Storm-troopers and several civilian party
members took part. The consecration began with a service in our
church. After the service the participants, led by our Storm-
931 E.g. see Cheinnitzer Tageblait, Nr. 36, 6.2.1923; Dresdner Nachrichten, Nr.
42, 12.2.1923
932 See 'Der DolchstoE',Wurzener Tageblatt, Nr. 91, 16.4.1924; and 'Do1chsto1-
Legende?', Bautzner Nachrichren, Nr. 268, 15.6.1924.
933 STA D, Mdl, Nr. 11126/6, Ma! 1925.
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troopers with banner, marched to the memorial square, where
General Schönfels from Dresden, who was born in Ruppertsgrun,
gave the cor secration speech. The local priest then consecrated the
memorial. It was a solemn moment when the memorial was
unveiled while the National Socialists saluted, the military
association stood to attention, and the drum rolled. Afterwards the
church community of RuppertsgrUn, the military association of
RuppertsgrUn and ex General von SchOnfels laid the wreath, and
our leader Grä1er spoke with powerful words about those killed in
the war. A final word from the local headteacher and the song 'I
have devoted myself with heart and hand' ended the solemn
celebration." 934 The integration of the Nazis in the local community
of Ruppertsgrun helped to explain why the village became one of
the earliest Nazi strongholds in Saxony. The local NSDAP gained
34.2 per cent of the vote in the May 1929 provincial elections.
A report in the Deutsche Zeitung about the erection of a war
memorial in Plauen showed the deep divisions between the
organised working class and the nationalist milieu: "The singers'
union of Plauen erected a monument for its members who died
during the war - 119 in number - in the pretty town park. A large
bronze' sheet was fixed to a huge boulder, which was moved with
incredible effort to its current location. It honours the dead heroes
in their quality as soldiers and singers by a suitable design from
the local artist Rudolf Zenker. The monument was unveiled in the
presence of a huge crowd on Sunday, 28th of May. The locally
published 'Volkszeitung für Südwestsachsen', the paper of the
independent SPD, was outraged by the vast number of participants
934 NSIS, Nr. 50, 11.12.1927.
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and the Impressive procession at which members of the singer
unions, military and sports clubs marched and carried around fifty
flags. The paper, whic'i always distinguished itself by a particularly
coarse language and which fiercely attacked anything which could
be interpreted as an impression of German-vOlkisch thought and
propaganda, expressed its venomous hatred in its report about the
consecration of the monument: "Ugly! Ugly like the whole system
which has caused this murder of the nations and now even plays
hell with the corpse of the murdered! ... So ugly that it would be
desirable at the first possible opportunity, to put a detonator into
the backside of the disgraceful monument. And also one for the
monument of the 1 34er, which will be erected near by."935
One issue of constant dispute between the conservatives/
nationalists and Republican supporters concerned the use of flags.
The former often expressed their dislike of the Republic by
showing the 'black-white-and-red' flag of Wilhelmine Germany, or
carrying their own consecrated flags, e.g. the Nazi swastika flag, to
which they swore allegiance. The Chemnitzer Tageblatt covered a
dispute about raising the 'black-white-and-red' flag in Werdau. The
master decorator August Maa1 raised a 'black-white-and-red' flag
during a local fair. An SPD member of the town council ordered him
to take the flag down, and eventually threatened to have the flag
confiscated by the police. However, Maa1, continued to display the
flag throughout the festive week and was later fined 150
Goidmark. The Ministry of the Interior reversed the verdict and
pointed out that it is not illegal to display a 'black-white-and-red'
flag.936
935 Deutsche Zeitung, Nr. 255, 7.6.1922.
936 Chemnitzer Tageblatl Nr. 198, 19.7.1924.
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Reunion celebrations of war veterans also played an important part
in the annual agenda of the nationalist mileu. In mid-1925 the
Saxon police reported well attended regimental celebrations in
Bautzen, Leipzig, Dresden, Chemnitz, Annaberg, Freiberg, Plauen
Zwickau and DObeln. 937 Nationalist and vOlkisch 'organ isations
participated in great numbers.938 The 'Saxon Military Association'
was one of the largest organisations in Saxony, claiming 1,624 local
branches with 206,325 members in mid-1925. 939 The Nazis
participated on these occasions too and used similar aspects and
rituals for their propaganda. There was a big military concert of the
First Saxon SA band in summer 1929. The consecration of flags was
attended by Goring, Killinger and Kunz.940
 Ex-soldiers of the 104
regiment in Chemnitz cheered the Nazis in June 1930.941 A Nazi
activist gave a "stirring speech" about 'Frontsozialismus' (socialism
at the front) at a party meeting in Dresden in September 1930. He
talked about "the Fron tsozialism us which inspired the army and
Heimat in 1914" until bourgeois cowardice and Marxist traitors
stabbed the army from behind. 942 The speaker blamed this
betrayal for the current situation and claimed there would only be
a positive change when the Volk remembered this
Frontsozialismus, which was National Socialism.943
937 STA D, Mdl, Nr.11126/6, Juni 1925.
938 Elliot analysed in an article about German military organisations: "When
one considers that there were approaching 30,000 Kriegervereine which
were honour-bound to turn out on national and church festivals, funerals of
comrades, local Kreisverband events etc., here was to be found a significant
source of irritation to the supporters of the Republic, and discontented
industrial workers" (C. J. Elliot, 'The Kriegervereine and the Weimar
Republic', Journal of Contemporary History, 10(1) (1975), p. 114).
939 STAD,MCII 11126/6,JuIi 1925.
940 SB, Nr. 28, 14.7.1929.
941 Ibid., Nr. 98, 20.6.30.
942 FI Nr. 34, 9.9.1930.
943 Ibid., Nr. 34, 9.9.1930.
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A brigade meeting of Storm-troopers In Markneukirchen in April
1931 proved to what extent the NSDAP integrated all the themes of
the nationalist milieu in their celebratio'is and appealed to these
groups. The setting was a festival in which all the citizens
participated ("the streets were decorated with garlands and flags
there was a concert and German dance in the evening"). 944 The
swastika flag was the symbol of rejection of the Republic and the
desire for a new National Socialist state. Markneukirchen's
economic and cultural background as a centre for the production of
musical instruments provided the link with local tradition, the field
service of a local priest provided the religious blessing, and the
march of 3,000 Storm-troopers through the town gave the image of
discipline, order, military strength, the memory of glorious days
("again and again it was said, that it was like in the good old
peaceful days, when the military marched with ringing steps
through the streets during exercises ... war veterans from 1870/71
received seats of honour") 945 , and a new beginning.
There were far fewer nationalist/conservative celebrations in the
final years of the Republic. This leads to the speculation that this
aspect of the conservative milieu partly disintegrated. More
research is needed to analyse this development and its relation to
the growth of the NSDAP.
(iv) The bourgeois press and the rise of the Saxon NSDAP
Most experts accept that the mass media, in particular the press,
exerted a powerful influence in political opinion making. In the
944 NSDAP Ma.rkneukirchen, p. 29.
945 thicI.
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early 1980s Richard Hamilton put forward the thesis that the re-
orientation of the bourgeois press towards the NSDAP helped the
party's rise from the late 1 920s onwards.946
 Howev2r, there are no
systematic investigations about the influence of the press in the
rise of the Nazi Party. Very recently the political scientist JUrgen
Falter produced several crucial findings in his illuminating book
Hitler's Wähler. He confirmed that there was a general tendency
among bourgeois newspapers to move to the right in the final years
of the Republic, and that the press In rural areas and small towns
tended to be NSDAP-friendly or at least not opposed to the
party.947
 Falter also proved that the newspapers' move to the right
helped the growth of the NSDAP in rural protestant areas from
1928 onwards. 948
 Falter concluded that the NSDAP's electoral
success, among other things, was helped by the bourgeois press.
Overall, however, he argued that the influence of the press in
voters' decision-making was less significant than Hamilton
believed.949
The press in Saxony was clearly dominated by the bourgeoisie,
which published ninety-four percent of all local newspapers (see
Table 23 below). 950
 The NSDAP's share of the press was, as in the
Reich, extremely small. 951
 The 25,000 copies of Der Freiheitskampf
946 R. F. Hamilton, Who voted for Hitler? (Princeton, NJ, 1982).
947 Falter, Whler, pp. 330, 334.
948 Ibid., p. 336.
949 Ibid., p. 339.
950 Only eighteen of the overall 300 Saxon newspapers came from the
working-classes (Handbuch der deutschen Tagespresse (1932), PP. 3 11-335).
951 In the Reich 2.6 per cent of all newspapers sympathized openly with the
NSDAP, in Saxony only 1.3 per cent ( Tagespresse , pp. 27, 39).
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competed with more than two million copies of the bourgeois and
working class press.952
Several features of the local press support the argument abo t the
extreme divisions in Saxon society. The press in Saxony was much
more politicized than was the case in the rest of the Reich. Whereas
Table 23: Newspapers in Saxony in 1932: party allegiance and copies




























1: nationalist/right: national, rech ts, DNVP; bourgeois/neutral: b urgerlich,
heima tlich, regierungsfreundlich, republikanisch (Ne ue Leipziger
Zeitung), wirtschaftspolitisch, Zentrum; liberal: liberal, demokra tisch.
2: including the KPD's figure of 119,300 copies, which is likely to be greatly
overstated.
Source: calculated from Handbuch der deutschen Tagespresse (1932).
26.9 per cent of the newspapers in the Republic were affiliated
with a party or a political cause, in Saxony the figure was 45.3
percent.953
 Particularly striking was the fact that the powerful
representation of the Centre Party and the liberals in the middle,
which accounted for thirteen per cent of all newspapers in the
Reich, did not exist in Saxony. The only two significant
democratic/liberal newspapers in the state, the Oberlausitzer
Tageszeitung (12,300 copies) and the Zittauer Morgen-Zeitung
952 According to Otto Strasser, the SB reached a circulation of 50,000 (Kühnl,
NS Linke, p. 4). Even this probably exaggerated figure was small compared
with the bourgeois press.
953 Calculated from Tagespresse , pp. 27, 39.
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(13,000 copies), were published in the eastern towns of Zittau and
Neugersdorf. This was an area with a strong liberal milieu which
the Nazis found comparatively difficult to infiltrate before their
seizure of power. 954 In the electoral district of Chemnitz-Zwickau,
the stronghold of the NSDAP, the political orientation of the press
was extremely right-wing and nationalistic. More than half (forty-
two) of the eighty newspapers in the state which openly declared
themselves as supporters of a nationalist or right wing cause, were
published here.
In Saxony, and throughout Germany, newspapers of all political
shades of opinion were published in big and medium sized towns,
while independent or right-wing/nationalistic newspapers
dominated in the countryside and in small and medium sized
towns.955 The local press of the Left or liberals was only present in
fourteen of the total of 206 Saxon towns in which newspapers were
published. The only place in Saxony were one of their newspapers
had a local monopoly was the liberal 'Oberlausitzer Tageszeitung' in
Neugersdorf (AH Lobau). There was not a single Saxon town where
the only local newspaper was left-wing. At the same time the
right-wing press enjoyed a monopoly in forty-seven small and
medium sized towns.956 It is noticeable that most of these places,
954 In the June 1930 state elections the NSDAP received 8.0 per cent in the
Al! LObau, 9.2 percent in the AH Zittau, and 16.9 per cent in the town of
Zittau. Its average in Saxony was 14.4 per cent. In the July 1932 Reichstag
elections the NSDAP received 32.9 per cent in the AH Zittau, 38.7 per cent in
the AH Löbau, and 39.6 per cent in the town of Zittau. Its average in Saxony
was 41.3 per cent.
955 Falter, Wähier, p. 333.
956 The places were (NSDAP election results in the July 1932 Reichstag
election in brackets): Adorf/Vogtland (60.1%), Adorf/Erzgebirge (41.0%),
Annaberg (58.2%), Augustusburg (58.3%), Bischofswerda, Buchholz (48.9%),
Burkhardtsdorf (32.6%), Dahien, Drehbach (58.2%), Frankenberg (41.4%),
Frauenstein, Geithain, Gelenau (37.7%), Geyer (51.0%), Grimma (35.2%),
Groitzsch, Gro1enhain, GrolschOnau, Hainichen, Hermsdorf, Hohenstein-
Ernstthal (41.7%), Klaffenbach (34.7), Klotzsche, Leukersdorf (46.6%),
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like Adorf/Vogtland (NSDAP's poli in the July 1932 Reichstag
election: 60.1 per cent), Annaberg (58.2%), Marienberg (54.8%),
Markneukirchen (72%) and Thum (59.9%), were traditional Nazi
strongholds. However, a monopoly for a local right-wing paper was
not necessarily a guarantee of Nazi success. For example the NSDAP
scored election results far below the state average in the towns of
Grimma (35.2%), Klaffenbach (34.7%) and Radeberg (35.2%). These,
however, were exceptions which can be explainedin terms of other
factors. The SPD's local newspaper, the Volkszeitung für das
Muldental, was distributed in Grimma, and Kiaffenbach and
Radeberg were located at the outskirts of two large cities with a
strong SPD press (Chemnitz, Dresden). Furthermore, all three places
had a large working-class population.
Large parts of the bourgeois press helped the Nazis to spread their
ideas by frequently announcing and reporting their meetings.
Conservative newspapers, like the Erzgebirgische Volksfreund,
were sympathetic towards the Nazi movement from its first
meetings at the end of 1922 onwards. 957 The LNN reviewed
Hitler's speech in Altenburg in April 1926 thus: "His arguments are
carefully thought out ... His speech was intellectually well
balanced."958
The respectability of the local NSDAP was enhanced when many
conservative/nationalist papers supported the H ugenberg/ Hitler
referendum against the Young Plan at the end of 1929. The SPD in
Liebertwolkwitz, Lommatzsch, Lugau (43.3%), Lunzenau, Marienberg
(54.8%), Markneukirchen (72%), Mugeln, Netzschkau (42.2%), Neuhausen,
Neukirchen, Oelsnitz/Erzgebirge (43.7%), Olbernhau (49.0%), Radeberg
(35.2%), Rodewisch, Sayda, Schandau, Stollberg (45.8%), Thum (59.9%),
Treuen, Waldenburg, Waldheim, WeinbOhla, ZwOnitz.
957 E.g. see Erzgebirgischer Volksfreund, Nr. 281, 3.12.1922.
958 LNN Nr. 101, 12.4.1926.
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Chemnitz warned the working class in late November that the
'right-wing' Chemnitzer Tageblatt, which normally printed 5,000-
7,000 copies, planned to flood the Erzgebirge with a special edition
of 100,000 copies.959 After the referendum received even more
support in the electoral district of Chemnitz-Zwickau than in rural
Pomerania, the SPD accused the three 'independent' bourgeois
papers in Chemnitz of "outrageous irresponsibility" because of their
"fierce competition for the favour of swastika and Stahlhelm."96°
The Chemnitzer Tageblatt comprehensively covered local NSDAP
meetings and became an NSDAP paper in all but name.96'
It is worth quoting a longer report of a NSDAP meeting during the
Young campaign by a local bourgeois paper in the Erzgebirge: "The
primary teacher Gopfert from Glauchau, an excellent speaker,
spoke to the people of the Erzgebirge about the slavery of the
German Volk at a meeting of the National Socialists in the 'German
House' in Buchholz. After a short speech of welcome by the
chairman Martin, the speaker immediately got down to his theme
with great anger and with completely convincing and rich economic
and political knowledge. Whatever one thinks of National Socialism,
one had to believe what one heard here. The speaker ended by
saying that there was one conclusion: Finally become men and
women of action! You have to fight like the soldier at the front to
protect the fatherland ... The end of GOpfer's speech released a
storm of approval. And this was appropriate! Because whatever
party you belong to, you need to judge as a German in these hours
959 See 'Wehrt der LUgenflut!', ChVSt, Nr. 249, 24.10.1929.
960	 'Wo liegt Chemnitz?', ibid., Nr. 262, 11.11.1929.
961 E.g. see the long article about the Killinger meeting in Chemnitzer
Tageblatt, Nr. 254, 14.9.1929.
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and yesterday you were only able to say: what this man said was
right!"962
The right-wing Dresdner Nachrich ten , which sold 36,000 copies,
was also converted to the Nazi cause by 1930. Its special
correspondent at the NSDAP Gau meeting in Plauen in mid-1930
described a "Volksfestivaf' with an "impressive and romantic torch
parade" and "competently led conferences". The article went on:
"The citizens displayed an ample quantity of flags and showered
the marching brownshirts, in the main young men, with flowers.
The applause of the masses and 'hell' shouts were drowned out by
the countless SA bands which played military music." 963 The Nazis
in Werdau (AH Zwickau) were also blessed with a local paper which
supported their cause wholeheartedly, which they warmly
acknowledged after the seizure of power: "The Werdauer Zeitung
stood at our side as an undaunted fighting partner." 964 When the
Oschatzer Gemeinnutzige, a DNVP paper, and other provincial
newspapers argued that the attitude of the National Socialists
regarding private ownership was "highly questionable" 965 , another
bourgeois paper, the 'neutral' Tageblatt Borna, quickly allowed the
Nazis to publish an article to put things right: "The National
Socialists generally accept the principle of private ownership and
puts it under state protection."966
The collection of newspaper clippings in the state archive in
Dresden gives a sample of the extent of support the Saxon NSDAP
962 Obererzgebirgische Zeitung, Nr. 252, 26.10.1929 (in 'Die anderen Uber
uns', SB, Nr. 47, 24.11.1929).
963 See 'Landesparteitag der Nationalsozialisten', Dresdner Nachrich ten, Nr.
255, 2.6.1930.
964 STA D, ZAS, Mr. 429.
965 Oschatzer Gemeinnutzige, 23.5.1929.
9& TageblattBoma, 28.5.1929.
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received from nationalist/right-wing newspapers before autumn
1930 Dresdner Anzeiger, Dresdner Nachrich ten, Ch emni tzer
Tage bla tt, Aligemeine Zeitung Chemnitz, Erzgebirgisch er
Volksfre un d, Obererzgebirgische Zei tung, Erzge birgisch e
Nachrich ten und Anzeigenblatt, Vogtländischer Anzeiger- und
Tageblatt, Nachrich ten für Grimma, Zittauer Nachrich ten, Sächsicher
Pos tillion, Waidheimer Tagebla tt, Werda uer Zeitung,
Crimmi tscha uer Tagebla tt, Oscha tzer Gemeinn u tzige, A uerbach er
Zeitung, Freiberger Anzeiger, Bautzner Nachrich ten. Several
independent/bourgeois newspapers, like the Tagebla tt Borna,
Wurzener Tageblatt, and Westlausitzer Zeitung, supported the
NSDAP in their propaganda effort too. From 1931 onwards they
were joined by many more right-wing and bourgeois/neutral
newspapers which were sympathetic to the NSDAP. 968 The
nationalist Dahiener Nachrich ten wrote in early 1932: "Only
National Socialism can save us" 969 , and the 'independent' Nossener
Anzeiger celebrated a Nazi success in mid-1932: "Killinger in
Nossen. A unique propaganda success."97°
The bourgeois newspapers reinforced middle-class anxieties about
a socialist revolution and helped to increase the divisions in Saxon
society between left and right. Between 1919 and 1923 they
vehemently attacked the SPD government and shared
responsibility for its illegal dismissal by the Reich. In 1923 the
Saxon intelligence service reported: "The press which represents
967 STA D, ZAS, Nr. 425-428.
968 E.g. the officially independent Tharandter Tageblatt, the bourgeois
Riesaer Tageblatt and Klingenthaler Nachrich ten, and the nationalist/
right-wing Erzgebirgische Zeitung, Oberzgebirgisch er General-Anzeiger,
Lommarzscher Anzeiger, SchOnburger Tageblatr, Vogtlandischer Anzeiger,
Sachsischer Kurier.
969 DahlenerNachrichten, Nr. 40, 17.2.1932.
970 NossenerAnzeiger, Nr. 128, 3.6.1932.
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the political viewpoint of the bourgeoisie, indulges in daily attacks
against the current Zeigner government", wrote of "a Boishevist like
government", and highlighted the terror felt about the unemployed
and Proleta.rische Hundertschaften. 97 ' The influential LNN spoke of
the 'Communist Knuppel guard'972 , and the DVP press was not
alone in describing Zeigner as a 'traitor'.973
In all election campaigns after the fall of the Zeigner government
the bourgeois press warned the population about the threat of a
socialist revolution if the Marxist parties should win. They
reminded the population of the Zeigner government, 'red terror',
disturbances, casualties and lootings. Terror reports from Soviet
Russia and the unchristian ideology of the Marxist parties were
widely used themes in bourgeois papers. 974 A weekly church paper
for two villages in the AH Stollberg warned in early 1930: "The
Boishevist government has led a fight against the Church for twelve
years, it has not dared to wipe it out yet, but is preparing to do so
Every state rests on the faith of God. This ultimate belief is
abandoned, destroyed and wiped out in Russia ... these
developments in Russia, once they are completed, will become a
model for Europe. Today Russia, tomorrow and thereafter the other
states."975 Nationalist papers said Germany could either withstand
the current crisis or sink in Bolshevist anarchy. Before the
September 1930 Reichstag elections the Dresdner Nachrich ten
wrote: "This fight is about ... Germany's future, about all our
971 Ibid.
972 See 'Die kommunistische Knuppelgarde in Sachsen', LNN, Nr.99, 12.4.23.
973 See 'Der MP als Landesverrater', Zeit (STA D, All Glauchau, Nr.24, p. 14).
974 See also Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', pp. 13-14.
975 Mitteilungen für die Kirchengemeinden Nieder- und Oberwurschnitz,
Nr. 2, Februar 1930.
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futures, about whether misery of unemployment and the decline of
the economy will increase, whether the coming winter will spread a
shrou'l of unutterable misery and slow languish over our
fatherland from which will arise the red blood-soaked face of
Russian Bolshevism ... This is what the fight is about. It is not about
the destiny of parties, it is about the destiny of our Volk." 976 The
situation in the Soviet Union served as a battlefield between the
bourgeois and Marxist parties. While the former painted the
picture of a barbaric state, the latter sent delegates to Soviet Russia
who reported back to Saxony on the good living conditions the
Russians enjoyed.
The bourgeois papers' main aim was to prevent a Marxist victory.
Before early 1930 they only rarely expressed a preference for any
bourgeois party in this task. Typical was the advice of the right-
wing Oelsnitzer Volksbote before the May 1929 state elections:
"Vote for whom you want, but do not vote for the Communists and
Social Democrats. We all have to die one day, but it does not have
to be through mass murder or starvation as in Soviet-Russia."977
When the economic crisis hit Saxony and the political atmosphere
was radicalized at the end of the 1920s, an increasing number of
right-wing/nationalistic papers, particularly in rural areas, became
sympathetic to the NSDAP. The Nazis' pronounced the same anti-
Marxist slogans as the bourgeois parties, but represented a fresh
political force with an untainted background and put forward a
vision of hope for the German nation. Many bourgeois papers
expressed hope that the NSDAP would join the 'anti-Marxist' front.
This explains why many conservative papers expressed their
976 Dresdner Nachrichten, Nr. 432, 14.9.1930.
977 oelsnitzer Volksbote, Nr. 107, 10.5.1929.
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disappointment when the Nazis decided against a coalition
government after the May 1929 state elections. The Ailgemeine
Zeitung in Chenitz wrote: "Particularly because we regard the
National Socialists as valuable allies, we would deeply regret it if
they remain content to criticise and stand aside (from any
responsibility)."978
A year later, however, more papers had thrown their support
behind the NSDAP. The nationalistic Obererzgebirgische Zeitung
reported about a Nazi meeting: "Against Corruption! - Never again a
Soviet Saxony." 979 This headline could have come from any
bourgeois/conservative party, however, the paper elaborated on
this theme: "The NSDAP, while other parties did not seem to care,
was active against the slavery of Germany." 98° The Dresdner
Nachrich ten wrote: "National Socialism attempts to keep awake the
national idea and the idea to free the German Volk from
unbearable suppression."°81
The Crimmitschauer Anzeiger provided a good example of how a
conservative paper turned towards the NSDAP. In the May 1929
state election campaign it warned about a 'red wave', described
the grave consequences of a Left government for Saxony, and
highlighted the Marxists' opposition to christian schools. 982 The
paper did not declare any party preference in their crusade against
Marxism. A year later, however, the Crimmitschauer Anzeiger
threw its support behind the NSDAP and rejoiced after the June
1930 state elections: "The victory is ours!" The paper praised Nazi
978 See 'Verwunderung - Verwirrung - Entrustung', SB, Nr. 22, 2.6. 1929.
979 Obererzgebirgische Zeitung, Nr. 134, 12.6.1930.
980 Ibid
981 Dresdner Nachrichren, Nr. 252, 30.5.1930.
982 CrinimitschauerAnzeiger, Nr. 84, 13/14.4.1929; Nr. 100, 30.4. 1929
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propaganda and the fact that the NSDAP was not linked with the
corrupt system.983
Various 'independent' n .wspapers picked up National Socialist
slogans, produced articles about the movement, and moved more
and more to the right. The Bautzner Tageblatt printed a long
article written by Killinger 984 , and the Chemnitzer Neueste
Nachrich ten commented on another unsuccessful attempt to elect a
new Prime Minister in Saxony in late July 1930: "The Volk is
without a leader"985.
The 'independent' Tageblatt ROdertal Zeitung und Arnsdorfer
Zeitung advised its readers before the September 1930 Reichstag
election to vote for "strong and honest personalities ... The voter
should only support parties which work consciously to rebuild the
German fatherland and to whom the word Germany means more
than anything (the importance is to vote!)." 986 Two years later the
paper was firmly behind the NSDAP. It described a "fascinating"
Hitler rally in Dresden (Nr. 89, 26.7.1932) and warned about the
increasing dangers of a civil war from a united KPD and SPD front,
who, among other things, beat up Nazis (Nr. 90, 28.7.1932). After
the July 1932 Reichstag elections the paper expressed its sorrow
that the NSDAP did not gain an absolute majority (Nr. 92, 2.8.1932).
JUrgen Falter rightly points out that even if one establishes a link
between the political leaning of the local press and the electoral
success of the NSDAP, It is difficult to determine cause and effect.
Was the local press National Socialist because most of its readers
983 See 'Im Spiegel der Presse', SVB, Nr. 144, 24.6.1930; and Crimmitschauer
Anzeiger, Nr. 167, 21.7.1930.
984 Bautzner Tageblau, Nr. 132, 10.6.1930.
985 ChemnitzerNeuesteNachrichten, Nr. 169, 29.7.1930.
986 TageblatrROdertaiZeitung undArnsdorferZeitung, Nr. 110, 13.9.1930.
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were, or was it the other way around?987 It often seemed a two-
way process which reflected the continuous radicalization of
politics. Several local newspapers wre more or less forced to adopt
a more lenient line towards the NSDAP in the face of its increasing
popularity among its readers. Until the September 1930 Reichstag
election the 'independent' Zwickauer Tageblatt refused to accept
National Socialist advertisements or announcements for meetings
which were supplemented with 'no entry for Jews' or were in any
way anti-Semitic. But the Nazis were later able to report:
"Thereafter the ZwickauerTageblatt had to adopt a friendlier line
towards us albeit reluctantly ... only out of instinct for survival, not
because of conviction." 988 Furthermore, the Social Democrats in
Chemnitz argued that the Aligemeine Zeitung in Chemnitz
supported the Hugenberg/Hitler referendum at the end of 1929
mainly due to its declining subscriptions and the fact that the local
industrialists backed the referendum. The SPD wrote: "Subscribers
left in their thousands because the attitude of the paper was not
sufficiently nationalistic." 989 Something similar happened to the
bourgeois papers in Glauchau, the Glauchauer Tageblatt und
Anzeiger and the Glauchauer Zeitung. In early 1931 the SPD
reported that both papers "recently seemed to be falling over
themselves in their efforts to appear friendly to the Nazis."990
Papers which traditionally supported the political right, drifted
more and more towards the Nazis. In early 1930 the Werdauer
Zeitung turned against Hindenburg after he had not joined the
flugenberg-Hitler referendum. The paper explained: "Germany
987 Falter, Wä.hler, p. 327.
988FK,Nr.49,27.2.1932.
989 See 'Wo liegt Chemnitz?', ChVSt, Nr. 262, 11.11.1929.
990 Ibid., Nr. 28, 21.3.193 1.
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needs a fresh and energetic man as president who is in the prime
of his life, and who can seize power on his own initiative! We can
not afford to have someone as head of th' Reich who is only
pursuing representative functions!"991
The Nazis faced severe problems when the local bourgeois press
was not sympathetic to their ideas. The NSfS wrote in mid-1926:
"The public meeting which we organised in Hermsdorf/Erzgebirge
on Sunday the 9th of May did not draw the expected crowd
because the local newspaper was strangely not delivered on
Saturday, as usual, but on Sunday!" 992 The Saxon NSDAP also
blamed the unsympathetic press in Leipzig for their difficulties in
the town: "In no large city in Saxony is there more need for the
spread of the National Socialist press than in Leipzig."993
Additionally, the FK felt the need to introduce the column 'Leipzig's
Journalism'.994
An increasing number of bourgeois newspapers, in rural areas and
large towns (Chemnitz, Plauen, Dresden), showed open sympathies
for the NSDAP before 1933. Nevertheless it is also true that the
largest Saxon papers, Leipziger Neueste Nachrich ten (180,000
copies) and the Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten (110,000 copies),
and many other bourgeois papers did not support the Nazi Party
and its radicalism. However, they often sympathized with some of
the nationalist ideology of the far-right, appeared similarly helpless
as the traditional parties in providing a vision of a brighter future,
991 SVB, Nr. 64, 17.3.1930.
992 NSIS Nr. 13, 30.5.1926.
993 Hc. Nr. 234, 7.10.193 1.
994 NSIS, Nr. 11, 13.3.1927.
995 Also see W. Pyta, Gegen Hitler und für die Republik. Die Auseinander-
setztmg der deutschen Sozialdemokratie mit der NSDAP in der Weimarer
Republik (DUsseldorf, 1989), pp. 404-405.
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and were often not explicit enough about the Nazis radicalism and
the consequences of Nazi rule. The 'independent' Sächsische
Dorfzeitung und Elbgaupresse wrote: "The great maority of the
German Volk longs for nothing more than work and order.
However, radicalism will always create uncertainty and the
disintegration of state and economy ... A free Volk is unworthy of
dictatorship."996 The only comment the same paper made after the
NSDAP won 37.3 per cent of the vote in the July 1932 Reichstag
elections was that it was "against violence and terror." 997 The
warnings of the DNN on the day of the July 1932 Reichstag
election were only half-hearted and too late: "The greatest danger a
state can face is rule by a single dominating party or even a party
dictatorship ... Hatred, or the stirring up of hatred, will not provide
any political solution. Only the Volksgemeinschaft which removes
hatred and the belief in panaceas." 998 The fact that most bourgeois
newspapers increasingly withheld any criticism against the NSDAP,
often because they did not want to alienate some of their
readers999 , was crucial in making the Nazis respectable in Saxon
society.
(v) The relation of the NSDAP with bourgeois parties in Saxony
The relation between bourgeois parties and the NSDAP changed
several times. Between 1925 and early 1929 the bourgeois parties
were comparatively indifferent to the few Nazis. The two NSDAP
members of the state parliament supported the bourgeois
996 Sächsische Dorfzeitung und Elbgaupresse, Nr. 214, 13/14.9.1930.
997 Ibid., Nr. 179, 2.8.1932.
998 DN1ç Nr. 178, 31.7.1932.
99 Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', p. 71.
264
government and were noticeable for their absence in the chamber.
When the Nazi movement started to grow from early 1929
onwards the bourgeois parties showed Interest and frequent sigiis
of sympathy towards the new phenomenon. The Nazis were seen to
belong to the 'anti-Marxist front', and therefore to be one of them.
When the NSDAP won five seats and a key position in parliament in
the May 1929 state election, it became clear that the Nazis had
their own ambitions. They did not shrink from disturbing the
fragile political status quo in parliament - which favoured the
bourgeoisie - to increase their power. An increasingly unstable
relationship between NSDAP and bourgeois parties developed. On
the one hand the Nazis tolerated BUnger's government and co-
operated with the bourgeois parties.'°°° On the other hand,
however, they continuously threatened to bring down the
government when their demands were not met. Finally the NSDAP
initiated BUnger's resignation when it withdrew its support from
the government in February 1930. Henceforth, Saxony was in a
state of 'political limbo' until the new state elections in June 1930.
The bourgeois parties disliked disruption and instability. The Saxon
industrialists, who had parliamentary support among the DVP and
DNVP, expressed their annoyance that the Nazis had brought down
two "excellent governments" and described the June 1930 state
elections as "the most unnecessary of all election campaigns".1001
1000 All bourgeois parties and the NSDAP condemned Germany's sole
responsibility in the outbreak of the First World War (VdSL, 4. Wp, 11.
Sitzung, 23.10.1929). The NSDAP supported the government motion to
abandon the holiday of Ninth November and even tried to top it by bringing
in a motion to abandon the holiday of May the First (Ibid., 11. Sitzung,
23.10.1929). All bourgeois parties and the NSDAP passed a motion in favour of
war invalids (Ibid., 19. Sitzung, 12.12.1929).
101 SI, Nr. 26, 2 8.6.1930.
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The bourgeois parties' attitudes towards the NSDAP ranged from
attacks against the Nazis (particularly in the June 1930 election
campaign) to wooing their support (generally In parliament after
May 1929). In the June 1930 state election campaign the leader of
the parliamentary DVP, BlUher, mobilized the voters to form a
"united front against the dangers of Socialism and National
Socialism" 1002, and his party colleague, Dr. Schneider, asked the
party members to fight against the National Socialists. 1003 The SPD
noted that this was the "first time that the party officially
distanced itself from the National Socialists." 1004 However, this was
a late and half-hearted response to the NSDAP, which after all had
brought down two DVP-led governments and attacked it for
keeping the "administration filled with Marxists", and "wasting
millions in the Ministry of Labour and Welfare under Eisner". In
the view of the SB, "there is no great difference between the
Marxists and the DVP ... The DVP betrayed the bourgeoisie."1005
After the June 1930 state election the WP, DVP, DNVP, SLV, VrP
and CSVD allied with the NSDAP in July and October to appoint
Krugg von Nidda und von Falkenstein (DNVP) as Prime
Minister. 1006 The NSDAP's Gregor Strasser would have become
Minister of the Interior under Nidda. The Saxon Nazis gave
moderate and conciliatory speeches in parliament during this
phase. Their parliamentary leader, Fritsch, declared in late July
that their aim was to overthrow the "unjust system", but that they
1002 The Nazis were criticised because of their revile of Hindenburg (see
'Aufmarsch zur Sachsenwahl', Dresdner Anzeiger, Nr. 255, 2.6.1930).
1003 DVZ Nr. 127, 3.6.1930.
1004 Ibid.
1005 SB, Nr. 76, 23.5.1930.
1006 VdSI., 5. Wp, 2. Sitzung, 15.7.1930, p. 25; ibid., 7. Sitzung, 7.10.1930,
pp. 197-198.
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would always use legal means for this purpose.'°° 7 In early
October Fritsch tried to underline his party's abilities to take over
government responsibility by referring to Thuringia and
Braunschweig 1O° 8 , and his colleague Kunz was almost voted
parliamentary president in mid-November.'009
There are several reasons why the 'honeymoon' between most
bourgeois parties and the NSDAP ended very quickly henceforth.
First, the Nazis were disillusioned because the growth of their
mandates had not resulted in any gain in parliamentary power.
They did not get the Ministry of the Interior, and their bourgeois
allies deserted them when they voted for Hickmann to become
vice-president of parliament before Kunz, who only became second
vice president. 101 ° The NSDAP showed its new opposition course
when it rejected the budget in December 1930 1011 , when the whole
Nazi parliamentary faction left parliament "in protest against a
one-sided parliamentary presidency" 1012 , and in early 1931
several Nazis were excluded from parliament because of insulting
remarks. 1013
Secondly, the NSDAP's ambition in the state parliament and their
disturbing activities were checked by a political truce which
developed against the NSDAP in the aftermath of the June elections.
The VNR's, DDP's and SPD's toleration of Schick's cabinet of experts
without Nazi participation 10 ' 4 sealed the Nazis' fate as a powerless
1007 Ibid., 4. Sitzung, 22.7.1930, p. 71.
1008 Ibid., 7. Sitzung, 7.10.1930, p. 213.
1009 Ibid 12. Sftzung, 13.11.1930.
1010 Ibid.
1011 Ibid., 18. Sitzung, 11.12.1930, p. 685.
1012 Ibid., 27. Sitzung, 27.1.193 1, p. 960.
1013 E.g. Donicke (ibid., 26. Sitzung, 29.1.1931, p. 981) and Lasch (ibid., 27.
Sitzung, 3.2.1931, p. 1012)
1014 see the statements of DDP and VNR in ibid., 7.10.1930, pp. 200, 203.
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parliamentary force until March 1933. Lastly, the DVP moved away
from its often sympathetic attitude towards the NSDAP. It is true
that an outcry went through the Saxon DVP when its
parliamentarians under Bluher's leadership failed to give the Nazi
candidate Kunz their vote for President of the Saxon parliament,
and made possible the election of the Social Democrat Weckel in
late 1930. Pressure from the constituencies soon led to BlUher's
resignation.'°' 5 Additionally, the call of the Saxon DVP for a more
aggressive foreign policy under the slogan 'away with Versailles'
emphasized its break with Stresemann's conciliatory policy and its
drift to the right from late 1930 onwards.'° 16 However, when the
DVP's problems with Frick became apparent in Thuringia, the
Saxon DVP also moved away from the NSDAP. In February 1931 a
DVP parliamentarian attacked the Nazis for their violence and
radicalism, and their role in Thuringia. 1017 Several months later the
NSDAP's state leadership described their frustration in a letter to
the Munich headquarters: "The reason why we do not profit from
the success of the last election lies in the behaiour of the middle
parties, especially the DVP, which is particularly spiteful towards
us since the fall of Frick in Thuringia."° 18 The Saxon Nazis
complained about their "complete helplessness due to the co-
1015 See Mei&ier Volkszeitung, Nr. 271, 21.11.1930. The D\'P district of
Freiberg had disapproved the action of their parliamentary party, supported
Hardt's vote for Kunz, and unanimously declared its confidence in Kunz (see
Ziztauer Morgen Zeitung, Nr. 268, 16.11.1930). The DVP district of Eastern
Saxony asked Bluher to resign (see SVB, Zwickau, Nr. 270, 20.11.1930).
1016 See 'Volkspartei gegen Stresemann', in SVB, Nr. 270, 20.11.1930.
1017 VdSL, 5. Wp, 27. Sitzung, 3.2.193 1, p. 1033.
1018 BA, Sammiung Schumacher, Nr. 208, Bd. 1, Plauen an MUnchen,
23.5.1931.
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operation between SPD and the middle parties in the state
parliament."1019
Throughout the Weimar years the DNVP co-operated with the
NSDAP more than any other significant bourgeois party. After the
NSDAP was declared illegal in the Republic at the end of 1923, the
Saxon DNVP proposed a motion in parliament to reverse the
ban. 102° Both parties frequently allied in parliament and local
councils 1021 with the final aim of creating a new political system.
Professor Siegert, DNVP member of the Saxon parliament, spoke to
his constituency about the bankruptcy of the 'Young-System' and
described the September 1930 Reichstag elections as a political
turning point: "They were a great, impressive victory for the
National Socialists ... The outcome of these elections is the clear
awakening of our nation and the victorious penetration of the
national idea into the masses.1022
All conservative parties and the NSDAP agreed on certain issues
where they formed a united front. They all united to pass a bill in
parliament which introduced a compulsory commemoration hour in
the week before Totensonn tag (last Sunday before Advent
commemorating the dead) for those who died in the war. 1023 They
all condemned Remarque's book 'All quiet on the western Front'
and welcomed the fact that Schieck's government was the first to
propose that the Reich censor should ban the film' 024 ; they also
1019 Ibid.
1020 Stoschek, 'Zur Entwicklung', p . 271.
1021 E.g. when the NSDAP in Leipzig announced a possible referendum to
dissolve the local town council the DNVP declared its support (STA D, Mdl, Nr.
11126/4, September 1930).
1022 'Am Sonntag vor elnem Jahr', Chemnitzer Tageblatt, Nr. 355, 23.12.1930.
1023 VdSL, 5. Wp, 31. Sitzung, 17.2.193 1.
lO24pjj 18. Sitzung, 11.12.1930, P. 637; ibid., 30. Sitzung, 12.2.193 1.
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supported the removal of French flags during an international
competition between French and German athletes in Mei1en'025;
and finally, they all united in a bill against ungodly movements.1026
On the one hand the Nazis were noticeable for extremely aggressive
speeches against the Left in parliament, on the other hand they
continued to support the bourgeois parties with conciliatory
remarks. The Nazi student Werner Studentkowski, in particular,
was known for his notorious parliamentary speeches. Scuffling
broke out and the parliamentary session had to be adjourned when
he remarked that "every criminal is a Marxist." 1027 During another
speech he put forward an analogy about 'pure races' and others by
comparing pure-bred dogs with pigs. He concluded that "pigs are
normally stabbed." 1028 However, when the NSDAP tried to topple
the Schieck government with referenda or votes of no confidence,
Studentkowski was keen to emphasise that this was a move against
the system and nothing personally against members of the
government, who were "men of honour."1029
The 'neutral' Schieck government undermined the Republic with its
reactionary policies. After the SA was banned in spring 1932,
Schieck proposed that Berlin should simultaneously ban the
Reich sbanner, the largest democratic organisation in support of the
Republic 1030. Furthermore, a government decree, which declared
working-class sport organisations to be political, led to a ban on its
1025 Ibid., 42. Sitzung, 19.5.193 1, p. 1543.
1026 Ibid., p. 1568.
1027 Ibid., 39. Sitzung, 28.4.193 1, p. 1455.
1028 Ibid., 62. Sitzung, 17.12.193 1, p. 2615.
1029 Ibid., 88. Sitzung, 18.10.1932, p. 3863. Before the referendum to bring
down the government in early 1932 he explained: "When we proceed against
the government of Schieck, it is by no means a fight against the persons
who are part of the government" (ibid., 64. Sitzung, 26.1.1932, p. 2709).
1030 Ibid., 69. Sitzung, 26.4.193 2, p. 2921.
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festivals, while bourgeois clubs were able to continue to celebrate
publicly in autumn 1932.1031
"arliament became increasingly polarized. Two members of the WP
joined the DNVP and one member of the DNVP, Fritsche, left the
party in protest against their close co-operation with the
NSDAP.1032
However, although the bourgeois parties drifted more and more to
the right in the final years of the Republic, they continued to resist
too much Nazi power and a 'Nazi take-over'. As we have already
seen, this became clear during the elections of the president of the
state parliament. In July 1930 all bourgeois parties followed the
tradition that the largest faction in parliament should provide the
president, and indirectly supported the Social Democrat Weckel as
candidate by handing in blank ballot papers. The Democrats voted
for Weckel. Only the NSDAP and KPD put forward their own
candidates.'°33 The situation changed only four months later. In
November 1930 the Social Democrat Weckel managed to be elected
with just thirty-five votes, compared to thirty-four votes for Kunz,
the candidate of the NSDAP. 1034 Again the KPD put forward its own
candidate and the Democrats supported Weckel, however, this time
the bourgeois was split. Some still stuck to tradition and handed in
blank ballot papers (fourteen), but the majority supported the Nazi
Kunz (twenty). The NSDAP's campaign to bring down Weckel1035
failed just. However, as the bourgeois parties moved further to the
1031 Ibid., 88. Sitzung, 18.10.1932, PP. 3916-3917.
1032 Ibid., 67. Sitzung, 18.2.1932, p. 2842.
1033 Ibid., 1. Sitzung, 10.7.1930.
1034 Ibid., 12.Sitzung, 13.11.1930.
1035 E.g. see the article 'Weckel must resign! Never again Weckel as
president of the state parliament' (FK, Nr. 205, 3.9.193 1).
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right they kept their distance from the NSDAP. At the end of 1931
Weckel was voted president again because the bourgeois parties
put forwa' d a candidate of the WP, and did not support the Nazi
Kunz. 1036 The Nazis described the lack of support for their
candidate as a "betrayal by the parties Involved" and left
parliament in protest. 1037 A year later the same seemed to happen
when the bourgeois parties put forward Dr. Eckardt, a member of
the DNVP, and the NSDAP put forward Kunz again. This time,
however, even some Nazis supported Eckardt in the second ballot
which secured his election as president with forty votes. 1038 In this
respect, the representatives of the bourgeois parties were not
prepared to give in to NSDAP pressure.
(vi) Conclusion
There were many direct contacts between Nazis and the
bourgeoisie. Many bourgeois clubs, organisations, newspapers,
parties, and even parts of the state administration, were infiltrated
by the NSDAP. The staff in the sanatorium in Gottleuba (AH Pirna)
used the Hitler salutation for greetings. 1039 Even the conservative
Minister of the Interior, Richter, whose speeches were frequently
applauded by the NSDAP 1040, admitted the sympathetic attitude of
the police towards the NSDAP in Chemnitz and Dresden.1041
1036 VdSL, 5. Wp, 59. Sitzung, 24.11.193 1.
1037 Ibid.
1038 Ibid., 89. Sitzung, 19.10.1932.
1039 Ibid., 69. Sitzung, 26.4.1932, p. 2953.
1040 Ibid., 70. Sitzung, 27.4.193 2, p. 2975.
1041 Ibid., 62. Sitzung, 17.12.1931, p. 2599. See also the speech of the Social
Democrat Gerlach (ibid.) and BOchel (ibid., 69. Sitzung, 26.4.1932).
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However, open sympathy for the NSDAP in Saxony, although it was
increasing, was not all-embracing. More important was the fact that
the growing acceptance of the NSDAP in bourgeois circles fostered
the disintegration of the Republic. More than anything else, the
Nazis' aggressive ideology found fertile soil in the bourgeoisie's
conservative, reactionary, and often anti-democratic values.1042
Many members of this conservative milieu, whether they
specifically liked the Nazis or not, increasingly saw the NSDAP as
the only party which was able to carry out the main task, i.e. to get
rid of the Republican system and to create a new authoritarian
state. Fritsche, a member of parliament who had left the DNVP
because of its friendly line towards the NSDAP, described two cases
in parliament where the Saxon judiciary and police acted with open
sympathy towards the NSDAP. He concluded that an inquiry into
these cases were pointless because a majority of the civil servants
took the view that: "The National Socialist Party is a fine party,
after all it is national. If someone uses the word national he
immediately encounters favourable assessments by all other
people who are nationalist too, and the police officer and the judge
tell themselves: nationalist people cannot be criminals, these things
are impossible among nationalist people ... The National Socialist
Workers Party after all is a legal	 1043
Opinion leaders and influential people in Saxony's bourgeois society
frequently formed a 'united front' on the right with the NSDAP. The
Prime Minister Schieck earned great applause from this group
1042 I disagree with Elliot, who played down the influence of the
conservative milieu, when he argued that it was "highly doubtful" that
activities of military organisations promoted 'militarist' attitudes, a
glorification of war, or were prescriptions for future political actions (Elliot,
'Kriegervereine', p. 126).1043 VdSL, 5. Wp, 97. Sitzung, 12.1.1933, pp. 4255-4258.
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when he demanded that Germany should have "equal rights with
other nations and finally be freed from the Tributfessein ... which
our honour and conscience cannot bear any longer." 044 The
influential DNVP leader Siegert defended the DNVP's and NSDAP's
attempts to bring down the democratically elected government by
emphasising that those parties which led Germany into misery
were "Katastrophen-Parteien" (parties aiming at a catastrophe) and
not those parties which always warned about a catastrophe.1045
The function of the administration and decent codes of behaviour
in society slowly fell apart in the final years of the Republic. A Nazi
doctor in the AH Schwarzenberg refused to treat a pregnant women
because he was on duty for the local Storm-troopers. He was not
prosecuted for this. 1046 The SA leader Bennecke summarized the
development of uncertainty and disintegration in a speech in
parliament in late 1931: "Some things which are legal in one place
are illegal in other places. At times one can get the impression that
the Saxon administration is in the process of disintegration."1047
1044 Ibid., 64. Sitzung, 26.1.1932.
1045 Ibid., 55. Sitzung, 11.7.193 1, p. 2336.
1046 Ibid., 70. Sitzung, 27.4.1932, p. 2970.
1047 Ibid., 61. Sitzung, 16.12.193 1, p. 2565.
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12. Key study: the economic crisis and the effects of the
Nazis' propaganda machine. The Amtshauptmannschaft
Schwarzenberg between 1926 and 1933
(i) Introduction
It is widely accepted that the economic depression and the collapse
of the Weimar Republic stood in close relation to each other.1048
Additionally, no historian would refute the link between the
economic crisis and the growing support for the NSDAP from the
late 1920s. 1049 However, although all the major regional studies
about the rise of the NSDAP accept this, it is surprising how little
they scrutinize this crucial background and do not attempt to
establish a clear link between the growing depression and the rise
of the Nazi movement.1050
Until recently, historians have also agreed that Nazi propaganda
was essential in explaining the dramatic rise of the NSDAP's votes
from around 800,000 to nearly fourteen million between 1928 and
1932. From 1925 onwards Hitler's main objective was to mobilize
as many voters as possible to come to power through the ballot
box. This strategy led the Nazis to build up a tight organizational
network all over Germany through which the party developed a
sophisticated mass mobilization machine which became more and
more centrally controlled, authoritarian, and efficient. In his classic
study about the Nazi Party Orlow regarded the twin bases of the
1048 H. James, 'Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic',
in I. Kershaw (ed.) Weimar: Why did German Democracy Fail? (London,
1990), p. 31.
1049 Pridham, Bavaria, p. 215.
1050 E.g. Pridham devoted a sub-chapter of nine pages to the economic crisis
and mentioned the depression in one sentence in his conclusion (Pridham,
Bavaria, pp. 2 15-224, 322.). Böhnke devoted seven pages to the impact of the
economic depression and did not mention it in his conclusion (BOhnke,
Ruhrgebiet), and Paul did not really discuss the background of the economic
crisis (Paul, Saargebiet).
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Nazis political success as skilful propaganda and effective
organization 1051 , and Zeman wrote that the rise of the Nazis was
"largely due to the skilful exploitation of propaganda
techniques".'° 52 Nearly a decade ago, however, Richard Bessel
questioned the importance of the Nazis' propaganda machine for
the first time. He called it a "myth" and argued that the Nazi
electoral success was mainly explained by the social and political
culture. 1053 Furthermore, Gerhard Paul concluded in his recent
authoritative study about Nazi propaganda before 1933:
"Propaganda was only one among several factors which explained
the rise of the NSDAP. A large part of the NSDAP electorate did not
have to be convinced by propaganda ... but voted for the party of
Hitler independently from its propagandistic self-projection, longed
for a saviour and projected their own desires into the NSDAP."054
It is useful to look at a smaller region in detail to investigate what
roles the Nazis' relentless propaganda, the failure of their political
opponents, and the increasing effects of the economic crisis played
in swaying a majority of the local population to turn away from the
Republic and to support the NSDAP in the final years of the Weimar
era. The AH Schwarzenberg provides excellent conditions for such a
key study. The district is the only Saxon Amtshauptmannschaft
from which very detailed monthly police reports about the political
1051 Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 5; also see Bracher Dictatorship , p. 129.
1052 Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (1973), p. 32.
1053 R. Bessel, 'The Rise of the NSDAP and the Myth of Nazi Propaganda',
Wiener library Bulletin, 33 (1980), pp. 20-29. Also see I. Kershaw, 'Ideology,
Propaganda and the Rise of the Nazi Party', in P. Stachura (ed.), Hitlers
Machtergreifung 1933 (London, 1983), p. 162. Additionally, it is surprising
that historians seem to have neglected detailed analysis of election
campaigns. One exception is J. Ciolek-Kumper, Wahlkampf in Lippe. Die
Wahlkampfpropaganda der NSDAP zur Landtagswahl am 15. Jan uar 1933
(Munchen, 1976).
1054 G. Paul, Aufstand der Bilder. Die NS-Propaganda vor 1933 (Bonn, 1990),
p. 255.
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and economic situation between 1926 and 1933 have survived
almost completely. Furthermore, the AH Schwarzenberg was a
typically densely populated and industrialised district in the
Erzgebirge. Around 70 cent of its population were employed in
industry and only 7.5 per cent in agriculture. Its 132,000 citizens
produced various goods including machines, metal, enamel, men's
wear, embroidery, paper, brushes, chemicals, paint, and wood
carving. 1055 The Erzgebirge covered a substantial part of the
electoral district of Chemnitz/Zwickau (see Map 1 on page 10 and
Map 2 below), the stronghold of the Saxon Nazi movement and one
of the party's greatest bastions in the Reich.
(ii) Comparatively tranquil years; the Nazis are the busiest
activists on the political right (1926-1928)
1926, like the previous years, was a year of economic recession
during which some factories had to shut down and many others
had to introduce short-time work and cuts in salaries. 1056 The
police reported in June 1926: "The unemployment has devastating
effects on the workers. One can see the worries in all faces.
Everyone asks himself where this is going to lead if it continues
like this." 1057 The political situation was tense due to the
referendum for the 'Furstenenteignung' in June and the state
elections in October. The parties on the Left mobilized all their
energies for both campaigns and outpaced all other political groups
in their public appearance. The bourgeois parties only campaigned
1055 See 'Wirtschaftsbericht der Bezirksgruppe Westerzgebirge des
Verbancies Sächsischer Industrieller', SI, Nr. 11, 12.3.1932, p. 127; Del- Gau
Sachsen, p. 10.
1056 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940, April 1926.
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shortly before the state elections and used their hold over the local
press for their propaganda. The NSDAP was by far the busiest
party on the right during the election campaign and, together with
the KPD, the only party which campaigned for new support
throughout the year (for the following discussion see Figures
below). The Nazis had founded the district's first party branches in
late 1923 and early 1924 in the free town of Aue (September
1923) and the town of Schwarzenberg (March 1924). 1058 From here
they slowly spread into the Erzgebirge.
The NSDAP made some remarkable election gains in several small
towns in the 1926 state elections (for election results see Figure 6
below). The results were linked with their local propaganda: In the
twenty-nine places where the NSDAP did not hold a party meeting
between November 1925 and October 1926 its average was 3.3 per
cent of the vote. 1059 In the fourteen places where the Nazis held
one to five meetings during the same period, its average vote was
7.3 per cent. The NSDAP won 23.8 per cent of the votes in Sosa,
where it held three meetings, 17.8 per cent in Zschorlau (three
meetings), 10.4 per cent in Lauter (six meetings), and 9.2 per cent
in Niederschlema (two meetings). However, there were also a few
1058 Erzgebirgischer Volksfreund, Nr. 217, 16.9.1933; NSDAP Schwarzen berg,
p. 10.
1059 All election results are taken from the monthly police reports of the
AH Schwarzenberg (STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940-1945), statistical
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eligible to vote	 voting participation
1928	 84141	 77.1 per cent
1929	 86235	 76.7 per Cent
LW 1930	 85567	 72.0 per cent
RW1930	 86004	 85.3 percent
RW1932a	 91087	 91.2 percent
RW 1932b	 88662	 87.4 per cent
RW 1933	 89084	 92.9 per cent
*: percentage for Hindenburg in the second ballot in the 1925 Presidential
elections; **: percentage for Hitler in the second ballot in the 1932
Presidential elections.
Source: StDR, (1919-1933); STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940-1945.
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places where the Nazis achieved good election results without
holding a single meeting after the re-creation of the party. For
example the Nazis won 9 per cent of the vote in the village of
SchOnheiderhammer. SchOnheiderhammer, however, was only a
mile away from Eibenstock, where the NSDAP had organised four
meetings since late 1925. A striking feature of this election
campaign was that the prominent Nazis Gregor Strasser, Himmier
and Dietrich spoke at two meetings each of the total fourteen
NSDAP election meetings held in the district. Hitler had ordered all
party speakers to participate in the Saxon elections. 106° Slier, a
former Communist and locksmith, spoke at all other meetings.'°6'
The party's propaganda headquarters in Munich already controlled
and approved the propaganda leaflets which were designed by the
Saxon Nazis for the campaign.1062
The economic situation and the mood of the population improved in
the AH Schwarzenberg between 1927 and 1928. The police
recorded in summer 1927 that "the business of industry and trade
continuous to be good."° 63 Politically the atmosphere was quiet
too. The campaign for the May 1928 Reichstag elections was short
and peaceful. The bourgeois parties organised only a few badly
attended meetings shortly before the elections. The DVP attracted
eleven visitors to their meeting in Waschleithe, the DDP's meeting
in LOssnitz was cancelled because only eight interested people
1060 BA, NS 18, Nr. 5022, 8.9.1926.
1061 Except one meeting by the ex-Communist Kunnemann (STA D, All
Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940, Oktober 1926).
1062 BA, NS 18, Nr. 5022, Himmler, 8.10.1926.
1063 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1941, August 1927.
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turned up, and the Volksrechtspartei could attract only nineteen
people to a meeting in Eibenstock.1064
Underneath the surface of tranquillity, however, several problems
accumulated. Some sectors of industry continued to face recession
and their situation worsened at the end of 1928. Farmers
complained about their tax burden; one cardboard factory, two
clothing factories and five leather gloves factories were
temporarilly forced to shut down; several embroidery factories
faced problems, and innkeepers complained about a lack of
customers. In the fall of 1928 the police stated that "industry is in
the middle of a crisis which will affect all thriving industrial sectors
in the end."°65 Furthermore, the anti-Democratic NSDAP had
become the most active political party beside the KPD. A net of
NSDAP branches covered the fifty-two villages and towns of the
district in early 1928 (Eibenstock, Johanngeorgenstadt, Lauter,
POhla, Raschau, Rittersgrun, Sosa and SchwarzenberglO66).
The strong link between the Nazis' appearance in public meetings
and their local election showings continued in the May 1928
Reichstag election. In the twelve places where the NSDAP
organised between one and four meetings between November 1926
and May 1928, the party gained an average of 9.2 per cent of the
votes (compared to its average of 5.9). It is striking that the small
towns where the NSDAP organised most meetings in the district
correspondingly brought the greatest share of votes. The NSDAP
gained 19.5 per cent of the votes in Zschorlau where it had staged
three meetings since late 1926, 16.4 per cent in Pöhla (three
Mal 1928.
1065 Ibid., March, April, June, September 1928.
1066 NSDAP Schwarzen berg, p. 16.
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meetings), 15.5 per cent in Sosa (four meetings) and 12.5 per cent
in Lauter (three meetings). In the thirty-six places where the
NSDAP had not organised a single public meeting during that
period the party only scored an average of 3.7 per cent of the
votes. During the years when the Nazi movement was still
comparatively small, one public meeting by the NSDAP could make
all the difference. In May 1928 the party gained an average vote of
7.0 per cent in all nineteen villages and small towns of the AH
Schwarzenberg where it had organised at least one public meeting
since November 1925.
The local Nazis, as on the national level' 067 , mouthed mainly anti-
Marxist slogans and above all, tried to appeal to workers before
and during the 1928 Reichstag campaign. Their main target was
the SPD. From 1927 onwards the NSfS's column 'letter from Sosa'
reported about the Marxist stronghold and its SPD mayor Hille and
vilified it as the epitome of Marxist corruption. The Nazis, who
nicknamed Hille 'Isidor' 1068 , accused the Social Democrat of
"mismanagement", "building a luxury home", "neglecting the
unemployed", "corruption", and called for all "brain and hand
workers" ('Arbeiter der Stirn und Faust) to join the NSDAP.' 069 The
Nazis frequently allied with Communists in town councils to attack
Social Democratic maladministration or to underline their support
for the unemployed. In Raschau the NSDAP and KPD fought
together against the SPD mayor with the result that the local
1067 The NSDAP's central election slogan was 'break the Dawes chains' (Paul
NS-Propaganda, pp. 84-85).
1068 Alter the chief of the Berlin criminal police, Dr. Bernhard Wei1, a Jew,
who became Goebbels majors scapegoat in Berlin under the nickname
'Isidor' (H. Heiber, Goebbels (New York, 1972), pp. 62-63).
1069 NSIS, Nr. 4, 23.1.1927; ibid., Nr. 7, 13.12.1927; ibid., Nr. 14, 3.4.1927.
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bourgeoisie regarded the Nazis as a radical workers party. 107° In
Aue the NSDAP "unreservedly supported" a Communist motion in
the town councils for winter aid for the unemployed.'07'
Furthermore, the local Nazis were 'proud' that they had former
members of the soldier councils and Marxists in their ranks1072,
and organised a meeting to discuss the lockout of metal
workers1073
At the same time, however, the Nazis never neglected the middle
classes. In February 1928 they organised a meeting in
Schwarzenberg: "The new department store in Schwarzenberg - the
ruin of small business and craftsmen."° 74 The Nazis were
extremely anti-Marxist and stressed that they wanted to unite all
classes in a new and strong Germany. 1075 Anti-Marxism and their
strong emphasis on the fatherland and patriotism made the Nazis
acceptable to the middle classes. An early Nazi activist and later
branch leader from Raschau was appointed to lead the bureau of
the local newspaper Erzgebirgischer Volksfreund in
Schwarzenberg because of his "nationalistic attitude". 1076 Lastly,
most NSDAP activists came from the middle classes.' 077 Most
bourgeois parties rejected electoral alliances with the NSDAP until
1070 BDC, Pilimayer, 'NSDAP Raschau', p. 2.1071 FK, Nr. 104, 2.12. 1930.
1072 NSfS, Nr. 18, 6.5.1928.
1073 Ibid., Nr. 10, 6.3.1927.
1074 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1941, Februar 1928.
1075 NSfS, Nr. 25, 19.6.1927.
1076 BDC, Pillmayer, 'NSDAP Raschau', p. 2.
1077 The first four members of the NSDAP in Schwarzenberg were machine
operator Emil Lippold, accountant Karl Lehmann, shop assistant Paul Beck
and accountant Walter Weissflog (December 1923). The founding members of
the party branch in March 1924 were (three of eight members) master
builder Walter Ring, machine operator Emil Lippold, post assistant MOckel
(NSDAP Schwarzen berg, p. 10). The early leaders of the NSDAP in Atie were
the engraver Franz Pillmayer and Dr. Flirt. Also see footnote 1111.
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the late 1920s. However, when the Nazis began to win more seats
In local councils, state and national elections, more and more
middle class parties looked for co-operation with the NSDAP. The
WP in Aue offered the local Nazis an electoral alliance before the
1928 Reichstag elections1078 , and the co-operation of the bourgeois
parties and NSDAP in Raschau secured a bourgeois majority in the
town in early 1930.1079
(iii) The crisis begins to hit the population; the NSDAP becomes
the most active of all political parties (1929-1930)
The economic situation continued to deteriorate in 1929 (see
Figures 7 and 8 below). In fall the police reported high food prices,
persistent unemployment, a depressed atmosphere among the
population, the miserable situation of those who depended on social
benefits, and one suicide because of the economic depression.'°8°
One indication of the worsening state of the economy was the fact
that an increasing number of Saxons used the closeness to
Czechoslovakia to buy goods which were cheaper than in
Germany. 108 ' The AH Schwarzenberg, like ten other
Am tsha up tmannschaften, were bordering Czechoslovakia. Local
people made more and more trips across the border to enjoy
1078 NSIS, Nr. 19, 13.5.1928.
1079 BDC, Piimayer, 'NSDAP Raschau', pp. 5-6.
1080 STA D, All Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1942, September-Oktober 1929.
1081 A price comparison of basic foodstuffs in Saxony and Czechoslovakia at
the end of 1929: a pound of bread: 0.19 Reichsmark (Saxony)/O.16
Reichsmark (Czechoslovakia); butter: 2.30-2.50/2.10; potatoes: 0.04-0.05/0.03;
a litre milk: 0.38-0.40/0.35; one egg: 0.16-0.20/0J2; a pound of beef: 1.20-
1.60/0.90-1.10; a pound of pork: 1.40-1.60/1.30; a pound of veal: 1.40-1.60/1.30;
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Percentage of official unemployment: 1926 (II): 8.8; 1927 (II): 7.5; 1928 (II):
4.6; 1929 (VI): 5.3; 1930 (II): 13.3; 1931 (III): 19.2; 1932 (II): 32.1 (month in
brackets).
Source: 1926-29: STA D, All Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940-1942; 1930-32: Der
Arbeitsmarkt in Sachsen.
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Economic situation of large factories in the
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Note: The data for the graph is based on percentage for each year (month in
brackets). Source: STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940-1945.
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considerably cheaper drinks and food in Czech pubs and
restaurants. 1082 Local taylors complained that people used their
Czech competitors because of their cheaper material and working
costs. 1083 Shoe-makers were upset that people brought their shoes
to repair or bought new ones across the border.' 084 Farmers
lamented that door-to-door-salesmen sold cheap Czech food, like
eggs, in the region.' 085
 Tobacco traders complained that people did
not buy loose cigarettes any more but bought whole packages
across the border 1086 . The great misery and specific problems of
the border region became evident when the parliament in Dresden
discussed the topic in several sessions between late 1930 and early
1933. 1087
 The VSI too, frequently attempted to make the Berlin
government aware of Saxony's particular problems and called one
initiative "Saxony's misery - Borderland misery".'°88
A representative of the Saxon government painted a gloomy
picture in an emergency meeting of the VSI about Saxony's
economic crisis in early 1931: "A particularly unfavourable
situation exists in the regions which border with Czechoslovakia.
The predominant industries, like musical instruments, Posamen ten,
timber, and the toy industry, go beyond the border of the Reich.
The competition in the immediate vicinity is able to substantially
undercut its Saxon neighbours due to more favourable conditions of
1082 Ibid., Juni 1929.
1083 Ibid., Oktober 1929.
1084 Ibid., Nr. 1944, March 1931.
1085 Ibid.
1086 Ibid., April 1931.
1087 VdsI, 5 Wp, 16. Sitzung, 27.11.1930; ibid., 22. Sitzung, 15.1.1931; ibid., 43.
Sitzung, 21.5.193 1; ibid., 104. Sitzung, 14.2.1933.
1088 SI, Nr. 8, 21.2.1931, P. 142. The VSI complained that the Czech shoe
producer Batas imported more than three million pair of shoes to Germany,
mainly to Sa.xony, in 1928 (ibid., Nr. 33, 1930, p. 755).
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production in Czechoslovakia, lower taxes and wages, the usual
undercutting of the eight-hour day, etc. This particularly attracts
skilled workers and increasingly causes Saxon employers to close
Saxon factories to re-build them on the other side of the border.
Craft and retail trade are nearly totally wiped out because the
population keeps itself in good supply in Czech' border towns ... The
Saxon border region becomes more and more deserted."1089
The particular problems for local industries due to Czech
competition led to legislation which aimed to limit this. However,
the people continued to be able to buy goods, though in limited
quantities, until the end of the Weimar era. 1090
 Furthermore, from
the late 1920s there was an increase of the smuggling of goods like
shoes, leather goods, laces, gloves, and tobacco products from
Czechoslovakia to Saxony, which was difficult to control.1091
The local Nazis made a decisive breakthrough in 1929. Between 1.-
10. March their district participated in a propaganda campaign in
which eighty-four public meetings were organised in Saxony by the
headquarters in Plauen in co-operation with the NSDAP's
propaganda headquarters in Munich. 1092
 The Saxon leadership
initiated the campaign, organised the distribution of all speakers,
and designed and printed some of the leaflets. 1093 Heinrich
Himmler, who was in charge of the NSDAP's propaganda
headquarters in Munich, organised the allocation of national party
1089 'Sachsen braucht Arbeit!', ibid., Nr. 31, 1931, P. 93.
1090 In April 1932 the people who lived in the border region were able to
buy a limited amount of food tax-free on two weekdays. This was then
restricted to one weekday from 1.5.1932 onwards (STA D, AH Schwarzenberg,
Nr. 1945, Mat 1932).
1091 Thid., Nr. 1942, Dezember 1929.
1092 SB, Nr. 9, 3.3.1929; BA, NS 18, Nr. 5022.
1093 BA, NS 18, Nr. 5022.
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speakers, supplied the Gau with leaflets, and had the final say
about the content of the leaflets. 1094
 The organisation of the
campaign took exactly one-and-a-half months and was complicated
because several of the speakers from outside Saxony became ill
and had to be replaced. The Nazis in the AH Schwarzenberg held
public meetings in five different villages and towns and followed
up the campaign with several more meetings. The party branch in
Aue organised five meetings with the prominent speakers Dauser,
MUnchmeyer, Friedrich, Kunz and Killinger and several meetings in
the surrounding area. Feder, Loepich and Friedrich spoke in
Eibenstock and the local branch organised several meetings in
surrounding villages too.' 095
 The success was immediate and the
Saxon Nazis urged their headquarters in Munich to send them a big
batch of membership application forms which were in demand
from all areas of the state.1096
As in other parts of Saxony, the local bourgeois press assisted the
NSDAP. In early 1929 the SB openly praised the local press for
their contribution to the preparations for a Strasser meeting in
Schwarzenberg/Erzgebirge: "Newspaper articles in the local press
and the well known red placards announced the appearance of our
party colleague Strasser days and weeks in advance ... It has to be
emphasized that the local press accepted our reports either
shortened or in full."1097
Soon afterwards the court of justice decided that new S
 state
elections had to be held and the Saxon parliament agreed on 12
May. At this point NSDAP headquarters in Munich and Plauen
1094 Ibid.
lO95	 Nr. 15, 14.4.1929.
1096 BA, SlSch, Nr. 208, Plauen an MUnchen, 29.4.1929.
1097 See 'Stra1er in Schwarzenberg', SB, Nr. 8, 24.2.1929.
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quickly organised a spectacular propaganda campaign with national
and local speakers. The party leadership took the Saxon state
election very seriously. Gregor Strasser announced: "This election
will be regarded as a barometer of the atmosphere among the
population far beyond the borders of Saxony."° 98 Moreover, the
Nazis hoped that an electoral increase would make them the
decisive force in the middle of the Saxon parliament. 1099 This time
the organization of speakers was decided at a special meeting
which was headed by Gregor Strasser in Plauen in early April. Each
national party speaker was assigned to speak at a specific number
of meetings. It seems that local party branches, even small ones,
participated in the determination of the speakers and asked for
their favourite speaker on the list. The propaganda headquarters of
the Gau informed the speakers where and roughly when to
100 Once the local branches received their instructions, they
contacted the speakers directly and negotiated the exact details.
For example Heinrich Himmler had to speak ten times during the
campaign, including small villages. Speakers were able to chose the
topic of the meeting and, if a meeting place was not already hired
for a specific date, sometimes even the date.
Between 19 April and the election day on 12 May the NSDAP
staged thirty-five public meetings in the AH Schwarzenberg alone.
Kunz from Zwickau spoke at nine meetings, and eleven speakers
from outside Saxony (Kube, Himmler, Hinkel, Mossakowsky, Engel,
Goering, Dauser, Wohlleben, Oberlindober, Hinkel and Strobel)
spoke at twenty meetings. The Nazis also campaigned in a one day
1O98 Nr. 19, 12.5.1929.
1099 Ibid.
1100 BA, NS 18, Nr. 5022.
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propaganda tour with several lorries full of storm-troopers, mainly
from Zwickau. They handed out leaflets and party speakers gave
short 'speeches in the middle of market squares."°1
The Nazis fought their campaign not on issues specific to Saxony,
but argued that there was no remedy for the misery in Saxony and
that only a fundamental change in the whole system could bring an
improvement. 1102 The leaflets were nationally used NSDAP leaflets.
Some of them had a note about the state elections at the
bottom. 1103 Already in late 1928 Himmler told a local activist that
it was impossible for the party's propaganda headquarters to
consider specific regional features. 1104 The NSDAP tried to attract
the working class and middle class during the election. The local
Nazis noticeably stepped up their campaigns to woo the middle
classes after the May 1928 elections. In June 1928 the Nazis in Aue
campaigned against department stores and for the protection of the
middle classes 1 105, in September of that year the Nazis spoke about
the 'awakened middle classes' 1106 , and in summer 1929 the Nazis
concentrated on the disastrous effects of the economic crisis for
middle class business men and attempted to win members of the
WP 1 107
The enormous propaganda and the increasing economic crisis in the
Erzgebirge paid off. The NSDAP doubled its electorate from 5.9 per
cent in mid-1928 to 11.4 per cent in the AH Schwarzenberg in May
1929 (the party's average was 1.6 and 5.0 per cent in Saxony). The
1101SB, Nr. 16, 21.4. 1929. Also see NS1, Nr. 23, 10.6.1928.
llO2g Nr. 19, 12.5.1929.
1103 BA, SlSch, Nr. 208, München an Plauen, 26.4.1929.
10 BA, NS 18, Nr. 5004, IlimmIer, 13.12.1928.
llO5 Nr. 24, 17.6.1928.
1106 Ibid., Nr. 39, 30.9.1928.
1107 Ibid., Nr. 29, 2 1.7.1929.
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Nazis gained 21.2 per cent of the vote in Eibenstock, 13.2 per cent
In Schwarzenberg, and 12.0 per cent In Aue. These were their
strongholds in he region and places where they had campaigned
most. Mutschmann thanked Himmler in a personal letter for his
contribution to the "success, which was expected, but nevertheless
surprising in its proportion."1108
The propaganda campaigns in the first half of the year and the
following election success was the 'take off' for the local NSDAP.
After several quiet months during the summer vacations the
NSDAP completely outpaced all other parties in its propaganda
activities and organised more political meetings and attracted more
participants than all other parties combined from September 1929
onwards (this did not change until March 1933; see Figures 9-12
below). The occasion for this was provided by the campaigns of
radical rights for the referendum against the Young plan from
September onwards and for the local elections in November. The
campaign against the Young Plan was followed with particular
interest by the population. The police noted that "even among the
working classes voices were heard that Germany cannot fulfil the
payment plan for such a long time" 1109
 The NSDAP, except for one
DNVP meeting in Schneeberg, was the only party in the district
which campaigned for the referendum on the Young Plan and
organised twenty-three meetings around that topic. Twenty-one
point six per cent of the local population voted in favour of the
campaign on 22 December. It was striking again that the Nazis did
well in places where they held most public meetings. They
1108 BA, NS 18, Nr. 5022, Mutschmann an Hinimler, 18.5.1929.






























The number of public meetings of political parties in the AH
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Figure 10:
The number of meetings of political parties
outside election campaigns (including
referenda) in the AH Schwarzenberg
between 1926-1931
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Figure 12:
The average number of participants at public meetings of
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organised six meetings In Eibenstock between June and December
1929 and 30.8 per cent of the population voted in favour of the
Young campaign. Four meetings in Zschorl iu were rewarded by
34.8 per cent of the vote. Many people in the villages around Aue
voted in favour of the referendum (GrUna: 8 6.0%, Dittersdorf:
38.1%, Oberpfannenstiel: 31.2%, Oberschlema: 2 5.2%,
Niederschlema 2 1.6%, LOssnitz: 17.4%).
The new member of the Saxon parliament and leading figure of the
Saxon NSDAP, Erich Kunz from Zwickau, was the key figure for the
spread of the movement in the AR Schwarzenberg. l "° Relentlessly
he helped to build up the local movement and spoke at thirty-one
meetings between mid-1926 and mid-1930 in the AH
Schwarzenberg. The sudden increase of NSDAP meetings from 1929
onwards was brought about by Kunz and a small number of local
speakers, by three members of the Saxon state parliament (Cuno
Meyer, Dr. Fritsch and Killinger), and very importantly (see further
below), by prominent Nazi speakers from outside Saxony. At the
district's 156 public meetings held by the NSDAP between
February 1929 and June 1930 Kunz spoke twenty-two times, Horn
from Eibenstock ten times, the local teacher Gopfert nine times,
Weissflog from Schwarzenberg seven times, Hartwig from Zwickau
six times, Cuno Meyer six times, and Dr. Fritsch and Killinger both
four times. The core of extremely active local speakers was crucial
for the Nazis' propaganda. Between 1926 and July 1932, nine local
speakers spoke at 274 (more than one-third) of a total of 765
1 °NSDAPSchwarzenberg,pp. 12, 15.Kunzwasbornon 16.12.1897 in
Vielau/ AH Zwickau. He joined the NSDAP in 1922. In 1929 he became district
leader of Zwickau and NSDAP member of the Saxon parliament (Stockhorst,
5000 KOpfe).
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public meetings." Furthermore, local speakers like Weissflog and
Horn started to speak in Communist strongholds like BermsgrUn,
Breitenbrunn, and Mittweida."2
In 1930 the economic situation and the political atmosphere
deteriorated rapidly. The Communists and Nazis used every
opportunity to fight each other and the first serious clashes
between the police and unemployed demonstrators took place
early that year." 3 Innkeepers, small business men, craftsmen and
hawkers complained about bad business 1114 , and more and more
gloomy reports about depressed industries were compiled: in
Schneeberg the toy and embroidery industry had completely
collapsed because of lack of orders; in Eibenstock the production of
beadwork and Bun tstickerei nearly ceased; the people in
Bernsbach expected a total collapse of the economy; the crisis
continued in Lössnitz and worsened considerably in
Schwarzenberg, and bad business was reported in RittersgrUn, in
SchOnheide and in the villages around A.11S The economic
deterioration coincided with another state election in June 1930
and the police observed irritation among the citizens: "Because of
the confusing state of the economy the majority of the population
has its doubts which party they should follow."16
1111 Kunz (51 meetings, shop assistant, Zwickau, MdL), Gopfert (46, teacher),
Horn (43, draughtsman, Fibenstock, MdR), Weissflog (31, Schwarzenberg/AH
Schwarzenberg), Schuster (27, medical doctor, Aue), Undner (28,
headmaster, Lauter/AH Schwarzenberg), Wegner (19, Dr., Kirchberg/AH
Zwickau), Hat-twig (17, builder, AH Bautzen), and Engel (12, Dr., Werdau/AH
Zwickau) (STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940-1945).
1112 NSDAP Sch warzen berg, p. 25.
1113 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1943, März 1930.
1114 Piid. Februar,Juni 1930.
1115 Ibid., März, Mal, August, Oktober 1930.
1116 Ibid., Juli 1930.
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The NSDAP thrived in these conditions. The police recorded in the
weeks before the state elections: "The NSDAP's membership
number Is rising ... Particularly active were the National SocIali'ts
whose uniformed members appeared in considerable numbers In
the villages. They gave speeches in public In which they praised
their party as the one which will restore their fatherland
again." 1117 The Nazis also continued to woo the supporters of the
traditional Marxist parties and the unemployed. In Early 1930 they
organised a meeting for unemployed in Aue' 118, and shortly before
the elections they appealed to "all honestly fighting working-class
members" who traditionally supported the KPD to vote for
them.1119
While the number of participants in NSDAP meetings continuously
increased from 1928 onwards, the bourgeois parties were not able
to attract large crowds even during their few meetings before
elections. The DNVP's meeting in Lauter had to be cancelled
because only five people turned up in June 1930, and only twelve
visitors attended the election meeting of the DVP in Bernsbach in
September 1930. 1120 Particularly striking, in contrast to this, was
the continuous increase of participants to NSDAP meetings
compared to other parties (see Figures 9-12). By 1932 the Nazis
attracted more than twice as many participants to their public
meetings (78,752 between January-September 1932) than all other
parties combined (35,826).
The Nazis electoral performance in a village or town was still linked
with their local propaganda. It is striking that of the nine villages
1117 Ibid., Juni 1930.
1118 S13 Nr. 8, 23.2.1930.
1119 Ibid., Nr. 94, 15.6.1930.
1120 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1943, Juni, September 1930.
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where the NSDAP remained below 14.4 per cent (NSDAP's average
in Saxony) in the June 1930 state elections, five were small villages
where the NSDAP had not organised a single public meeting since
November 1925 (Jugel, Markersbach, Neuheide, Tellerhäuser,
Wittigsthal). Places In which the Nazis held most public meetings in
the twelve months before the state elections brought them election
results above the average of 20.3 per cent for the AH.: the NSDAP
gained 27.8 per cent of the vote in Eibenstock where it had
organised ten meetings, 27.6 per cent in Niederschlema (nine
meetings), 24.3 per cent in L.auter and 21.3 per cent in Zschorlau
(both eight meetings).
It was crucial that the local Nazis were able to attract thirty-seven
prominent national party leaders from outside Saxony - among
them were Feder, Munchmeyer, and Gregor Strasser 112 ' - to speak
in seventy-five of altogether 242 meetings in their district between
1926 and June 1930. Prominent Nazis pulled the crowds before
June 1930 and laid the foundation for the spread of the local Nazi
movement. Striking examples were a Feder meeting in Lauter with
600 visitors in early 1926, a Buttmann meeting with 300
participants in Zschorlau in November 1929, and a MUnchmeyer
meeting in Eibenstock with 750 visitors In March 1930. Between
1121 Albrecht (Dr., Altenburg, 6), Buttmann (Munich, 2), Bruckner
(Gauleiter, Silesia, 1), Dauser (Munich, 7), Dietrich (MdR, 4), Dreher (MdR, 1),
Engel (Berlin, 2), Feder (MdR, 1), Frank (Berlin, 1), Friedrich (Munich, 3),
Professor Gregor (Weimar, 2), Goring (MdR, 2), Gugel (Nuremberg, 1) Haage
(MdL, Prussia, 1) Himmier (Landshut, 3), Hinkel (Berlin, 1), HUttmann (MdL
Hamburg, 1), Kerr! (MdL, 1), KOhier (MdL, Baden, 1), Krause (Munich, 1),
Kruger (Haile, 1), Kube (1), Kunze (Berlin, 3), Loeper (Dessau, 1), LUtt
(Braunschweig, 1), Mergenthaler (Stuttgart, 1), Mossakowsky (Berlin, 2),
Munchmeyer (2), Oberlindober (5), Roth (MdL Baden, 1), Sauckel (1),
Schemm (3), Stöhr (MdR, 1), Gregor Strasser (Landshut, MdR, 5), Wohileben
(Gera, 5), and Zippel (MdL, Munich, 1). AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940-1942;
NSDAP Schwarzen berg, pp. 24-2 5. MdR: member of Reichstag; MdL: member
of state parliament; the figure indicates how often they spoke.
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1926 and the June 1930 state elections these prominent Nazis
attracted an average of 168 people to their meetings in the region,
while Saxon Nazi speakers were only able to attract an average of
97 people to their meetings. During that time nearly forty per cent
of all NSDAP visitors heard a speech of what was often a prominent
Nazi from outside Saxony. After prominent Nazi speakers had
boosted the local NSDAP in all major campaigns before the June
1930 election campaign, the local Nazis were able to continue the
momentum with their own speakers and a rapidly growing number
of activists. After Erich Kunz successfully built up the district from
nearby Zwickau until 1930, Horn from Eibenstock, who became a
member of the Reichstag in September 1930, became the party's
most important speaker in the district. Horn spoke at forty-three
meetings before July 1932. Franz Pillmayer became another
important local Nazi leader. He was branch leader from Aue, was
appointed to the Reichstag in September 1930, and became leader
of the district in early 1931.
Between the June 1930 state elections and the September 1930
Reichstag elections the NSDAP increased its electorate from 20.3
per cent to 23.9 per cent. Again they had campaigned on national
issues, arguing that a "decision in the Reich" was a "clarification in
Saxony." 1122 The main motto of the local Nazis, "Away with the
Young Reichstag", matched the national campaign. Although the
working class was the main target at national level 1 123, the topics
of the meetings were not specifically organised to attract workers.
In the Nazis' fifty-one election meetings there was only one which
I
1122 FK, Nr. 24, 24.8.1930.
1123 Paul, NS-Propaganda, p. 92.
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tried to appeal directly to workers (and also farmers), and only
three 'against the corrupt marxist system'.
The economic situation was becoming desperate at the end of the
year. The Nazis warned that "a catastrophe was imminent in the
Erzgebirge . " l24
 The police reported a "very depressed mood"
among the population in November that year and elaborated: "The
number of unemployed grows more and more. The long term
unemployment worsened and caused the impoverishment of many
families who can only barley dress themselves and are in debt. The
acquisition of firewood, potatoes and clothes for the coming winter
causes particular difficulties." 25
 Additionally, there were rumours
and fears of severe political disturbances in the winter in the face
of a helpless police."26
The Nazis continued to flood the district with an increasing number
of well attended meetings in which they attacked the political
system, the government, and particularly the SPD, which they
blamed for the bad economic situation in Germany because of its
ErfUllungspolitik. 1127 In December the police observed: "The
atmosphere among the population regarding politics is tense and
strained. Many people mention that only a National Socialist
government can create healthy and orderly conditions."128
1124 iiç Nr. 35, 10.9.1930.
1125 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1943, November 1930.
1126 Ibid.
1127 Ibid.
1128 Ibid., Dezember 1930.
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(iv) Economic collapse and despair; the Nazis dominate the
agenda (1931-1933)
Although 1931 was a year of no major elections, the political
atmosphere became more and more radicalised. Physical clashes
seemed imminent. Small troops of NSDAP, SPD, KPD patrolled in
Elbenstock, and there was a lock out in a factory in
Johanngeorgenstadt." 29 Meanwhile new activists flocked into the
NSDAP. In Eibenstock an SA was founded and a new party branch
was founded in Erla-Crandorf." 3° The district leader had to remind
zealous party branches that It was impossible to fulfil all their
demands for prominent speakers and that they should refrain from
contacting them themselves" 31 , and the headquarters in Plauen
reported a growing number of party activists who wanted to
acquire the speaker pass' 132• A clear indication of the growth of
the Nazi movement was the division of the former district of
Zwickau into two sub-districts. The AH Schwarzenberg and parts of
other districts north of it became the new sub-district of Aue in
early 1931 and an independent district at the end of the	 133
The police stated in February 1931: "The hostility between the
different parties reaches a point which will inevitably lead to a
civil war in Germany."" 34 The depression continued to worsen and
affected more and more economic sectors and individuals. The
atmosphere among small businessmen and shopkeepers, and
particularly among the unemployed and pensioners, was "very
tense" due to government measures in Berlin." 35 Workers, civil
1129 Ibid., Januar 1931.
1130 Ibid., Nr. 1944, Apr11, August 1931.
1131 FK, Nr. 7, 9.1.193 1; ibid., Nr. 265, 13.11.193 1.
1132 BA, SlSch, Rundschreiben Plauen, 7.1.193 1.
1133 FK Nr. 49, 27.2.193 1.
1134 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1944, Februar 1931.
1135 Ibid., August 1931.
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servants, especially teachers, were "very embittered about the
government measures" too. 1136 At the same time long term
unemployed had no wood fire to heat their flats, local farmers
described their situation as a "catastrophe", workers were appalled
that they had to pay high church taxes while rich landowners only
paid a small amount or nothing, innkeepers spoke about the need
to close their pubs if business worsened, and employers feared
immediate "industrial collapse" and expressed their resentments of
the reparation payments." 37 Most importantly, hardly anyone saw
a light at the end of the tunnel. The police recorded the atmosphere
of resignation and hopelessness at the end of 1931: "An
improvement of the economic situation is not expected, it is rather
feared that the economy will collapse completely."38
In mid-1931 the police observed that the high unemployment, cuts
in wages and financial emergency measures from the central
government "drive large parts of the working population into the
hands of the radical parties." 1139 Additionally, the NSDAP argued in
its meetings that particularly the lower civil servants and small
businessmen had to suffer most under the system of
140 The NSDAP was thriving on the people's increasing
disillusionment with the central government and flooded the
district with up to twenty-seven meetings each month. Although
the NSDAP organised an average of more than eighteen meetings
every month and completely outpaced all other parties combined,
they still managed to increase their average number of participants
1136 Thid., Oktober 1931.
1137 Ibid., Juli, Oktober, November, Dezember 1931, Januar 1932.
1138 Ibid., November 1931.
1139 Ibid., Juli 1931.
1140 Ibid., September 1931.
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considerably in 1931. For the first time, the average number of
participants at their meetings was higher than that of any other
party (see Figure 12).
The other political parties were not able to match the Nazis'
dynamic, let alone seriously challenge the continuous rise of the
NSDAP. The bourgeois parties' seven meetings between October
1930 and December 1931 (none of which was directed against the
NSDAP), contrasted sharply with the Nazis' 247 meetings. The SPD
concentrated its main efforts in fighting the Nazis. Twenty-three of
its overall thirty-nine meetings were targeted against the NSDAP
during that period. Their intentions were good, but in reality the
party organisation was disintegrating in the Erzgebirge and these
were pitiful efforts against the well oiled NSDAP propaganda
machine. The SPD had lost the vitality of the 1926
'Furstenenteignungs' campaign. The SPD, like the bourgeois parties,
for too long behaved like a traditional party of local dignitaries
('Honoratioren') which only campaigned shortly before
elections. 1141 From the late 1920s onwards it was unable to
respond sufficiently to the Nazis' relentless propaganda style.
Moreover, as government party and main creator of the system the
Social Democrats were more and more driven onto the defensive.
The Nazis in Aue predicted this well at the time of the SPD's last
electoral success in May 1928: "The SPD is visibly rejoicing in its
election victory. We congratulate them, after all they have to take
responsibility for interior and for foreign affairs in the future. And
1141 Walter Fabian, a former SPD leader from eastern Saxony described: "In
small and medium sized villages and towns, and also in large towns, one only
spoke before elections or on May the First. Normally the gatherings were for
a limited circle only." W. Fabian, 'Arbeiterführer und Arbeiterbildungs-
wesen im Freistaat Sachsen', Herkunft und Mandat, pp. 123-124.
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they will thoroughly fail again, which will open up the eyes of
many German workers again ... it was only a 'Pyrrhic victory'. It is
true that he SPD has still a comparatively large electorate behind
it, however, this is only a dead mass, which is only kept together
by the party organ. Opposite this is the strengthened NSDAP. We
have a fighting spirit, because we have the deep belief that we will
seize victory in the final battle." 42 It speaks for itself that the
enormous number of SPD sports clubs In the region - there were
thirty-nine clubs in thirty of the total of fifty-one villages and
towns in the district 1143 - did not seem to help the party's
propaganda drive.
The KPD took the fight against the Nazis more seriously too and
organised nineteen of its 123 meetings against the latter. Overall,
however, the Communists were more keen on exploiting the crisis
for their own purpose than throwing all their energies against the
NSDAP. Between autumn 1930 and the end of 1931 they gave
eighteen talks about the apparently exemplary situation in the
Soviet Union, organised at least seven meetings for the
unemployed, concentrated five of their talks on the treacherous
SPD, and held meetings on various other topics to attract specific
groups in society. While the bourgeois parties were inactive and
the SPD was more and more driven onto the defensive, the only
two dynamic parties left, the NSDAP and KPD, both aimed at
overthrowing the system. Furthermore, like other regions, the local
Nazis received invaluable support from the local bourgeois press.
The Nazis in Aue were full of praise for their local newspaper, the
right-wing Erzgebirgischer Volksfreund, and described the paper
1142 NSI'S, Nr. 22, 3.6.1928.
1143 GeschäftsberichtATSB 1928/29, pp. 216-2 17.
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as an "incorruptible fighter for national and vOlkisch concerns"
which had helped to spread the ideas of Hitler.'144
In the face of government helplessness and inactivity towards the
growing crisis, people longed for some kind of action. In autumn
right wing circles expressed the hope that the NSDAP would
become active and do something. 1145 Increasingly more people
favoured the Nazis' cry for a tough line in foreign policy and an end
to reparation payments. The local Nazis demanded resolute action
in the negotiations for rearmament and reparations against the
"arrogant French".' 146 The police observed: "All sections of society
sharply criticize the government and demand that all payments to
the victorious powers is stopped."147
For many people the rise of the dynamic Nazis seemed
unstoppable. Furthermore, their promise to re-build a strong and
healthy Germany seemed to provide the only hope in the middle of
a deepening crisis which seemed to lead to the destruction of the
whole system. Additionally, only the NSDAP seemed capable of
checking the perceived threat of social unrest and a possible civil
war. The police noted at the end of 1931: "Generally the people
express the opinion that the NSDAP will soon be the strongest of all
political parties, and that its rising movement cannot be stopped by
anything. The SPD seems to be on the way to perishing. The party
apparently continuously loses members who join the NSDAP, KPD
and the newly founded SAP. Regarding the political situation, the
people expect that the KPD will initiate large unrest ... The majority
of the peaceful population is very embittered about the bloody
1144 Erzgebirgischer Volksfreund, Nr. 217, 16.9.1933.
1145 STAD, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1944, Oktober 1931.
1146 Ibid., Nr. 1945, Februar 1932.
1147 Thid., Nr. 1944, Dezember 1931.
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terror of the KPD. There is surprise that the government does not
introduce decisive measures."148
In 1932 the crisis worsened further. Police reports confirmed that
the economic situation continued to deteriorate each month and
that business had reached more or less a "standstill"." 49 In
February only 18.1 per cent of all large factories recorded good
business, while 59.7 per cent were struggling and 22.2 per cent
were closed (see Figure 8). The social tensions due to
unemployment and poverty rose too. The police recorded in the
spring: "There was and still is great anger among those who receive
social benefits because of the cuts in aid. In some places in the
district the local police, sometimes backed up by the riot squad,
was kept ready on pay days to keep public 150 The number
of violent clashes between political opponents rose too. This was
particularly the case in strongholds of the KPD and SPD where the
Nazis faced stiff resistance from radical left-wing supporters. The
police frequently reported fights in the KPD stronghold of
Schneeberg and the SPD bastion in Lössnitz.1151
The swing towards the Nazis continued in 1932. The police stated
early that year: "The majority of the population expect that the
NSDAP will be the strongest party in due time and that it will take
over government responsibility in the spring. Only this party seems
to be able to change the current extremely bad economic and
political situation." 1152 A little later the police reported: "The
1148 Ibid., Nr. 1945, November 1931.
1149 thid., Februar 1932.
1150 Ibid., Nr. 1945, Mai 1932.
1151 E.g. two Nazis were seriously wounded by activists of the Reichsbanner
and KPD in LOssnitz (STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1945, August 1932).
1152 Ibid., Nr. 1944, Januar 1932.
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NSDAP Is winning more and more supporters through the
determined and purposeful appearance of the party's speakers in
its frequent meetings."1153
The KPD, but especially the NSDAP, organised many meetings,
propaganda parades, distributed leaflets, put up posters and
advertised in newspapers during the election for the Reich
president in spring 1932. However, while the NSDAP was rewarded
and mobilized the majority of the voters for Hitler in the second
ballot (51.3 per cent), Thälmann only received 17.5 per cent of the
votes and the KPD experienced a set-back in its ability to mobilize
their supporters. Winkler rightly points out that it is likely that
Thälmann's loss of 5,896 votes in the district between the first and
the second ballot (6.9 per cent) was caused by Communists who
stayed at home, or even voted for Hitler in the second ballot.1154
However, the disappointment of the majority of the local
population over the election of Hindenburg and not Hitler was
short-lived. When the national parliament was dissolved in Berlin
the police captured the people's revived expectations: "There is
hope that the new government, which is likely to be filled by the
NSDAP, will find special solutions to the economic situation."1155
During the campaign for the July 1932 Relchstag elections the
NSDAP's propaganda headquarters in Munich (RPL) gave out the
slogan: 'Germany wake up!' 1156 The NSDAP's fifty-one public
campaign meetings featured a variety of topics, like women,
religion, and the economy in the forthcoming Third Reich. The
topics of the meetings did not reflect the RPL's targeting of the SPD
1153 thid., Nr. 1945, Februar 1932.
1154 WjMer, Katastrophe, p. 529.
1155 STA D, All Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1945, Juni 1932.
1156 Paul, NS-Propaganda, p. 100.
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as main opponent. 1157 There was not a single NSDAP meeting which
had the SPD or Marxism as its topic.
The local NSDAP gained 49.1 per cent of the vote and only lost 2.3
per cent in the 6. November Reichstag elections. It was striking,
however, that the Nazis only gained about 32.2 per cent of the
seats in the district's local elections on 13 November. 1158 This was a
loss of 14.6 per cent within one week and clearly a result of the
NSDAP's negative attitude and comparatively bad organisation in
local affairs. In 1928 the local expert for communal affairs, Hans
Lenk from Aue, similar to his colleagues elsewhere, postulated the
NSDAP's tactics in the local councils: "Not positive co-operation, but
strict opposition!" 1159 Henceforth the Nazis never really changed
their attitude. The Nazis' tendency to blame the other parties and
the system for all problems 1160 , their avoidance of discussing
detailed solutions to the problems, and their sweeping promises of
improvements once they were in power, did not reap the same
electoral success in local elections as it did in general elections.
People voted for the Nazis to set up a complete new political and
economic system, however, in local affairs they were more
'conservative' and preferred the traditional parties to look after the
Street lfl front of their houses. The NSDAP's poor results in local
elections were not Surprising. An activist from the Erzgebirge
complained to the Munich headquarters about the NSDAP's poor
material on local affairs compared to the one by the Marxist
1157 Ibid.
1158 FK Nr. 22, 26.1.1933.
1159 NSIS, Nr. 24, 5.8.1928.
1160 E.g. see the articles 'Zschorlau, Erzgebirge: Wie lange noch?' (FK, Nr. 95,
21.11.1930), or 'Steinbach im Erzgebirge: em durch Marxismus ruinierter
Ort!' (ibid., Nr. 259, 6.11.193 1).
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parties1161 , and the Saxon NSDAP only Introduced a very thin
(eight pages) 'Correspondence for Local Council Members' in late
193 1.1 162
The economic depression continued in 1933. Innkeepers announced
that the "collapse" of their trade was "inevitable"; the whole region
suffered losses due to the lack of snow in their ski resorts during
Christmas and New Year.' 163 Hitler's appointment as Chancellor
enhanced the polarization of the local population. While the
majority greeted the appointment and the police observed a unity
among the citizens with nationalistic sympathies, the Left as well
unified in its opposition against the new government. 1164 Before
the Reichstag elections in early March SPD and KPD activists
formed the 'Socialist Fighting Union' and nationalist organisations
staged parades with "unprecedented participation" in all villages
and towns. 1165 The majority of the population voted for the NSDAP
(51.9 per cent) and reacted with joy, relief and great expectations
at the election result and the following celebrations (particularly
the 'Day of Potsdam'). The police recorded that many people
displayed flags from their windows and that "many eyes were
watering with joy despite the enormous misery."66
1161 BA, NS 25, Nr. 329, 23.8.1929.
1162 Thid., NS 22, Nr. 1067.
1163 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1950, Januar 1933.
1164 Ibid., Februar 1933.
1165 Ibid., Februar, März 1933.
1166 Ibid., Marz 1933.
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(v) The challenges for the Nazis in the AH Schwarzenberg:
working classes, middle classes, economic crisis and religion
The local Nazis faced four main challenges in their ambition to
become a mass party in the All Schwarzenberg: 1 to attract
workers and unemployed; 2 to attract the rest of the society, i.e.
mainly the middle classes; 3 to respond to a worsening economic
crisis; 4 to react to an emerging rival 'catch-all' party based on
religious sentiments.
Seventy per cent of the working population were employed in
industry in the AH Schwarzenberg. To become a mass movement
the Nazis needed to attract large parts of the working classes. We
saw that the local Nazis tried to woo the working classes, more than
any other group, before 1933. In spring 1931 they proclaimed
success in the election to the factory councils in Aue' 167, and a little
later proudly reported that the Erzgebirge, a former Marxist
bastion, developed into a National Socialist stronghold. 1168
 At the
end of the year the district leadership stated that sixty per cent of
all Storm-troopers came from the working class 1 169, and ordered
every party branch to build up factory council branches. 117° When
the Nazis embarked on their most favourite theme,
maladministration and financial problems in local villages and
towns, they mainly targeted workers who still supported the
'corrupt' Marxist parties in these places.117'
In a district with a high unemployment rate it was crucial that the
NSDAP included this group in its propaganda too. After the KPD
1167 Ft Nr. 95, 24.4.193 1.
1168 Ibid., Nr. 106, 8.5.193 1.
1169 Ibid., Nr. 283, 5.12.193 1.
1170 Ibid., Nr. 259, 6.11.193 1.
1171 E.g. see 'Zschorlau, Erzgebirge: Wie lange noch?' (ibid., Nr. 95,
21.11.1930); 'Steinbach im Erzgebirge: em durch Marxismus ruinierter Ort!'
(ibid., Nr. 259, 6.11.193 1).
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concentrated much of its agitation and organised at least seven well
attended meetings for the unemployed, the NSDAP was the
district's second most active party campaigning for out-of-work
voters. The Nazis only organised two meetings for the
unemployed' 172 , but put a lot of emphasis on portraying
themselves as a party which looked after the group. On several
occasions they underlined that the unemployed were the ones who
were hit worst by the economic and financial crisis in the
communes. They "unreservedly supported" Communist motions in
town councils for winter aid for unemployed 1173 , and organised
winter aid for their own unemployed Storm-troopers and party
members." 74 They even organised party cells and a Gau circular
for the unemployed. 1175 It is important to remember that even the
KPD only reached a tiny fraction of the officially 240,000
unemployed in the district in its 'unemployment' meetings at the
end of the Weimar era.
One of the most serious challenges to the success of the local Nazis
in attracting working-class support was the great effort the
Communists' made to describe a 'heaven-like' situation in the
Soviet Union compared with the crisis-ridden capitalist world.
Between autumn 1930 and the end of 1931 the Communists
organised eighteen public talks, mainly given by party activists
who had visited the country themselves, about the apparently
exemplary situation in the Soviet Union. The Nazis had to respond
to this. They agreed with the KPD about overthrowing the existing
1172 In Aue in February 1930 (SB, Nr. 8, 23.2.1930) and in Eibenstock in July
193 1(STA D, All Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1944, Juli 1931)
1173 FK Nr. 104, 2.12.1930.
1174 Ibid., Nr. 283, 5.12.193 1.
1175 Ibid., Nr. 259, 6.11.193 1.
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system, but they were forced to confront the Communists when
putting forward their own 'attractive' alternative to the current
order. More than anything else, the Nazis' success depended on
their ability to convince the masses that their vision of a future
state, i.e. a National Socialist state, was the only positive alternative
to the existing misery.
The local NSDAP reacted to the KPD's challenge and organised eight
meetings between mid-1931 and the end of the year, and another
six meetings in 1932, in which party speakers painted a picture of
horror about the situation in Russia. This was part of a Nazi
campaign throughout Saxony. Klötzner, a former member of the
Cheka, and the Reich speaker Richter from Hanover, toured the
state and spoke about 'The true face of the Soviet Union' from May
1931 onwards. Klötzner's meetings caused much publicity and were
able to attract crowds of up to 700 people in the AH
Schwarzenberg.1176
The Nazis were generally very quick in their reactions to any
serious challenge from the Marxist parties. When the KPD, but
particularly the SPD, stepped up its anti-Nazi propaganda after the
September 1930 Reichstag elections, the Nazis responded with
increased agitation against both parties and Marxism in
general. 1177 From November on the Nazis in the AH Schwarzenberg
targeted specifically the SPD with meetings like: "Death to the lie.
1176 Klotzner, his father and his brother, were former members of the KPD
(his father founded the KPD in Chemnitz) until they became disillusioned
during a visit in Soviet Russia. KlOtzner then was suspected as a 'counter-
revolutionary and just managed to escape from Russia. During NSDAP
meetings he appeared in the uniform of the GPU (successor name of Cheka)
and showed his Russian papers (including the GPU paper) to visitors (BA,
SlSch, Nr. 208, Rundschreiben Plauen, 22.5.1931).
1177 Ibid., Schreiben 30.10.1930.
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The SPD in favour of a health Insurance certificate (Krankenschein)
for 50 Pfennig'."78
To become a 'catch-all party' the Nazis also needed to attract all
other groups in society, i.e. particularly the middle classes. We saw
that the NSDAP stepped up its propaganda towards the middle
classes in early 1928 when it campaigned against a department
store in Schwarzenberg because It threatened small business men
and craftsmen. Kunz warned about "The destruction of the middle
classes"." 79
 The NSDAP, compared with the passive middle class
parties, increasingly took the initiative on the streets, in public
meetings and in the press. The Nazis' resolute stance against
Marxism and the perceived threat of disturbances and civil war
drove members of the middle classes to the NSDAP. Neither the
government nor the other parties was able to help the suffering
population or able to offer a solution out of the crisis (except the
Communists' vision of a Bolshevist state).
The way in which the Nazis responded to the catastrophic economic
crisis was crucial to their becoming the largest mass party in the
region. It was striking that the Nazis almost completely neglected
local issues in their meetings. The NSDAP only organised four
meetings which centred around local affairs (outside local election
campaigns) between 1926 and July 1932. This is surprising as the
local population faced very specific and extremely grave economic
problems from the late 1920s onwards. Employees in the
widespread cottage industry lead an appalling existence in the
Erzgebirge. A Communist parliamentarian described how mothers
and their children produced kid gloves twelve to fourteen hours a
1178 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1943, November 1930.
1179 Ibid., Nr. 1941, Februar, April 1928.
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day for a weekly income of five to six Reichsmark." 80 The centre
of this trade was in Johanngeorgenstadt where more than 1,100
people produced kid gloves at home. The same parliamentarian
discussed how whole families, father, mother, grandmother and
two children, produced chip baskets and altogether earned twenty-
two Reichsmark a week in Bockau and Lauter. 1181 Some local
industries were completely wiped out during the economic crisis.
The toy and embroidery industry totally collapsed and the
beadwork industry was nearly at a standstill by mid-1930. 1182 A
DVP parliamentarian reported in early 1933: "The once prosperous
enamel industry in the area of Schwarzenberg ... a significant
source of income for many workers, is completely wiped out."1183
lastly, there were the specific economic problems the district faced
as a border region.
There was thus a wide choice of grave problems in the district.
However, the Nazis did not organise a single local meeting on these
issues and were the least interested in discussing them of all
parliamentary members in Dresden. When they were forced to take
part in the debate, the Nazis made it clear that "they can only find
a solution to these problems in their own state" but that they were
willing "to give provisional support" to measures which were
designed to ease the catastrophic situation in the Erzgebirge."84
This was a clever and opportunist tactic because the NSDAP was
not caught in the insoluble problem of how to overcome the crisis
in practical terms. The Nazis' tactic was to distance themselves
1180 VdSI, 3. Wp, 31. Sitzung, 12.5.1927, pp. 1059-1062.
1181 Ibid.
1182 STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1943, März, Mal 1930.
1183 VdS'L, 5. Wp, 104. Sitzung, 14.2.1933, p. 4537.
1184 Ibid., 22. Sitzung, 15.1.193 1, p. 872.
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from all responsibility for the consequences of the 'corrupt',
Marxist 'November system' and to promise a solution once a
nationalistic and strong National Socialist state was created. None of
the other political parties had anything similar to offer which
appealed to all sectors in society.
The government and the bourgeois parties discussed the enormous
misery in the Erzgebirge and the border regions. 1185 But they were
not in the financial position to cure the problems of what were
largely old-fashioned and declining industries, and they sometimes
admitted this. 1186 The SPD tried to win over supporters with an
honest political debate. A Social Democrat played down the
competition by Czechoslovakia and argued in parliament: "The fact
that there is considerable unemployment in Saxony is caused by
our large number of small business, but also by the exceptionally
unproductive work of these firms." 1187 The speaker went on to
explain the main cause for the economic depression: "Nowadays the
piano Industry only uses about twenty per cent of its production
capacity, but not because the wages are too high, but because there
simply is no demand. Demand has decreased due to the spread of
mechanical music, radio, gramophone, etc. ... neither the German
and the Saxon economic crisis, nor the world economic crisis, is
caused by economically harmful Marxist union and wage policies,
1185 thid., 16. Sitzung, 27.11.1930, pp. 570-578; ibid., 104. Sitzung, 14.2.1933,
pp.4536-4541.
1186 A member of the DNVP stated that the problem of the border regions
could not be solved without the help from the Reich ( ibid., 16. Sitzung,
27.11.1930, p. 578). The KPD reported that the government and the bourgeois
parties declared in a committee that "it would not make sense to support the
chip basket industry" because there was not enough qualified wood in the
Erzgebirge and no chance to re-gain the lost markets against the
competition by machine made chip baskets from abroad (ibid., 4. Wp, 102.
Sitzung, 24.1.1929, p. 3805).
1187 thid., 5. Wp, 22. Sitzung, 15.1.193 1, p. 857.
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but it Is caused by ... the nature of the capitalist system. And on top
of this comes direct capitalist mismanagement." 1188 These rational
expanations did not comfort those who faced extreme misery or
anxieties about the future. 1189 Furthermore, statements like this
alienated the workforce In the region and only appealed to those
who favoured the replacement of the current system by a marxist
state. A rapprochement between the SPD and the majority of the
middle classes was not realistic despite the party's continuous
attempt to woo for middle class support. The SPD newspaper in
Mei1en enhanced the prejudices between both groups by
describing master craftsmen as "old, reactionary, opposed to
everything new" 1190 , and party colleagues in Zwickau warned
about a strike of the butchers' guild: "In the struggle against
injustice we will always fight on the side of the butchers, however,
if it is against the consumers interest we would make so much
noise that the struggle will fail."9'
A Communist member of the parliament was not reluctant to
underline what he regarded as the only remedy for the misery of
the people: "It will not help them if the Saxon government will give
them ... one or several million in subsidies. This will not help at all,
they will not get out of their misery but the misery will still
continue. One can clearly see that one has to tackle the root if one
wants to get rid of it, one has to get rid of the capitalist system
(very true! from the Communists). The capitalist system must be
removed." 192 Nearly every one in the region supported this, but
1188 thid., pp. 857-859.
1189 Bennecke, 'SA Sachsen', pp. 76-77.
1190 Lobmeier, 'Mittelschichten', p. 97.
1191 Thid, p. 98.1192 VdSL, 5. Wp, 48. Sitzung, 25.6.193 1, p. 1894.
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while never more than forty per cent of the population were
seeking a Marxist solution, the majority was in favour of a
nationalist, a '4ational Socialist, solution.
The Nazis' championship of a strong, nationalist state was decisive
for their popularity, particularly in a border region. It is generally
accepted that the atmosphere in border regions was more
nationalistic than elsewhere in the Reich. 1193 The NSDAP frequently
organised Grenzlandtage" 94 at which party members from Saxony,
Thuringia, Bavaria and Czechoslovakia (Bohemia) met near the
border to demonstrate against the division and exploitation of the
'November system'.' 195 The Nazis attempted to stir up hatred
against "inferior elements from Poland and Slovakia" who worked
in the coal mines of the Zwickau district1196 and attacked a club in
Aue which did not use 'black-white-red' flags at its festival1197.
The Saxon government did its part to enhance nationalist feeling
and anti-Czech sentiments. In 1931 they sent a detailed
questionnaire to villages and towns on the border for a
memorandum about 'the predicament of the border region' in an
effort to gain more aid from the Reich government in Berlin.1198
The questionnaire not only sought to establish the economic decline
and misery, but also the "danger for ... Deutsch turn on both sides of
the border ... and the Infiltration of the national Tschechen turns in
areas of originally purely German population." 99 The response
1193 Winkler, Katastrophe p. 698.
1194 Uterally, 'border region day'.
1195 E.g. see the Grenzlandtag in Adorf/Vogtland (NSiS, Nr. 35, 31.8.1928) or
in Johanngeorgenstadt (ibid., Nr. 42, 2 1.10.1928).
1196 Ibid., Nr. 27, 8.7.1928.
1197 Ibid., Nr. 32, 12.8.1928.
1198 STA D, AH Annaberg, Nr. 592-593, Notlage der sächsischen Grenz-
gebiete.
1199 Ibid., Nr. 592, Staatskanzlei, 10.6.193 1.
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from several border towns In the AH Annaberg, the eastern
neighbour of the AH Schwarzenberg, underlined the locals'
perceived feeling of thr'at from the Czech nation and their extreme
nationalist and racist attitudes. The town of JOhstadt reported that
"Tschechisierung proceeds in giant strides ... in several decades the
border region with purely German population will be infiltrated
strongly, maybe even predominantly, by Czechs. A mix with the
German population on the German side will be inevitable." 12°° The
town of Oberwiesenthal worried that "Deutsch turn was seriously
endangered abroad, and particularly at the border."' 201 The NSDAP
benefitted from these fears and gained 59.5 per cent of the vote in
Oberwiesenthal, and 54.1 per cent of the vote in Johstadt in the
July 1932 Reichstag elections.
More than anything else, the local NSDAP tried to attract people to
their meetings with slogans against the November system and the
misery it caused for Germany, and by emphasising the qualities of
their own party and of their leader Hitler (see Table 24). These
Table 24: NSDAP meeting topics in the AH Schwarzenberg between
November 1925-July 19321 (percentage in brackets)
Nov. 1925-	 June 1929-	 Nov. 1930-
	
May 1928	 Sept. 1930	 July 1932
total	 65	 177	 469
November system!	 29 (44.6)	 73 (41.2)	 93 (19.8)
Germany's misery
NSDAP/Hitler	 9 (13.8)	 33 (18.6)	 119 (25.4)
anti-Marxist	 9 (13.8)	 21 (11.9)	 46 (9.8)
specific group/topic2	11 (16.9)	 23 (13.0)	 89 (19.0)
specific party	 0	 0	 iS3 (3.2)
others	 7 (10.9)	 27 (15.3)	 107 (22.8)
1: topic of 711 meetings is known.
2: for categories of specific group/topic see Table 25 below.
3: SPD: 10, KPD: 5. Source: STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940-1945.
1200 Ibid., Johstadt, 19.2.193 1.
1201 Ibid., Oberwiesenthal, 23.2.1932.
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were broad themes which could appeal to all groups in society. At
the same time, the more the movement grew and a Nazi state
became possible, the more the Nazis felt obliged to explain their
party's positions on issues like religion, the economy, or workers
and women.
The skill of the local Nazis was to remain vague about issues where
there was no immediate solution, and to fight very determinedly
on issues where they felt they could argue a point. The most
distinctive feature of the Nazis' meeting topics in the AH
Schwarzenberg was the great number of meetings about the
relationship between the NSDAP and religion (see Table 25 below).
There were good reasons for this. The area was a stronghold of the
Table 25: NSDAP meetings which appealed to a specific group or dealt with












































































Source: STA D, AH Schwarzenberg, Nr. 1940-1945.
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Christlich-sozialer Volksdienst (CSVD), a party which originated
from the merger of two former christian parties at the end of
1929. 1202 The CSVD was a protestant movjement of nationalistic
workers, white-collar workers and former DNVP politicians which
stood for a conservative and social pietism and wavered between
the support for the Republic or the Monarchy. 1203 The CSVD gained
a remarkable 11.2 per cent and 10.6 per cent of the vote in the
June 1930 state election and the September Relchstag election in
the AH Schwarzenberg that year (its average in Saxony was only
2.2/2.5 per cent). This was a serious challenge for the local NSDAP.
The CSVD was a new party on the right which appealed to all
classes, i.e. particularly to dissatisfied voters of the bourgeois
parties, workers and women in the region.
The Nazis reacted swiftly and surely after the June elections.
During the September Reichs tag election campaign two-and-a-half
months later they organised three meetings about their stance
towards religion. Then, after the CSVD still gained 10.6 per cent of
the vote in the region, Dr. Engel from Werdau, the priest Krebs
from Plauen, and the local teacher Göpfert focused on this topic and
spoke at most of the twenty-nine meetings about NSDAP and
religion in the district between December 1930 and July 1932.
Between July 1930 and July 1932 the local Nazis gave twenty-eight
per cent of all their meetings in which they tried to appeal to a
specific group or dealt with a specific issue about their movements
relationship with religion. Additionally, the Nazis underlined their
attitude as good, Christian, German citizens when they called upon
their supporter to vote for the 'Christian lists' during the elections
1202 Falter, Wahien, p. 54.
1203 Ibid., p. 55.
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of 'parents' councils'.' 204
 It is also noteworthy that Der
Freiheitskampf introduced a small section 'church news' in
1932. 1205 The CSVD, like all other bourgeois pFrties, was not able to
compete with the NSDAP in terms of dynamic and propaganda.
Between September 1930 and July 1932 it organised five meetings
in the whole district. Its vote dropped to 4.9 per cent in July 1932
and the party ceased to be a serious challenge for the NSDAP.
(vi) Conclusion
We have attempted to provide a link between the deepening
economic crisis and the nearly simultaneous rise of the Nazi
movement in the AH Schwarzenberg. The district offers a typical
example of the economic crisis in the Erzgebirge/Vogtland, which
covered about two-thirds of the electoral district of Chemnitz-
Zwickau, one of the NSDAP's greatest bastions in Weimar Germany.
We have documented the fear and desperation of the local
population due to the crisis. The background of this crisis is crucial
to explain the rise of the Nazi movement in the region. However, it
is not possible to establish a concrete link between the particularly
miserable situation in a village or town and the strength of the
NSDAP. The severity of the economic crisis in a village or town
compared to its immediate surrounding area did not explain the
success of the local NSDAP. Some villages and towns in the AH
Schwarzenberg which faced a particularly severe depression in its
industries, like beadwork in Eibenstock, were NSDAP strongholds.
Others, like the depressed glove industry In Johanngeorgenstadt,
1204 FK, Nr. 112, 16.5.1931. Also see Chapter 8 (u).
1205 E.g. see FK, Nr. 123, 28.5.1932.
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were places were the Nazis election results were far below the
district's average.1206
Additionally, the Nazis' electoral performance was not 'inked with
the predominance of a particular industrial sector. The NSDAP
obtained the majority of the vote in the July 1932 Reichstag
election in places with metal industry (Beierfeld: 61.2%, Bernsbach:
53.5%, Oberschlema: 55.5%, Schwarzenberg: 5 1.7%, Zschorlau:
60.7%), textile industry (Breitenbrunn: 52.3%, Eibenstock: 54.8%)
and paper Industry (Niederschlema: 56.6%). Additionally, it did not
seem to matter for the NSDAP's electoral success if the small towns
were dominated by large factories or many small business places.
The NSDAP was strong in places where the majority of the
industrial workforce were employed in factories with more than
fifty employees 1207 , or where only a minority of the local
workforce were employed in large factories 1208 . Throughout
Saxony thete was no link between the grade of industrialisation
and the strength of the NSDAP in 1932 (see Table 26 below).
However, there was a small positive correlation between the
NSDAP's voting success and a high percentage of local workforce
employed in the textile industry, working in agriculture, or
working in cottage industry (see Table 26 below).
1206 In the July 1932 Reichstag elections the NSDAP gained 54.8 per cent of
the vote in Eibenstock, and 37.4 per cent in Johanngeorgenstadt.
1207 E.g. eleven large factories accounted for 75 per cent of the total local
workforce in Beierfeld, in Bernsbach the figures were 6/60%,
Niederschlema: 5 / 77.6%, Oberschlema: 4/66.3%, Schwarzenberg: 26/52.4% (A.
Zahn 'Die Standorte des Gewerbes in Sachsen', ZSäStL4, (1932/33), pp. 125-
147).
1208 Breitenbrunn: 1/25.8%, Eibenstock: 12/28.9%, Zschorlau: 3/45.0%
(ibid.).
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Table 26: Saxon districts, its percentage of workiorce in certain industries,
and the NSDAP's percentage in the July 1932 Reichstag elections:
district/town	 NSDAP industry agri- textiles cottage
culture*	 ** ind.***
AH Auerbach	 57.9	 68.8	 48.3	 5.3
AU Oelsnitz	 57.5	 55.7	 17.2	 39.7
AH Plauen	 56.2	 57.5	 21.1	 63.7
AH Marienberg	 54.4	 56.8	 19.3	 22.3
AH Freiberg	 53.7	 44.2	 32.5
Werdau	 53.3	 67.5	 51.5
AH Annaberg	 52.5	 65.8	 48.4	 6.9
Plauen	 50.7	 63.5	 50.0
AH Dippoldiswalde	 50.1	 38.4	 37.0
Freiberg	 49.7	 47.1
AH Werdau	 49.6	 58.6	 20.3	 56.9
AH Schwarzenberg	 49.0	 70.0
AH FlOha	 47.9	 63.6	 49.8
AH Gro1enhain	 46.6	 35.1	 39.6
Al-I Glauchau	 45.9	 67.4	 64.3	 7.0
AH Stollberg	 45.0	 68.4	 49.5	 8.7
AH Rochlitz	 44.9	 60.7	 20.7	 57.0	 9.2
AH Dbbeln	 44.7	 48.0	 25.9	 19.0
AH Mei1en	 43.5	 39.0	 35.3





AH Oschatz	 42.9	 34.9	 35.2
AH Grimma	 42.3	 41.9	 29.9
Bautzen	 42.0	 44.9
AH Chernnitz	 41.9	 77.7	 65.9	 16.7
Chemn itz	 41.9	 60.7
	 30.6
AH Kamenz	 41.9	 50.2	 28.5	 32.9	 5.5
Crimmitschau	 41.8	 67.8	 56.8
AH Bautzen	 41.1	 47.5	 31.7	 32.3
Mittweida	 40.9	 54.7	 42.5
AH Zwickau	 40.6	 61.9	 28.3
AH Borna	 40.2	 46.6	 27.6
Meerane	 39.6	 71.3	 68.1
Zittau	 39.6	 49.6	 45.6
AU Pirna	 39.3	 51.5	 21.5	 9.8
Reichenbach	 38.7	 62.5	 58.2




AH Dresden	 36.3	 53.5
Pirna	 33.5	 55.0	 20.4




AH Leipzig	 30.0	 55.7
Freital	 21.6	 70.2
*:> 15 per cent; **:> 19 per cent; ***:> 5.3 per cent.
Source: calculated from StJbSa, (1924/26); StDR, (1932); F. Walter, 'Die sachsi-
sche Textilindustrie', ZSäStL4, (1928/29), p. 256; A. PfUtze 'Die Haus= (Heim=)


















































If one takes the number of people in need (Hilfsbedurftige'209)
who received welfare support in the different districts of Saxony, it
becomes apparent that the Nazis' ability to exploit the economic
crisis varied considerably (see Table 27 below). In the KH Chemnitz
and KH Zwickau, the NSDAP received election results above the
state average in July 1932 in all districts and free towns where the
support for Hilfsbedurftige was above the state average. However,
the Nazis' performance was extremely bad in nearly all areas of the
Table 27: People in need (Hilfsbedurftige) who received aid in March 1932
(per 1000 citizens). July 1932 Reichstag elections results (figures above the





































1209 Hilfsbedurftige included war invalids, pensioners, unemployed who
received any kind of welfare benefits, and others (A. Betterlein 'Die Statistik































































































































Saxony	 80.8	 41.2	 45.8
Source: A. Betterlein, 'Die Wohlfahrtserwerbslosen in Sachsen', ZSäStL4,
(1931), pp. 220-22 1; A. Betterlein, 'Die Statistik der Fursorge in den
Rechnungsjahren 1927 bis 1931', ZSäStL4, (1932/33), p. 189.
KHs Dresden and Leipzig where more people depended on the
welfare service than the average. The NSDAP gained votes below
the state average in all free towns (Dresden, Freital, Mei1,en, Pirna,
Riesa, Döbeln, Leipzig, Mittweida and Wurzen) - except Freiberg -
and in the AHs Dresden, Pirna, and Leipzig.
The Nazis only received a voting percentage above the Saxon
average in three (Freiberg, Chemnitz and Plauen) of the ten
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electoral districts with the highest percentage of people receiving
state support (Pirna, Freiberg, Chemnitz, Freital, Wurzen, AH
Leipzig, MeW,en, Plauen, Mittweida, Pirna). 1210 It is striking that the
combined vote for the Marxist parties was higher than 45.8 per
cent of the vote (above average) in seven of these ten places (Pirna,
Chemnitz, Freital, Wurzen, AH Leipzig, Mei1,en, All Pirna). Of all
twenty-eight electoral districts where the NSDAP scored more
votes than 41.2 per cent (state average) in the July 1932 elections
in Saxony, there were only ten districts/towns where the payment
for unemployed and people in aid was above the state average (All
Freiberg, Werdau, AH Annaberg, Plauen, All Dippoldiswalde,
Freiberg, Zwickau, Aue, Bautzen, Chemnitz). There was therefore no
clear link between a high rate of unemployment and a high vote
for the NSDAP. 1211 On the contrary, overall the NSDAP did better in
districts where the number of people who received state support
was below the average than in places where the number was above
the average. The Nazis' average vote in the former was 42.2 per
cent, and 40.4 per cent in the latter.
However, it is true that the NSDAP was strong in five of the six
districts of the Saxon employment office with the highest rates of
registered unemployed (Chemnitz, Mittweida, Olbernhau, FlOha and
Plauen). 1212 Only in Freital, the greatest SPD bastion in the Reich,
1210 It is likely that fewer unemployed were registered in the Erzgebirge/
Vogtland than elsewhere because of the high number of workers employed
in the cottage industries or other small scale industries, most of who were
not organised in a union and entitled for unemployment benefits.
1211 This confirms the findings of Hanisch (D. Hanisch, Soziaistruktureiie
Bestimmungsgrunde des Wahiverhaitens in der Weimarer Repu bilk. Eine
Aggredatdatenanaiyse der Ergebnisse der Reichstagswahien 1924 bis 1933,
(Duisburg, 1983), pp. 119-142). Also see R. J. Evans and D. Geary (eds.), The
German Unempioyed. Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemployment
from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich (London, 1987).
1212 F. Walter, 'Die Konjunkturlage in Sachsen im Frühjahr 1932', ZSaStLA,



















did the Nazis have election results below the state average. At the
same time, however, the Nazis also scored electoral results above
the average in most employment districts with the lowest
unemployment rate (Oschatz, Dippoldiswalde, Reichenbach, Riesa,
Grimma, Kamenz), except in Borna and LObau.
Furthermore, there was no link between the debt the Saxon
communities accumulated due to the economic crisis and the
strength of the local NSDAP (see Table 28). In the KH Chemnitz and
KH Zwickau the NSDAP scored election results below the state
average in the indebted communities Gelenau, and Zwickau, but
did well in Schwarzenberg, Oberfrohna, Limbach, Klingenthal and
Elsterberg. In the KH Dresden and KH Leipzig the Nazis did very
disappointingly in the heavily indebted communities of Dresden,
Riesa, Pirna, Oetzsch-Markleeberg, Taucha and Hartmannsdorf. In
the KH Bautzen the Nazis result was good in the indebted
communities of Olbersdorf and Zittau, but bad in Neugersdorf.
Table 28: New debts per capita of towns with more than 5,000 citizens in the
AH Schwarzenberg and Saxon Kreishauptmannschaften in 1932 (three
highest and three lowest of KHs only) and election results of July 1932





















of the employment office because they often did not coincide with the
electoral districts. It is, however, possible to determine if the Nazis did well
or badly in the employment districts by comparing the former (see the map
of the employment districts in Der Arbeitsmarkt in Sachsen, Nr. 24,














































































































































Saxony	 248.9	 41.2	 45.8
*: election result is only fairly accurate.
Source: G. Hoffmann, 'Die Schulden von Land, Gemeinden und Gemeindever-
bänden in Sachsen, ZSäStL4, (1932/33), pp. 103-105.
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Overall, the NSDAP seemed to score better election results in
communities with very low debts than very high debts.' 213 It is
s.riking that nearly all places with the lowest debts in the state
(Eibenstock, WeinbOhla, Colditz, Bischofswerda, Adorf, and
SchOnheide) were NSDAP strongholds.
The AH Schwarzenberg was economically not one of the most
afflicted regions. The number of people who received welfare
support was below the state average, the number of unemployed
was only slightly above the state average, and the new debts of its
communities were not the highest in Saxony. Nevertheless it
became the NSDAP's sixth strongest electoral district in May 1928
and twelfth strongest electoral district in July 1932. The increasing
economic crisis provided the necessary background for explaining
this. However, other factors, like the weakness of the Marxist
parties and organisations, the press, and the behaviour of the
bourgeois groups were crucial in determining the strength or
weakness of the NSDAP in the individual towns and villages.
Overall, the findings suggest that, above everything else, it was fear
of economic hardship, social disturbances and the collapse of the
whole system that made people turn to the NSDAP. For many
people only the Nazis offered a promising non-Marxist solution to
the crisis.
Clearer than the direct link between the success of the NSDAP and
the economic crisis was the relationship between the Nazis'
propaganda and their electoral performance in Saxony. Before the
late 1920s, the NSDAP was strongest where it was most active, i.e.
1213 This seems to contradict Falter's findings, who argued that there was a
positive link between debts in agriculture and business and the electoral
success of the NSDAP (Falter, Wãh1er, pp. 3 14-324).
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- - - - - - Others
in south-western Saxony. In the May 1928 Reichstag election the
NSDAP scored election results above the state average (2.7 per
cent) in sixteen electoral districts who were all - except Zittau and
Mittweida - in the south-west. Only three districts (Mittweida,
Bautzen, Zittau) of the twenty-two were the NSDAP's electoral
percentage was above its state average were outside this area in
the June 1930 elections. From late 1930 onwards the NSDAP was
particularly strong where its propaganda completely outpaced all
other opposition parties. Eight of nine electoral districts where the
NSDAP received the absolute majority in the July 1932 elections
were in the Erzgebirge/Vogtland.
Figure 13:
Number of public meetings of political parties in the KH Leipzig
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1932	 J	 F M AM	 J	 J A	 S	 0	 N D
NSDAP	 156 288 478 356 103 137 286 0 56 267 259
	 0
KPD	 73 160 310 248 59 86 149 0 55 175 260
	 0
SPD	 26 61 174 165 20 34 167 0
	
9 158 242	 0
Others	 50 44 122 33 47 44 61 0 10
	 38	 65	 0
Source: STA L, AH Döbeln, Nr. 2409.
330
The KH Leipzig in north-western Saxony was an SPD bastion and a
region where the Nazis found it comparatively difficult to attract
mass support (its eectoral support always remained below the
state and Reich average). It is striking that the NSDAP's
propaganda was far less dominant here than in the KHs Chemnitz
and Zwickau (compare Figures 9-12 on page 293-294 with Figure
13 above). Furthermore, the AH Leipzig, a solid Marxist stronghold
and the district where the NSDAP scored a smaller percentage of
the vote than in any other AH in Saxony in the July 1932 elections
(SPD: 34.3 per cent, KPD: 24.6 per cent, NSDAP: 30.0 per cent), was
at the same time a region where the NSDAP was beaten by the
Marxist parties in terms of the number of public meetings (see
Table 29 below). The lack of a party network and propaganda in
the rural areas of north-western, but particularly eastern Saxony,
Table 29: The number of public meetings of NSDAP, SPD and KPD in the AH



































1: including SA, HJ, NSBO; 2: including Reichs banner, Eiserne Fronr Bund,
and Sozialistischer Freidenker, 3: including KJVD, Rote Hilfe; Antifaschisti-
sche Aktion, Rote Sporteinheit, and Internationale Arbeitshilfe 4:
unemployed, Jehovas Witnesses, Sta.hlhelm, etc.
Source: STA L, AH Leipzig, Nr. 2673.
helped to explain the low votes for the Nazis in these areas until
1930. The further east the electoral districts lay, the weaker were
the results for the NSDAP, particularly in rural areas. The Nazis
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were only able to do reasonably well in towns where propaganda
could be made by even a small group. This explained the party's
impressive electoral performa ice in Mittweida/KH Leipzig and the
eastern towns of Bautzen and Zittau in 1930. All three towns
possessed fairly active NSDAP branches and the Nazis made a lot of
propaganda in the months preceding the June 1930 elections.1214
Hitler, Epp and Wagner spoke in Bautzen during the election
215
However, the development of the Nazis' propaganda machine in
Saxony was not only a success story, but also one which faced great
problems and limits. The party's policies, the means for carrying
out propaganda and for responding to attacks from opponents were
often not clear and had to be defined again and again.1216
Frequently there were no common or even contradictory leaflets in
neighbouring party branches' 217 . Until the late 1920s the
1214 The NSDAP in Bautzen organised several meetings in and around the
town in early 1930 (FK., 8.9.1930), the branch held training evenings for
party members once a week (ibid., Nr. 87, 6.6.1930), and possessed the largest
and most active SA in eastern Saxony (ibid., Nr. 57, 29.4.1930). The district of
Zittau carried out twenty meetings in February (ibid., 12.3.1930), twelve in
March (ibid., Nr. 42, 10.4.1930) and twenty-two internal and public meetings
in May 1930 (ibid., Nr. 96, 18.6.1930). The Nazis in Mittweida also seemed to be
active in organising public meetings (ibid., Nr. 78, 25.5.1930). The NSDAP
gained 17.7 per cent of the vote in Mittweida, 17.3 per cent in Bautzen, and
16.9 per cent in Zittau in the June 1930 state elections.
1215 Ibid., Nr. 91, 12.6.1930; ibid., Nr. 99, 21.6.1930.
1216 Himmler complained in Plauen that the branch in Naunhof advertised
for a Sta.hlhelm band in a leaflet (BA, NS 18, Nr. 5022, 1.6.1927). The
Untergau Vogtland asked Plauen how to react to an article in the local SPD
newspaper in 1927. Plauen advised them to wait for an answer from Berlin
(ibid., 14.5.1927). The headquarters in Plauen complained about how one
party branch had organised a 'Deutscher Abend'. The branch had decorated
everything black-white-and red, however, there were only two small
swastika flags and the programme was signed with 'FestausschuI'. The
headquarters warned that they did not want to see similar 'military club like
manners' any more (ibid., SlSch, Nr. 208, 23.10.1930). In mid-1931 Plauen
asked the Munich headquarters how to react to the many letters they
received because of the large advertisement of a Jewish oil trust in the
VOlkischer Beobachter (ibid., 30.6.193 1).
1217 In 1927 the NSDAP branch in Leipzig reported that one of their
branches complained that they had problems in explaining a contradictory
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propaganda headquarters in Munich were frequently not able to
cope with the amount of work and sometimes also neglected Ga u
Saxony. 1218 Himmier apologized to the Gauleitung in Plauen that
only Gottfried Feder was able to speak in Saxony as prominent
party leader during the May 1928 election campaign. He explained:
"One cannot give more than one possesses ... Unfortunately I cannot
do more." 1219 Some branches did not follow the instructions from
Munich and went directly to the Munich propaganda headquarters
or party speakers' 220; some branches had problems in financing
the rent for meeting places1221 ; some speakers cancelled meetings
at short notice1222 ; some branches prepared public meetings badly
and wasted the time of speakers 1223 , frequently there was a lack of
leaflets and propaganda material 1224 , and some supporters of the
movement were put off by aggressive propaganda.' 225 Even in
leaflet from a neighbouring branch to local workers in 1927 (ibid., NS 18, Nr.
5022, 23.4.1927).
1218 Himmler apologized to a party activist in Leipzig for a late answer and
pointed out that the headquarters were too small (ibid. 2.2.1927). DOnicke,
NSDAP leader of Leipzig, complained to Himmier that he had not received the
schedule demanded three weeks earlier for the speakers (ibid., Nr. 5006,
27.2.1928).
1219 Ibid., Nr. 5006, 26.4.1928.
1220 Himmler complained to Plauen that the branch in Gro1enhain
demanded propaganda material from him (ibid., Nr. 5022, 23.8.1928). The
NSDAP branch in Chemnitz apologized to Himmier in early 1928 for
contacting national party speakers (ibid., Nr. 5006, 13.3.1928).
1221 The NSDAP in Leipzig complained to Himmler that the rent for meeting
places was extremely high in Leipzig (ibid., 27.2.1928).
1222 The NSDAP branch in Egidien complained that Haake cancelled a
meeting at short notice (ibid., 17.3.1928).
1223 The Munich propaganda headquarters asked Plauen to explain why the
meetings for Benesch were badly prepared (ibid., 1.4.1928). The Munich
propaganda headquarters complained in Plauen that the district of Dresden
had not prepared a meeting for Reich speaker SchOne for several days
(ibid., SlSch, Nr. 208, 11.6.1929).
1224 Himmler informed the NSDAP branch in Oelsnitz/Erzgebirge that they
had no more leaflets for local elections any more (ibid., NS 18, Nr. 5009,
15.7.1930).
1225 Several member of the Stahiheim in Plauen cancelled their
subscription to the FK after an aggressive article against their organisation
(ibid., Nr. 5018, 22.6.1931).
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mid-1931 the propaganda headquarters in Plauen complained that
"several branches still did not send in their reports at the end of
each month" 1226 , and that several speakers di not appear in
brownshirts. 1227 The Nazis from Belgershain/AH Grimma recalled
that "no-one in the party looked after them." 1228 They had to take
the initiative themselves to buy party leaflets and brochures in
Leipzig before the September 1930 elections. later on none of the
four neighbouring party branches was interested in organising a
party meeting in the village. The first National Socialist meeting
took place only when members from the established branch of
Naunhof took pity on them in January 193 1.1229 Most importantly,
the NSDAP leadership in Plauen only started to build up an
efficient propaganda apparatus after the September Reichstag
election. Plauen introduced the first propaganda circular at the end
of 1930 1230 , and not long afterwards ordered the introduction of a
propaganda leader for each district and even party branch.1231
Yet, despite all these problems, propaganda was crucial for the
success of the NSDAP in Saxony. The Nazis from Belgershain, a
small village in the AH Grimma, explained the increase from nine to
fifty-six votes (second largest party) between the June and
September 1930 elections through the distribution of leaflets and
brochures several days before the second election.'232
One of the best examples of the importance of propaganda for
NSDAP success at the polling station were the elections to the LK in
1226 Ibid., SlSch, Nr. 208, 22.5.193 1.
1227 Ibid., 22.5.193 1.
1228 NSDAP Belgershain.
1229 Ibid.
1230 BA, SlSch, Nr. 208, 23.12.1930.
1231 Ibid., 22.1.193 1.
1232 NSDAP Belgershain.
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Saxony in May 1931. The Nazis won twenty-two of the forty seats
although this was the first time that the NSDAP had participated in
elections to Agricultural Chambers in a whole state in Germany,
and even though the Nazis faced the opposition of the SLV which
had controlled the Chamber before 1931. The Saxon Nazis already
tried to woo the farmers in the 1920s and possessed a
sophisticated agricultural organisatlon by early 1931. It was
organised among the KHs and AHs. 1233 Similar to other propaganda
campaigns in the state, the Nazis only used a short time (ten
weeks) from planning to carrying out the election campaign for the
Agricultural Chamber. 1234 From mid-March onwards the NSDAP
headquarters in Plauen gave the order to concentrate propaganda
on rural regions' 235 , and the party mobilized a large group of
speakers with expertise on agricultural questions (eight Saxon Gau
speakers, twelve Gau speakers from outside Saxony, and additional
speakers from Gau Ostmark) 1236 for the actual election campaign
from late April onwards. Der Freiheitskampf introduced a special
supplement for the elections, and Plauen ordered the party
activists to deliver one leaflet and a ballot paper to each farm in
their district, to tell farmers when and at what time voting took
place, and to place a party member with ballot papers in each
polling station for late canvassing. 1237 No other political party was
able to match such widespread rural propaganda or could hope for
similar electoral success. The SPD did not even put up its own lists,
and the KPD only managed to put up its own lists in Bautzen and
1233 BA, SlSch, Nr. 208, Rundschreiben, 15.3.193 1.
1234 Ibid., NS 18, Nr. 5015, Plauen an MUnchen, 28.2.193 1.
1235 Ibid., SlSch, Nr. 208, Rundsclireiben, 15.3.1931.
1236 Ibid., Rundschreiben, 20.4.193 1.
1237 Ibid., Rundschreiben, 7.5.193 1.
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the Erzgebirge, though unsuccessfully. In reality there was only a
choice between SLV and NSDAP. In the months before the elections
the NSDAP avoided direct confrontation with the SLV in order not
to alienate potential voters. The SLy, which was close to the DNVP,
was nationalist and right-wing.' 238 The Nazis' campaign was a mix
between a concrete manifesto for improvements 1239 , and
emotional, nationalist and racist appeals' 240. Compared with the
SLy, the NSDAP appeared more determined, radical, dynamic,
unspoiled, fresh and promising. The FK explained the success in
the elections in the AH Zittau by the "untiring finicky work,
particularly the talks with the farmers which took place in the
various villages every evening." 241 The Nazis' agricultural
propaganda drive was even more remarkable considering that they
also carried out a propaganda campaign protesting against the
situation in the Saxon parliament in the second half of March'242,
as well as a campaign against the SPD's annual party conference in
Leipzig in May 1931.
1238 The former corvette captain Feldmann, director of the SLy,
promulgated in a speech in February 1931: "Two factors are essential for the
thriving of a Volk: living space (soil) and living power (growth)." He also
talked about a "final battle", a "leader" and "Schicksalsgemeinschaft" (FK,
Nr. 39, 16.2.1931).
1239 The Nazis put forward that the current Agricultural Chamber did not
pursue a coherent policy and that it had betrayed its constituencies
regarding the tax on milk (Milchmark). They promised to get rid of the large
bureaucratic machinery, to be economical and in close contact with the
constituencies, to close the small agricultural schools, to recognize the
Landbund if it remained politically neutral, and to increase the farmers
interest in the product stock exchange and cattle markets (BA, SlSch, Nr. 208,
Rundschreiben, 25.4.1931).
1240 The FK wrote that Germany can only recover through its "blood and
soil' (FK, Nr. 99, 29.4.193 1), that "agriculture will become the corner stone of
the Third Reich" and that "the co-operation of the farmers will decide if
German soil will be occupied by a healthy German race or slaves of
international Jewish capitalism" (ibid., Nr. 109, 12.5.193 1).
1241 Ibid., Nr. 117, 22.5.193 1.
1242 BA, NS 18, Nr. 5016, Plauen and Mllnchen, 12.2.1931.
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13. Final conclusion
The development of the NSDAP in Saxony - the most densely
populated state and an important industrial region - was crucial for
the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany before 1933. The electoral
district of Chemnitz-Zwickau, Saxony's most industrialized region in
which more than one-third of its population lived, was one of the
earliest and remained one of the most important NSDAP
strongholds before the Nazi Mach tergreifung in Germany.
Additionally, the NSDAP's electoral breakthrough in the Saxon state
elections in 1929 and 1930 were decisive for the development of
the party on the national level. It was here that the Nazi leadership
was confronted with the question of government participation for
the first time in May 1929. This paved the way for Frick's
participation in a bourgeois coalition government in Thuringia half
a year later. Furthermore, the Nazis' dramatic success in the Saxon
state elections in June 1930 was their first significant election
victory in an important state in the Reich, and a crucial step for the
Nazis' national electoral breakthrough in the September 1930
Reichstag elections. The June election campaign in Saxony was the
NSDAP's first centrally organised massive propaganda campaign
under the party's new head of propaganda, Goebbels.
The most distinctive feature of the Saxon Nazis was their skilful
exploitation of the enormous crisis which unfolded in the late
1920s. They were masters in opportunism, simplification and
deceit. Their actions were ruled by the overriding aim to come to
power through the ballot box. In order to mobilize mass support
from all classes in society they promised everything to everyone in
sweeping statements which were often contradictory. Detailed
proposals for improvements remained the exception and played a
337
subordinate role. This strategy could only succeed because of the
enormous crisis which hit Saxon society after 1929. During the time
of extreme misery, uncertainty and fear, many citizens were
attracted by the Nazis' appeal to their emotions rather to their
reason. The Nazis were anxious to point out that they - unlike all
other parties - had no links with the 'corrupt' and disintegrating
system, which they proclaimed they would sweep away and
replace with a strong National Socialist Germany which would serve
the interests of all.
The enormous crisis Saxon society faced after the First World War,
which reached its peak between 1929 and 1933, was crucial for the
rise of the local Nazi movement. The other main factors which
explained the Nazis' success in Saxony was the disintegration of the
working-class milieu - particularly in south-western Saxony -
which was ruthlessly exploited by the Nazis, and the survival of
traditional authoritarian mentalities (what we termed the
'nationalist milieu'), which were radicalized in the years of
crisis. 1243 The Nazis skilfully exploited the inability of the
traditional parties and the elites, in reacting to the challenges of the
1243 Geoff Eley explains the success of Nazism primarily as a result of the
crisis after the First World War, and regards the 'pre-industrial traditions' of
Germany as a complementary aspect (G. Eley, 'What Produces Fascism: Pre-
industrial Traditions or A Crisis of the Capitalist State?', in G. Eley, From
Unification to Nazism. Reinterpreting the German Past (London, New York,
reprinted, 1992), pp. 275-276). 1 find it difficult to put more emphasis on
either aspect. Eley's overall criticism of Kocka's 'one-sided' emphasis on the
"powerful persistence of pre-industrial, pre-capitalist traditions" to explain
right-wing extremism in Weimar Germany seems justifiable for Saxony too
(ibid., p. 257; J. Kocka, 'Ursachen des Nationalsozialismus', Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichre, (25) (1980), pp. 9-13). Far from industrializing rapidly at the
end of the nineteenth century, Saxony was one of the oldest industrial
regions in Europe and faced problems to adopt its traditional industries
(particularly the textile industry) to the new demands of modernization in
the twentieth century. Eley is right to point out that "the crucial problem
becomes that of establishing how certain 'traditions' became selected for
survival rather than others" (Eley, Unification to Nazism, p. 262).
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crisis. The more the crisis deepened and the middle and upper
classes were paralysed by helplessness, the more the National
Socialist solution became viable.
The activity of the NSDAP's mass mobilization machine and the
response of its political opponents also played a crucial role for the
Nazis' electoral success in Saxony. In places where Nazi propaganda
dominated public life and where they encountered least opposition
from their political opponents, the NSDAP's electoral performance
was most successful.
Saxon society produced great opportunities but also severe
limitations for the Nazis. A crucial explanation of why the Nazis
were able to establish a stronghold in Saxony were the enormous
divisions between the Left and the Right in the region. It was no
coincidence that the Vogtland, the place of the revolutionary
activities of Max HOlz and a very early Communist stronghold1244,
became the earliest Nazi bastion. Saxony remained a region with
sharp contradictions until the end of the Republic. In the November
1932 Reichstag elections, the SPD scored its best result in Saxony
out of all national electoral districts while the NSDAP gained its
second best result in the state, and the Communists also received a
percentage of votes far above the national average.1245
The Nazis were able to attract support from all sectors of Saxon
society. Most importantly, they succeeded - with some reservations
- in their most difficult task in Saxony: they established a
stronghold among the working class in one of the industrial
1244 With 9.1 per cent of the vote, Chemnitz/Zwickau was the best KPD
electoral district in the June 1920 Reichstag elections.
1245 The SPD gained 32.2 per cent of the vote in the Reichstag electoral
district of Leipzig, the NSDAP received 43.4 per cent of the vote in the
district of Chemnitz/Zwickau, while the KPD gained 21.4 per cent there too.
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heartlands of Germany. The SPD was by far the largest party in
Saxony until the early 1930s, the main representative of the
working class, and the most resolute defender of the democratic
system. The less widespread and deep-rooted the Social Democratic
party and organisational network was, the less dedicated, united
and determined was it ability to ward off and respond to the
enormous challenges posed by the Nazis and the disastrous
economic crisis, and the more successful was the NSDAP in
mobilizing working-class support during the final years of the
Republic. In the heavily industrialised Erzgebirge/Vogtland in
particular the Nazis made devastating inroads into the working-
class electorate.
The NSDAP also received invaluable support from large sections of
the Saxon middle and upper classes. Increasingly more bourgeois
clubs, organisations, newspapers, and even parts of the state
administration, sympathized with the Nazis. The growing
acceptance of the NSDAP in bourgeois circles - particularly among
opinion leaders with influence over the press, industry and the
state machine - was crucial for the 'away from the Republic
movement' and the Nazis' comparatively smooth seizure of power
from March 1933 onwards. The Nazis' aggressive ideology found
fertile soil and was often identical with the bourgeoisie's
nationalist, anti-democratic, and anti-Marxist values. Many
members of this conservative milieu, whether they specifically
liked the Nazis or not, Increasingly saw the NSDAP as the only
party which was able to carry out the main task, i.e. to get rid of
the Republican system and to create a new authoritarian state.
They regarded the Nazis as the only ones capable of creating order
in the growing chaos and bringing to heel what they saw as the
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increasingly radicalised socialist mobs who were physically
monopolising streets and squares.
Overall, the findings suggest that, above everything else, it was fear
of economic hardship, social disturbances and the perceived
collapse of the whole system that made people turn to the NSDAP.
The failure of their traditional parties and governments, and the
familiarity with the NSDAP's ideology made this a comparatively
smooth process. For many people, only the Nazis offered a
promising non-Marxist solution to a crisis of this scale.
The polarization of Saxon society into those who aimed at a socialist
society and those who favoured a nationalist, authoritarian society,
came to a head in the final years of the Republic. In this situation,
the Nazis offered something unique: the creation of a
Volksgemeinschaft to overcome the divisions within society. What
was unique was that they offered to unite all groups and classes in
German society, including left and right. They offered hope and a
way out of the crisis. A crucial precondition for the success of this
vision was that they were not linked with the traditional parties
and the system which seemed to have failed. The Nazis' appeal
centred around extreme nationalism. Both, a unified Volk and a
strong, authoritarian nation attracted people from all sectors of
Saxon society. It naturally appealed to the conservative/anti-
democratic groups. In addition, it offered a Heimat to those who
were uprooted, unorganised and not affiliated to organisations or
parties. Most Germans, including the working classes, were not
organised in political parties or their affiliated organisations.
Finally, a considerable part of the working classes began to support
the Nazis when they were not firmly embedded in a working-class
milieu, and their traditional parties did not respond to these deep
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rooted nationalist desires for a Volksgemeinschaft and a strong
nation which came out into the open during the crisis. While the
Marist parties championed 'internationalism' and 'class struggle',
the Nazis promoted strong nationalism and 'class unity' of left and
right.
From the late 1920s onwards, Saxony's democratic system
gradually disintegrated and a power vacuum developed both at the
centre and at the periphery.' 246 The only solution to the political
polarization was a 'neutral' cabinet of civil servants which
governed the state from May 1930. Increasingly more members of
the state administration, judiciary and the police drifted to the
anti-democratic right and pursued a line sympathetic to the NSDAP.
However, although Saxony's democratic system crumbled, it did not
fall. The final 'take over' by the Nazis was the result of events
which took place outside Saxony. Only the 'seizure of power' at the
national level after the March 1933 elections catapulted the Nazis
into power in Saxony.
Until the end, the Nazis faced several serious limitations in Saxony.
Open sympathy for the NSDAP was not all-embracing in any group
of Saxon society, not even in middle or upper-class circles. The
relationship between an important part of the traditional elites, e.g.
Schick's government and several leaders of the VSI and LK, and the
Nazis, remained lukewarm. The Nazis also faced limits in mobilizing
mass support among the working class outside south-western
Saxony. Furthermore, the elections in November 1932 showed two
1246 For a model of the character of the sequential breakdown of the Weimar
Republic or other democratic systems see Bracher, AuflOsung; and J. J. Linz
'The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Requilibra-
tion', in J. J. Lmz and A. Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes
(Baltimore, London, 1978), PP. 3-124.
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things: First, the NSDAP's electorate depended on the crisis and had
already passed its peak. Secondly, the great majority of the
population wa extremely sceptical about the Nazis' ability to do a
better job in local councils than the traditional parties.
Furthermore, there continued an 'unhealthy' imbalance between
the increase of the NSDAP's electorate and the Nazis' organisational
ability. The Nazis' electorate grew faster than their propaganda
output, and much faster than their ability to attract new members
(see Table 7 on page 109). Although the Nazis became the strongest
party in Saxony in the final years of the Republic, they were unable
to mobilize the majority of the population to topple the democratic
system in Saxony or the Reich 1247 , and they did not gain control of
the state or society before March 1933.
More than anything else, the investigation shows how complex the
relationship between National Socialism and German society was
and how difficult it is to make generalizations about this
phenomenon. The diversity among the individual classes makes
any discussion very complicated. It is hard to find a common link
between a female cottage worker who produces gloves in a village
in the Erzgebirge and a typesetter at a publishing company in
Leipzig (working classes), or a butcher and a journalist (middle
classes). Moreover, each village, town or region in Saxony produced
a different picture. Each of them exemplified a different emphasis
on the various criteria employed to explain the strength or
weakness of the local NSDAP.
1247 Several NSDAP/KPD referendums to dissolve the state parliament failed
miserably, and the Nazi were unable to mobilize the majority of the Saxon
electorate in any elections before the Mach tergreifung.
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Glossary and Abbreviations
ADGB	 Aligemeiner Deu tscher Gewerkschaftsbund (socialist
federation of trade unions).
AH.	 Amrshauprn annschaft (administrative unit in Saxony).
ASPD	 Alte Sozialdeniokratische Partei (old SPD).
BA	 Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
BA DH	 Bundesarchiv, Zwischenstelle, Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten.
BDC	 Berlin Document Centre.
ChVSt	 Chemnitzer Volksstimme.
GWD	 Chris tlich-sozialer Volksdien t.
DDP	 Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic Party).




















De u tschn a tionaler Han dl ungsgehilfen verban d (Conservative
White-Collar Union).
Deutschnationa.le Volkspartei (German National People's
Party).
Deu tschsozialistische Partei (German Socialist Party).
Deutschsoziale Parrei (German Social Party).
DeutschvOlkische Freiheitspartei (German VOlkisch Freedom
Party).
Deutsche Volkspartei (German People's Party).
Deu tschvOlkischer Sch u tz- und Tru tzbund.
Dresdner Volkszeitung.
Erich Kunz (personal files in BA DH).
Der Freiheitskampf (official Nazi newspaper of Gau Saxony.
First published on 1 August 1930).
NSDAP's largest regional administrative unit.
Regional leader of the NSDAP.




Jahrbuch der Deutschen Sozialdemokra tie (year-book of SPD).
Kreisha up tmann schaft (largest administrative unit in
Saxony).
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German Communist
Party).
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L K	 Lan dwirtschaftskammer ( Agricultural Chamber).
LNN	 Leipziger Neueste Nachrich ten.
LVZ	 Leipziger Volkszeitung.
LW	 Lan dragswahlen ( state lections).
Mach ter-	 Term used to describe the Nazis' 'seizure of power' after March
greifung	 1933.
Mdl	 Ministerium des Innern ( Ministry of the Interior).
NKfS	 Nationaler Kiub für Sachsen (National Club of Saxony).
NSBO	 Na tionalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisa don (National
Socialist Factory Cell Organisation).
NSDAP	 Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National
Socialist German Workers' Party).
NSF	 Nationalsozialistische Frauen (National Socialist Women).
NSFB	 Na tionalsozialis tische Freiheitsbewegung (National Socialist
Freedom Movement).
NSfS	 Der Nationa.le Sozialist für Sachsen (official Nazi newspaper
for Saxony between the end of 1926 [in print since March
1926] and December 1928. Published by StraFer's 'Kampf-
Verlag' in Berlin. Predecessor of the SB).
NS LB	 Na tionalsozialistischer Lehrer-Bund (National Socialist
Teachers' Union).
PP	 Polizeiprasidium (police headquarters).




Reich	 Empire (term widely used to describe the German nation
between 1871 and 1945).
Reichswehr German army.
RW	 Reichstagswahlen (elections to the German parliament).
SA	 Sturmab teilung (Storm-troopers).
SaStKa	 Sächsische Staatskanzlei (Saxon state chancellery).
SB	 Der Sächsische Beobachter ( successor of the NSIS and
official NSDAP newspaper in Saxony between January 1929
and June 1930. Published by StraIer's 'Kampf-Verlag').
SI	 Sãchsische Industrie (weekly newspaper of VSI).





























Sächsisches Landvolk (Saxon Peasant Party; affiliated with
the DNVP).
Säch sische Landwirtschaftliche Zei tschrift (Saxon
agricultural newspaper).
Sozialdemokra tische Pa.rtei Deutschlands (Social
Democratic Party of Germany).
Sch u tzstaffeln (elite Nazi organisation).
Staatsarchiv Dresden.
Nationalist ex-servicemen' s organization.
Staatsarchiv Leipzig.
Stadtarchiv Leipzig.
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs.
Statistisches Ja.hrbuch des Deutschen Reichs.
Statistisches Jahrbuch für den Freistaat Sachsen.
Sächsisches Volksblatt (Zwickau).
Fatherland; one's native country.
VOlkischer Beobachter (official NSDAP newspaper).
Verhandlungen des Sachsischen Landtages (minutes of
the Saxon state parliament).





Verband Sachsischer Industrieller (organisation of the
Saxon industrialists').
Wirtschaftspartei (Business Party).
Wahiperiode (time between elections).
Zeitung sausschnittsammlung (newspaper clippings
collection).
Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung Berlin
(former 'Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED').
Zeitschrift des Sächsischen Statistischen Landesamtes.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Conditions laid down by the NSDAP for toleratiig the BUnger
government in early July 1929 (read out by Cuno Meyer before the second
vote for the president in the parliament in Saxony on 4.7.1929):
1. Da1 die sächsische Regierung sich im Reichsrat gegen alle Vertrage,
insbesondere gegen das Pariser Abkommen und alle daraus resultierenden
Malcnahmen einsetzt, durch die das deutsche Volk in weitere politische und
wirtschaftliche Abhangigkeit vom internationalen Bank- und Börsen-
kapitalismus kommt.
2. DaI die sachsische Regierung zur Durchfuhrung von SparmaFnahmen
bereit ist, und zwar durch Vereinfachung des behördlichen Verwaltungs-
apparates, insbesondere durch Einziehung der sachsischen Gesandtschaften
in Berlin und Munchen, und weiter eine Herabsetzung der Gehalter und
Streichung der Pensionen für nicht aus dem Berufsbeamtentum hervor-
gegangene Minister veranlaKt.
3. DaF sich die sachsische Regierung zur Ausarbeitung eines ausreichenden
und umfassenden Arbeitsprogrammes bereiterkiart, das geeignet ist, die
Erwerbslosigkeit zu beheben und die sachsische Industrie neu zu beleben
und bei Vergebung von Staatsauftragen die sächsische Industrie in erster
Linie zu berücksichtigen.
4. DaK sich die sachsische Regierung bereit erklart, die Mietzinssteuer rest-
los dem Wohnungsbau zuzuführen und darUber hinaus noch Mittel bereit-
zustellen, mit deren Hilfe eine Beseitigung der Wohnungsnot erreicht wird.
5. Da1 die sächsische Regierung billige Staatskredite für die Landwirtschaft
bereitstellt.
6. DaF die sachsische Regierung bereit ist, sich aktiv für den Schutz des
Mitteistandes im Handwerk, Handel und Gewerbe einzusetzen und insbeson-
dere die Beseitigung der steuerlichen VergUnstigungen der Konsumvereine
und der Sonderbesteuerung der Warenhauser sorgt.
Weiter fordern wir:
Das Innenministerium und Kultusministerium dan nicht mit einem
Demokraten besetzt werden, weil wir sonst nicht die Gewähr haben, da1
unsere Bewegung gleichgeachtet wird wie jede andere Partei oder
Bewegung. Em demokratischer Innenminister gibt uns nicht die Gewahr,
da1 wir mit gleichem MaK gemessen werden, weil eben hinter der
demokratischen Partei das jUdische Gro1kapita1 steht.
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DaI ist unsere Grundbedingung.
Ich erinnere dabei an das Verbot des Wiking, das Redeverbot Adolf Hitlers,
der in Plauen und Zwickau gesprochen hatte, und nicht einmal em
Zwischenruf war hierbei erfolgt.
Wir Nationalsozialisten wollen keinen Mmisterposten. Soliten Sie aber der
Meinung sein, daI wir uns von der Verantwortung drUcken wollen, so irren
Sie sich. Wenn sie es wunschen, da1 wir mitregieren, so kommt für uns nur
das Innenministerium in Frage. Und zwar werden wir einen Fachmann
stellen, der es wirklich versteht, und nicht auf Grund seines Parteibuches
sich einbildet, Minister spielen zu konnen. (Wir hätten Pg. Dr. Frick
prasentiert.)
Source: 'Unsere Politik im Landtag' (M. v. Killinger), SB, Nr. 28, 14.7.1929.
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Appendix 2: Mücke's letter to SPD and KPD from 29 June 1929:
An die
Herren Vorsitzenden der sozialdemokratischen und kommunistischen
Fraktion im sächsischen Landtage
Dresden, Landtag
Sehr geehrte Herren!
Die Entwicklung der innerpolitischen Ereignisse, sie sich an die Wahi des
jetzigen Ministerprasidenten geknUpft haben, veranlassen die Reichs-
leitung der N.S.D.A.P. in Ueberlegung einzutreten, ob die zukunftige
Regierung uberhaupt lebensfahig ist.
Ich darf mir daher erlauben, als Abgeordneter der 'Sektion Reichsleitung'
der N.S.D.A.P. mit Ermachtigung und irn Auftrage meiner Parteileitung an
Sie heranzutreten mit der Frage, ob Sie geneigt sind, mit mir Verbindung
aufzunehmen zur Kiarung der Frage, ob eine UnterstUtzung einer von
Ihren Parteien gebildeten sächsischen Regierung durch die nationalso-
zialistische Fraktion sich ermoglichen la1t.
Die Reichsleitung legt Wert auf die Kiarung dieser Angelegenheit, urn mit
der Landtagsfraktion entsprechend in Verbindung treten zu kOnnen. Die
Herren werden sich aus dern vorigen Landtage erinnern, daI dieselbe Frage
schon einmal gespielt hat, und da1 damals mir Zusicherung gemacht
werden konnten, die uns ermoglicht haben wUrden, eine von Ihren
Parteien gebildete Regierung zu unterstUtzen.
Mehr oder weniger dieselben Punkte wurden ja auch heute zur Debatte
stehen. Ich dan sie daher im Kernpunkte wiederholen. Danials steilte ich
zur Bedingung in erster Linie die Vermeidung jedes Ausnahmegesetzes
gegen meine Partei, Vermeidung jedes Verbotes oder Auflosung aus
Gründen, die bei anderen Parteien unter gleichen Verhaltnissen nicht zum
Verbot oder zur Auflosung führten, Vermeidung alter Polizeischikanen usw.
usw., Vermeidung einer Beschrankung der AeuIerung der
Meinun g sfreiheit.
Soilten die Herren geneigt sein, die angeregte Besprechung zu haben, so
ware ich für eine gefallige Benachrichtung, gegebenfalls fernmUndlich
(37 490), zu Dank verpflichtet.
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Ich dan annehmen, daic em volliges Schweigen auf mein Schreiben als
Ablehnung aufzufassen ist und da1 ich dann dementsprechend meiner
Reichsleitung Bericht erstatten könnte.
Die nationalsozialistische Fraktion hat Kenntniss.
Ich darf ergebenst bitten, dieses Schreiben als vertraulich zu behandein.
Mit vorzUglicher Hochachtung
thr ergebenster
gez.: Helimuth v. Mucke
Abgeordneter der "Sektion Reichsleitung" Der N.S.D.A.P.
Source: Sächsisches Volksblatt, Nr. 153, 4.7.1929.
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Appendix 3: Conditions laid down by the NSDAP for tolerating the Schieck
government in February 1930:
Die NSDAP legt keinen Wert darauf, daft in Sachsen, das im Mai 1929
antimarxistisch gewahlt hat, eine gro1e Koalition unter Emschlu1 der
Marxisten gebildet wird.
Mit der Person des Präsidenten des Staatsrechnungshofes Herrn Schieck als
Ministerprasidenten sind wir im aligemeinen einverstanden. Nach seiner
bisherigen Tatigkeit glauben wir erwarten zu konnen, daK er gewilit ist, im
sachsischen Regierungs- und Verwaltungsapparat wirklich saubere
Verhaltnisse zu schaffen.
Wir sind bereit, unter folgenden Bedingungen in Verhandlungen zur
Bildung einer Regierung unter Fuhrung des Herrn Prasidenten Schieck
einzutreten:
1. Kein Marxist einschlieIlich Aitsozialisten in der Sachsischen Regierung.
2. Bei alien entscheidenden politischen Fragen, bei Berufung von
Ministerien, hoheren Regierungsbeamten usw. ist der interfraktionelle
AusschuF einzuberufen. Die Regierung hat die die Regierung stUtzenden
Parteien Uber die beabsichtigten wichtigsten MaKnahmen zu unterrichten.
3. Die sachsische Regierung hat sich im Reichsrat gegen alle Vertrage,
durch die das deutsche Volk in weitere politische und wirtschaftliche
Abhangigkeit vom internationalen Bank- und Borsenkapitalismus kommt,
einzusetzen.
4. DurchfUhrung von SparmaInahmen, Vereinfachung des behOrdlichen
Verwaltungsapparates, Einziehung der Sächsischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin,
Herabsetzung der Gehälter und Streichung der Pensionen für nicht aus dem
Berufsbeamtentum hervorgegangene Minister.
5. Es ist em ausreichendes und umfassendes Arbeitsbeschaffungsprogramm
auszuarbeiten, das geeignet ist, die Erwerbslosigkeit zu beheben und die
sachsische Industne in erster Lmie zu berucksichtigen. Die Mietzinssteuer
ist restios dem Wohnungsbau zuzufuhren und daruber hinaus noch Mittel
bereit zu stellen, mit deren Hilfe eine Beseitigung der Wohnungsnot
erreicht wirci.
6. Der Landwirtschaft sind billige Staatskredite bereitzustellen.
7. Schutz des Mitteistandes in Handwerk, Handel und Gewerbe, Beseitigung
der steuerlichen VergUnstigung der Konsumvereine sowie
Sonderbesteuerung der Warenhauser.
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Wir betonen, da1 eine Besetzung eines Ministeriums durch die NSDAP unter
den jetzigen Verhältnissen nicht in Frage kommt. Wir erwarten aber, daIs
unseren Wunschen bei Besetzung der einzelnen Ministerien Rechnung
getragen wird.
Mit deutschem Gru1! Gez. v. Killinger
Source: SB, 1/2.3.1930.
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Appendix 4: Declaration of the NSDAP before the state election in Saxony on
22 June 1930:
Vom Smn des 22. Juni: ... Die sächsische Regierung hat die Erwartungen des
sachsischen Volkes enttäuscht ... (als Gegensatz dazu) ThUringen: fUhrt
Schulgebete wieder em, hat Verordnungen gegen kulturzerstOrende
Nigger'kultur', protestiert gegen Young, hat keine marxistischen Bonzen als
Beamte, hat aktive MaFnahmen gegen katastrophale Reichspolitik, kuscht
nicht vor der marxistisch verseuchten Reichsregierung ... Das Bestreben
eines jeden wahrhaften Sachsen muFte daher sein, dafur zu sorgen, daLi
Sachsen als 2. deutscher 'Frei'-Staat gleich ThUringen em Boliwerk gegen
Bolschewismus und Sklaverei wird. Jeder Sachse mü1te dafUr sorgen, da1
auch in Sachsen wie in Thuringen wahre Volkspolitik getrieben wird. Dann
wird die Sklaverei nur noch kurze Zeit dauern wenn so em Land nach dem
anderen erobert wurde ... Zwar, das bekennen wir Nationalsozialisten, der
Parlamentarismus vermag die deutsche Schicksaifrage nicht endgUltig zu
lösen. Aber es ist em Weg offen zur Macht, zur Freiheit und Brot. Wir
Nationalsozialisten werden das durchfuhren, was die Interessen aller
schaffenden deutschen Volksgenossen erfordert, das steht fest! Wir lehnen
es aber auch im Gegensatz zu manchen anderen Parteien und
Interessengruppen ab, unsinnige Wahlversprechungen aufzustellen. Das
gesamte noch seibstandig denkende deutsche Volk weth>, was wir wollen, und
das genügt. Namlich:
Kampf
für Freiheit und Brot, gegen Marxismus und Kapitalismus
fur Beseitigung der Arbeitslosigkeit, der Wohnungsnot und der
Wirtschaftkrise,
gegen Youngversklavung und Erfullungspolitik, fur Wahrheit, einen
sauberen Volksstaat und Christentum,
gegen Luge, Korruption und Antichristentum,
für em starkes, einiges, deutsches Volk aller Berufe,
gegen Parteiunwesen, Zersplitterung und ihre Folgen,
für deutsche Kultur und deutschen Glauben,
gegen Bolschewismus und Untergang!
Seid thr, deutsche Volksgenossen, mit uns Nationalsozialisten in diesen
Forderungen einig, dann zieht auch die Folgerungen aus eurer Besinnung.
Wenn ihr mit den jetzigen Zustanden nicht mehr zufrieden seid, dann wahlt
mit uns Liste 7.
Source: SB, Nr. 95, 17.6.1930.
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Appendix 5: KPD report about the political situation in Saxony after the
Nazi Machrergreifung (written on 26 November 1933):
Nach den ersten ErschUtterungen der Organisationseinheiten nach dem
Marz, ist die Sammiung der Mitglieder und der Aufbau der Organisation
bezirklich wie örtlich im Unterbezirk Leipzig am besten gelungen ... 25
Funktionare mit finanziellen Zuschu1en waren im Bezirk tatig. Bis Juli kam
eine gedruckte Zeitung heraus Im Oktober wurden fur Leipzig-Stadt allein
in 3 Tagen 17 Zellenversammlungen festgelegt RH hat von ihren
Organisations Einheiten in Leipzig uber 10000 Handzettel und Streuzettel
herausgegeben ... Im Unterbezirk Leipzig befanden sich 2
Konzentrationslager: Sachsenburg fur 'Besserungsfahige' (keine strengen
Kontrollen); Lager Kolditz ('Schwerbesserungsfähige') ... Die NS-Presse
berichtete Uber 20000 Haftlinge in den Konzentrationalagern
Die SPD im Bezirk: Von einer Arbeit der SPD im Bezirke war nichts zu
verspuren ... Die Arbeitsmitglieder der SPD sind sehr gleichgultig und
kampfscheu, aber uns und unserer Arbeit nicht so feindlich, wie vor der
MachtUbernahme der Nazis. Aus den Betrieben smd durch die Nazis nicht
nur die letzten Kommunisten, sondern auch alle SPD-Arbeiter entlassen
worden. Wenn frUher in den stadtischen Betrieben Gas-Wasser-
Elektrizitätswerke, Stra1,enbahn, Schlachthofe usw. Domanen der SPD
waren, so haben sich jetzt die Nazis dort eingenistet ... (SPD-Arbeiter die
hinausgeworfen wurden) haben sich trotz des Entzuges ihrer
Existenzgrundlagen durch die Nazis noch nicht revolutionär eingestellt. Der
ältere, der rUckstandigere Teil derselben, glaubt noch an em
'Abwirtschaften Hitlers'. Fin gro1er Teil jUngerer SPD-Arbeiter kam zur
Partei. In Leipzig-SUd, dem Stadtteil 11, wurden bei einem Mitgliederstand
der Partei von 180 - 40 fruhere SPD-Arbeiter nach dem Marz neu in unsere
Partei aufgenommen ... arbeiten aktiv mit ... Stadtteil gibt 14-tagig eine gute
Zeitung in 200 Exemplaren heraus..
Nazi und SA: Die Unzufriedenheit der Naziwahler nahm besonders unter den
kleinburgerlichen Anhang und proletarischen Elementen zu ... auf dem
Lande dieselben Erscheinungen ... Merkmale: Jetzt nur auf jedem 15-20
Fahrrad Hakenkreuzwimpel, nicht mehr viele Nazifahnen von Häusern. In.
der SA ist fast dauernd Zersetzung. Im KZ in Kolidtz waren zeitweilig 1/6 der
Haftlinge SA-Leute
Arbeit auf dem Dorf wegen organisatorischen Schwache noch zurUck





-personal files: Bauer, Robert; BOhme, Heilmut; von Killinger, Manfred;
Lasch, Kurt; Meyer, Cuno; von MUcke, Helimut; Mutschmann, Martin;
Piimayer, Franz; Tittmann, Fritz.
Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Potsdam:
-Reichsministerium des Innern (15.01).
-Reichskommissar für Uberwachung der offentlichen Ordnung (15.07).
Bundesarchiv Koblenz:
-Sammiung Schumacher (Nr. 208).
-Reichspropagandaleitung (NS 18).
-Bestand Reichsorganisationsleiter (NS 22).
-Hauptamt für Kommunalpolitik (NS 25).
-NSDAP Hauptarchiv (NS 26).
-Kleine Erwerbungen Nr. 569: H. Bennecke 'Die SA in Sachsen vor der
"MachtUbernahme''.
-Zeitungssammlung (Nr. 103, Nr. 106).
Bundesarchiv, Zwischenarchiv, Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten:
-personal files: Haake, Rudolf; Kunz, Erich
Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung Berlin (former 'Zentrales
Parteiarchiv der SED'):
-Flugblattsammlung.
-SPD, KPD (ZPA 9).
-SPD, KPD, NSDAP (ZPA 10).
PDS Archly Leipzig:




-Ministerium des Innern: among other things, weekly or monthly police
reports about the political and economic situation in Saxony between
1919 and 1931, nd files about the NSDAP between 1929 and 1933. There
are, however, many gaps due to war losses.
-Amtshauptmannschaften: among other things, reports about the political
and economic situation, public meetings, and election reports from the
various AH.s in the KH.s Chemnitz and Zwickau. There are, however,
substantial gaps due to war losses.
-Zei tungsa usschni ttsamml ung (large collection of newspaper clippings
from 1919 to 1945): among other things, reports about election
campaigns, Saxon governments, Saxon towns, political parties and
organisations, and the economy.
-Sachsische Staatskanzlei: among other things, confidential reports about
the political and economic situation between 1923 and 1930. There are,
however, substantial gaps due to war losses.
-newspapers from Saxony.
Staatsarchiv Leipzig:
-reports from police headquarters (PP-V): among other things, reports
about the activity of political parties in Leipzig.
-reports from police headquarters (PP-St): documents which were stored
in the 'Zentrales Parteiarchiv Berlin' and returned to Leipzig in 1990.
-judicial inquiries and criminal procedures (PP-S).
-reports from Amtshauptmannschaften: among other things, reports
about the political and economic situation, public meetings, and election
reports from the various AH.s in the KH. Leipzig. There are, however,
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